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PRECIS
In its simplest terms, the argument developed in this thesis is 
as follows. Ostensibly, government policy was directed to the promotion 
of private economic activity. Limited use of taxation was regarded as 
important for the achievement of this aim. But, in practice, the Govern­
ment was subjected to difficult-to-resist pressures for increased 
spending, generally on grounds of fostering private enterprise. As a 
consequence, the Government was forced to exploit alternatives to taxation 
in order to meet expenditure commitments. Short-term - essentially 
political - considerations in the selection of alternatives frequently 
led to action which ran counter to the expressed intention of promoting 
private activity. In the long-run, the methods of financing expenditure 
may be seen as contributing to the expansion of the public sector at 
the expense of the private sector.
Therein may be seen the rationale of the chapter arrangement.
Chapter One represents the basic information on trends in total expendi­
ture and the main components, together with pointers to the pressures 
underlying those trends. Restrictions on the Government’s use of its 
taxing powers are investigated in Chapter Two. Following chapters examine 
the alternatives to taxation in order to meet expenditure commitments. 
Chapter Three concentrates on borrowing. Budgetary aspects of the land 
laws are studied in Chapter Four. Chapter Five considers other sources 
of funds, primarily the railways. The final chapter examines the nature
iv
and significance of changes in the Government’s cash balances, the prob­
lems of the Treasury and its relations with the banking system.
This arrangement of material has both advantages and disadvantages. 
But a compromise has had to be found between the need for relating all 
aspects of the finances and the necessity of tracing long-run changes in 
the various elements. Inevitably, some repetition cannot be avoided, 
for each chapter has to take into account basic structural changes in 
the public finances as a whole. Relationships between various sources 
of funds and expenditure trends, in short, are approached from different 
angles in successive chapters. Cross-referencing is designed to eliminate 
unnecessary repetition. This procedure facilitates examination of such 
issues as the relations between the N.S.W. Government and the London 
capital market, the basis of tariff policy, the purposes of land legis­
lation, and so on. These issues are all subsidiary to the main problem 
of how the Government financed its expenditure but are related in terms 
of the underlying argument briefly outlined above.
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"All public expenditure is popular, 
all taxation is unpopular."
--  Sydney Mail, 27 October i860
2The Problem and its Context
Colonial governments played influential roles in the develop­
ment of the Australian economy.'*’ The present study has been 
undertaken in the belief that further progress on the problem of 
government intervention in the economy before Federation depends on 
more exact and comprehensive knowledge of government financial 
operations than has been available. Much work still needs to be done 
on the question of how governments affected the course of economic 
development, but even more needs to be done on the question of why 
they behaved as they did. Misrepresentation is almost bound to 
follow concentration on one or two aspects of government policy in 
isolation from general budgetary considerations. Tariff policy, for 
example, cannot be explained satisfactorily simply in terms of 
doctrinal assertions and apart from overall financial management.
It is necessary to know something of the relationship of customs 
revenue to other sources of funds, the relationship of all funds to 
expenditure commitments and the changing problems of co-ordinating 
the two sides of the public ledger. That implies close attention to 
the interaction of economic and political change, caution in assigning
- 1 -
1
For an informative and controversial preliminary review of new 
evidence, see N.G. Butlin, ’’Colonial Socialism in Australia, 1860- 
1900" in H.G.J. Aitken (ed.), The State and Economic Growth (Few 
York, 1959)> pp.27“78. See also, by the same author, ’’The Shape of 
the Australian Economy, I86I-IQOO”, The Economic Record, Vol. 34j 
No. 67 (April 1958).
3initiative to individuals or groups and moderation in dealing with 
the shaping influence of economic conditions.
Ideally, investigation of government interference with the market 
mechanism in this period should range over the whole scope of govern­
ment policy in the six colonies. The present study has had to he 
directed to a less ambitious objective. Difficulties presented by 
the form of the public accounts, the complexity of the factors pro­
ducing alterations to government policy and the need to cover a 
sufficient span of time to observe long-run changes in the government 
finances have combined to make concentration on one colony inevitable. 
Partly because of the scope of the source material available, research 
has been directed primarily to developments in New South Wales.
The central problem selected for investigation is: How did the 
N.S.W. Government finance its expenditure in the period of its con­
stitutional independence, I856-I9OO? How did it secure control of 
resources and marshall them to meet expenditure commitments? Though 
superficially narrow in scope, the problem involves finding answers 
to two related questions:
(1) Why did particular policies and financing methods emerge and 
change over time?
(2) What were the implications for economic development in New South 
Wales?
This is essentially an institutional study and not an essay in social 
accounting: it is concerned with the adaptation of government policy 
to changing economic conditions and political pressures.
4Some Fundamental Considerations
An assumption which largely shaped the present research was
that a beginning should be made with the annual abstracts of the
public accounts. Having established the types of activity undertaken
by the N.S.W. Government and the sources of funds drawn on, attempts
might then be made to interpret the statistics through study of the
political and economic forces at work in the colony. This procedure
has been followed throughout, but not without encountering numerous
difficulties presented by the form in which Treasury statements were
published. It is not only useful, but essential, to indicate some
of the fruits of work on the public accounts, insofar as these
affect the marshalling of material hereafter.
The N.S.W. public accounts before the passing of the 1902
Audit Act were extremely complicated, confusing and frequently in-
2complete over a wide range of operations. Criticism of the 
Treasury was voiced by each of the three men who controlled the Audit 
Office in this period, their arguments indicating unambiguously that
- 2-
2
This should not be taken to mean that all weaknesses were 
removed after the introduction of the 1902 Act. For a critical 
appraisal of twentieth-century public accounting in N.S.W., see 
F.A. B1and, Budget Control: An Introduction to the Financial System 
of Hew South »'/ales (2nd edition, Sydney, 1936), especially p.6 ff. 
See also the implied criticism by the current Auditor-General in 
W.J. Campbell, Australian State Public Finance (Sydney, 1954)> 
especially Chapter IV.
5the Treasury’s abstracts were deliberately misleading.^ Political 
controversy over the reliability and usefulness of the accounts was 
a recurring theme in parliamentary debates.^- For the purposes of the 
present research, it was, accordingly, imperative to discover three 
things:
(1) Whether the accounts could be reconstructed for analysis;
(2) Why confusion surrounded the accounts; and
(3) Whether the unsatisfactory form of the accounts was due to any 
fundamental problem of financial management* The answers to these 
questions are basic to all that follows.
Appendix 1 contains a reconstruction of the annual abstracts.
This implies that no insuperable difficulties have been encountered,
although, as the notes to the tables indicate, any reconstruction can
only be regarded as a set of estimates of varying quality. In essence,
5problems similar to those encountered by Butlin and de Meel
3
W.C. Mayne was posted to a government position in London in I864 to 
prevent his protests about the Treasury being made public. (See P.N. 
Lamb, "Geoffrey Eagar and the Colonial Treasury of New South Wales", 
Australian Economic Papers, September 1962, p*34)« Christopher 
Rolleston's comments may be seen in Minutes of Evidence, Select Com­
mittee on the Civil Service, N.S.W.V. & P., 1872-3, Vol. 1, especially 
p.696 and his annual reports (1871-83), especially the fifth,
N.S.W.V. & P., 1875~6, Vol. 2, p.101 ff. Edward Rennie engaged in in­
creasingly bitter controversy with the Treasury after 1883* See in 
particular, "Memorandum on the Record and Audit of the Public Accounts", 
appendix to Auditor-General’s Report, 1900-1.
^ Owing to its relevance to changes in taxation policy, this will be 
considered in Chapter 2, passim.
^ N.G. Butlin and H. de Meel, Public Capital Formation in Australia. 
Estimates 1860-1900 (Canberra, 1954)> Chapter III and pp.92-3»
6have been met and resolved, if not always satisfactorily, well enough 
to proceed with some confidence. The estimates which have been made 
are certainly more useful in indicating trends in the finances than 
in identifying precisely the transactions of any one year; but, so 
long as note is taken of areas in which uncertainty remains, the 
estimates serve the needs of analysis reasonably well.
Immediate reasons for the confusion surrounding the accounts are 
soon discovered. Two matters need special attention: first, the 
appropriating procedures of Parliament; and, second, the Treasury’s 
methods of fund accounting.
Until 1895> parliamentary votes did not lapse at the end of the 
financial year. From 1856 to 1870, votes were retained for issue 
until exhausted, even though this might involve keeping accounts 
against appropriations for five or more years. The first Audit 
Act (187O) restricted votes to fifteen months, but if contracts or 
engagements were entered into, the votes were retained indefinitely.
By the insertion of a clause in the Appropriation Act (1877 and 
following years), the Audit Act was modified: votes were given a 
minimum currency of two years, with the provision for indefinite ex­
tension retained. The 1895 amendment of the Audit Act stipulated that 
votes must lapse at the end of the financial year, although those 
secured prior to the amendment could be retained for issue until 
exhausted. Loan Acts similarly appropriated funds (by sanctioning 
the application of the proceeds of loans) but without any restriction
\ a
7as to the currency of the votes. As a committee of the Legislative
Council once reported, "The Public Moneys, when once appropriated, are
abandoned to the absolute control of the Executive".^
The Auditor-General condemned year after year the failure of
Parliament to restrict votes to one year. His New Zealand counterpart,
who visited Sydney in 1880, prepared a highly critical report containing 
7this comment:
The whole system is fatal to simplicity of account, and to the 
effective control of Parliament over the expenditure. For 
accounts must be kept against...all the votes of the past year, 
which are still kept alive for the payment of liabilities incurred 
under them, and against the votes of any former year, however 
remote, for payments made under contracts entered into during' 
that year, until the votes are exhausted. And, as a matter of 
fact, the public accounts for 1879 contain accounts of expendi­
ture on account of each of the years 1874? 1875? 1876, 1877>
1878, and 1879.
The procedure - the "accruals system" of recording transactions - not 
only resulted in unnecessarily complicated accounxs but meant that, 
until votes were exhausted, the statement of balances on the public 
accounts was always tentative and disputable, being liable to modifi-g
cation as balances of votes of former years were issued.
See Expenditure of Public Moneys, Despatches and Minutes Respecting 
(Sydney, Government Printer, 1869—70)> P»5*
7 J.E. Fitzgerald, Report on the Management, Accounts, and Audit of the 
Public Revenues in the several colonies...(of Australia and New Zealand) 
(Wellington, I88I), p.ll.Q
The procedure meant, in practice, that annual budgeting existed in 
name only, and that the scale, timing and tempo of expenditure were 
determined by the Executive, guided by the advice of powerful permanent 
officials. There will be need to consider some of the implications 
in more detail in later chapters,’ especially in explaining opportunities 
for "extravagant" expenditure and recurring budgetary disequilibrium on 
a relatively huge scale.
8This was a major source of complication, which greatly restricted
the usefulness of the accounts as a guide to parliamentary financial
proceeding's, but which, given time and patience, can be untangled.
Even greater confusion arose from the Treasury’s insistence on
summarising in the annual abstracts every entry in the ledgers involving
a transfer from one account to another. The I87O Audit Act, according
to the Auditor-General, required the abstracts to be prepared net of 
9cross-entries. Three decades of squabbling with the Treasury 
preceded agreement that net rather than gross receipts and payments 
should be abstracted and published each year. Few politicians were 
able to make sense of the accounts and Treasurers frequently claimed 
that only senior Treasury officials knew what the real state of the 
finances was at any time.^
Cross-entries in the N. S.W. accounts formed a very large 
proportion of the receipts and payments shown in the annual abstracts.^
It is one thing to identify and eliminate these in estimating net 
receipts and payments} it is another thing to recognise their signifi­
cance in Treasury financial management. Government accounting is 
essentially a system of accounting by funds. Separation of transactions
9
See Christopher Rolleston’s summary of the Audit Act and the 
Treasury’s intransigence, in Auditor-General’s Report, 187b 1 IT.S..7.V.& P., 
Vol. 2, p.101.
10
See, for example, William McMillan’s explanation, N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, 
Vol. 66, p.7757.
11
See the notes to Table 4 in Appendix 1.
9according to funds historically arose from the efforts of Parliament
to establish its control over expenditure. In Hew South Wales in this
period Parliament deliberated on the public finances as though funds
represented specific accumulations of money to be used only for
particular fund purposes. The Treasury, on the other hand, quite
early began to use the resources of all funds to meet expenditure
commitments without immediate concern for fund divisions. It has been
pointed out recently by the N.S.W. Auditor-General that "Treasury
financial management is directed to the maintenance of cash balances
at a sufficiency level from day to day and for this purpose the
resources of all funds are marshalled, the moneys of the stronger funds
being used when need be, to meet expenditure commitments of the weaker 
12funds". In the I856-I9OO period the Treasury progressively developed 
this practice and recorded the operations in the annual abstracts.
This, allied to the recording of expenditure in terms of original 
appropriations, rendered the accounts unintelligible to all but a tiny 
minority of financial experts."^
The increasingly heated controversy over the public accounts, 
which culminated in the downfall of the powerful administration of 
12
W.J. Campbell, op. cit., p*52.
13
A typical comment in Parliament was the followings "We find advances 
made from one account to another, and refunds and sums written off 
from one account to another, advances to loan account, with refunds 
back again to something else,until it becomes a matter of impossibility 
for any one to say what our income and expenditure amount to." (Debate 
on the financial statement, H.S.W.P.D., Vol. 6, p.211l).
10
George Reid in the late nineties, involved more than an argument 
about book-keeping.^ "Manipulation oi the accounts", "secrecy" 
and the "deliberate misleading of Parliament" - terms frequently 
employed - were symptomatic of a fundamental problem of financial 
management. This problem will be considered in the next section.
- 3-
The Underlying Argument and the Format of the Thesis 
Quite early in the study of the accounts, two features began 
to attract attention. Receipts classified by the Treasury under the 
heading of "Taxation" increased slowly and represented a diminishing' 
proportion of total receipts for much of the period. Expenditure, 
insofar as it could be established, displayed a long-run tendency 
to increase absolutely and relatively to the growth of population. 
The more the accounts were examined, and the more attention moved 
to political and economic factors underlying trends in the finances, 
the more it became clear that the N.S.W. Government was confronted 
in heightened form by a universal problem. Public opinion was 
always hostile to taxation increases, yet the Government was sub­
jected to mounting political and economic pressures making for 
expanding expenditure. How could it reconcile the demands for 
greater expenditure with the demands for extremely low taxation?
This will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 6.
14
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Early in the research that seemed to represent the link between 
the various aspects of the government finances - and still does, 
though with qualifications which will be considered at appropriate 
later stages.
In its simplest terms, the argument developed in this thesis is 
as follows. Ostensibly, government policy was directed to the 
promotion of private economic activity. Limited use of taxation 
was regarded as important for the achievement of this aim. But, in 
practice, the Government was subjected to difficult-to-resist 
pressures for increased spending, generally on grounds of fostering 
private enterprise. As a consequence, the Government was forced to 
exploit alternatives to taxation in order to meet expenditure commit­
ments. Short-term - essentially political - considerations in the 
selection of alternatives frequently led to action which ran counter 
to the expressed intention of promoting private activity. In the 
long run, the methods of financing expenditure may be seen as con­
tributing to the expansion of the public sector at the expense of 
the private sector.
Therein may be seen the rationale of the chapter arrangement. 
Chapter One presents the basic information on trends in total 
expenditure and the main components, together with pointers to the 
pressures underlying those trends. Restrictions on the Government's 
use of its taxing powers are investigated in Chapter Two. Following 
chapters examine the alternatives to taxation in order to meet
12
expenditure commitments. Chapter Three concentrates on borrowing. 
Budgetary aspects of the land laws are studied in Chapter Pour.
Chapter Pive considers other sources of funds, primarily the railways. 
The final chapter examines the nature and significance of changes in 
the Government’s cash balances, the problems of the Treasury and its 
relations with the banking system.
This arrangement of material has both advantages and disadvantages. 
But a compromise has had to be found between the need for relating all 
aspects of the finances and the necessity of tracing long-run changes 
in the various elements. Inevitably, some repetition cannot be 
avoided, for each chapter has to take into account basic structural 
changes in the public finances as a whole. Relationships between 
various sources of funds and expenditure trends, in short, are 
approached from different angles in successive chapters. Cross- 
referencing is designed to eliminate unnecessary repetition. It is 
believed that the procedure adopted serves a useful purpose in 
emphasising that caution is necessary when generalising about any one 
aspect of government policy, either to explain its rationale or its 
implications for the economy.
- 4-
Ma.jor Trends in the Government Finances 
Before marshalling the material according to the schema
discussed in the previous section, it is desirable to establish
13
clearly some of the major trends which need to be kept in mind 
throughout. Aspects requiring brief attention are:
(l) The long-run rising trend of government outlays and shorter-term
movements in the aggregate;
(2) Trends in the sources of funds; and
(3) Movements in government bank balances.
Only first approximations are aimed at, and comment may be minimised
by the use of graphs.
(a) Expenditure: Movements Figure 1 shows estimated total net 
in the Aggregate
disbursements at current prices and
three series (also in current prices) which indicate changing levels
15of economic activity between 1861 and 1900. J Apart from suggesting
the long-run rising trend of government outlays, the figure indicates
fairly clearly the shorter-run adjustment of the aggregate to changing
levels of economic activity. Very striking is the sharp increase
in the rate of expenditure expansion after 1873> which lagged by
about two years a marked rise in national income and in the rate of
capital formation in New South Wales and Australia generally. The 
15Estimates of Australian G.D.P. have been supplied by Professor 
N.G. Butlin from his forthcoming book, Investment in Australian 
Economic Growth, 1861-1900» Chapter 1, Table 1A. Estimates of 
Australian G.D.C.F. are from the same table. N.S.W. capital formation 
estimates have been calculated from Butlin and de Meel, op. cit., 
p.162 and N.G. Butlin, Private Capital Formation in Australia, 
Estimates 1861-1900 (Canberra, 1955)> p.114* Estimates of N.S.W. 
Government expenditure will be found in Appendix 1 (Table 4). (Note 
that in this and all following graphs of government receipts and pay­
ments, splicing has been necessary after 1894 to convert financial- 
year figures to a calendar-year basis).
FIGURE! 1 14
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’'boom and bust" sequence of economic change which the figure emphasises 
can be seen to have had repercussions on the trend of government expen­
diture, but the modest response to the depression of the nineties should 
be noted. Quite obviously, it is necessary to disaggregate in order 
to understand fluctuations in total expenditure and the influence of 
changing economic conditions. 'This is the major problem for attention 
in Chapter One.
(b) Receipts: Changes in There were, in this period, some
the Sources of Funds
notable changes in the relative impor­
tance of the various sources of funds. Figures 2 and 3 make this so 
clear as to require little comment.^
Earlier comments on the trend of taxation receipts are strongly 
supported by both figures. The substantial contribution of the Crown 
lands throughout the period - but especially in the seventies and 
early eighties - should be observed. Figure 3 suggests a striking 
inverse relationship between land revenue and loan proceeds in the 
middle of the period and also prompts consideration of the relationship 
between land revenue and taxation, especially in the early seventies. 
Borrowing can be seen to have had very special significance in the 
sixties and eighties, while the steady expansion of receipts for 
services cannot be ignored. Finally, the relatively large volume of
16
Both figures are based on tables in Appendix 1. Hereafter, when 
sources for graphs are not cited, the relevant statistics will be 
found in Appendix 1.
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trust funds available in the last decade or so should he borne in mind 
for later consideration. Trust funds during the depression had a 
very strong bearing on the level of taxation and on the Government’s 
borrowing programmes. Throughout the period, they made substantial 
contributions to the Government's cash reserves and were particularly 
useful to the Treasury in coping with short-run financial emergencies.
The various sources of funds, in short, were related in many ways 
and were also related in complex ways to changes in the level and 
composition of expenditure. An appreciation of these relationships is 
essential to a proper understanding of the major problem of how the 
Government met its expenditure commitments.
(c) The Co-ordination of A brief glance at earlier graphs will
Receipts and Payments:
Movements in Government be enough to recognise that short-run 
Bank Balances
changes in total receipts did not 
coincide at all closely with movements in total expenditure and, 
indeed, were often not matched by short-run fluctuations in expenditure. 
Budgetary disequilibrium, in fact, was a feature of N.S. .7. Government 
finance.
Budgetary disequilibrium is a recurring theme of importance to 
the present investigation. Here it is necessary merely to draw atten­
tion to one aspect, the considerable changes occurring at various 
stages in the government bank balances. Figure 4 shows the changes 
and prompts some questions.
19
FIGURE 4
Jff.S.W. GOVERNMENT CASH BALANCES
(at December 31)
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Why did these changes occur? Why, for example, did the cash 
"balances increase rapidly in the seventies when government expenditure 
was expanding at a rapid rate, and v;hile overseas borrowing was 
virtually suspended? To this particular question, a preliminary answer 
can be found in Figure 3 s this was the period when land revenue boomed 
and became the major source of funds. But that suggests further 
questions. Why, for example, did land revenue boom at this time?
Was the reason purely economic - explicable simply in terms of a wool 
boom - or were political factors involved? And why did expenditure not 
respond immediately to the sharp rise in land revenue? To go further, 
what were the implications of falling bank balances after 1877?
Questions of this kind are obviously worth asking. But, more 
than that, they can only be answered reliably on the basis of the 
information presented in Chapters One to Five, supplemented by a treat­
ment in the last chapter of the Government’s relations with the banking 
system. The major problem can be simply defined, yet it involves working 
through a complex territory towards an end with some relevance to current 
re-appraisals of Australian economic growth.
Chapter One
THE GROWTH AND COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
1. Trends in the Expenditure Aggregate 
and its Principal Components
2. The Reorientation of Government 
Policy, 1853-1860
3. "Labouring Amidst Difficulties", 
1861-1873
4* "Swimming with the Tide",
1874-1888
5* "Swimming Against the Tide", 
1889-1894
6. Budgetary Reform, 1895-1900
"...the cost of government in this country is very large because 
people depend upon the Government for everything."
--- Budget Speech, 1892
22
Introductory
In current prices, expenditure by the N.S.W. Government rose from 
less than £0.7 million in 1853 to over £15 million in the nineties.
Per capita expenditure (adjusted for price changes) was trebled in the 
same period. Available statistics suggest, further, that the propor­
tion of national income represented by government expenditure was at 
least twice as large in the nineties as in the fifties. In view of 
the almost uninterrupted espousal of free trade and laissez-faire 
objectives by the colony’s leading politicians, it is important to 
know something of this long-period growth of the government sector 
and why it occurred.
By tracing changes in the relative importance of the principal 
components of expenditure and resulting movements in the aggregate, 
it is possible to bring into sharp focus the nature of the Government’s 
demand for resources. At the same time some understanding may be 
gained of the significance of financing methods and the adjustments 
made at various stages.
Governments traditionally attempt to assess possible long-run 
effects on their finances of incurring new expenditure commitments, 
especially where Treasury organisation is keyed to this type of 
problem. It would be misleading to suggest that the N.S.W. Government 
in the period under review ignored the possibility of any new item 
of expenditure imposing a permanent, and possibly growing, claim on 
the revenue. For much of the period, however, caution in assessing
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expenditure proposals varied enormously according to short-run trends 
in the finances. The fact or the threat of increased taxation always 
led to brief attempts to curtail expenditure and to defer proposals 
likely to add permanent charges to the budget. But the pressure of 
existing commitments forced the Government to exploit other (non-tax) 
sources of funds and this, in turn, often stimulated demands for new 
government services and the relaxation of policies designed to restrict 
the expansion of expenditure. This was particularly so before stable 
cabinet government was achieved and while Treasury control of expen­
diture was poorly developed.
It is not necessary to explore all the difficult-to-control
factors forcing expenditure upwards or resisting efforts to retrench.
Figure 5 shows the growth of maintenance outlays on public undertakings
and the mounting interest component of government payments.'*' At the
very beginning of responsible government, the Treasurer had thought
2it necessary to warn Parliaments
...I feel that we require some one at our elbow to suggest to 
us that we must not squander our money in the construction of 
expensive railways - that costly works require to be looked 
after when constructed, and require a large expenditure to keep 
them in repair.
1
Maintenance outlays are from Butlin and de Meel, op. cit., p.l59$ 
interest payments from Table 7> Appendix 1.
2
Financial Statement of S.A. Donaldson, Herald, 7 November 1856.
FIGURE 5 23 A
MAINTENANCE OUTLAYS ( e x c l .  R o a d s )  & INTEREST Oil 
THE PUBLIC DEBT« 1S6Q -19Q 0
1 8 6 0  1 8 6 5  1 3 7 0  1 8 7 5  1 8 8 0  1 8 8 5  139 0  1 8 9 5  1 9 0 0
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This, and similar warnings about placing heavy burdens on posterity, 
frequently went unheeded, especially in the seventies and eighties.
The stages into which the period may be most conveniently divided
are as follows: (l) 1853-60; (2) 1861-735 (3) 1874-88; (4) 1889-945 
and (5) 1895-1900»J During the first stage there was a major re­
orientation of government policy which became manifest in a mounting 
preoccupation with public works, especially communications, to 
stimulate private economic activity. The most important new commitment 
of the Government was railway construction, incurred in default of 
effective private entrepreneurship. The second stage may be seen as 
commencing in 1861, the year the Crown lands were thrown open for 
settlement. Public expenditure expanded rapidly as work proceeded on 
the three railway trunk lines and numerous other public works. Economic 
and political disturbances in the late sixties and early seventies 
(reflected primarily in a controversy over taxation) brought to an 
end the first major expansion of government expenditure. But expen­
diture contraction was unnecessary as the pastoral boom of the seventies 
developed. Prom 1874 to 1885, government expenditure expanded at a 
very rapid rate and important new commitments were incurred. Lavish 
spending survived the collapse of the pastoral boom through resort 
to large-scale overseas borrowing. This borrowing added to mounting
3
Note that this dating for discussion of expenditure is not identical 
with the dating of stages in the history of taxation, borrowing and 
land policy, for reasons which will appear later.
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ba lan ce  o f payments problems and to  s e rv ic e  the debt ta x a t io n  
in c re a s e s  were in tro d u ced . A p o l i t i c a l  upheaval then  occurred  and 
government expen d itu re  was c o n tra c te d . A fu r th e r  (bu t much b r i e f e r )  
expansion of exp en d itu re  occurred  in  the l a t e  e ig h t ie s  and e a r ly  
n in e t i e s ,  a t a time when overseas borrow ing had become alm ost 
im p o ssib le . The c o lla p se  o f p r iv a te  a c t i v i ty  le d  to  a modest co n trac ­
t io n  o f government ex p en d itu re , which reached  a trough  in  1894* In  
th e  l a s t  f iv e  y e a rs  o f the cen tu ry  se r io u s  a ttem p ts were made by the 
Government to  uphold th e  re p u ta tio n  o f New South Wales as the most 
l i g h t l y  taxed  A u s tra lia n  colony w hile  dep loy ing  p u b lic  funds so as 
to  promote recovery  from th e  prolonged d ep re ss io n  and d rough t. Govern­
ment r e fu s a l  to perm it a ra p id  expansion o f ex pend itu re  to  s a t i s f y  
th e  urban working c la s s e s  le d  to  f u r th e r  p o l i t i c a l  tu rb u lan ce  and the 
d e c is io n  to jo in  th e  A u s tra lia n  F ed e ra tio n .
- 1 -
Trends in  th e  Expenditure Aggregate and i t s  P r in c ip a l Components 
With th i s  b r i e f  review as background, i t  i s  now p o ss ib le  to  
examine the  more im portan t e s tim a te s  of government ex pend itu re  w ith  a 
minimum of comment. In  t h i s  s e c tio n  c o n sid e rab le  use  i s  made o f graphs 
to  b r in g  out the  main f e a tu re s .  The fo llow ing  f iv e  se c tio n s  r e l a t e  
th e se  fe a tu re s  to  economic c o n d itio n s  and p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvring in  
the  su b -p erio d s  no ted  e a r l i e r .  Commencing w ith  an exam ination o f 
tren d s  in  th e  ag g reg a te , a t te n t io n  moves to  the  in f lu e n c e  o f m ajor 
components on those  tre n d s  and to  the more im portan t su b d iv is io n s  of
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i. Allowing for Price 
Changes
those components* Reference to the general notes on the expenditure 
estimates (Appendix l) would be a useful preliminary to what follows, 
(a) Behaviour of the Aggregate: At the outset efforts need to be
made to trace the course of total 
expenditure in real terms and in
relation to population expansion and the national income. Precise 
measures cannot be provided, but available estimates offer a useful 
guide to the major trends. The first task is to adjust the estimates 
of total net payments (Table 4> Appendix l) for price changes.
TABLE 1
Price Index, Government Expenditure 
1900 prices * 1000
Year Index Year Index
1861 984 1871 888
2 1007 2 977
3 972 3 1054
4 910 4 1044
I865 924 1875 992
6 915 6 982
7 919 7 954
8 915 8 958
9 941 9 946
1870 941 1880 962
Year Index Year Index
1881 953 1891 988
2 976 2 965
3 972 3 936
4 964 4 921
I885 964 1895 949
6 958 6 955
7 961 7 957
8 985 8 929
9 990 9 976
I89O 1016 1900 1000
NOTE: For sources and procedures, see footnote 4«
The table gives the index which has been used in preparing 
Figure 6.^ The conversion of the current-price series to constant
^ The index has been constructed from Tables 267 and 268, N.G. Butlin, 
Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing. I86I- 
1938/39 (Canbridge, 1962)» The two series offer a reasonable guide
to price changes relevant to government expenditure trends. The
FIGURE 6 27
ESTIMATED TOTAL NET DISBURSEMENTS, 1853 - 1900 
(Semi-logarithmic Scale)
1853 I860 1873 1888 1894 1900
-----  Current Prices
----- 1900 Prices
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p r ic e s  accen tu a te s  the  expansion o f ex p en d itu re  a f t e r  1863 and the 
c o n tra c tio n  a f t e r  1371; suggests  th a t  ex pend itu re  remained a t  the I 89I  
peak le v e l  u n t i l  1893; and em phasises the  more or l e s s  s ta b le  le v e l  o f 
ex p en d itu re  in  th e  second h a lf  o f th e  n in e t ie s .  By and la rg e ,  however, 
th e re  i s  l i t t l e  to  be gained by co n v e rtin g  to  c o n stan t p r ic e s ;  the  
c u r re n t-p r ic e  s e r ie s  o f f e r s  a u se fu l guide to  expend itu re  tre n d s . I t  
i s  c le a r  th a t  ex pend itu re  grew very  ra p id ly  fo r  by f a r  the g re a te r  p a r t  
o f th e  p e rio d .
In  t h i s  p e riod  po p u la tio n  in ­
c reased  a t  between 3 and 3 i  Per
i i .  Allowing fo r  P opu la tion  
Growth
cen t per annum, so th a t  here  was a pow erful p re ssu re  fo rc in g  government 
ex p en d itu re  upwards. As the e s tim a te s  p lo t te d  a g a in s t th e  rig h t-h an d  
s c a le  o f F igure  6 c le a r ly  show, ex p en d itu re  in c re ase d  much more ra p id ly  
than  th e  growth o f p o p u la tio n  in  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f the  f i f t i e s ,  fo r  
much o f the  s ix t i e s  and p a r t ic u la r ly  between 1874 and I885. Looking
4 (co n tinued )
f i r s t  -  "p ro p erty  and f in a n c e , government s e rv ic e s , p ro fe s s io n a l and 
p e rso n a l"  -  may be ap p lied  to  the  wages component in  government ex­
p e n d itu re . The second covers "o th e r p u b lic  components". Equal 
w eigh ts have been given  to  the two in  c o n s tru c tin g  a s in g le  index  
fo r  d e f la t in g  to t a l  ex pend itu re  e s tim a te s .
5
The po p u la tio n  f ig u re s  used in  com piling e s tim a te s  o f per c a p ita  
ex p en d itu re  a re  from Demography B u l le t in , No. 67 (1949)> p.154 
(e s tim a ted  mean annual p o p u l a t i o n ) . I t  needs to  be ap p re c ia te d  t h a t ,  
owing to  problems of t r a c in g  in te r - c o lo n ia l  m ig ra tio n  movements in  
th i s  p e r io d , a v a ila b le  p o p u la tio n  s t a t i s t i c s  cannot be regarded  as 
r e l i a b l e .  Indeed, the  m argin of e r ro r  which should be allow ed fo r 
y ea rs  between the ta k in g  o f censuses may be so co n sid e rab le  as to  
s e r io u s ly  a f fe c t  e s tim a te s  o f per c a p ita  ex p en d itu re .
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at the period as a whole, a trebling of per capita expenditure seems 
to have occurred.
Per capita figures may easily be given too much stress in inter­
preting trends. For present purposes, they help to establish the 
stages in the growth of government expenditure (as indicated by the 
vertical lines in Figure 6). Their mai»n weakness is in offering no 
indication of the strength of the Governments demands on the real 
resources of the economy. Unless related to the national income, 
expenditure estimates may give a quite misleading impression of the 
growth of the government sector relative to the economy as a whole.
iii. Allowing for the The major obstacle to attempts
Growth of National
Income to relate the expenditure of the
DT.S.W. Government to national income is the absence of estimates of 
the regional distribution of Australian gross domestic product. 
Substitute measures may, however, be used to secure an impression of 
the growth of the government sector. These suggest that the propor­
tion of G.D.P. represented by N.S.W. government expenditure may have 
been at least twice as high in the nineties as in the early part of 
the period under review.
Figure 1 (page 14) incorporates the essential information about 
the course of gross domestic products its almost uninterrupted 
expansion to a peak in 1889; its contraction to a trough in 18955 
and the modest recovery thereafter. From the same Figure emerges 
the fact that the N.S.W. Government's expenditure increased at a
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co n sid e rab ly  f a s t e r  r a te  than  G.D.P. between 1873 and 1885- 6 . I t  
can a lso  be seen th a t  the Government’s c o n tra c tio n  o f ex p en d itu re  in  
th e  second h a lf  of the  e ig h t ie s  preceded the downturn o f G.D.P. 
and th a t  the  fu r th e r  c o n tra c tio n  in  th e  m id -n in e tie s  d id  not match in  
s e v e r i ty  or tim ing  the  d e c lin e  of G.D.P. U nquestionably , many such 
apparen t in c o n s is te n c ie s  in  the  movement of the  two s e r ie s  would 
d isap p ea r i f  i t  were known when and to  what e x te n t New South Wales 
developed more ra p id ly  or more slowly than  th e  A u s tra lia n  economy as 
a w hole.^
F igu re  1 o f f e r s  a way round the problem: although i t  t e l l s  us 
n o th in g  d i r e c t ly  about th e  r e la t io n  between N.S.W. government expen­
d i tu r e  and N.S.W. g ross dom estic p ro d u c t, i t  suggests  s tro n g ly  th a t  
th e re  was a lo n g -ru n  in c re a se  in  the  r e l a t iv e  im portance of th e  govern­
ment s e c to r  in  th e  A u s tra lia n  economy as a whole and th a t  N.S.W.
7
conformed s u b s ta n t ia l ly  to  the g en era l p a t te rn .  With a v a ila b le
6
This i s  not the  p lace  to  pursue th i s  problem . I t  seems l i k e ly ,  
however, th a t  N.S.W. developed more ra p id ly  than  th e  economy as a 
whole between about I 872 and I 8855 th a t  the  lo n g -run  expansion came 
to  an end in  1886 ( th re e  y ears  b e fo re  the peak fo r  th e  economy as a 
w hole); th a t  th e re  was a b r i e f  one-year recovery  (1891)5 and th a t  
recovery  a f t e r  1895 was slow er than  fo r  the  economy as a whole. More 
d e ta i le d  a t te n t io n  to  a sp ec ts  of th i s  problem occurs in  l a t e r  c h a p te rs .
7
In  F igure  7? N.G. B u tl in ’ s e s tim a te s  of Gross Domestic P roduct a t 
m arket p r ic e s  ( investm ent in  A u s tra lia n  Bconomic Growth, 1861-1900» 
Table 1A) are  r e la te d  to  a l te r n a t iv e  m easures of th e  growth of govern­
ment ex p en d itu re . I t  has not been p o ss ib le  to  p repare  e s tim a te s  of 
t o t a l  n e t expend itu re  fo r  co lo n ie s  o th e r than  N.S.W ., p a r t ly  th rough 
la c k  o f tim e , p a r t ly  through the  shortcom ings of the  p u b lic  accoun ts . 
From th e  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g is te rs  of the  v a rio u s  c o lo n ie s , o rd in a ry  
(C .R .F .) expend itu re  has been a b s tra c te d  and, where n ecessa ry , the
FIGURE 7 31
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE A S O F  GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT 1861 -  1900
96
---- N.S.W., Queensland & Victoria,
Expenditure from C.R.F. and 
Loan Funds
All Governments, Expenditure 
from Consolidated Revenue
---  N.S.W., Expenditure, All Funds
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statistics, it is not possible to show adequately the strength of 
the demands of the colonial governments on the economy's resourcesg
at different stages. The estimates plotted in Figure 7* nevertheless, 
bring out the fact that government expenditure expanded much more 
rapidly than gross domestic product between 1874 and 1886 and that the 
governments were unable or did not care to retrench in the first half 
of the nineties on a scale nearly commensurate with the fall in
national income.
(b) Sources of Fluctuations The long-run rising trend of
in the Aggregate
expenditure, as the graphs have
indicated, underlay quite clearly defined fluctuations. It is 
necessary now to disaggregate in order to find the basis of those 
fluctuations. Two types of subdivision throw light on this problems 
first, a classification of outlays on durable assets as distinct from
7 (continued)
figures spliced to give estimates in calendar years. Estimates of 
expenditure from C.R.F. and loan funds for Victoria and Queensland 
are also derived from the registers. Since these two colonies and 
N.S.W. probably accounted for over three-quarters of Australian 
G.D.P., it is believed that the combined expenditure estimates (ex­
cluding trust fund payments) offer a reliable guide to long-run 
trends. N.S.W. estimated total net expenditure from all funds is 
also represented in the figure. Here, of course, caution is needed 
in interpreting the graph, for the relation is to Australian G.D.P. 
and not to the N.S.W. share of G.D.P. (for which estimates are not 
available).
8
A preliminary calculation of total net expenditure (all colonial 
governments) has been made for 1861 and 1895 (the beginning of expan­
sion and the trough of depression), working from public accounts of 
all colonies. The estimated expenditure for l86l is £6,887,000 
(approximately 10.3 per cent of G.D.P.), and for 1895* £32,990*000 
(approximately 22.3 per cent of G.D.P.).
current expenditure and, second, a classification of components 
figuring prominently in the making of policy.
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i. Capital and Current Figure 8 offers a guide to
Outlays
differing trends in capital and
9current outlays. Outlays on durable assets obviously were highly 
responsive to changing economic conditions. Current outlays, on the 
other hand, fluctuated only modestly around a strong upward trend to 
a peak in 1893, before settling at a fairly stable level. Expenditure 
contraction in the early seventies, in the second half of the eighties 
and after I89I was essentially a consequence of reduced outlays on 
durable assets. It is also clear that, in the main phase of expanding 
expenditure (1874-85), rapidly increasing outlays on durable assets
strongly accentuated the upward trend of the aggregate.
ii. Communications and 
Service of the Debt
A comprehensive analytical treat­
ment of government capital outlays
is outside the scope of the present study and, in any case, may be 
found elsewhere.^ At this point it is necessary to consider two com­
ponents of total expenditure which together accounted for approximately
9
In preparing Figure 8, Butlin and de Meel's estimates of N.S.W. 
public gross outlay on capital equipment (op. cit., p.158) have been 
deducted from my estimates of total net payments to give estimates 
of current outlays. Alternative estimates of current outlays have 
been made for selected years as a check on this procedure, but 
without suggesting good grounds for querying the trends shown in 
Figure 8.
10
See N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Growth, I86I- 
1900 (in the press).
-J
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FIGURE 8 34
GROSS OUTLAYS OR DURABLE ASSETS AND OTHER (CURRENT)
OUTLAYS (ESTIMATES) ...........  1860-1900
(Semi-logarithmic Scale)
1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
(1) Gross Outlays on Durable Assets
(2) Other (Current) Outlays
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h a l f  o f a l l  o u tla y s  from th e  beg inn ing  of th e  s ix t i e s  to  the  end 
o f th e  century* These a re  shown in  F igure  9 * ^
Communications accounted fo r  the la r g e s t  share  o f t o t a l  expen­
d i tu r e  ( c a p i ta l  and c u r r e n t ) ,  t e s t i f y in g  to  the  Government’s p re ­
occupation  w ith  th e  p ro v is io n  o f f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  a f a i r l y  ra p id ly  
growing p o p u la tio n  s c a t te re d  over a huge a re a . O utlays under th i s  
heading expanded u n t i l  1868, then  d ec lin ed  u n t i l  1873» A n o tab le  
expansion o f ex p en d itu re  on communications occurred  between 1874 and 
I885, a f t e r  which o u tla y s  d ec lin ed  fo r  th re e  y e a rs . A f u r th e r ,  bu t 
much b r i e f e r ,  expansion fo llow ed . From a peak fo r  th e  cen tu ry  in  
I89I, o u tla y s  slumped and only began to  reco v er in  the  f in a l  y e a rs  
o f the  cen tu ry .
F igure  9 a lso  shows payments on account o f the p u b lic  d eb t.
While never as la rg e  a component o f t o t a l  expend itu re  as communica­
t io n s ,  deb t se rv ic e  accounted fo r  a s ig n if ic a n t  p ro p o rtio n  o f the  
t o t a l ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  a t  tim es when ex pend itu re  on communications was 
be ing  c u r ta i le d .  This o b se rv a tio n  re q u ire s  e la b o ra tio n . L a te r  in  
th i s  c h ap te r  and in  C hapters Two, Three and Five re la t io n s h ip s  between 
communications o u tla y s , deb t s e rv ic e  and budgetary  problems w il l  be 
con sid ered  in  some d e t a i l .
(c )  Components o f E xpenditu re  F u rth e r c o n s id e ra tio n  of deb t
on Communications ^2
se rv ic e  may be d e fe rre d . Here
i t  i s  n ecessary  to  lo o k  more c lo se ly  a t  the  com position of expend itu re
■^For th e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  see Appendix 1 , Tables 6 and 7*
12See C hapter Three, passim .
FIGURE 9 36
N.S.W. EXPENDITURE : COMMUNICATIONS ANN. SERVICE OF 
.. THE PUBLIC DEBT, 1856-1900
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on communications* Just as communications constituted the dominant 
component of total expenditure, so railways dominated the communi­
cations component. This is clearly established in Figures 10 and 11.^ 
What this means, of course, is that the major fluctuations in total 
expenditure were to a large extent the consequence of fluctuating 
outlays on railways. There are obviously very sound reasons for 
basing an interpretation of the growth of government expenditure on 
the development of the colony's railway system, so long as adequate 
attention is given to other components of expenditure.
In the following five sections, opportunities arise for conside­
ration of expenditure components ignored so far. The aim in these 
sections is to trace the development of government expenditure pro­
grammes as responses to changing economic conditions and political 
manoeuvring. The dating of sub-periods, as already indicated, is 
determined mainly by phases in the establishment of a huge communications 
network, with railways occupying the centre of attention. Owing to 
the lasting and highly important significance of policy decisions 
taken in the few years after 1852, special attention is given to 
the first sub-period, 1853-1860.
- 2-
The Reorientation of Government Policy, 1853-1860 
The discovery of gold in 1851, first in New South Wales and 
then in much larger quantities in Victoria, demanded government
^For the statistics, see Appendix 1, Table 6.
FIGURE 10 38
EXPENDITURE ON COMMUNICATIONS, 1856-1900
1856 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
Harbours & Rivers 
IRoads & Bridges 
JPosts & Telegraphs 
Railways & Trains.
FIGURE 11 39
MAJOR COMPONENTS OF EXPENDITURE Oil COI&aIHICATIOHS,
£m.
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Railways & Tramways
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1856 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
KOTE: "Other" Posts & Telegraphs, Harbours & Rivers
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intervention."^ Interest here does not lie in the first efforts to 
regulate access to the gold deposits and to prevent the collapse of 
established activities, but in the major readjustments of government 
activity which required some years to work out. Of special concern 
is the sequence of events which lifted government expenditure to 
relatively high levels and altered the composition of that expenditure 
in accord with a revised conception of the Government's role in the 
development of the economy. For present purposes, attention needs to 
be directed to:
(1) The declining importance of the government sector prior to the 
gold rushes5
(2) The impact on government policy made by a speculative import 
boom and the rapid expansion of the new colony of Victoria;
(3) The advent of responsible government, adult franchise and the 
secret ballot; and
(4) The controversy over the occupation of Crown lands.
(a) The Trend Towards Government intervention in the
Laissez Faire
economy was still considerable
at the beginning of the 1850s but had been declining for at least 
three decades. Government policy, as formulated for a penal settle­
ment, required substantial and continual modification as private 
14
For a recent study, see Geoffrey Blayney, "The Gold Rushes: the 
Year of Decision", Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand 
(May, 1962), pp.129-140.
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e n te r p r is e  developed ra p id ly  a f t e r  th e  tw e n tie s . The p a s to ra l  
in d u s try  expanded in  s p i te  o f government impediments and acqu ired  
in f lu e n c e  w ith  the Government, m ainly by secu rin g  adequate rep resen ­
ta t io n  in  the  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. This Council worked in d u s tr io u s ly  
in  the  tw e n tie s  and t h i r t i e s  to  remove government r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  and to  p rov ide th e  c o n d itio n s  under which p r iv a te  
e n te r p r is e  might expand more ra p id ly . When p r iv a te  a c t iv i ty  
c o lla p se d  in  th e  e a r ly  1840s, c o n f l ic t in g  p ro p o sa ls  to  b r in g  about 
recovery  became en tang led  w ith  demands fo r  re sp o n s ib le  government.
In  the  ev en t, the  government s e c to r  su ffe re d  a fu r th e r  d e c lin e  in  
im portance.
The main lo c a l  source of funds a v a ila b le  to  government a f te r  
th e  tw e n tie s  -  the  revenue from Crown land  s a le s  -  was devoted , 
under C olonial O ffice  in s t r u c t io n s ,  to  a s s is te d  im m igration. The 
funds which th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council could ap p ro p ria te  came mainly 
from customs ta x a t io n . During the boom y ea rs  o f the  t h i r t i e s ,  
th i s  revenue financed  a r i s in g  volume of o u tla y s  on ro ad s , p o rt 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  p o s ta l s e rv ic e s  and the  l i k e .  The onset of a severe  
d ep ress io n  e a r ly  in  the  f o r t i e s  brought lan d  s a le s  to  a h a l t  and 
reduced th e  customs revenue a larm ing ly ; b u t th i s  was th e  time th a t  
th e  C olon ial O ffice  chose to  t r a n s f e r  to  c o lo n ia l funds sev e ra l new 
ch arg es , th e  l a r g e s t  by f a r  be ing  th e  upkeep of p o lic e  and g a o ls . 
Im m igration commitments were met fo r  a tim e by is su in g  deben tu res 
on the s e c u r i ty  o f th e  lan d  revenue (which was expected to  recover
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before long), but all other classes of expenditure had to be 
drastically reduced. Extreme bitterness was expressed by the Legis­
lative Council and the struggle for self-government was intensified.
The Council refused to increase customs taxation or impose new forms
15of taxation until its constitutional demands had been met. Instead, 
several futile efforts were made to secure grants or loans from the 
imperial government for public works.^ Unable to appropriate the 
land revenue, and faced by a decline in all other receipts which was 
not arrested until after 1846, the Council rapidly adjusted to a 
relatively very low level of expenditure. Although protests multiplied 
in the radical press about the serious deterioration in government 
services, the majority in the Legislative Council opposed any attempt 
to incur expenditure commitments which might result in a necessity 
for taxation increases. By 1847» in fact, most were prepared to 
argue that the colony’s main need was for more people in order to 
justify private individuals investing capital in undertakings stated 
by the newspapers to be required urgently. At the end of the forties,
15
It has been observed without exaggeration that the violent contro­
versy with the imperial authorities in the forties ”sprang from a 
loathing of taxation too absolute for the twentieth-century mind to 
comprehend readily”. (Michael Roe, Society and Thought in Eastern 
Australia, 1835-50 / Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, i960, J
p.218).16
See, for example, Gipps to Stanley, 27 July 1844» Historical Records 
of Australia, 1, xxiii.
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and in the early fifties, the main function of government was, in 
practice if not in theory, to augment the population as rapidly as 
possible.^
(b) The Impact of the Very briefly in I85I it seemed
Gold Rushes
that government financial assis­
tance might not be needed in order to secure a rapid inflow of 
migrants. But the opening up of the Victorian gold-fields entirely 
altered the picture: New South Wales began to lose population to the 
new colony, and its own gold-fields left other enterprises short of 
labour. Assisted immigration was immediately stepped up, but still the 
colony lost population to Victoria. In 1852 the N.S.W. population
rose from 197>000 to 205,000, but in Victoria the increase was from 
l897>000 to 168,000. On the assumption that these trends were likely 
to continue, arguments were voiced that the N.S.W. Government had a 
duty, not only to attract population to the colony, but to retain it 
in the face of the greater attractions across the Murray. In 1853 
the Government agreed that positive steps must be taken.
17
In I85O, the composition of government expenditure was as follows: 
immigration, 40 per cent; administrative departments, 21 per cent; 
police and gaols, 16 per cent; clergy, 11 per cent; public works,
12 per cent (the latter mainly for roads in urban areas). (Calcula­
tions based on abstracts in Records of the Colony of N.S.W., 1850).
18
Demography Bulletin, No. 67, 1949> p*154
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TABLE 2
N.S.W. and Victoria, 1851-55! Statistics
(A) N.S.W.
Year Populnf b cGold Prodn. Imports Exports0 Govt. Exp?
’000 •000 oz. £’000 £’000 £’000
1851 197 144 1564 1797 444
I852 205 819 1900 4604 600
1853 224 548 6342 4523 683
1854 242 238 5981 4050 1137
1855 266 64 4668 2884 1675
(B) Victoria
1851 97 145 1056 1422 419
1852 168 2219 4070 7452 979
1853 222 2676 15843 11062 3217
1854 284 2151 17659 11775 3088
1855 347 2752 12008 13493 4186
SOURCES: (a) Demography Bulletin, No. 67 (1949)> p»154*
(b) Brian Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia 
(Melbourne 1949)> p.109*(Note that these are export 
figures).
(c) Statistical Registers, N.S.W. and Victoria.
The statistics shown above suggest the atmosphere in which the 
N.S.W. Government formulated its expenditure policies. Victoria’s 
astonishing development dominated the debates in the N.S.W. Legislative 
Council in 1853» But two other factors facilitated a major change in 
government policy:
(l) In May 1853 advice was received that the Imperial Government 
had agreed to the final concessions demanded by the N.S.W. Council 
for preparing a constitution giving untrammelled rights of self- 
government ; and
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(2 ) A sp e c u la tiv e  im port boom in  1853 tre b le d  th e  government revenue 
and encouraged a l i b e r a l i t y  in  th e  a p p ro p ria tio n  o f funds.
The A p p rop ria tion  Act passed  in  1853 provided fo r  much g re a te r
ex p en d itu re  than  ever b e fo re  on a l l  e x is t in g  s e rv ic e s . During the
course  o f p ass in g  the  e s tim a te s , the Sydney Railway Company's appeals
fo r  f in a n c ia l  a id  were co n sid e red . The Government agreed to  lend  the
company i n i t i a l l y  £150,000 on co n d itio n  th a t  the  Government was given
re p re s e n ta t io n  on the  Board. At the  same tim e , i t  was agreed th a t
lo an s  to  th e  company should no t be made from revenue, bu t from the
proceeds o f deben ture  is s u e s .  This re s u l te d  in  the e s tab lish m en t
o f a lo an  account and d e c is io n s  to  fin an ce  o th e r o u tla y s  from the 
19same so u rce . A to ta l  o f £400,000 was im m ediately vo ted  fo r  w ater 
and sewerage f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  Sydney. Loan a u th o r is a t io n s  in  the  
fo llo w in g  two y e a rs  brought the  to t a l  to  £1,866,000. This inc luded  
p ro v is io n  fo r the  P itz ro y  Dock, th e  Glebe Is la n d  A batto ir,S ydney  
U n iv e rs ity , sev e ra l b r id g e s , p o r t f a c i l i t i e s  and p u b lic  b u ild in g s .
B ut, o f p a r t i c u la r  and l a s t in g  im portance was the a p p ro p ria tio n  of 
£225>000 to  purchase the  a s s e ts  of th e  Sydney and H unter R iver 
Railway Companies and £400,000 fo r  ra ilw ay  c o n s tru c tio n .
The L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c il 's  d e c is io n  to  f in i s h  the Sydney-Parram atta 
ra ilw ay  seemed to  a s l ig h t  m a jo rity  o f members c o n s is te n t  w ith  the  
To
7 See S tatem ent H, appendix to  A u d ito r-G en e ra l's  R eport 1900-1901, 
p .2 8 f f .  (Note th a t  borrow ing on th e  s e c u r i ty  o f the  land  revenue 
commenced in  1842 to  fin an ce  im m igration , b u t th a t  i t  was no t u n t i l  
1853 th a t  lo an s  were ra is e d  fo r  o th e r  pu rposes. For fu r th e r  comment, 
see C hapter Three, p p .159-60*
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new conception of the Government’s role in the economy since 1853«
There was, however, in the Council itself and in the community as a
whole much bitter opposition to this action. Newspaper critics
complained that, while railways were unquestionably essential in
New South Wales, the heavy and rising costs could only result in the
diversion of an excessive proportion of public funds to a project
which for a long time would serve only a tiny section of the community.
The Government, however, was determined to complete the rail link
with Parramatta as quickly as possible. While providing the funds for
this purpose, another decision was taken: to lease the line to a
large railway contractor (Randle) who was willing to maintain and
operate it for one year in return for 55 P©r cent of the gross earnings.
20The line opened for business in September 1855»
(c) Responsible Government, In November 1855 the new con-
Adult Franchise and the
Secret Ballot stitution was promulgated and
electioneering commenced throughout the colony. Would-be politicans 
campaigned in an atmosphere of widespread disillusionment about the 
colony's future, owing to a balance of payments crisis, rapidly 
falling gold production and drought. It was inevitable also that 
there would be a struggle for political power during the transition 
to responsible government and those already established sought to 
restrict the influence of MradicalMelements in the community.
20
See The Railways of New South Wales, 1855-1955 (Department of 
Railways, Sydney, 1955)> pp.18-25*
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Political instability as such needs no comment here, but it is 
necessary to indicate how the reorientation of policy which commenced 
in 1853 won general approval. Amongst the questions facing the colony 
at the beginning of responsible government, the ones immediately 
relevant to this study were:
(1) Should railways be extended and worked as public undertakings?
(2) What other, if any, action should be taken by the Government to 
promote economic expansion?
(3) Whose views were to prevail?
These three questions could not be considered independently of each
other at the time, nor is it realistic now to separate them.
In August 1856, the Government decided not to renew Randle’s
lease and authorised the commissioners to extend and work the railways,
paying into consolidated revenue the net revenue (gross receipts less
21working expenses). The commissioners pushed on very slowly with
the construction programmes originally envisaged by the private
companies. This prompted the Governor-General to propose that a
"general scheme with relation to Railroads" should be adopted and
arrangements made for the execution of the work as a whole, instead
22of letting contracts for a few miles at a time. Denison observed:
21
Ibid., pp.29-30.
22
"Memorandum - Railroads", by the Governor-General, 4 December 1856, 
L.C. Journal, 1856, Vol. 1, p.725*
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In the adoption of some general scheme of this kind, the whole 
Colony will feel an interest. Each district will comprehend that 
its particular welfare is cared for, whereas the present mode of 
carrying on the work excites no general feeling in its favour, 
and leads to suspicions that the interests of the more distant 
parts of the Colony are postponed to those of the districts in 
the immediate vicinity of Sydney.
Denison was seriously disturbed by the bitterness of the wrangling 
in the first Parliament and the failure to agree on general principles 
which might give direction to government policy. He prepared a guide 
for Parliament, urging the establishment of priorities in the con­
struction of public works, with special emphasis on communications.
His own preference was for a network of railways, but he observed that, 
’’whether Railroads be taken as the best, and only mode of constructing 
the principal lines of communication or not, it is evident, that if 
the Colony is to make any progress at all, that much more attention must 
be paid, than has hitherto been the case, to the various means of
facilitating the transport of passengers and goods from one part of
23the Colony to another”. Listing, as other essentials, roads, bridges, 
harbour and river improvements, electric telegraphs and irrigation, 
he observed:
It is hardly necessary to go into any detail to prove this, 
or to point out that, with regard to most of these works, they 
are not, in a certain sense, profitable, - that is, they do 
not hold out sufficient inducement to private enterprise to 
justify individuals in expending capital upon them; in fact, 
the advantage to be derived from them is to be seen more in the
23
’’Public Works: Paper from the Governor-General”, 7 August 1856, 
L.C. Journal, I856-7, Vol. 1 , p.733*
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general facilities afforded to trade, than to the increase 
and development of any particular branches of traffic, upon 
which the cost of the works, of whatever description they may 
be, might be made a charge.
It was primarily because there seemed no immediate prospect of securing
a satisfactory return on capital invested in railways that influential
24politicians sought to delay major decisions.
Although Denison's specific proposals for railway extensions 
reoeived a cool reception, his two papers for Parliament stimulated a 
more concerted attack on problems of communications in New South 
Wales. The first important step taken was to select a British engineer, 
Captain Bernard Martindale, to act as "Superintendent of Internal 
Communications" and Commissioner of Railways in 1857« Martindale 
was expected to co-ordinate the planning and construction of roads and 
telegraphs and, in conjunction with another British Engineer (John 
Whitton), work on the railways. These two technical experts wielded 
enormous influence on account of their technical skill and experience, 
and played major roles in the deliberations of select committees on 
railways appointed by the two Houses of Parliament. During 1857 and 
1858, these committees explored costs and alternative methods of con­
veying freight and passengers, while the engineers directed works 
already sanctioned.
24
This problem, of course, was closely related to the general problem 
of securing the necessary capital to finance construction. For 
detailed comments on this, see Chapter Three, pp.175-03.
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In December 1858 another important move was made: an Act was
passed to bring the railways directly under parliamentary control.
This was a natural development of Parliament’s claims to control the
public purse, but it was also an expression of distrust of ministerial
discretion. In Parliament, liberal Members led by Charles Cowper
and John Robertson had marshalled support on a scale sufficient to
challenge the squatter (and conservative) majority. Their first
success was in winning support for a Bill to provide that the second
Parliament, to be elected in l859> was to "be elected on the basis
of adult franchise and the secret ballot. In the debates on the
enabling legislation, the supporters stressed that electoral reform
was essential before decisions on railways and the occupation of the
Crown lands were reached. Questions of such vital importance to
the whole colony then and in the future, it was claimed, should not
be decided until the whole adult community was enfranchised and freed
25from intimidating tactics at elections.
The elections of 1859 greatly altered the composition of Parliament. 
Several once-powerful figures in government were not re-elected and 
many new men, representative of urban middle classes and ordinary 
wage-earners, swept into prominence. As the elections had been fought 
almost entirely on the question of whether the squatters were to 
retain their monopoly of the Crown lands, the new Parliament devoted
25
For comprehensive discussion of the land question, see Chapter 
Four, pp.255-9*
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its attentions to land reform. By i860, it was clear that only 
technicalities had to be dealt with before the Crown lands could be 
made available for occupation by all-comers. Contemporaneously, news­
paper comment disclosed a strengthening feeling throughout the colony 
that the Government should take action to prepare firm proposals 
for large-scale railway extensions. Votes were passed for trial 
surveys and the engineers were directed to report on costs.
Captain Martindale summed up developments by i860 in these 
words:^
Reviewing the history of the Railways, Main Roads, and Electric 
Telegraphs in this Colony during the last three years, it is 
satisfactory to mark the progress made. In June, 1857> there 
were 38 miles of Railway open; in June, i860, there are 54 
miles open, 15 ready for opening, and 53 in progress. In June, 
1857> the Main Roads embraced only about 340 miles, and scarcely 
a creek or river was bridged; in June, i860, they extend over 
900 miles, and, with a few exceptions, all the creeks and 
rivers have been or are being bridged over.... In June, 1857» 
the construction of the Electric Telegraphs was just commenced; 
in June, i860, there are 742 miles open for public use, 99 
miles in progress, and 753 miles about to be immediately 
commenced....
It is impossible not to be hopeful for the future. As 
Railways and the Electric Telegraphs extend, it may be hoped 
that private enterprise will undertake, at any rate, their 
management. Meantime it appears inevitable that the Government 
should bear the burden of the early years of such works in a 
young country, and labour amidst difficulties and complaints, 
satisfied with seeing the real advancement made.
26
Fourth Report by Captain Martindale, 30 September i860, L.C. Journal, 
i860, Vol. 6, p.
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"Labouring Amidst Difficulties*1, 1861-73 
In 1861 the passing of the Robertson Land Acts was greeted 
with widespread enthusiasm. Land reform was seen as the beginning 
of a new era in which the individual, with judicious assistance 
from government, might prosper and thereby contribute to the overall 
advancement of the colony. Some criteria still had to be worked 
out for the formulation of government policies in keeping with this 
conception, but the essential purposes of government activity seemed 
beyond dispute. To promote, and not to hinder, private activity 
must be the basis of government policy.
To have a clear-cut objective, of course, was not the same 
as having policies capable of achieving it, or the experience 
necessary for sustained activity on the part of the Government. The 
major tasks were to marshall resources for the building of railways 
and other assets designed to overcome physical obstacles to produc­
tion and exchange, to promote the establishment of a stable society 
and to eschew any action which would benefit one section of the 
community at the expense of others. All decisions had to be reached 
through political and administrative processes, subject to economic 
conditions beyond the control of government. From 1861 to the 
early seventies, the N.S.W. Government, like its counterparts in 
other colonies, sought to play a positive role in the development 
of the economy by providing the conditions under which private
- 3-
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activity could expand. The problems and compromise solutions of 
these years form the subject of this section.
(a) Criteria for the Extension Even as the final touches were
of Railways
being given to the new land laws,
efforts were being made to formulate a policy for the extension of 
railways. In recent years, access to the London capital market had 
been effected with modest success, and there seemed reasonable
27prospects of securing capital there to supplement local resources.
The major decisions still to be reached in l86l related to the type
of transport system to be developed, the direction of routes, the
extent to which the Government should be committed in advance, and
criteria to be adopted in the working of an approved system.
In the formulation of railway policy at this time, the permanent
officials, especially the Engineer-in-Chief for Railways (Whitton),
28played dominant roles. Whitton exerted great pressure to prevent 
the acceptance of proposals designed to limit initial costs. He 
spurned ideas of developing "cheap” horse tramways instead of substan­
tial railways employing steam locomotives, claiming that the latter 
29would result ins
27
See Chapter Three, pp. 183-6.
28
For eulogistic comments on Whitton by leading politicians, see 
Appendix 2, p.400. Further comment on railway officials (particularly 
John Rae) will be found in Chapter Five, passim.
29
"Railway Extension, Report from Engineer-in-Chief for Railways",
L.C. Journal, 1861-2, Vol. 8, p.353.
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. . . g r e a t e r  ex p ed itio n  in  means o f t r a n s p o r t ,  g re a te r  economy, 
g re a te r  com fort and r e g u la r i ty ,  and above a l l ,  g re a te r  s a f e ty ,  
than  by any o th e r system of locom otion.
W h itto n 's  views in  l8 6 l le d  to  th e  d e c is io n s  to  b u ild  the  th re e  tru n k  
l in e s  (Prom Sydney to  th e  w est and sou th-w est and from N ewcastle to  
th e  n o rth )  to  p o in ts  a t which b ra n c h -lin e  c o n s tru c tio n  might be 
commenced, and th a t  th e  t r a c k  should be b u i l t  fo r  a long  l i f e  o f use 
by steam locom otives. These views were embodied in  a Loan B i l l  i n t r o ­
duced in  l8 6 l  and passed e a r ly  in  1862.
I t  was g e n e ra lly  understood  a t  the  tim e th a t  th i s  p ro je c t  would 
take  a t  l e a s t  a decade to  com plete, m ainly because th e  tra c k s  had 
to  be l a id  ac ro ss  mountains posing  se r io u s  en g in eerin g  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
and p a r t ly  because of sh o rtag e  o f c a p i ta l  to  fin an ce  c o n s tru c tio n .
The e s tim ated  c o s t was c lo se  on £2 m illio n  -  as even ts proved, a g ro ss  
u n d e r-e s tim a te  -  and an immediate problem was to  decide on some 
c r i t e r i a  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  C aptain M artindale  had c o n s is te n t ly  urged  
th a t  c a p i ta l  should be sunk in  ra ilw ay s and te le g ra p h s  " in  such a 
manner th a t  we s h a l l  u lt im a te ly  cover th e  working expenses and 
i n t e r e s t " . ^  P o l i t i c i a n s  w ith  a background in  p r iv a te  b u s in ess  and 
an awareness o f th e  n a tu re  o f the  i n t e r e s t  burden which might be 
in c u rre d , supported  th i s  approach to  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  The o f f i c i a l s
30
See M inutes o f Evidence, S e le c t Committee on G reat Trunk L ines of 
R ailw ays, L.C. J o u rn a l , 1857> Vol. 2, p*410. Note a lso  th a t  S tan ley  
Jevons, in  a r t i c l e s  in  th e  Em pire, scorned p ro p o sa ls  to  b u ild  ra ilw ay s  
fo r  th e  sake o f " in d ir e c t  b e n e f i ts " .  (See J .A . La Nauze, P o l i t i c a l  
Economy in  A u s t r a l ia , M elbourne, 1949> P*32).
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responsible for working both railways and telegraphs did not question
it as the basis of rating policy. By 1863 it was standard policy
that "an adequate return" must be secured on capital invested, and
sparsely-populated districts demanding connection with the electric
telegraph system had to guarantee "that they will be responsible for
the annual payment of 5 per cent, (return by the lines) on the capital
invested, after paying the working expenses".^ This insistence on
railways and telegraphs striving to meet interest commitments in this
sub-period meant high charges to users of the services, while dis-
32couraging their use if other alternatives could be found.
Given these basic policy decisions, there was still the problem 
of meeting the demands of the electors for amendments and additions 
to the original programme of railway extensions. The 1862 Loan Act 
had to be supplemented by no less than five other Loan Acts which 
sanctioned increased expenditure, additional stations, minor deviations 
of planned routes, extra rolling stock and so on. All of these Acts, 
further, sanctioned the use of loan proceeds for public works in 
districts not in the path of the railway trunks, provided as political 
compensation for disgruntled electors. Log-rolling, which is often 
imagined as becoming important only in the late seventies, was
31
See "Electric Telegraphs - Report from Superintendent", L.C. Journal, 
1863-4, Part 2, Vol. 10, p.96.
32
For a withering commentary on this policy, see T.A. Coghlan, Labour 
and Industry in Australia (London, 1918), Vol. 3, pp.1219-1220. Further 
discussion of rating policies will be found in Chapter Five.
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acquiring some refinement already in the early sixties. Cabinet 
ministers, vs/hose tenure of office depended on the whims of rapidly- 
changing factions, sought to achieve popularity by acceding to 
requests to add items to the expenditure estimates.^ In order to 
get their estimates approved by Parliament, they consistently under­
estimated the costs of public works. Once sanctioned by an 
Appropriation or Loan Act, expenditure on any particular service 
could be increased by the simple expedient of introducing supplementary 
estimates. Expenditure passed beyond parliamentary control once the 
estimates were approved and this afforded ministers opportunities 
to manipulate disbursements for political ends. Condemnation of this, 
as will be shown a little later, was one of the factors resulting in 
the contraction of expenditure in the early seventies.
(b) Other New Expenditure It is important to realise that
Commitments
railway extension was not the
only important commitment of this sub-period. A brief review is 
necessary to demonstrate the increasing scope of government activity.
Of special interest are changing attitudes to local government, 
education and social welfare and unemployment.
33
For admissions of this, see any of the statements of early 
Treasurers in James Thomson (ed.), The Financial Statements of the 
Colonial Treasurers of N.S.W. from 1^55 to 1881 (Sydney, l88l). 
(This source is cited hereafter as Thomson, Financial Statements).
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i. Local
Government
The policy of the first ministry 
was "the establishment of muni­
cipal institutions for the purpose of relieving the Central 
Government of duties which it cannot adequately fulfil".^ A clear 
majority of politicians favoured an Act to establish municipalities 
so that Parliament would not have to worry about the provision of 
local services. Evidence of the workability of a scheme of local 
government was secured from Victoria and a Municipalities Act was 
passed in 1858.
This Act omitted a fundamental provision in the Victorian Act 
of 1854) on which it was modelled. J No minimum population require­
ment was demanded of districts seeking incorporation under the Act. 
This had the effect of encouraging many small councils to be formed, 
with the result that the revenue available to them from rates was 
often negligible. Since the Act provided that the Government would 
subsidise councils pro rata according to local revenue, the smaller 
councils received very little support from the Government. One 
result was the early disillusionment of many who had expected speedy 
improvement in local services. Small councils were disbanded and 
the people concerned looked to their political representatives to
34
See Governor-General’s speech on opening Parliament, Herald,
24 May 1856.
35
The best available account of local government is Frederick A. 
Larcombe, The Development of Local Government in New South Wales 
(Melbourne, I961).
58
secure attention from the Government. The larger councils (mainly 
in Sydney and Newcastle) made some progress, but they received 
relatively large subsidies from the Government. Additionally, it 
became customary to provide special grants to councils seeking to 
improve the services in their areas. The Government further made 
direct loans to the largest councils for water and sewerage works.
In essence, the councils were little more than agencies of the Govern­
ment. Members of Parliament found it essential to push the claims 
of their own constituencies. ’’The colony", said the Sydney Morning 
Herald in 1872, "is still in the municipal state of development; 
it is a big parish, and the parishioners have parochial views... 
and a man who does not profess to understand principles but can 
promise a fine bridge, or a railway extension, will get the votes."
The growing habit of "turning to the 
Government for help", complained of
ii. Education, Health 
and Welfare
by idealists, increased the Government’s commitment on account of
education, health and welfare services in these years. It was not
37simply that expenditure under this heading increased rapidly; 
the Government actually was in the process of relieving private 
organisations of some traditional responsibilities.
At the beginning of the period the Government subsidised the 
Benevolent Society, but in 1862 took over from the Society the
Editorial, 14 March 1872. 
^See Figure 12.
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"asylums for the aged and infirm". By I865 every charitable organi­
sation in the colony was in receipt of annual subsidies and, in 
order to arrest the upward trend of expenditure, an "Inspector of 
Public Charities" was appointed. This official initially supervised 
the distribution of government funds, but soon acquired a small 
staff and began to intervene in the management of charitable organi­
sations.
Lunacy, child delinquency and hospital management increasingly 
interested the Government, especially during the Premiership of James 
Martin, a social reformer. It was Martini Government which also 
established the Council of Education to rationalise the distribution 
of funds to private bodies concerned with the building and staffing 
of schools. A major part of the Council's activities consisted of 
efforts to improve the standard of teaching in "public" (i.e. non- 
denominational) schools. Under the influence of William Wilkins, 
Secretary of the Council, centralised administration and inspection 
developed rapidly and the "public" schools attracted an increasing 
proportion of the school population. The trend towards compulsory,
38secular education was already strongly in evidence.
38
Note that in 1862 steps were taken to abolish progressively State 
aid for religious denominations. From that date the annual vote 
for stipends to clergy declined as recipients died, for no new 
names could be added to the "Ecclesiastical Establishment". The 
expenditure involved is shown in Appendix 1, Table 10.
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iii. Assisted Immigration In the mid-fifties, the Govern-
and Unemployment
Relief ment was introducing seven to ten
thousand migrants each year, hut in the second half of the sixties
39suspended assisted immigration. The suspension of a traditionally 
important function of government was token of a change of attitude 
towards the question of unemployment.
Although organised protests in Sydney tried to force the Govern­
ment to abolish schemes of assisted immigration on the grounds of 
causing or aggravating unemployment, the Government for a decade 
refused to accede to the demand or to accept any responsibility for 
unemployment.^ However, the ’’social reform” government of Martin 
in the mid-sixties demonstrated that at least one powerful group of 
politicians considered that unemployment was a legitimate concern of 
government. During the balance of payments crisis of 1866, the 
Government took certain steps which provided precedents to be cited 
many times in later years;
(a) Free rail travel was provided for urban unemployed men to seek 
work in the country;
39
Assisted immigrants numbered 7>210 in 1856, 10,205 in 1857»
6,916 in 1858. Thereafter the annual inflow varied between one and 
four thousand until 1868, but then fell to a trickle of wives and 
children of men who had migrated earlier. (Sources Statistical 
Registers).
40
For a recent investigation, see Albert A. Hayden, ’’The Anti- 
Immigration Movement, 1877-1893”> Journal R.A.H.S., Vol. 48, Part 1 
(1962), p.25 ff.
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(b) Special grants were made to charitable organisations running 
soup kitchens in Sydney $
(c) The construction of public works was speeded up to provide 
employment for men temporarily dismissed from private employment 
(and this at a time when the Government was facing a major 
budgetary crisis).
It was the same Government which acceded to demands to suspend
assisted immigration in 1868, at least until the colony could throw
off the "stagnation" about which many colonists complained.^
(c) Economic and Political The suspension of assisted immi-
Factors in the Contrac­
tion of Expenditure gration in the face of protests
about “widespread unemployment" might easily be given too much stress.
But it may serve as a reminder here that neither the Government of
New South Wales nor the colony as a whole passed through the sixties
without having to weather economic adversity. It is desirable to
trace briefly the course of events from 1864 to the early seventies
to see why expenditure ceased to expand in the late sixties and was
then quite definitely contracted.
At the end of 1863 a new Treasurer informed Parliament that the
42Government was facing a serious budgetary crisis. In 1864 fears
^The pastoral industry made considerable progress in this period al­
though agriculture languished. Capital formation fell sharply in 1866, 
then rose rapidly to a peak in 1869, after which it declined heavily 
for two years. From 1872 the colony enjoyed rapidly increasing pros­
perity until 1879« Assisted immigration was re-introduced on a 
modified basis in 1873.
42For a more complete account of what follows, see P.N. Lamb,
"Geoffrey Eagar and the Colonial Treasury of New South Wales", 
Australian Economic Papers, September 1962, pp.32-35*
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became fact and the Government was overdrawn at the banks. Requested 
to sanction increased taxation, Parliament refused. The Treasurer 
immediately decided on sweeping reforms in the financial administra­
tions these included the reorganisation of the Treasury and the 
establishment of its authority over all spending departments; rele­
gation of the Auditor-General to the position of an ordinary
43government official; and a change of bankers. While one effect of 
these reforms was to give enormously increased power to the Treasury 
and the Executive, the controversy they aroused had a serious effect 
on the Government’s borrowing powers in London. In 1865, while 
borrowing was stepped up to meet deficiencies in the revenue, the 
terms on which capital could be borrowed rapidly worsened. On top 
of this came the Overend-Gurney crisis in London and a balance of 
payments crisis, very serious in Queensland, and fairly serious in 
New South Wales. By a series of financial expedients to be considered 
later, the N.S.W. Government weathered the storm, while stepping up 
the construction of public works to counter unemployment.
During the budgetary crisis, taxation was increased and a 
relatively large short-term debt incurred. The Government had exer­
cised to the full its borrowing powers under Loan Acts dating back 
to the early sixties. In 1367, ostensibly to secure funds to extend 
the railways in the interests of selectors battling against
See Chapter Three, pp. 186- 7 •
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successive droughts and floods, the Government sought approval for 
a very large loan to be raised in Europe. Immediately a controversy 
over taxation developed and Parliament refused to agree to the loan as 
proposed. For the first time since 1862 the Government had to battle 
’with Parliament to secure approval for borrowing to finish the rail­
way trunks.
It is necessary to appreciate several related elements underlying 
expenditure contraction after 1868. These may be indicated in 
summary form:
(1) Political advantage was to be won by any faction capable of
44presenting firm proposals for taxation reductions;
(2) Large amounts borrowed earlier (especially in the mid-sixties) 
were falling due for repayment without prospects of effecting 
conversions;
(3) The Governor touched off a storm of condemnation of ministers who
45authorised expenditure which had not received parliamentary sanction;
(4) Parliament, by means of an Audit Act, expressed its determination 
to regain control of the public purse;
^See Chapter Two, pp. 116-20.
45This was one of the few occasions on which the British Government 
interfered in the internal affairs of the colony after 1856. For a 
complete coverage, see:
(a) Letters to the Sari of Belmore, 1868-72 (holograph manuscript, 
Mitchell Library, Sydney), Vol. 1;
(b) Expenditure of Public Moneys, Despatches and Minutes Respecting 
(Sydney, Government Printer, 1869-70)»
(This led to the passing of the I87O Audit Act, which is considered 
briefly a little later).
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(5) In I87O-I there was a quite sharp and severe recession.
In review, the following sequence occurred. From 1868 to I87O, 
Parliament moved to limit the initiative of the Executive, by delaying 
approval of estimates submitted and by insisting on the introduction 
of an Audit Bill. At the same time, sections of the first planned 
phase of railway extensions were progressively completed, and workers 
on those sections were laid off. Then, in 1870, the colony experienced 
a severe recession, just as the Government needed to provide for the 
repayment of the deficiency loans raised in the raid-sixties. Salary 
reductions in the public service and a further slowing of the rate 
of railway construction seemed the only ways of reducing expenditure.
At the same time, taxation was increased amid a storm of bitter 
disapproval. A political crisis followed, with Henry Parkes campaig­
ning for office on a promise of taxation reform and the introduction 
of a "vigorous policy of public works". Parkes came to office in 
1872, at a time when export prices for wool were rising rapidly. He 
saw his opportunity to lower taxation and increase expenditure by 
disposing of the Crown lands, and wasted no time in exploiting it.^
As revenue poured into the Treasury, taxation was reduced, the 
deficiency debt was wiped out and assisted immigration was resumed 
to re-establish a pool of railway labourers. By 1874» all the con­
ditions were in existence for a renewed burst of railway construction,
46
See Chapter Four, pp. 269-76
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w ithou t any p re ss in g  need to  r a is e  la rg e  lo an s  abroad. Under th ese  
c o n d itio n s , the  campaigning fo r  ra ilw ay  ex ten s io n s  to  compete w ith  
V ic to r ia  in  the R iv erin a  and to  "open up th e  in land" had no fu r th e r  
o b s ta c le s  to  overcome. ^  The colony was on the  eve of ex p erien c in g  
an expansion o f th e  government s e c to r  a t  a pace unprecedented in  
New South Wales and no t to  be matched elsew here in  A u s tra lia  u n t i l  
V ic to r ia  experienced  i t s  n o tab le  boom in  th e  second h a l f  o f the 
e ig h t ie s .
- 4 -
" Swimming w ith  th e  T id e" , 1874-1888
. . . I  th in k  th e  p re sen t Government f u l ly  r e a l i s e  the  respon­
s i b i l i t y  which i s  e n ta i le d  on them by th e  f u l l  sea  upon which 
they f in d  them selves a f lo a t ,  and they f e e l ,  to  con tinue  the 
q u o ta tio n , th a t  they must tak e  th e  c u rre n t when i t  s e rv e s , or 
lo se  t h e i r  v e n tu re s . Perhaps I  may say a lso  th a t  in  endeavour­
in g , as they a re  doing , to  loosen  every band which f e t t e r s  
in d u s try  and which hampers commerce, they  a re ,  in  my o p in io n , 
pu rsu ing  a p o lic y  which i s  in  un ison  w ith  th e  s p i r i t  of th e  age, 
and which commends i t s e l f  to  th e  in te l l ig e n c e  o f the  coun try .
I t s  e f f e c t  w il l  a ssu red ly  be to  make New South Wales one o f 
the  cheapest and most d e s ira b le  p la ce s  in  th e  whole world fo r  
the  working man to l iv e  in .  P o p u la tio n  w il l  thus be a t t r a c te d  
to  our s h o r e s . . .s o  th a t  a d d itio n a l ta x a t io n ,  th e  hands and the 
funds w il l  be forthcom ing which a re  in d isp e n sa b le  fo r  the  
development o f  th e  re so u rce s  of th i s  m ag n ificen t coun try .
. 48
----  Speech by the  Governor, 31 March 1874»
^Led by Edward Deas Thomson in  1869 , th e  Sydney m erchants p re ssed  
fo r  th e  ra p id  c o n s tru c tio n  o f a l in e  th rough  the R iv erin a  to  coun ter 
th e  proposed V ic to r ia n  l in e  to  A lbury, the p r iz e  being  the wool t r a f f i c  
o f th e  re g io n . P o l i t i c a l  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f n o rth e rn  and w estern  
d i s t r i c t s ,  fe a r in g  th a t  th e  sou thern  ex ten s io n  would re c e iv e  p r io r i t y ,  
combined in  a campaign fo r  a "g en e ra l"  p lan  o f ex ten s io n s  fo r  the whole 
colony. The G overnor, S ir  H ercules Robinson, a lso  ra is e d  h is  vo ice  
p u b lic ly  in  favour of ra p id  ra ilw ay  e x ten s io n .
A84 S ir  H ercules Robinson, Speeches. During H is A d m in is tra tio n  o f the 
Government of N.S.W. ( Sydney, 1879), P*Ö3«
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Under boom c o n d itio n s , and w hile  accum ulating r e l a t iv e ly  eno r-
49mous cash  re s e rv e s , the N.S.W. Government embarked on a spending 
sp ree  which continued  fo r tw elve y e a rs  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f economic 
a d v e rs ity  in  the p r iv a te  s e c to r .  Although ra ilw ay  investm ent 
in c re a s in g ly  dominated a t te n t io n ,  every component o f p u b lic  expen­
d i tu r e  in c re a se d , most f a r  more ra p id ly  than  p o p u la tio n  was in c re a s in g . 
P arliam en t again  l o s t  c o n tro l of the  ex pend itu re  and m in is te rs ,  though 
seldom long  in  o f f ic e ,  enjoyed s u b s ta n t ia l  d is c r e t io n a ry  powers. The 
T reasury  emerged as the  most pow erful government departm ent, engaged 
in  h ig h ly  s o p h is tic a te d  f in a n c ia l  management b e a rin g  l i t t l e  r e la t io n ­
sh ip  to  th e  budgetary p roceedings o f P a rliam en t. E v en tu a lly , co n tro ­
versy  over the p u b lic  accoun ts , budgetary  d is e q u ilib r iu m , the  th r e a t  
o f in c re a se d  ta x a tio n  and the  emergence o f p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  combined 
to  c a l l  a h a l t  to th e  ra p id ly  r i s in g  tre n d  of ex p en d itu re . A tte n tio n  
now i s  d ire c te d  to  the  main fe a tu re s  of th i s  s t r ik in g  expansion of 
government a c t i v i ty .
(a ) The Second Major Phase In  1874, 402 m iles of ra ilw ay
of Railway E xtensions
tra c k  were open; by 1888 the
m ileage had in c reased  to  2 ,126. Prom th e  very  low le v e l of £99>000 
in  18731 t o t a l  new c a p i ta l  o u tla y s  ro se  alm ost con tinuously  to  
£2,838,000 in  1885, then f e l l  p ro g re s s iv e ly  to  £630,000 in  1 8 8 8 .^  By
49
See F igure  4> p«19*
50
See B u tlin  and de Meel, op. c i t . ,  p .l6 2 .
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l88l contact had been made with the Victorian railways at Albury; 
an extension was traversing the Riverina towards Hay; and the western 
line had reached Dubbo. Within a few years the Queensland border was 
reached, a north-western line constructed to Moree, the western line 
extended to Bourke (on the Darling) and the Riverina line to Hay* In 
the same period, Sydney's tramway system was commenced and the metro­
politan railway system was developed.
For present purposes, it will be sufficient simply to list some
51of the implications of these basic facts:
(1) The main justification for this massive programme of construction
was ostensibly the need to develop the colony's natural resources,
that is, to promote production, especially for export. Considerable
52doubt has been cast on the validity of this and it is certain that
the rapidly rising overseas interest bill involved an increasing drain
on export earnings in a period of falling prices, thereby aggravating
balance of payments problems and contributing to the onset of a
53serious and prolonged depression.
(2) By contrast with railway policy in the previous sub-period, 
progressively less attention was paid to the yield on railway investment,
51
For comprehensive analysis, see N.G. Butlin, Investment in 
Australian Economic Growth, Part 3* Further discussion in the present 
study is to be found in Chapters 3» 5 and 6.
52
N*G. Butlin, op. cit., Chapter 1.
53
This point is developed in Chapters 3> 4 and 6.
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proponents listing a growing range of external economies as justifi­
cation for continued heavy investment.
(3) The neglect of profitability criteria in railway investment was 
disguised by the emphasis on supposed external economies which, in 
fact, distracted attention from the political criteria underlying 
policy.
(4) Railways had so captured the imagination of Australians that every 
little town hoped to become linked by rail with other towns. Political 
representatives were chosen to urge the claims of the electors, using 
whatever arguments would prove successful. Politicians combined to 
secure support for railway extensions in particular directions. 
Ministers increasingly found that the only way to retain office was
by agreeing to railway extensions in several directions at the one 
time.
(5) Politicians representing electorates not in the path of railway 
extensions expected "compensations” for their constituents, in the 
form of other types of communications facilities and government 
services.
(6) Railway construction stimulated the urbanisation of the community 
and brought the Government to the position of being the largest 
employer of labour, with important influences on wages and working 
conditions.
(7) Most politicians were in some measure compromised by the con­
tinual log-rolling of the period and made only token protests about
70
evidence of the executive’s unconstitutional management of the 
public funds.
(8) The threat of increased taxation in the eighties stimulated the 
development of political parties, a reassertion of the constitutional 
rights of Parliament and the curtailment of new capital outlays on 
railways.
(b) The Changing Scope of It is significant that the whole
Government Activity♦
I874-I800 community became embroiled in
political conflict in the second half of the eighties. What the 
Government had done, and might do in the future, was of vital concern 
to every section of the colony, including powerful financial and 
commercial interests. For dependence on the Government had become 
increasingly evident throughout the community. The Government was 
not only by far the largest employer of labour; the ramifications of 
government policy were complex, impinging on living standards, business 
expectations and, indeed, all aspects of life in a colony which had 
enjoyed a long period of economic growth which was evidently coming 
to an end. To illustrate the changing assumptions of the period, 
attention is now directed to a few alterations to the scope of govern­
ment activity.
i. The Provision of The Sydney tramway system, as
Tramways
developed in the eighties, holds
important clues to the changing assumptions of the period. In 1879 
the Government built a tramline to cope with the crowds expected to
71
visit the International Exhibition, The intention at first was to
remove the line when the exhibition ended, but the Sydney Omnibus
Company sought permission to purchase it and develop a private tramway
service. This produced an immediate public outcry and demands that
the Government provide a tramway network for the metropolis. The
54arguments advanced were summarised by the Railway Commissioner :
1. The Tramways, if constructed by the Government, would
be of a more durable nature, and more complete in their arrange­
ment and equipment.
2. The rates of conveyance would be more permanent, local 
causes not being allowed to affect them to the same degree, and 
the fluctuations so often prevailing with undertakings in the 
hands of private Companies would be avoided.
3. Greater civility and attention would be assured from the 
employees, as they would be more directly the servants of the 
public.
4. The Government, looking only for a fair return on the 
capital invested, would make more moderate charges than a 
Company whose aim would be to obtain as large dividends as 
possible for its shareholders.
5* A Company would not construct a line unless assured that 
it would yield an immediate return upon its outlay, and thus 
Tramway accommodation would be denied to many places, the future 
prosperity of which would be dependent upon increased means of 
communication.
As the tramways were developed, several leading politicians 
complained that the assumptions underlying policy were responsible 
for a serious drain on the public purse. The Government of Parkes, 
which introduced a retrenchment policy in 1887, decided that the 
lines should be leased to private enterprise. Months of propaganda
54
Railways and Tramways: Report by Commissioner for 1879» 
N.S.W.V. & P., 1880-81, Vol. 2, p.793.
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in the electorates preceded the calling of tenders in 1888, Three
55or four syndicates, one from Melbourne, tendered. But, before the 
lease could be arranged, parliamentary sanction was necessary. Here, 
political tactics became very important. Opponents of the ministry 
raised two red herringss
(1) That Members had been bribed to support the proposal in Parlia­
ment ; and
(2) That the Government had decided to accept the tender of the 
Melbourne syndicate.
Inter-colonial rivalry and charges of corruption in government combined
to bring to an abrupt conclusion this effort to rid the Government
of one responsibility. Although a Royal Commission rejected the
bribery charges in their entirety, public opinion was now firmly
56opposed to private ownership or management of the tramways.
ii. Assisted Immigration Further evidence of changing
and Unemployment Relief
assumptions is to be found in
the decision to terminate assisted immigration in I887 and the
55
The events relating to the proposed leasing of the tramways were 
fully discussed in the Sydney Letters of The Australasian Insurance 
and Banking Record (cited hereafter as A.I.B.R.) . For a summary, 
see November 1888, p*799*56
Alleged Attempted Bribery of Members of Parliament - Report of 
Royal Commission, N.S.W.V. & P., 1889, Vol. 1, p.621 ff.
(it should be noted that in I887 the Select Committee which recommen­
ded the appointment of a parliamentary public works committee 
uncompromisingly rejected isolated suggestions that the railways should 
be handed over to private enterprise. See N.S.W.V. & P., 1887, Vol. 2,
p.139).
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acceptance of full responsibility for the relief of unemploy- 
57ment.
TABLE 3
Ho» of Assisted Immigrants« 1874-88
Year No. Year No.
1874 1,080 1882 3,233
5 973 3 8,369
6 1,463 4 7,568
7 6,018 5 5,554
8 5,190 6 4,081
9 5,731 7 1,362
1880 3,134 8 528
1 2,577
SOURCE: Statistical Registers
Superficially, no more was involved than the sequence discussed 
in the section on the pre-1874 period; in fact, the Government's 
commitment to the preservation of employment opportunities and living 
standards was much greater by the late eighties than it had become 
in the late sixties.
It was during 1879» when the colony experienced a brief but
severe balance of payments crisis, that positive steps were taken to
cope with unemployment. In that year 36,000 men were fed at soup
58kitchens in Sydney for several weeks.J As in 1866, the first step
taken was the introduction of supplementary estimates providing for
57
Expenditure on assisted immigration is shown in Appendix 1, 
Table 10.58
Daily Telegraph, 12 August 1879* "Our Unemployed".
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special grants to charitable organisations. But much more significant 
was the implementation of Parliament's decision to appropriate the 
Government’s cash reserve for public works and the approval of a loan 
programme exceeding £7 million. These steps were in part justified 
at the time by arguments that the Government had a responsibility to 
ensure that all men able and willing to work should be able to secure 
jobs, whether in private or public undertakings. The rapid expansion 
of government expenditure in following years was justified by the 
Government increasingly on grounds of offsetting problems of the 
private sector, especially during the serious drought of 1884-5* 
Despite bitter opposition from the anti-immigration movement of trades 
unionists, the Government continued to import labour and to meet 
criticism by pushing ahead rapidly with public works.
When a halt was called to the expansion of expenditure in 1887, 
the Parkes Government was immediately faced with the fact that some 
hundreds of men formerly employed by the Government could not find 
private employment and had converged on Sydney. Very much against 
his laissez-faire principles, Henry Parkes decided that the Government 
must take steps to deal with unemployment or be dismissed from office. 
Accordingly, a Casual Labour Board was appointed to draft unemployed 
urban men to country jobs and, if necessary, to provide temporary 
work near Sydney. The Board was soon charged with fraudulent opera­
tions and the Government expressed alarm at the "serious drain upon 
the public revenue" while false impression was given "of the real
75
59condition of the country”. In a matter of a few months, the Board
had given jobs to upwards of 8,000 men, supplying tents, tools, rations,
and high wages. Victorians had crossed the border to share the benefits
and the attractive conditions of employment had "induced men to desert
60the legitimate operations of private employers”. Costing in the 
vicinity of a quarter of a million pounds, this little experiment in 
unemployment relief prompted Parkes, always the great advocate of 
assisted immigration, to bring to an end this traditional function of 
government.^
iii. Education, Health and 
Welfare Services
The Government's increasing commit­
ments under this heading may be
indicated graphically - See Figure 12 - and by a brief review of 
developments between 1874 and 1888.
It is important to note that expenditure on education, health 
and social welfare increased almost continuously from 1857 to 1883 
and that, after 1872, this was the fastest growing component of 
government expenditure. In the seventies, government grants for 
education enabled the Council of Education to effect notable improvements
59
See Correspondence re Unemployment, N.S.W.V. & P., 1888-9> Vol. 3> 
P.IO89.
60
See Report of Casual Labour Board Inquiry Commission, ibid., I889, 
Vol. 6, pp.575-1261.
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Rote that a trickle of assisted immigrants arrived until the late 
nineties. These were wives and children of men formerly introduced. 
Sanction for the expenditure came from unexpended balances of immi­
gration votes passed before I887.
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in the schools of the colony. In 1877 the Government decided that 
local subscriptions for the building of schools need no longer be 
demanded. Thereafter, a very large programme of school construction 
•was undertaken and, in 1880, there were almost enough schools to make 
compulsory primary education practicable. In that year, the Depart­
ment of Public Instruction was established and three years later 
financial aid for denominational schools was withdrawn. The building 
programme of earlier years and the withdrawal of aid to church schools 
enabled the Government to reduce expenditure while increasing the range 
of educational services offered (high schools, technical education, 
etc).
Expenditure on health and welfare services also fell slightly
after 1883« The main reason for this was closer supervision of
charitable organisations receiving government aid. In 1878 the
6 2
Inspector of Public Charities reported:
These Charities have now assumed colossal proportions, for 
setting aside that branch which treats of insanity, there yet 
remains sufficient to absorb above one hundred thousand pounds 
a year of the Public Revenue; and I feel that it would be a 
mistake to leave them longer in their present chaotic condition.
In disbursing this large sum no recognized principles have 
been aimed at, nor has any organization been attempted, on the 
one hand, to save the Government liberality from imposition by 
those whose relatives are able to support them (wholly or in 
part) - or, on the other, prevent the importation from 
adjoining Colonies of persons who ought to be maintained in the 
time of their incapacity by the Colonies in which they have been 
previously residing.
Report, 1 March 1878, N.S.W.V. & P., 1877-8, Vol. 2, p.639*
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When repeated year hy year, the inspector's complaints and recom­
mendations gradually had effect with the Government and steps were 
taken to strengthen his control.
Increasing control of private organisations, efforts to improve 
the efficiency (and reduce the expense) of public hospitals, asylums 
and child welfare institutions, in fact, characterised government 
action in the eighties.^ The attempts made to restrict expenditure, 
however, encountered mounting opposition from public opinion and from 
the officials concerned. An enquiry into the government asylums for 
old and incapacitated people in 1887, for example, produced demands 
for action to overcome "the horrors and miseries and the amount of
64human suffering endured for years" by the inmates. In the same
year, the inspector of charities recommended action to remove "some of
the causes which at present operate in bringing many persons within
65the Charities' area". Just as public opinion indicated a growing 
belief that the Government had a responsibility to prevent or correct
63
A striking example is to be found in the State Children's Relief 
Department, established in 1881. This Department removed children 
under 12 from institutions controlled or subsidised by the Government 
and arranged for board with private families, thus saving the Govern­
ment about fifty per cent on the cost per child. (See Report of the 
department, N.S.W.V. & P., 1883, Vol. 2, p.857 ff).
64
Report of the Government Asylums Inquiry Board, N.S.W.V. & P., 1887, 
Vol. 2, p.138.65
Report, 30 June 1887, ibid.t 1887-8 , Vol. 4, p.692 ff. (Recommen­
dations included the establishment of a "Hospitals' Insurance Fund" 
and regulations to control the housing of the poor).
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unemployment, so in matters of health and social welfare were the 
Government's responsibilities increasing. The people of New South 
Wales, it was observed in l887> were no longer reluctant to receive 
State aid - they expected it and there was little the Government could 
do to alter this attitude.^
There is no need here to pursue in any detail the other new 
expenditure commitments of this period, such as the introduction of 
a steam pilot service, the purchase and working of equipment to 
locate mineral and artesian water deposits, the subsidisation and 
general supervision of fire-fighting services, improved defence arrange­
ments and so on. In the decade or so when the Government was flush 
with funds, numerous small items were added to the expenditure esti­
mates and soon became permanent charges on the revenue. Complaints 
about the "socialisation” of New South Wales formed a large part of 
the propaganda spread by Henry Parkes in the mid-eighties, as he 
battled to regain office. His campaign, which resulted in the contrac­
tion of expenditure after 1886, needs brief notice in the context of 
political controversy over the public accounts and taxation.
(c) The Politics of Expenditure It will be recalled that the
Contraction
Audit Act of 1870 was introduced 
to reassert Parliament's control of the purse. In the early seventies 
the Act was successful and the Executive was severely restricted in
Ibid., p.692.
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regulating expenditure. It would be impracticable to review all the 
elements in the nullification of the Act, yet it is important to 
understand that appropriating and accounting procedures contributed 
notably to the great expansion of expenditure and its contraction 
after 1886.
By 1877 the Auditor-General was complaining that he was "power-
67less to exact compliance with the requirements of the Audit Act".
As the representative of Parliament, he was distressed at the wide 
arbitrary powers assumed by the Executive and the Treasury in regulating 
expenditure and manipulating calls on various sources of funds with 
little regard for formal restrictions imposed by legislation* The 
practice of keeping votes alive indefinitely made effective audit 
impossible, resulted in incomplete accounts and the failure to provide 
at any time an accurate statement of the balances on the public 
accounts. Loan Acts, which both authorised the raising of loans and 
appropriated the proceeds, were supposedly framed to prevent the use 
of the proceeds for purposes not specified by Parliament. But, by 
"advances" from one loan fund to another, and from consolidated 
revenue or trust funds to loan funds, with later "repayments", the 
spirit of the legislation was completely ignored. Further, Parliament 
annually granted the Treasurer an Advance Vote, which was promptly 
paid into a trust fund, operations on it being nowhere disclosed in
67
7th Annual Report of the Auditor-General, N.S.W.V. & P ** 1878-9,
Vol. 2, pp.1009-1010.
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th e  accoun ts . When the  A uditor p o in ted  o u t, in  1886, th a t  th e  advance
v o te  o f £200,000 appeared as £1,248,937 o f ”r e - i s s u e s ” in  the T ru st
68A ccounts, P arliam en t f in a l ly  became alarm ed.
This was not a ll#  P o l i t i c a l  t a c t i c s  f re q u e n tly  delayed the
p ass in g  o f th e  annual A p p rop ria tion  Act u n t i l  th e  f in a n c ia l  y ear was
f a r  advanced, and on th re e  occasions the  Act was not passed  u n t i l  the
y ea r fo llo w in g  th a t  to  which i t  r e la te d .  This was simply a r e s u l t  of
th e  en d less  e f f o r t s  to  em barrass th e  c u rre n t m in is try  by de lay in g
im portan t l e g i s l a t i o n .  Im portant m easures were norm ally d e fe rre d
u n t i l  the  f in a n c ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n  had been d e a l t  w ith , and p o l i t i c ia n s
could  de lay  very  e f f e c t iv e ly  by a rgu ing  fo r  hours on minor item s in
th e  e s tim a te s . O ften , having achieved th e i r  purpose, they would
sa n c tio n  r e la t iv e ly  enormous ex p en d itu re , e sp e c ia lly  fo r  ra ilw a y s ,
69w ith  h a rd ly  any deb a te . While th e  A pprop ria tion  B i l l  remained 
unenac ted , monthly Supply A cts were re s o r te d  to .  These merely g ran ted  
a lump sum equal to  o n e -tw e lfth  o f th e  p rev ious y e a r ’ s ap p ro p ria tio n s  
and th e  d is p o s i t io n  of the  sums was in  th e  hands of the E xecu tive .
What t h i s  meant was th a t  th e  A p p rop ria tion  Act o f te n  d id  l i t t l e  more 
than  confirm  the  expend itu re  a lread y  in c u rre d  under Supply A cts.
68
16th  Annual R eport, i b id . , 1887- 8 , Vol. 3» p p .631-2. See a lso  
p o l i t i c a l  debate  on the r e p o r t ,  N.S.W.V.P.D. , 1885- 6 , V ol.18 , p .6 l0  f f .
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For a running commentary, see th e  Sydney L e t te r s  o f A .I.B .R . An 
example (9 A pril l8 8 l ) :  5$3 m iles  o f ra ilw ay  e x te n s io n s , e stim ated  
to  c o s t £8 m ill io n , were approved ’’a f t e r  very  l i t t l e  deb a te” fo r  the 
p ro p o sa ls  ’’were so framed as to  c o n c i l ia te  a l l  s id e s  of th e  House” ).
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Some glimmer of the possibilities open to the Executive may 
now be appreciated. In the absence of political parties, individual 
politicians or groups of politicians representing neighbouring con­
stituencies could - and did - offer support on the floor of the House 
in return for the placement of items on the estimates for the benefit 
of highly sectional interests. It was no trouble for the Executive 
to add items to the estimates? but whether the expenditure was 
actually incurred was another matter, depending in large part on 
whether political alliances remained stable for any length of time. 
But, over and above all this, was the fact that a large part of total 
expenditure could be incurred without formal parliamentary sanction. 
The Treasury would keep the Executive informed on the effective limits 
to expenditure in the short-run, and the Executive would then distri­
bute the spoils.
The whole approach to expenditure control made a mockery of the 
principle of parliamentary control of the purse. To suggest that 
this was not appreciated in the late seventies and early eighties 
would be misleading, but Parliament as a whole made no effort to 
change matters until the Government admitted in 1886 that there was a 
large deficiency of consolidated revenue, which could be remedied 
only by the imposition of heavier taxation. This announcement, which 
prompted many Members to examine for the first time the recent 
increasingly critical reports of the Auditor-General, led to a very 
unsavoury wrangle over the public accounts and the honesty of the
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T re a su re r . George Dibbs became the ta r g e t  fo r  abuse, be ing  charged 
s p e c i f ic a l ly  w ith  having inform ed P arliam en t o f a huge su rp lu s  when he 
knew th a t  the  revenue accounts were h eav ily  overdrawn and th a t  the 
o v e rd ra f t  was ra p id ly  m ounting. The T reasu re r and Prem ier p u b lic ly  
d isp u ted  w ith  each o th e r as to  th e  tru e  s ta t e  of the b a lan c e s , and 
Dibbs decided  to  t r a n s fe r  blame fo r  h is  m isstatem ent of f a c t  to a 
s e n io r  T reasury  o f f i c i a l .  This le d  to  a s e r ie s  of c o u rt c a se s , a pu b lic  
o u tc ry  a g a in s t the Government and a v io le n t  p o l i t i c a l  upheaval. P o li­
t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  dubbed “p r o te c t io n i s t “ and ’’f r e e  tra d e “ , emerged a t 
th i s  tim e.
71As w il l  be shown in  th e  nex t c h a p te r , the  “p r o te c t io n is t s “ 
favoured  in c re a se d  ta x a tio n  to  keep government expend itu re  a t  h igh  
le v e l s ;  th e  “f r e e t r a d e r s “ demanded th e  c u rta ilm e n t of expend itu re  so 
th a t  New South Wales might remain th e  most l i g h t ly  taxed  colony in  
A u s tra l ia .  The Parkes Government, which came to  o f f ic e  a t  the 
beg inn ing  o f 1887, moved to  implement i t s  e le c t io n  prom ises. These 
in c luded  ta x a tio n  re d u c tio n s , the  c u rta ilm e n t o f ra ilw ay  c o n s tru c tio n  
by stopp ing  work on “p o l i t i c a l “ ra ilw a y s , th e  removal of the Railways 
Department from p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro l and th e  e s tab lish m en t o f a p a r l ia ­
mentary P ub lic  Works Committee to  s c r u t in is e  a l l  p ro posa ls  fo r  works 
ex pend itu re  exceeding £20,000. Thus was expen d itu re  c o n tra c te d  in  
1887- 8.
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For a d is c u ss io n  of D ibbs, see Appendix 2, p p .393-5*
71
See p p .1 3 1 -6 .
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...Parliaments will preach economy, Governments will promise 
it, hut it always amounts to the same thing in the end. Each 
member thinks retrenchment undoubtedly necessary for the country 
as a whole, but draws the line when it threatens his own con­
stituency.
--- Daily Telegraph» 21 October 1893
It is important to realise that during the contraction of
expenditure in 1887-8, government cash balances mounted. Also, as
informed observers appreciated, the long-run expansion of New South
Wales had come to an end, causing unemployment and general pessimism.
The Parkes Government, recognising that its policy of retrenchment
was tending to intensify the contraction of private activity and that
public opinion was opposed to continued retrenchment, gradually
relaxed the restrictions imposed on the expansion of expenditure.
Further, the newly appointed Railway Commissioners reported adversely
in 1888 on the condition of the Government's major undertaking,
claiming that massive outlays in Sydney were essential to prevent the
whole system grinding to a halt through traffic congestion, obsolete
73rolling stock and unsatisfactory tracks. Despite warnings from 
London about adverse trends in the capital market, the Government 
permitted expenditure to expand at a very rapid rate.
^2See Chapter Six, pp. 329-30 and 337-9*
73Railways and Tramways - Quarterly Report of Railway Commissioners, 
December 1888, N.S.W.V. & P ., 1889, Vol. 5, pp.96-7.
84
It is not proposed here to delve into the developments of the 
vital years, 1889-94> owing to their importance for the special 
issues considered in following chapters. All that is required is a 
brief review of political and financial adjustments produced by the 
serious turn of economic events.
In I89I the traditional instability of government in New South 
Wales virtually ended. George Dibbs, head of a group of politicians 
expressing various degrees of belief in protection, formed a govern­
ment with the support of the newly-established Labour Party. Payment 
of Members had been introduced and the majority of politicians elected 
in I89I, whether dubbing themselves ’’protectionist”, "free trade” 
or ’’labour”, represented urban working class interests. Dibbs had 
previously been in political power during the spending spree of the 
eighties and believed firmly that the Government should and could do 
much to offset the contraction of private activity. He was a strong 
leader who moulded an efficient cabinet from not very promising
material. But he was also closely identified with influential
74financial and commercial interests in the colony and came under 
increasing criticism from the parliamentary opposition as the 
representative of wealthy vested interests. His policy of ’’protection” 
(i.e. increased taxation) and contra-depression spending at first 
appealed to the working classes, but his main political opponent,
See Appendix 2, pp. 393-5*
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George Reid, set out to prove that working-class interests did not 
concern the Premier, The ’’proof” was provided through analysis of 
Dibbs' taxation policy: ’’protection” was a misnomer for heavy customs 
taxation imposed as an alternative to taxing the wealthy classes. 
Sensing that public opinion was moving against his policy, Dibbs 
in 1894 made a frantic effort to retrench expenditure and dropped the 
pretence of being a protectionist. Taxation reductions were promised 
and also a change in the incidence of taxation, but by this time Reid 
had won enough support amongst the workers to win an election. His 
budgetary reforms will be considered in the final section.
Dibbs came to power in 1891 primarily through his attack on 
the inconsistency of Henry Parkes. Parkes, author of the retrenchment 
policy of 1887-8, had gradually relinquished the policy and sanctioned 
the heavy expenditure of I89O-I. Dibb3 claimed that employment 
opportunities could be provided much more cheaply than by continued 
investment in railways. Road construction and minor public works 
(financed from revenue) could absorb many men displaced as the 
result of curtailed expenditure on railways. In I892 Labour Commis­
sioners were appointed to register job vacancies in public and private 
undertakings and to direct unemployed men to suitable locations. The 
Commissioners were authorised to issue concession rail tickets, to 
provide tents and blankets, to issue stores at cost price, charter 
coaches for the transport of men to jobs away from the railways and
86
75to ensure that every man had at least ten shillings a week.
Subsidies to charitable organisations were increased and special grants 
were made to municipalities so that the drift of unemployed men to 
Sydney might be arrested.
The depressive forces at work were much more severe than the
Government had imagined possible, and Dibbs quickly recognised that
the growing problems of the time could not be solved solely by the
Government. A Department of Agriculture was formed to promote farming,
76though on a very modest scale. Efforts were made to prevent the
complete collapse of banking and funds were made available to see
77depositors through the crisis period of bank reconstructions.
Machinery was established to deal with industrial disputes: this, like 
the Acts to deal with bank crises, were interpreted, probably correctly, 
as evidence of the Government's increasing tendency to side with 
capital against labour. In 1894 there was political upheaval in the 
colony and George Reid emerged as the champion of the working classes, 
with detailed plans for budgetary reform.
75
For a review of the work of the Commissioners, see their First 
Annual Report, N.S.W.y. & P., 19OI, Vol. 6, pp.375“400.
7 6
The first important step was the establishment of the Hawkesbury 
Agricultural College, although building (which commenced in 1891) was 
not completed until 1896. One or two experiment farms were started and 
the Department concerned itself with essentially long-range projects 
which could have no immediate effect on agriculture in N.S.W.
77
Fundamentally, the Acts of 1893 were designed to meet the special 
needs of the Government. See Chapter 6, pp.341-2.
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Budgetary Reform, 1895-1900
. . . I  say th e re  are fo u r ways to  r e s to re  confidence . The 
f i r s t  i s  by a reform ed system of keeping the  accoun ts; th e  
second i s  by having a proper f in a n c ia l  c o n tro l;  the  th i r d  
i s  by r ig id  and p e r s i s te n t  economy; and th e  fo u r th  i s  by a 
thorough re v is io n  o f our f i s c a l  system .
---- George R eid , 1 8 9 4 ^
R e id 's  Free Trade P a r ty , depending on th e  support o f the  Labour 
P a r ty , came to o f f ic e  l a t e  in  1894 ben t on sweeping reform s. In  the  
next two c h a p te rs , sp e c ia l a t te n t io n  w ill  be given to  R e id 's  reform s. 
For th e  p re se n t i t  w il l  be s u f f ic ie n t  to  draw a t te n t io n  to  th e  main 
fe a tu re s  o f government p o lic y  as the  colony moved towards c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  in te g ra t io n  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f A u s tra l ia .
To see th e se  developm ents in  p e rsp ec tiv e  i t  i s  necessa ry  to 
r e c a l l  th a t  exp en d itu re  had reached peak le v e ls  in  th e  e a r ly  n in e t ie s ,  
a t  which tim e customs ta x a t io n , imposed in  the  name of p ro te c t io n , 
had been s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in c re a se d . Although new investm ent in  ra ilw ay s 
was d r a s t i c a l ly  c u r ta i le d  a f t e r  I 89I ,  many fa c to r s  op era ted  to  p revent 
more than  a token p o licy  o f re trenchm ents amongst th e se  f a c to r s  was 
th e  enormous commitment to  overseas in v e s to rs  in  government lo an s  
and the  huge p u b lic  u n d e rtak in g s  which had to  be m ain ta ined  and 
worked. S u b s ta n tia l re d u c tio n s  in  ex pend itu re  could be made by
Report o f e le c to r a l  m eeting , D aily  T e leg raph , 5 August 1894*
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suspending work on roads and public buildings, by staff reductions 
and lower salaries in the public service and by restricting or sus­
pending grants to charitable and local government organisations.
All these avenues were explored by Reid, whose electoral promise was 
to virtually abolish customs taxation and achieve annually balanced 
budgets.
Reid's policy was calculated to restore confidence and thereby 
encourage a revival of private activity which would take up the 
slack in employment. That it failed in this objective was partly 
accidental - the great drought hindered recovery - and partly the 
result of political conflict. The introduction of a truly free trade 
tariff brought a substantial fall in revenue which was only partly 
offset by the imposition of income and land taxation. This new 
taxation roused the business community to organise for the defeat 
of Reid and his colleagues. At the same time, the Labour Party, 
which was in a position to bring about the Government's downfall by 
a transfer of allegiance to the protectionists, was alarmed at 
the determination of Reid to balance his budget by curtailing expen­
diture through the suspension of public works. Reid was in a dilemma, 
especially when his income tax Bill was successfully challenged in 
court, causing a delay in the collection of taxes. He did what 
all his predecessors had done: absorbed the very substantial trust 
funds for the general purposes of government and manipulated the 
accounts to present evidence of a balanced budget. This way he was
89
able to sustain expenditure at a fairly stable (and high) level and
to satisfy in part the demands of his political alliance* But his
rejection of numerous demands for increased spending to promote
recovery displeased in particular the urban working classes, while
highly critical reports on his financial operations by the Auditor-
General gave the business community the ammunition needed to discredit
79his administration.
Led by George Bibbs and William McMillan, a campaign for "honest” 
public accounting and reporting was waged from 1896 onwards. This 
played into the hands of the protectionist opposition party, which 
was able to demonstrate that*
(1) Free trade could not provide the revenue needed to meet the 
Government's commitments; and
(2) The Reid policy as a whole had failed to restore confidence and 
promote a strong revival of private activity. When the majority of 
N.S.W. electors indicated agreement with these assertions, Reid and 
his free trade policy were rejected in 1899« Protectionists came
to office, and there was no longer a major obstacle to the federation 
of the colonies, as had exited when New South Wales alone had remained 
in favour of free trade. But it was also generally accepted by then 
that events had proved conclusively that the N.S.W. Government, acting 
alone, could not bring about a rapid revival of economic activity. 
Joint-government action was regarded as essential to cure the ills of 
time.
^'See Pp.150-1.
Chapter Two
FREE TRADE AND LIMITATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT’S USE 
OF ITS TAXING POWERS
1. Taxation and the Free Trade "Tradition”, 1855-1864
2. The Idealisation of Free Trade and the Curtailment of 
Expenditure, 1865-1873
3* Free Trade, Land Sales and Borrowing, 1874-1883
4* "The Thin End of the Wedge of Protection", 1884-1886
5. Free Trade and Retrenchment, I887-I89O
6. The Pretence of Protection, I89I-I894
7* Free Trade and Direct Taxation, 1895-1900
********
Free trade "is a fine, large, comprehensive, beneficent doctrine, 
something like Christianity, and we see a great many different 
sects, and if you put Adam Smith's bible into the hands of different 
men, they will do as they do with another bible. They will take 
different meanings out of it".
--- Sir Patrick Jennings, N.S.W.P.D., 1885-6, p.l853
"New South Wales has now definitely decided upon the freest of free- 
trade. Prior to the passing of the new Customs Duties Act she was 
the most lightly-taxed colony in Australasia.... But even the 
'revenue tariff' of New South Wales is to go."
--- A.I.B.R. editorial, 19 December 1895
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Intro due tor.y
It was suggested earlier that the N.S.W. Government was con­
fronted in heightened form by a universal problem. That problem 
was stated to be the reconciliation of demands for greater expendi­
ture with demands for extremely light taxation. In the previous 
chapter evidence was produced to indicate the very marked growth 
of the government sector and it was observed that each break in the 
long-run rising trend of expenditure coincided with serious political 
conflict over taxation. The opportunity arises now for a close 
examination of taxation throughout the period, with special attention 
to its bearing on the exploitation of non-tax sources of funds and 
the short-run breaks in the upward trend of expenditure.
One fact needs emphasis at the outset: the history of taxation 
in this period is essentially a matter of customs taxation and 
attitudes to free trade and protection.^" By general agreement, 
Australian tariff history is an important field of academic enquiry.
At the same time, in proportion to the amount of attention it has 
attracted, it has yielded little in the way of contributions to 
an understanding of the role of government in the development of the 
Australian economy. One economic historian has recently criticised
1
Revenue from taxation in the 45 years surveyed amounted to 
approximately £74 million, of which no less than £55 million came from 
customs duties. Excise produced about £5 million, stamp duties about 
£7 million, licences about £4 million and other taxes (gold, land 
and income) about £3 million.
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severely the conventional attention to tariff policy as a reason
for under-estimation and misrepresentation of government intervention 
2in the economy. This viewpoint, which also underlies the present
thesis, does not imply that tariff history is no longer worthy of
attention. Nor does it mean that one should dismiss as irrelevant the
doctrinal assertions of leading N.S.W. politicians, who resisted
attempts to follow Victoria into thorough-going protection. Through
study of phases in the development of taxation policy, it is possible
to gain some insight into the bearing of the free trade doctrine on
government interference with the market mechanism.
Minor changes in taxation policy and minor sources of tax
3revenue are ignored in this chapter." On the basis of significant 
tax adjustments, the period needs to be subdivided as follows!
(1) 1855-64; (2) 1865-73; (3) 1874-83; (4) 1884-86; (5) 1887-90;
(6) 1891-94; and (7) 1895-1900» Before pursuing developments in these 
sub-periods, it is necessary to emphasise certain basic points:
(l) Taxation represented between one-half and one-third of total 
net receipts until the early seventies, but thereafter represented 
only one-fifth or less of the total. (This is brought out in Figure
3, p.17).
2
See N.G. Butlin, ’’The Shape of the Australian Economy, I86I-I9OO”, 
The Economic Record, Vol. 34» No. 67 (April, 1958)> p.14*
3
Similarly, it is not proposed to discuss the border customs dispute. 
For a recent discussion of this, see G.D. Patterson, ’’The Murray River 
Border Customs Dispute, 1853-1880”, Business Archives and History,
Vol. 11, No. 2 (August 1962), pp.122-136
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(2) Although per capita expenditure increased threefold over the 
whole period, per capita taxation displayed no long-run tendency to 
increase; in fact, it was lower in the second half of the nineties 
than in the second half of the fifties. (See Figure 13)*
(3) Free trade implied limited use of the tariff as a source of 
funds, while opposition to taxation generally was so strong as to 
greatly restrict the use of other taxes.
(4) By standards elsewhere in Australia, very slight modifications 
of the tariff to increase revenue produced major political conflicts.
(5) These conflicts invariably involved choices between further 
taxation increases, curtailed expenditure (at least under certain 
categories) or the exploitation of other sources of funds.
(6) The fact that whenever possible the Government chose to exploit 
non-tax sources of funds in preference to curtailing expenditure was 
basically responsible for the long-run expansion of the government 
sector at the expense of the private sector. Through borrowing, 
management of the Crown lands to secure the largest possible revenue, 
manipulation of bank balances and other techniques, the Government’s 
intervention in the economy became increasingly pervasive and 
important.
- 1-
Taxation and the Free Trade ’’Tradition”. 1855-1864 
In I85I, customs taxation was the principal source of funds. 
There were specific duties on spirits and tobacco and ad valorem
FIGURE 13 94
EXPENDITURE & TAXATION PER HEAD OF PO PULA? I PIT, 
1836-1900 (Current Prices, Semi-log. Scale)
(A) Total Net Expend, per head
(B) Total Tax Rev. per head
(C) Total Customs Rev. per head
(Arrows indicate timing of major controversies 
over taxation policy)
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duties on most other imports, goods from Britain paying two per 
cent and goods from other countries paying ten per cent. Protection 
had been espoused with some strength at various times, especially 
during the depression of the forties, and some duties had been
imposed quite explicitly to afford a measure of protection to local
4industries. The separation of Victoria from New South Wales, 
followed by the discovery of gold, led to a review of tariff policy.
In 1852 Edward Deas Thomson, Colonial Secretary and a doctrinaire
5freetrader, framed a new tariff on the basis of free trade and no 
preference to British imports. This tariff was amended in 1855 and 
remained basically unaltered until 1865. The need to increase the 
revenue by the latter year was so pressing that the colony had to 
agree to what was regarded as serious interference with the tradition 
of free trade. In this section, it is proposed to look briefly 
at the evolution of the free trade tradition, its implications for 
government finance as a whole and the factors forcing a review of 
policy in the mid-sixties.
4
Colonial distillation and sugar refining developed behind the 
protection of customs duties.
5
For an account of Deas Thomson’s free-trade background and influence, 
see J.A. La Nauze, ’’Merchants in Action: The Australian Tariffs of 
1852”, The Economic Record, (Vol. 31? 1955)? especially p.80 ff.
96
TABLE 4
Gross Taxation Receipts , 1888-64 - £ ’000
Year Customs Excise Licences Other Total
1855 422 52 44 24 542
6 471 51 50 60 632
7 533 63 66 29 691
8 557 51 69 61 738
9 612 54 69 66 802
1860 555 44 68 54 721
1 585 39 72 65 761
2 609 35 74 88 806
3 616 51 75 57 799
4 538 26 75 36 675
SOURCE: Public Accounts. For refunds and net receipts, see 
Table 12 (Part 2), Appendix 1.
(a) Taxation and the Struggle By comparison with any later
for Self-government
period of the nineteenth century, 
New South Wales was quite heavily taxed in the 1840s. Apart from 
customs duties on almost all imported goods, shipping was subjected to 
a range of imposts (fees on entry and clearance, registration, 
wharfage, lighthouse and harbour dues, etc.). Goods sold at auction 
were subject to duty and there were market and fair dues, tolls, 
licence fees of many kinds and an assessment on stock. In 1840 a 
proposal was seriously entertained to impose a poll tax on servants 
and this stimulated a growing and sustained campaign against taxation.
6
The moderate Sydney Gazette indicated general reaction in the 
comment (6 June I840): “Will the Colonists of New South Wales consent 
to direct taxation, without representation?.... If our DEAREST AND 
BEST FRIENDS in Downing-street, find you willing to impose taxes upon 
yourselves, without claiming any voice in the disposal of those taxes, 
they will not trouble you with any alteration in your form of 
Government.M
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Depression, which caused a serious decline in customs revenue,
forced the Government to intensify efforts to stamp out smuggling
and temporarily surrender control of the Customs Department to the
imperial authorities. At the same time, the colony was granted a
new constitution, which provided for the establishment of District
Councils authorised to levy local taxes to finance local services.
Additionally, many charges (for example, police and gaols) were
transferred from imperial to colonial funds. Colonial reaction was
extremely bitter, talcing the form of a fight for control of the land
revenue, opposition to the District Councils and any taxation
increases and a determination to win responsible government.
7As indicated in the previous chapter, one consequence of the 
depression was a heavy reduction in most categories of public expendi­
ture financed from taxation. Laizzez-faire attitudes took root 
in the forties and were well established by the mid-century. Strong 
support for assisted immigration (financed from the land fund) from 
most leaders of colonial society rested on several grounds, one of 
which was that a rapid increase in population would permit a gradual 
easing of taxation. It was not unexpected, therefore, that when 
the British Government separated Victoria from New South Wales in 
I85I and set the Legislative Councils to work on new constitutions, 
tariff policy should come immediately under review.
See pp. 40-2.
7
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(b) The Gold Rushes and Free The discovery of gold in I85I did
Trade
not immediately lead to a flush
of imports, but colonial legislators were convinced that there would
be rushes, a rapid influx of population and, hence, a rapid gain in
customs revenue* With these expectations, Deas Thomson was bound to
win strong support for a policy of free trade, if only because this
meant a considerable diminution in tax imposts.
Next to the governor, Thomson was the dominant figure in public
affairs. He was also cautious and had a keen appreciation of the
rapidly developing need to frame policies in consultation with
interested sections of the community. He framed a tariff in 1851
without ad valorem duties, but with specific duties on a wide range
of items. This he submitted to the Sydney Chamber of Commerce for
advice. Years later, he noted that his 1852 tariff had been fully
considered before being submitted to the legislature, and he had
’’always great pleasure in acknowledging that one principal merit of
that tariff, viz., the small number of articles liable to duty, was
due to the Chamber of Commerce of that day. As originally framed
by himself, in 1851, it was defective in that respect; he had recast
o
it in conformity with their suggestions". He had also removed many 
other irritants tD shipping (water police rates, lighthouse rates, fees 
for entry and clearance, etc.). His aim, he claimed at the same time,
8~
Thomson, speaking in the Legislative Council on a new tariff Bill, 
Herald, 23 December I863.
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was to remove the element of compulsion in the payment of taxes.
The customs duties (on spirits, wine, beer, tobacco, tea, coffee
and sugar), he regarded as ’’voluntary taxes, self-imposed, and such as
the working classes might abstain from if they chose.... But even
if they were to abstain from the duty-paid articles, they had another
resource at their command - the consumption of wine, beer and tobacco
of colonial production, none of which articles were liable to any duty 
a
whatever”. Excise duties of 3s. 6d. a gallon were payable only on 
colonially distilled spirits.
It will be recalled that the colony experienced from 1853 a specu­
lative import boom which came to an end with a balance of payments crisis 
in 1855« It will be recalled also that these were the years in which 
government expenditure increased dramatically and in which the Govern­
ment’s range of commitments was significantly enlarged. Starting 
in 1853> in fact, expenditure increased more rapidly than customs 
revenue and by late 1854 it became necessary to augment the revenue.
In that year, duties on spirits were increased steeply (the duty on 
brandy, for example, rising from six to nine shillings a gallon).
In 1855» it was clear that further increases in the tariff must be 
made and the free trade policy encountered its first serious challenge. 
This was when Deas Thomson emerged as the great champion of free trade.
9
Loc. cit
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(c) The Peas Thomson It needs to be understood that
Tariff of 1855
in 1855 borrowing, which had
commenced in earnest in 1853, was becoming increasingly difficult, just 
as the colony was getting accustomed to heavy expenditure on public 
works.^ In other words, funds from taxation and loans were dimini­
shing at a time when government expenditure under all classes was 
rising. In July 1855> the Governor-General (Denison) submitted a 
lengthy financial minute, proposing both increased expenditure and 
greatly increased taxation.^ He suggested that the Council should 
decide between:
(a) Ad valorem duties on all imports;
(b) Ad valorem duties on all luxuries;
(c) A general increase in the existing duties.
There is no need to delve into the debates on taxation in 1855* 
Thomson expressed himself as inflexibly opposed to re-imposing 
ad valorem duties on the grounds that these encouraged importers to 
practise fraud and were the traditional instrument for protecting 
minority interests at the expense of the majority. He admitted that 
additional revenue must be secured, but argued that this could be 
achieved by a judicious selection of articles to be subjected to 
higher duties. The obvious choice for higher duties were spirits.
TÖ
For further discussion, see Chapter Three, pp. 161-4*
11
See David Blair (ed.), Speeches of Henry Parkes (Melbourne, 1876),
PP*49- 50•
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In order to ensure that the revenue was not affected by a rapid
increase in colonial distillation, he proposed to increase the excise
duty on spirits to 6s. 5^» a gallon. Minor increases in duties on
articles already in the schedule were proposed. After a good deal
of discussion, the new tariff was sanctioned, with maximum rates of
10s. a gallon on brandy and gin and lesser rates on wine, beer, tea,
12sugar (and sugar products), coffee, cigars and tobacco.
The tariff of 1855 was generally regarded as a personal victory 
for Deas Thomson, approved by many members of the Legislative Council 
only with grave misgivings about its adequacy in the face of mounting 
government expenditure. There was no question of any widespread 
support for protection in New South Wales at this time. Those who 
thought that it was too early to adopt fully the principle of free 
trade were troubled about the tendency to charge more and more expendi­
ture items to loan funds instead of to the ordinary revenue. Whereas 
in Victoria loans were raised almost wholly for ’’reproductive” public 
works, in New South Wales it was rapidly becoming customary to finance 
all sorts of public works from loans and even to charge maintenance 
expenses to loan accounts. The confirmation of free trade as the 
policy of the N.S.W. Government in 1855» despite the fact that the 
Government currently found it necessary to secure advances from banks
12
The full schedule, and all other changes in customs duties in 
the period surveyed may be found in Customs Handbook, 1896: For the 
Use of Officers of Customs (Sydney, 1896).
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in the colony, was vitally connected with the decision at this time
13to approach the London capital market for funds. Taxation was to 
remain at very low levels, borrowing was to increase and, because 
the local loan market was proving incapable of meeting the Govern­
ment's needs, hopes were to be pinned on London capitalists. It was 
confidently predicted by Deas Thomson and his supporters that the 
Government's decision to continue following the lead of the mother 
country in tariff policy would contribute to a favourable reception 
for colonial loan issues in London. Thus, at a key point in the 
colony's public financial development, the decision was taken to 
exploit another source of funds in order to restrict government inter­
ference in commerce.
(d) The First Parliament and The elections for the first
the Question of Taxation
Parliament brought home to many
politicians the fact that wage-earners throughout the colony believed 
that they were unfairly taxed - that free trade was seen as an 
instrument for benefiting the wealthy classes at the expense of 
the poorer. In the highly unsettled condition of political life 
in 1856, it was to be expected that men struggling to gain or hold 
office would seek to allay the criticisms and fears of the workers.
The thinking which emanated from the first Parliament is important, 
not because it brought any change in policy, but because it gave
See Chapter Three, pp. 162- 4 *13
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currency to the view that free trade must inevitably involve resort 
to direct taxation.
The Governor-General’s address to the first Parliament sought 
to prepare the Members for increased taxation. ’'Should the exigencies 
of the country demand increased taxation,” Denison said, "care will 
be taken that such additional burthen shall be so distributed as not 
to bear with undue pressure upon any particular class of the 
community”. S t u a r t  Donaldson, delivering the first financial state­
ment, apologised for having to advise that "the old Government” had
bequeathed a deficit of £150,000 which had to be dealt with as a matter 
15of urgency. "It is vain", he went on, "to increase the existing 
tariff in the expectation of improving the revenue.... The revenue 
of a country should be raised in proportion to the amount of benefit 
each party in the State receives and enjoys through the protection 
afforded them by the Government.... Early next year, if the present 
Ministry remain in office, we intend to bring forward a scheme of 
taxation which will fall principally upon property, as we consider 
that mode of raising a revenue the more equitable one, and by this 
means we hope to relieve the labouring classes from the prospects of 
imposts".
The ministry did not remain in office and, although lip-service 
was paid to the ideal of "free trade and direct taxation", Parliament's
14Herald, 24 May I856.
^ Herald, 7 November 1856.
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solution to the existing difficulty was to authorise the issue of 
Treasury Bills to cover the deficit. As will he demonstrated here­
after, on all later occasions when the revenue proved deficient, 
Parliament fell hack on the issue of Treasury Bills, discussed at 
length the desirability of introducing direct taxation and, until 
George Reid broke with tradition, amended the tariff to produce more 
revenue rather than resort to income and land taxes.
(e) Free Trade and the Public Figure 14 shows the course
Finances9 I856-I864
of customs revenue and the total
value of recorded imports in current prices. ^  It will be observed 
that imports rose rapidly to a peak in I864 and then fell abruptly 
and that customs revenue increased very much more slowly, falling 
sharply in 1864. Expenditure was increasing rapidly and, as is shown 
in Figure 15> balances on the consolidated revenue fund were declining 
from the i860 peak-level, becoming debit amounts in 1863-65. The 
free trade policy was heading for another major challenge.
Few contemporaries disputed the assertion that the free trade 
policy greatly stimulated commerce, especially the re-export trade.
But another factor contributing to the rapidly rising volume of 
imports was persistent overseas borrowing by the Government. This 
borrowing, of course, carried with it an increasing interest commitment
16
The figure employs a technique adopted by Albert H. Imlah, to 
indicate the extent of the tariff adjustment at various stages. See 
Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica (Cambridge, Mass., 1950)> p.159*
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abroad, to be met in practice very largely from customs revenue.
In fact, government expenditure as a whole was increasingfer more 
rapidly than revenue, so that important financial adjustments were 
rapidly becoming essential.
(f) "New Principles of In September 1863, the Government
Taxation", 1863-64
admitted reluctantly that estimates
of revenue adequacy had proved "unduly hopeful" and that a serious
17deficiency seemed inevitable. A new Treasurer, Geoffrey Eagar, 
rocked the colony with his proposals for balancing the budget and a 
major controversy ensued. At this point, it is proposed simply to 
indicate the nature of the measures proposed by Sagar, his failure to 
win approval for those measures and the expediencies adopted. In 
the next section, the taxation adjustments of 1865 will be examined 
in some detail.
It is worth noting that Sagar’s predecessors, like Treasurers 
at all later periods of budgetary crisis, sought to allay suspicions 
that there was cause for concern about the state of the finances.
In 1863 the Premier, the Minister for Lands and the Treasurer each 
presented quite different assessments of budgetary prospects. Eagar 
excused them on the score that the public accounts were in such an 
unsatisfactory condition that no one could state precisely what was 
the position with regard to the finances. On assuming office, he drew
See Financial Statement of T.W. Smart, Herald, 4 September 1863»
17
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on an im pressive  background in  accountancy to  e s ta b l is h  the  f a c t
i  o
th a t  th e  e s tim ated  d e fic ien c y  fo r  1864 was £904>000. He in d ic a te d
th a t  the  cho ice fa c in g  P arliam en t was between d r a s t ic  retrenchm ent
(and c e r ta in  d i s t r e s s  to  w orkers who would have to  be d ism issed)
and in c re a se d  ta x a t io n . His c o lle ag u es) he c laim ed, had no id e a  how
exp en d itu re  could be reduced , so th a t  new ta x a tio n  must be imposed.
E ag a r’s main p ro p o sa ls  were fo r  the  im p o sitio n  of stamp d u tie s
and th e  re - im p o s itio n  o f ad valorem d u tie s  (o f  5) 6 and 10 per c e n t ) . ^
H ere, in  E agar’ s view , was a p o licy  f u l ly  in  accord w ith  the  ’’f r e e
tra d e  and d i r e c t  ta x a t io n ” o b je c t iv e , m odified  to  meet the  p re ss in g
needs o f th e  Government. The L e g is la t iv e  Assembly supported  the
p ro p o sa ls  by a s l ig h t  m a jo r ity , bu t the  Free Trade A sso c ia tio n  and the
in f lu e n t i a l  Sydney Morning H erald sought to  have th e  p ro p o sa ls  r e je c te d
20in  the  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. The Free Trade A sso c ia tio n  d ec la red !
1. That a l l  laws which r e s t r i c t  le g i t im a te  commerce are 
wrong in  p r in c ip le  and in ju r io u s  to  the i n t e r e s t  of the  
community.
2. That the  f i s c a l  p o licy  of th i s  country  should tend  to  
d ecrease  r a th e r  than  to  in c re a se  th e  number of a r t i c l e s  su b jec t 
to  Customs d u t ie s ;  and th e  im p o sitio n  o f a system of D ire c t Taxa­
t io n  in  the  event of any augm entation o f revenue being  r e q u ir e d . . . •
18
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f G eoffrey E agar, 2 December 1863, Thomson, 
F in a n c ia l S ta tem en ts« pp.111-113.
19
He a lso  proposed p o s ta l charges on newspapers and a reform  of borrow­
in g  p o licy  ( in c lu d in g  the  e stab lish m en t o f a s in k in g  fu n d ).
20
D ec la ra tio n  o f the  N.S.W. Free Trade A sso c ia tio n , 2 February 1864.
The f u l l  te x t  i s  reproduced in  C.M.H. C lark ( e d . ) ,  S e le c t Documents in  
A u s tra lian  H is to ry , 1851-1900 (Sydney, 1955)) p .263.
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5» That Taxation should he imposed in such a manner that 
no honest industry should be restricted, but every man left 
at perfect liberty to conduct his lawful business in the way 
he thinks best for his own interests....
6. That protective duties of any nature or kind whatever, are 
taxes upon the earnings of the many to increase the profits of 
the few, and are a sacrifice of the consumer to the exclusive 
benefit of the producer.
7. That the abolition of restrictions on commerce, as a means 
of cheapening the cost of living to the working classes, is 
the only legitimate method by which the Legislature can assist 
industry and foster manufactures....
Petitions were presented to the Upper House making these points
and, although other petitions urged the Council to support Eagar's 
21proposals, the Herald and Deas Thomson carried the day in the 
Council. The Herald argued that MThe colony looks with confidence 
to the Legislative Council to save the country from a tariff which 
has forced its passage through the Assembly thus far, in defiance of 
public opinion, of mercantile warnings, and, we may add, in violation 
of the declared views of many who have supported it.... The tariff, 
as now offered, invades and compromises principles which involve the 
interests of the colony for all time to come.... There is found in 
the tariff avowedly a new principle of taxation, one which is
21
Typical of the ‘'favourable*' petitions was one dated 10 February 
1864, claiming that Eagar's proposals "will save the necessity 
of recourse being had to more obnoxious and oppressive drains on 
our domestic resources.... The imposition of direct taxes ought 
not to be attempted until it is found that indirect taxation 
through the Customs is no longer to be depended upon as a means 
for raising a sufficient revenue.... (The) principles of free 
trade are not applicable to this Colony in its present condition". 
(See L.C. Journal, 1863-4» Vol. 10, Part 1, p.5^7* )
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professedly the initiation of a new system of government. It is
22the thin edge, to he followed by the whole weight of protectionism'*.
In the Legislative Council, Deas Thomson bitterly attacked the
new measures, while admitting that the need for additional revenue had
23been demonstrated clearly:
In this respect a mere knowledge of arithmetic and accounts 
becomes entirely subordinate to the higher qualifications 
necessary to form a sound opinion and to exercise a wise dis­
cretion in settling the proper legislative measures for increasing 
the revenue. A thorough acquaintance with the principles of 
political economy, a study of Britain’s great progress in this 
field, a just appreciation of local interests as they are likely 
to be affected by any change in the commercial policy which has, 
since the introduction of free trade principles by the tariff 
of 1852, so largely contributed to the general prosperity - are 
severally questions which must not be ignored...•
Thomson's recommendation was that the current problem should be met
by Ma temporary loan in the shape of exchequer or Treasury bills",
followed by a gradual increase in the duties on articles already in
the tariff schedule. Agreeing with this, the Council rejected the
tariff Bill and the Assembly had to reconsider the position.
The Assembly required little prompting to resort to Treasury
24Bills to meet the deficit. As will be shown later, these bills 
were only partly taken up in the colony, the bulk being forwarded to 
London, where their arrival was the signal for a loss of confidence
22
Editorial, 3 February 1864*
23
Notes for an address, Deas Thomson Papers, Vol. 4> pp.436-7*
24
See Chapter Three, pp. 186-8.
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in the Government’s stock generally, a rapid rise in the yield on 
new issues and extreme difficulty in disposing of both debentures and 
Treasury Bills. Government expenditure was sustained at high levels 
(the progress of public works not being affected) mainly because 
the Oriental Bank gave the Government relatively enormous overdraft 
facilities in London, while colonial banks reluctantly granted short­
term credits. At the same time, the Treasury was reorganised, 
important new accounting procedures were adopted and efforts were 
made to regulate spending under votes by the main departments (es­
pecially the railways). The public finances rapidly deteriorated and 
by 1865 it was impossible to defer action on new taxation any longer.
- 2-
The Idealisation of Free Trade and the Curtailment 
______________of Expenditure, 1868-73___________
It was generally - and probably correctly - assumed that the 
operation of the free trade tariff, together with the development 
of railways and other communications facilities, stimulated the 
expansion of private activity in the second half of the fifties and 
the first half of the sixties. In the second half of the sixties 
and the early seventies, it was widely believed that the Government 
paid too little attention to the needs and problems of private enter­
prise, thereby intensifying rather than countering the effects of 
bad seasons and low export prices. The Government’s taxation policy 
was the major source of grievance. Rather than reduce expenditure
112
in l865> stamp duties and ad valorem duties were imposed and borrowing, 
on very unfavourable terms, was stepped up. Promises to reduce taxa­
tion and ’'return to the principles of free trade" were made but not 
kept. As customs revenue remained almost stationary from 1866 to 
1871, in a period when the annual interest commitment was increasing 
rapidly and when loan redemptions could not be avoided, overseas 
borrowing had to be curtailed and progress on major public works slowed 
down. Reduced capital inflow and falling export prices added to the 
difficulties of the colony at a time when seasons were particularly 
adverse. A balance of payments crisis in I87O led to a further deficit 
on the consolidated revenue fund in 1871, forcing the Government to 
curtail expenditure and again increase taxation. In this section, 
it is proposed to look briefly at the taxation levies of the period, 
the political conflict and the increasingly urgent need to satisfy 
the demands for greater expenditure (especially on public works) and 
for a light revenue tariff.
TABLE 5
Gross Taxation Receipts, 1865-73 - £'000
Year Customs Excise Stamps Licences Other Total
1865 636 38 34 78 31 817
6 829 35 66 79 27 1036
7 783 41 63 78 25 990
8 848 45 62 78 25 IO58
9 839 36 67 78 25 1045
1870 854 30 65 78 22 1049
1 860 29 78 76 27 1070
2 975 24 94 80 35 1208
3 1128 37 95 83 29 1367
SOURCE: Public Accounts. For refunds and net receipts, see Table
12 (Part 2), Appendix 1.
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(a) The Taxation Increases In the middle of 1865 Parliament
of 1865-66
passed Acts imposing stamp duties,
a "package duty", and providing for an increase of 20 per cent in the
duty payable on most items in the tariff. By legislation early in
1866, action taken by the Executive in December I865 was legitimised!
this involved the repeal of the 20 per cent increase in specific duties
and approval of ad valorem duties of five per cent on all articles not
currently subject to duty. The resulting increases in the revenue
25
may be seen in Table 5 and. Figure 16. J These were clearly changes 
of some moment, and it is desirable to give some indication of the 
way in which the relevant Bills were presented to Parliament in 
order to win sufficient support for their enactment.
The colony had assumed that, when Eagar and his ministerial 
colleagues were defeated early in I865 on their policy for balancing 
the budget, nothing more would be heard of the proposed "tampering 
with free trade". In March I865, however, T.W. Smart advised that 
the Government could not place debentures either in London or locally, 
that the bank overdrafts were increasing rapidly, that there seemed 
no way of reducing expenditure and that, accordingly, taxation had
26to be increased. "A large amount of money", Smart announced, "must
go by the next mail to meet our liabilities in London, whilst at the
23
It will be appreciated that an exaggerated scale has been employed in 
Figure 16 to facilitate recognition of the taxation adjustments.
26
See Thomson, Financial Statements, p.127 ff«
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present time I have the greatest difficulty in providing for current
demands in the Colony. I question whether, if it had not been for
the indulgence of two of the banks I would not be justified in saying
that the Government would have had to 'shut the doors'.... By
management on the part of the Government, and with the support of this
House, and the assistance of the banks, I have no fear but that the
finances of the country will, in a very short time, be placed on a 
27sound footing". Bills imposing a duty of one shilling on each 
package imported and an increase of 20 per cent on all items subject to
duty were framed for a currency of two years only: in this way support
was secured for what were called emergency measures only.
Announcement of the proposed measures led to an immediate rise 
in customs revenue, simply because importers hastened to withdraw 
stocks from bond. When the increased duties came into effect in June, 
customs revenue fell. The Premier (Charles Cowper), on the resignation 
of the second of the Treasurers of his ministry, faced Parliament
in December with the news that the budgetary situation was still
deteriorating. It had become essential, he said, to resort to ad 
valorem duties to improve the revenue. "If we are to construct rail­
ways and pay £370»000 a year interest without any adequate receipts; 
if our Postal Department involves us in a loss of £40,000 a year; if 
we are to carry electric telegraphs all over the colony which do not
Ibid., p.128.
27
116
pay quite so well as we have been led to suppose; if we cannot make
any large reduction in the Public Service, we must have some additional 
28taxation.”'1' What had to be done was to widen the net, to subject all 
articles currently duty-free to ad valorem duties of five per cent.
The day after this announcement, the new duties came into force, 
thereby taking the mercantile community by surprise. On 19th January 
1866 the tariff was legalised and two days later the ministry was 
voted out of office.
(b) The Taxation Increases It is hardly necessary to demon-
of 1871
strate the bitterness which the
tax increases of 1865-6 engendered and the controversy which raged
unchecked until the early seventies. There was support in the colony
for the ad valorem duties and James Martin (Premier, 1866-8 and I87O-I,
who favoured protection) frequently justified retention of the duties
2Qwith evidence of increasing manufacturing employment. But the
28
Ministerial Statement of Charles Cowper, Herald, 21 December I865.
29
Martin had been the only opponent of Deas Thomson's free trade 
tariff in I852 and remained a firm believer in protection. His 
Treasurer (Sagar) supported ad valorem duties simply because they 
produced the greatest revenue. Martin’s supporters included several 
avowed protectionists, who tried to have ad valorem duties of 20 per 
cent imposed to encourage native industries. Martin and Eagar would 
not agree, because duties on such a scale would seriously reduce 
the revenue. Martin used the statistician's estimates of ’’factories 
and works” to prove that duties of five per cent were sufficient to 
stimulate some import-replacement production. These figures showed 
an increase in the number of factories from 96O in 1865 to 1,919 in 
1872. (it is, of course, useless to place much reliance on these 
estimates as a guide to manufacturing employment).
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influential Press, the Chamber of Commerce and most politicians 
waged an unceasing campaign for taxation reductions and a return to 
free trade as it operated before 1865. When the tariff was again 
increased in 1871, Henry Parkes determined that the electorate should 
decide once and for all whether New South Wales was to follow Victoria 
into protection or pursue an independent line on tariff policy.
The circumstances leading up to this appeal to the electors deserve 
attention.
Reference to Figure 15 will show that credit balances on con­
solidated revenue were achieved in 1866 but that these balances 
declined persistently thereafter. The taxation increases of 1865-6 
alone were not responsible for the correction of the debit balances 
of l863~5: apart from the issue of Treasury Bills, a short-term 
"deficiency loan" of £800,000 was raised in 1865-6, repayable by 
annual instalments from 1867« Borrowing for public works continued, 
so that the Treasury was confronted with the facts of a rapidly 
increasing interest commitment and the frequently recurring need to 
effect redemptions. The Government had shown little real inclination 
to retrench and, as customs revenue failed to increase, a rapid 
deterioration of the finances was inevitable. This meant that 
taxation reductions were impossible and that borrowing for public 
works in the late sixties could only result in even greater strains 
on ordinary revenue. Overseas borrowing was greatly curtailed after 
1868 and work on the trunk lines of railway was slowed down.
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In  I 869 th e  c u rre n t T reasu rer claim ed th a t  th e re  would he no
re tu rn  to  the p r in c ip le s  of f r e e  tra d e  u n t i l  owners o f p ro p erty
became l i a b l e  fo r  ta x e s . " I  ask , what does p ro p e rty  in  t h i s  country
pay fo r  the p ro te c t io n  which i s  accorded to  i t ?  I t  pays n o th in g .
The p o o re s t man in  th e  country  c o n tr ib u te s  as much as the w e a l t h i e s t " .^
E a rly  in  I 87O firm  p ro p o sa ls  were in tro d u ced  fo r  a ta x  on incomes of
£200 and upwards, the revenue to  o f f s e t  t a r i f f  re d u c tio n s , mainly
31through the  a b o l i t io n  o f the  ad valorem  d u t ie s .  The p rop o sa ls  were 
c o n te s te d  b i t t e r l y  and le d  to  th e  dow nfall o f the Cowper m in is try .
M artin  re tu rn e d  to  o f f ic e ,  "proved" th a t  income ta x a tio n  would be a 
poor s u b s t i tu te  fo r  customs ta x a tio n  (m ainly on th e  grounds o f c o lle c ­
t io n  c o s ts )  and secured  approval fo r  in c re a se s  in  th e  duty payable
32on many a r t i c l e s  in  the  c u rre n t t a r i f f .
I t  i s  im portan t to  reco g n ise  th a t  the  t a r i f f  in c re a se s  o f 1871 
in  New South Wales fo llow ed the f i r s t  e f f e c t iv e  s tep s  towards p ro te c ­
t io n  in  Queensland (1870) and V ic to r ia  ( l8 7 l)>  each of which faced  
s im ila r  budgetary  problems to  those  co n fro n tin g  the  N.S.W. Government. 
A lso, th e  c u rre n t N.S.W. Prem ier (M artin) was coming out more 
s tro n g ly  th an  ever in  favour of p ro te c t io n . P o l i t i c s  were extrem ely
30
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f Saul Samuel, Thomson, F in a n c ia l S ta tem en ts ,
p .228 .
31
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent of Saul Samuel, 17 February 1870, i b i d . ,  
p p .252-5.
32
For d e t a i l s ,  see Customs Handbook ( 1896) ,  p.49*
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u n s e t t le d ,  as might he expected in  a pe rio d  of economic re c e s s io n , 
and sev e ra l f a c t io n s  were ju g g lin g  fo r  power. Henry P arkes, in  
o p p o s itio n , was w ell aware th a t  h is  p e rso n a l p re s t ig e  would in c re a se  
ra p id ly  i f  he could cap tu re  the  support o f Sydney*s m erchants and the 
working c la s s e s .  He had sev e ra l v e rb a l weapons a t h is  d is p o s a l ,  
e s p e c ia l ly :
(1 ) The f a c t  th a t  government employees had su ffe re d  heavy lo s s e s  
of wages in  1871 (an average re d u c tio n  o f te n  per c e n t) ;
( 2 )  Employment on p u b lic  works had been g re a t ly  c u r ta i le d ;
( 3) M erchants were very  d is g ru n tle d  w ith  the  t a r i f f  p o licy  and were 
a lso  concerned a t  the  Government’s f a i lu r e  to  do anyth ing  to  a r r e s t  
th e  flow o f th e  R iv e rin a  wool t r a f f i c  to  M elbourne.
Parkes knew very w ell how to  s a t i s f y  the  m a jo rity : r e tu rn  to
f re e  tra d e  and undertake  a ” s p i r i t e d  programme o f p u b lic  works” .
Since th i s  im plied  g re a t ly  in c re a se d  c a p i ta l  expen d itu re  to g e th e r
w ith  reduced ta x a t io n ,  the  only way o f ach iev ing  th e  o b je c t iv e s  was
33to  e x p lo it  th e  Crown la n d s . As w il l  be shown in  Chapter Pour,
Parkes had been adv ised  to  take  t h i s  course some y ears  e a r l i e r  by 
a very  i n f l u e n t i a l  f ig u re  in  th e  London c a p i ta l  m arket. The f a c t  
th a t  he was not the  only le ad in g  p o l i t i c i a n  w ith  th i s  c lue  to  a 
so lu tio n  i s  a t  p re se n t im m ate ria l. Parkes in  1871 was p repared  to  
storm  around the e le c to r a te s  of New South Wales developing  a v is io n
See P .191.
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of prosperity unlimited on the basis of a government policy of free 
trade and heavy expenditure on public works. The sort of argument 
he employed may be readily found in the literature,^ and need not be 
developed here.
Parkes became Premier for the first time in 1872, dominating an 
Assembly whose members represented various interests in the following 
proportions:"^
Agricultural ........... 5*1$
Pastoral................ 24*0$
Mercantile.............. 27*8$
Manufacturing..........
Mining................... 5*1$
Service. . ............. 1.31°
Professional ........... 19*0$
Trades.................  6jo
Other.................... 12.6$
By this time, wool export prices were rising rapidly and the demand 
in Sngland was greater than ever before. By administrative action, 
the Robertson Land Acts of 1861 were made to yield a mounting revenue 
which solved all the Government’s financial problems. A start on the 
second major phase of railway construction was possible without even 
the need for immediate overseas borrowing and it was possible to pay 
off all the "deficiency debt". In 1873 the ad valorem duties were
34
See, especially:
(1) Henry Parkes, Speeches on Various Occasions Connected with the 
Public Affairs of Hew South Wales (Melbourne, 1876);
(2) Henry Parkes: Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History 
(London, I892), esp. Vol. 1.
35
A.W. Martin, Political Groupings in New South Wales, 1872-1889 
(Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1955)> P*45*
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abolished and in the following year the Stamp Act was not renewed.
Parkes always claimed - and many historians have accepted the
claim at face value - that he alone was responsible for the IT.S.W.
decision to accept free trade when other colonies were becoming
irremediably committed to protection. Sir Hercules Robinson, the out>
spoken Governor, told Parkes that his name ’’will live as a ’household
word’ in the homes of those who labour, and will be remembered with
the same affection and gratitude which surrounds the name of Sir
Robert Peel in the Old Country”. ^  John Robertson was more to the
point with his comment that ”It was the operation of the land law...
that enabled the Government and the Parliament to abandon the ad 
37valorem duties.”
-3-
Free Trade, Land Sales and Borrowing,
___________ 1874-1883__________
The freetrade policy continued with only isolated and weak
challenges from 1874 to 1883. Free trade (without income and land
taxation) and a high and rising level of expenditure were possible
simply because the Government exploited to the full the Crown Lands
and, when these could not yield sufficient revenue, turned to the
London capital market for funds. The Government's public works
36
Robinson to Parkes, 16 November 1873> Parkes Correspondence 
(Mitchell Library, Sydney), A927, p.164.
37N.S.W.P.D., I885-6, Vol. 19, p.1884. (Figure 17 shows the truth 
of this assertion).
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programmes had th e  e f f e c t  of d r iv in g  up wages, w hile  the r e la t iv e ly  
low customs d u tie s  added l i t t l e  to  the  co s t of im p o rts . The stan d ard  
o f l iv in g  o f N.S.W. w orkers may w ell have been the  h ig h e s t in  the  
w orld in  th i s  p e r io d . C e r ta in ly , p o p u la tio n  from o th e r co lo n ie s  
was a t t r a c t e d  to  New South W ales, and in  l8 8 l the  T reasu rer could 
suggest th a t  th e  tim e was approaching when people from Europe would
39Mcome out in  thousands to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  the  b le s s in g s  we p o sse ss" . 
Henry P a rk es , S ir  H ercu les Robinson and o th e r prom inent p u b lic  f ig u re s  
were accustomed to  a sc r ib e  th i s  p ro s p e r ity  to  th e  f r e e  tra d e  p o licy
- ) 0
o f the  Government b u t ,  as should be q u ite  c le a r , f r e e  tra d e could
have been no more than  one of many 1c o n tr ib u tin g  f a c to r s .
TABLE 6
Gross T axation  R ece ip ts , 1874-83 -  £*000
Year Customs E xcise Stamps L icences Other T otal
1874 951 45 101 86 17 1200
5 974 40 5 89 14 1122
6 1012 46 - 94 9 1161
7 1075 48 2 101 7 1233
8 1149 44 - 110 7 1310
9 1112 44 2 112 3 1273
1880 H 89 44 72 112 - 1417
1 1394 69 193 116 - 1771
2 1480 79 228 117 - 1904
3 1547 12 215 118 - 1892
SOURCE* P u b lic  A ccounts. For re funds and n e t r e c e ip ts  see Appendix
1 , Table 12 (P a r t  2)
38
See N.G. B u tl in , "C o lon ial Socialism  in  A u s tra l ia ,  1860-1900" in  
A itk en , op. c i t . , pp•73-4•
39
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f James Watson, 15 November 1881, N.S.W.P.D. 
Vol. 6, p .1994.
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In this section it is proposed to indicate in summary form 
the sequence of financial adjustments underlying the retention of 
the free trade tariff.
(1) The wool boom which commenced in 1871 was exploited by the Govern-
40ment through its control of land sales. As revenue poured into the 
Treasury, the "deficiency debt" was wiped out, the ad valorem duties 
were abolished, the Stamp Act was not renewed, yet cash balances 
mounted rapidly.4^
(2) The second major phase of railway extensions commenced without an 
immediate need to float large loans and expenditure under all cate­
gories began to rise rapidly. Parliament sanctioned large outlays 
from loan funds but many of the authorised loans were deferred as the 
Treasury drew on cash balances, adjusting the accounts in terms of 
"advances" from consolidated revenue to loan funds. Even so, cash 
balances rose from £1.6 million in 1874 to £3*5 million in 1877» and 
the Government became progressively less interested in attempts to 
make railways pay their working expenses and interest on loans. Rate 
reductions were made.42
(3) In 1878-9 land revenue fell. Cash balances declined rapidly as 
expenditure continued to mount. The Treasury decided to raise a very
40
See Chapter Pour, pp. 269-74*
41
See Chapter Six, pp. 329-30 and 337-9*
42
See Chapter Five, pp. 319-20.
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43large loan in London to augment cash balances and the Government 
proposed additional taxation to meet a threatened deficit in the 
consolidated revenue fund.
Pearing that the decline in land revenue would continue 
indefinitely, the Treasurer (Watson) urged the sanctioning of pro­
posals "to equalise the revenue and expenditure".^ Since the 
(Parkes) Government was committed to the preservation of free trade, 
and considered it "undesirable" to impose land and income taxes, 
alternative taxes had been considered. These were: (a) a new Stamp 
Act, imposing a probate duty of one per cent; (b) slight increases in 
customs duties on luxury items and in excise duties on colonial 
spirits; (c) an export tax on wool and coal; and (d) a tax on 
horned cattle and horses. There was very little opposition to (a) 
and (b) and the measures were passed, but the other proposals were 
condemned and ridiculed. Parkes rose to the defence of his Treasurer 
in a speech in which he asserted that his government could not go 
to the customs for essential revenue ("a matter of principle") and
felt that income and land taxes would be too expensive to collect 
45and too unpopular. The Government’s enormous expenditure on
43
See Chapter Three, pp. 208—10.
44
Financial Statement, 10 December 1879> N.S.W.P.D.» Vol. 1, 
p.547 ff.
45
Debate on the financial statement, ibid., Vol. 3> p.2928 ff.
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ra ilw ay s  and o th e r s e rv ic e s , he added, had done much to  r a is e  the
v a lu e  o f land  and the incomes of people engaged in  p a s to ra l  and
m ining e n te r p r i s e s .  I t  was, th e re fo re ,  ju s t  th a t  th e se  people should
accep t an o b lig a t io n  ” to  c o n tr ib u te  fo r  the  g re a t advantages the
a  6
S ta te  has given them". The p a rliam en ta ry  m a jo rity  f a i l e d  to  see the 
wisdom or ju s t i c e  o f th e  p ro p o sa ls  and the  export and s to ck  tax es  
were n o t in tro d u ce d . The Government had o th e r ways o f secu rin g  the  
n ecessa ry  funds.
(4) By r a is in g  a lo an  o f over £3 m ill io n  in  London, funds were 
provided  to  r e - c r e d i t  th e  co n so lid a te d  revenue fund w ith  sums 
‘’advanced'’ to  lo an  funds in  e a r l i e r  y e a rs . This loan  c o n tr ib u te d  
to  th e  co lony ’s recovery  from a b r i e f  re c e s s io n  and was one f a c to r  
in  th e  s tro n g  re v iv a l o f demand fo r  Crown la n d s . Revenue from a l l  
so u rces , b u t most n o tab ly  from the la n d , in c reased  qu ick ly  as boom 
co n d itio n s  developed.
- 4 -
"The Thin End o f the Wedge o f P ro te c t io n ” , 1884-6
The land  revenue amounted to  £1 .6  m ill io n  in  l880 bu t in  the  
nex t two y ears  averaged £2 .8  m ill io n . This expansion o f th e  lan d  
revenue qu ick ly  pushed ta x a t io n  out of the  p o l i t i c a l  l im e lig h t and 
allow ed th e  Government to  con tinue  w ith  i t s  spending sp ree . Although
I b id . , p.2933*
46
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the majority of politicians had been happy to escape from the painful 
task of sanctioning either heavy taxation increases or reduced 
expenditure, the brief recession had brought out strongly how heavily 
the Government depended on land revenue. From 1878 there was a 
mounting campaign to end the "wholesale alienation of the public 
estate”. Leading opponents of the well-entrenched Parkes-Robertson 
government played up the need for land reform, promising (if elected) 
to offer little land for sale and to reform the Robertson Acts. 
Alexander Stuart came to office at the beginning of 1883, immediately 
placed a strict limit on land auctions and introduced new legislation. 
This action was taken before efforts were made to discover the 
attitude of Parliament to additional taxation to offset the reduced 
land revenue. By 1884 the Government was in trouble with its finances 
and the colony was confronted with drought and falling export earnings. 
From I884 to 1886 political conflict over government expenditure and 
taxation policies reached fever-point, political parties emerged, 
protection was strongly advocated and the purpose of government 
activity as a whole came in for close scrutiny.
A fall of £1.3. million in land revenue in 1883 was the 
direct consequence of administrative action, but a relatively low 
level of revenue in following years was due to the ending of the 
wool boom and falling export earnings. Since government expenditure 
was expanding at a rapid rate when the decision was taken to slash 
the land revenue, borrowing was stepped up immediately. By the
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TABLE 7
T axation  and Land R ece ip ts  and Balances on C onso lidated  
______________ Revenue Fund, 1882-86 -  £ '000______________
(A) Gross Taxation  R ece ip ts (a )
(B)
(C)
Tear Customs E xcise Stamps L icences T otal
1882 1480 79 228 117 1904
3 1547 12 215 118 1892
4 1727 80 226 120 2153
5 1760 116 254 123 2253
6 2069 110 308 125 2612
Gross Land Revenue
Year S ales Leases T otal
1882 2455 459 2914
3 1269 387 I 656
4 1363 390 1753
5 1314 562 1876
6 1206 438 1644
B alan ces , C onso lidated  Revenue Fund, December 31
Year Balances
1882 3889
3 2511
4 1229
5 3
6 -1287
SOURCE: P u b lic  Accounts.
(a )  For re funds and n e t r e c e ip t s ,  see Appendix 1 , Table 12.
(b ) For re funds and n e t r e c e ip t s ,  see Appendix 1 , Table 13»
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end of 1884 - in the contemporary terminology - all advances to 
loan funds had been recredited to consolidated revenue. What this
meant, of course, was that substantial increases in taxation had been
avoided by formally using loan proceeds for current expenditure. Sven
so, balances on consolidated revenue were declining rapidly and the
Government's policy of raising huge loans in quick succession in
London could only result in an even greater strain on consolidated
revenue (on which the interest commitment was a primary charge).
Pears were widespread that heavy increases in taxation were imminent.
The Stuart government, when announcing the decision to restrict
land sales in 1883, had made it clear that a major revision of
taxation policy was inevitable. Early in I884 George Dibbs, the
Treasurer, informed the Legislative Assembly that the time had come
to "compensate the revenue" for the loss involved in the new land 
47policy:
...the Government declines to arrest the prosperity of the 
colony, the development of its resources, by suspending those 
great public works which are absolutely essential to our 
growth and progress.... There was, of course, a very simple 
way open to the Government of tiding over the temporary 
difficulty now existing. They had only to suspend the progress 
towards the completion of numbers of important works to find 
themselves in the possession of abundant means...they had only 
to resort to a variety of moves of that kind to have saved me 
the necessity of asking this Committee to grant additional 
taxation.•.• We do not desire that the country should stand 
still but that it should go ahead.
47
Financial Statement of G.R. Dibbs, 24 January 1884, N.S.W.P.D., 
1883-4, Vol. 11, p.1450.
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The tim e had come, he added, to  f u l ly  adopt f r e e  tr a d e , th a t  i s ,  
to  fu r th e r  reduce customs ta x a tio n  and compensate the  revenue by 
th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f a p ro p e rty  ta x .
48A month l a t e r ,  Dibbs again  made a f in a n c ia l  s ta tem en t:
Among th e  b e s t  su p p o rte rs  o f the Government th e re  i s  and th e re  
was a s tro n g  and a m an ife s t o p p o s itio n  to  the  proposed p ro p e rty -  
ta x . The O p p o sitio n , o f co u rse , gave us c le a r ly  to  understand  
th a t  they  were opposed to  th e  p ro p e r ty - ta x , and indeed to  any 
form o f ta x a t io n  w hatever. Among our own f r ie n d s  and su p p o rte rs  
a lso  th e re  i s  the  same marked ex p ress io n  -  which we could no t 
shu t our eyes to  -  th a t  the  p ro p e r ty - ta x  was repugnant to  the 
H o u se ...«  (B ut) I  hope th a t  I  may y e t have the  o p p o rtu n ity  to 
g ive  e f f e c t  to  my f r e e  tra d e  id e a s .
Dibbs then  proposed , and P arliam en t approved, ex c ise  d u tie s  on 
tobacco , c ig a r s  and c ig a r e t t e s  and im port d u tie s  on c ig a r e t t e s  and 
s te a r in e .  He to ld  P arliam en t th a t  p ro sp ec ts  were b e t t e r  than  a n t i ­
c ip a te d  and th a t  the Government would probably  be ab le  to  make ends 
meet w ithou t any a d d itio n a l ta x a t io n .
A fa m ilia r  p a t te rn  o f budgetary  problems was u n fo ld in g . D irec t 
tax es  were no t a ccep tab le  to  P arliam en t and th e re  was s t i l l  no 
in c l in a t io n  to  c u r t a i l  government ex p en d itu re . Cash ba lan ces  in  
th e  banks were run down and re p le n ish e d  by o v erseas borrowing on 
a s c a le  unpreceden ted  in  A u s tra lia n  h is to r y .  M isleading  s ta tem en ts  
about the s t a t e  o f the  fin a n c es  were made by D ibbs, who c le a r ly  hoped 
th a t  the  heavy inflow  of B r i t i s h  c a p i ta l  would have a s t a r t l i n g
48
Supplem entary F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f G.R. D ibbs, 20 February 1884, 
H.S.W .P.D. ,  1883-4, Vol. 11, P.1902.
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e f f e c t  on th e  customs revenue. There i s  no doubt th a t  i t  d id  have 
such an e f f e c t ,  fo r  customs revenue mounted w hile expo rt ea rn in g s  
f e l l  h e a v i l y .^
H is to r ia n s  agree th a t  the  y ea rs  from I 884 to  1886 were o f
sp e c ia l  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  the p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  o f New South W ales.
50Trade un ion  o rg a n is a tio n  on a n a tio n a l le v e l ;  the  fo rm ation  o f
51ra d ic a l  a s s o c ia tio n s  to  b r in g  p re ssu re  to  bear on p o l i t i c i a n s ;  and 
th e  emergence of ’’f r e e  tr a d e '1 and ’’p r o te c t io n i s t11 p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
im plied  im portan t p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  ad justm ents to  changing 
economic c o n d itio n s . Government ta x a t io n  p o l ic ie s  dominated a t te n ­
t io n ,  se rv in g  as a b a s is  fo r  a m ajor re a p p ra is a l  o f the purpose of 
government a c t i v i t y .  In  l im ite d  space , l i t t l e  more can be a ttem pted  
than  a b r i e f  review  o f the ch a llen g es  to  the  f r e e  tra d e  p o lic y .
When P arliam en t r e je c te d  the m in is try ’s p roposa l fo r  a p ro p e rty  
ta x  in  I 884, o rg a n is a tio n s  o u ts id e  P arliam en t were formed to  vo ice  
e f f e c t iv e ly  th e  p r o te s ts  o f some s e c tio n s  o f th e  community. The 
Democratic A llian ce  and o th e r ra d ic a l  groups campaigned amongst
49
Export ea rn in g s  in  I 883 were a t a peak le v e l  of £20.3 m il l io n . 
T h e re a f te r :
1884 -  £18.6 m.
1885 -  £16.8 m.
1886 -  £15.7 m.
(Source: S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g is te r ).
50
See Robin G o llan , R ad ica l and 'Working C lass P o l i t i c s :  A Study of 
E as te rn  A u s t r a l ia , I 85O -I9IO (M elbourne, i 960) ,  p p .86-95*
51
See A.W. M artin , "W illiam  McMillan -  A Merchant in  P o l i t i c s " ,  
J o u rn a l, R.A.H.S. , Vol. XL, 1954, p .201 .
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workers, farmers and lesser manufacturers, arguing that New South 
Wales was not democratically governed because merchants, hankers and 
pastoralists determined what government policy should be and whose 
interests were to be safe-guarded. N.S.W. trade unions were deter­
mined to preserve the working conditions and standard of living
achieved in the seventies and early eighties, but in I884 were not in
52favour of protection. While the Government pursued its massive 
public works programme, financed by British capital, unionists were 
willing to support free trade. But by 1885 it was becoming obvious 
that government policy was not capable of countering the serious 
effects of a prolonged drought, falling export earnings and a 
relatively low level of private investment. It was also placed 
beyond doubt in 1885 that government spending could continue at 
current levels only if heavy taxation increases were made. Thus, 
taxation policy came under consideration from two angles: first, 
as a weapon for establishing a new economic policy; and, second, 
as an alternative to expenditure reductions in order to balance the 
budget. The politicians were inevitably caught up in a tangle of 
conflicting proposals, objectives and expedient solutions to a 
pressing problem.
The signal for political conflict throughout the colony was 
the reluctant admission by the Treasurer, Bibbs, that the Government
Gollan, op. cit., p*95*
52
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was facing the largest deficiency on consolidated revenue since 
the beginning of responsible government. This led to the resig­
nation of the Premier, Stuart, in October 18855 his replacement by 
Dibbs; the resignation of Dibbs in December and his replacement by 
John Robertson, wI10 gave way to Sir Patrick Jennings in February 
1886. During this parliamentary upheaval, the Free Trade Association 
was formed to counter the growing movement towards protection in 
the colony. Overseas borrowing continued unabated, a considerable 
proportion of the capital borrowed being applied to current expenditure 
claims. Each of the rapidly changing ministries proposed new 
taxation before losing support in the House. When Jennings assumed 
office in 1886, Parliament was informed that there could be no further 
evasion of the truth: the community as a whole must shoulder relatively 
heavy burdens in order to ’’preserve the honour” of the colony abroad. 
The Government must go to the Customs for a great deal of additional
revenue and, at the same time, income and land taxation must be 
53introduced.
Jennings submitted his policy to the Assembly in the form of 
taxation proposals which were approved in toto by a slight majority. 
Immediately, Bills were introduced and lengthy debate commenced.
As soon as the Customs Duties Bill was read for the first time, the 
Government took steps to have the new schedule brought into operation
N.S.W.P.D., I885-6, Vol. 19, P.I85I ff.53
(7 April 1886). It was not until the end of September that this
action was legitimised. Prom April the number of articles subject
to specific duties was doubled and ad valorem duties of five per
cent were re-imposed on many articles. Throughout 1886, Parliament
debated the new tariff and the Land and Income Tax Bills. The
Income Tax Bill was withdrawn by the Government and the Land Tax
Bill was defeated in the Upper House. As had occurred on similar
previous occasions, the debate in Parliament centred on the ad valorem
duties and the old familiar question of free trade or protection.
(in the course of the debate, approval was given for increases in
stamp duties, on a sliding scale, as "a token” of Parliament's
willingness to alter the incidence of taxation).
As was to be expected, the re-imposition of ad valorem duties
was blown up as a serious threat to the traditional free trade
policy of the colony. Henry Parkes charged Jennings with having
inserted "the thin end of the wedge of protection”, to which Jennings
54replied:
It is all very well to get up and deliver essays on free-trade; 
it is all very well to get up and utter homilies and speeches 
on abstract principles which might as well be delivered before 
a debating society for all the practical application they have 
to the immediate object in view.
That object was the correction of a deficit of between £1 and £2 
million. Jennings continued:
134
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We had to provide for that, and our primary object in providing 
for it was to sustain the honor and credit of the country, 
and to show before we went on with great and expensive works, 
and before we went into the markets of the world for a fresh 
loan, that we had provided by fresh taxation for the ordinary 
revenue of the country.
There ensued the wildest parliamentary session in N.S.W. history.
The Government brought pillows and blankets into the House and
arranged to have supporters awakened for 3nap divisions. There could
be no serious assertion that the Government had "gone protectionist",
but Parkes took the line that the five per cent ad valorem duties
were introduced at the instigation of the ministry’s "protectionist
masters" outside Parliament and could be increased hereafter at any
time for protectionist ends. The influential Press strongly supported
55Parkes in comments like this: '
The position now stands thus: the thin edge of the protectionist 
wedge has been inserted by treachery and the maul is attempted 
to be seized by brute force.
As 1886 drew to a close, it was clear that the next elections
were to be fought on the straight issue of free trade or protection.
It has been well said that "The new extra-parliamentary organisations
swung into action, and, interpreting the multitude of traditional
political issues in the light of opposing tariff policies, they
succeeded in squeezing the old factional squabble into some semblance
56of a two-party contest".
55
Daily Telegraph editorial, 13 July 1886.
56
A.W. Hartin, loo, cit.■ p.202.
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Free Trade and Retrenchment, 1887-1890
"The elections have resulted in a signal triumph for Sir
57Henry Parkes and Free Trade," it was reported in March I887.
Thirty-seven metropolitan constituencies returned only one avowed
protectionist; eighty-seven country constituencies returned thirty-
eight protectionists. There was, therefore, a large majority
favourable to free trade, the only real break with tradition being
the presence in the Assembly of a noisy group of country politicians
voicing protectionist arguments at every opportunity. Parkes had told
the electors, "In meeting the old, mouldy, worn-out, empirical doc-
58trine of Protection, we face it as deadly enemies". He promised 
to abolish the ad valorem duties, reduce specific duties and transfer 
many items to the free list, introduce land and property taxation, 
implement a policy of retrenchment and remove the railways depart­
ment from political control.
Attention needs to be drawn to three aspects of Parkes' policy 
in 1887-8 , brought out in Table 8:
(l) The abolition of ad valorem duties reduced the customs revenue;
57
"Our Sydney Letter", A.I.B.R., 15 March 1887, p.l80.
58
Address to the electors of St. Leonards, 25 January 1887, Parkes, 
Fifty Years...of Australian History, Vol. 11, p.l84*
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TABLE 8
Gross T axation and Land R ec e ip ts , 1886-90 -  £ ’000
(A) Gross T axation  R eceipts^
Year Customs E xcise Stamps L icences T otal
1886 2069 110 308 125 2612
7 2012 204 322 126 2665
8 1883 260 410 130 2682
9 1906 261 380 130 2677
1890 1888 266 461 133 2748
(B) Gross Land Revenue
Year S ales Leases T o tal
1886 1206 438 1644
7 1222 1158 2380
8 1212 1056 2268
9 1149 988 2137
1890 127 6 968 2244
SOURCE: P u b lic  Accounts
(a ) For re funds and n e t r e c e ip t s ,  see Appendix 1 , Table 12*
(b) For re funds and n e t r e c e ip t s ,  see Appendix 1 , Table 13*
* ■ * * *
( 2 ) Revenue from ex c ise  d u tie s  in c re a se d  because d u tie s  were 
r a is e d  o s te n s ib ly  to  p rev en t lo c a l  in d u s tr ie s  develop ing  under the 
p ro te c tio n  o f customs d u t ie s ,  no m a tte r how l i g h t ;
(3 ) Revenue from p a s to ra l  le a s e s  was n early  tr e b le d  in  1887 ,
fo llo w in g  a determ ined  b id  to  e x tr a c t  from the  s q u a tte rs  funds to
59o f f s e t  red u c tio n s  in  customs tax a tio n *
See Chapter Four, pp. 289- 91*
59
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Most of the financial adjustments in this period are better 
considered in later chapters and for the present it will be 
sufficient to note a few points which should be kept in mind as 
bearing on the next - and most significant - challenge to free trade, 
in 1891.
From one angle, these four years were important in bringing
Parkes, his "soft goods party"^ and the free trade doctrine into
growing disrepute with the working classes. There is no doubt that
the Parkes policy of free trade and retrenchment offered some stimulus
to private economic activity in 1887-8, but there was unemployment
and a fairly widespread belief that the colony was passing through 
6la depression. In these two years, private new capital formation
62was higher than at any time since l88l,v' although it was not on a 
scale to compensate for the rapid decline in public investment from 
the peak level of 1885-6. It was noted in the previous chapter that 
the Government felt bound to do something about unemployment in 1887 
and also decided to suspend assisted immigration.
6Ö
This was the epithet applied by the Opposition and radical journals 
like the Bulletin: it implied an identification of the Government’s
interests with the colony's merchants.
61
See, for example, A.I.B.R.» 1888, p.874* "It is high time for 
our Government to better itself by pushing on reproductive works in 
order to counteract the depression which mantles the colony..."
62
N.G. Butlin, Private Capital Formation, p.139«
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Discontent amongst the working classes could not he ignored.
When the electors went to the polls in 1889» New South Wales 
was, without any doubt, depressed. Although the elections once more 
were fought on the issue of free trade or protection, two related 
issues loomed large in the arguments of all candidates. These were 
the issues of retrenchment and direct taxation. It soon became 
apparent that retrenchment was unacceptable to either of the parties 
and that the real division of opinion was on the question of how the 
Government might increase the revenue. ‘'It was a commonplace of 
the political discussion of the time that the squatters supported 
the Protectionists in the hope of concessions in land matters, and 
supremely in order to avoid a land tax, to which many Freetraders 
were now prepared to resort for revenue".^ Parkes and his colleagues 
returned to office, with a good deal of support from the working 
classes. Their arguments had won the day:
(1) Free trade meant lower prices;
(2) Increased expenditure would be planned to counter unemployment;
(3) If additional revenue proved to be needed, land and income 
taxes would be introduced. In the meantime, overseas borrowing 
would be stepped up.
As was shown in the previous chapter, the retrenchment policy 
was abandoned and the Government entered upon another expenditure
£3
33. Mansfield, "Party Organization in the New South Wales Elections 
of February, I889", Journal R.A.H.S.t Vol. 41, 1955» P*72.
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sp ree  which c a r r ie d  ex p en d itu re  to  a peak fo r  th e  cen tu ry  in  1891.
No s e r io u s  e f f o r t  was made to  augment the  revenue by land  or income 
ta x a t io n ,  borrow ing in  London became im p o ssib le , the  G overnm ents 
cash  b a lan ces  were run  down to  dangerously  low le v e l s ,  y e t c o n tra c ts  
were l e t  fo r  sev e ra l m ill io n s  o f pounds o f p u b lic  works. In  I 89I  
new ta x a t io n  could  no t be avoided. The q u estio n  to  be decided  was 
w hether th i s  revenue should be c o lle c te d  through th e  Customs o r by 
r e s o r t in g  to  lan d  and income ta x e s .
- 6-
The P re tence  o f P ro te c t io n , 1891-94
In  June 1891 g en era l e le c t io n s  were h e ld . L e g is la t io n  fo r  
th e  payment o f Members having  been passed  by the  p rev ious P a rliam en t, 
400 can d id a te s  p re sen ted  them selves to  th e  e le c to r s .  They in c luded  
f e d e r a t io n is t s  and a n t i - f e d e r a t io n i s t s ,  p r o te c t io n is t s  and f r e e t r a d e r s ,  
lab o u r can d id a te s  and s in g le - ta x e r s .  Parkes and the Free Trade P a rty  
re tu rn e d  to  o f f i c e ,  bu t w ith o u t an ab so lu te  m a jo r ity . T he ir ten u re  
o f o f f ic e  depended on the  support of the  new Labour P a r ty , which 
had dropped the  p r o te c t io n is t  p lank  of tra d e  union p o lic y . This p a r ty  
soon l o s t  confidence in  P a rk es , o s te n s ib ly  over h is  d e c is io n  to  
re g u la te  coal mines in  o rd er to  avoid s t r ik e s  and o th e r d is p u te s . In  
October Parkes re s ig n ed  and George Dibbs formed a m in is try  accep tab le
64to  the  Labour P a r ty . An observer w rote:
^"Our Sydney L e t t e r “ , A .I .B .R ., 18 November I 89I ,  p*879*
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Although as a whole the Ministry is an avowed Protectionist 
one, seeing that it does not embrace any of the ultra-democratic 
members of the late Opposition, it is as strong a one as could 
have been looked for, and is hardly likely to be more amenable 
to the ’squeezing’ of the labour party than the previous one..*. 
The Ministry have announced their intention to shelve the 
federation question for the present, and to confine the business 
of the first session to finance, considering that the cost of 
minor public works should be paid for out of revenue, to meet 
which it will be necessary that a large additional amount shall 
be raised by taxation. It is proposed that this shall be raised 
through the Customs, and that such import duties should be 
imposed as are consistent with their declared policy of protec­
tion, and with financial requirements. Following out the usual 
custom, the incoming Ministry have discovered, by a re-arrangement 
of figures, that the finances of the colony are in a deplorable 
state.
One or two points about the sincerity of ’’protectionist” 
politicians need to be made. George Dibbs, their leader, stated in 
1887i65
...I am a free-trader myself.... I shall not be a free-trader 
to-day, and a protectionist to-morrow. I hope to be consistent.
Five months after saying this, Dibbs was elected leader of the 
protectionists. To political observers throughout Dibbs’ turbulent 
political life, there was never any question of his accepting the 
doctrine of protection. Like Parkes, he was an opportunist highly 
skilled in exploiting doctrines for political ends. Other protec­
tionists in Parliament varied enormously in the emphasis they gave 
to the protectionist doctrine. John See, Dibbs’ Treasurer, remarked:
°^Debate on the financial statement, N.S.W.P.D. 1 8 8 7 , Vol. 25, p.667* 
Financial Statement, 14 December 1892, ibid., Vol. 6l, p.2710.
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We have a ffirm ed  th e  p r in c ip le  of p ro te c t io n , because our 
f r ie n d s  o p p o site  have c a l le d  i t  by th a t  name. Some hon. 
members on our s id e  o f the  House do no t c a l l  i t  p ro te c t io n .
They a re  no t s a t i s f i e d  w ith  what we have done as a measure 
of p ro te c t io n . But here  l e t  me p o in t out th a t  a t r u ly  p ro te c ­
t iv e  t a r i f f  would no t g ive  us revenue. We know th a t  p e r fe c t ly  
w e ll.
There i s  no doubt w hatever th a t  the  s o -c a l le d  p r o te c t io n is t  
ep isode  in  N.S.W. p o l i t i c s  (1891-94) was an e f f o r t  to  s u s ta in  expen­
d i tu r e  a t  very  h igh  le v e l s  in  a p e rio d  of severe  d ep ress io n  w ithout 
r e s o r t in g  to  land  or income ta x a t io n . As had occurred  so many tim es 
p re v io u s ly , when th e  Government could not or would no t c u r t a i l  
c u rre n t e x p en d itu re , reco u rse  was made to  the  Customs fo r  th e  a d d itio n a l 
revenue needed. That i s  what happened in  1891, and i t  rem ains ju s t  to  
sk etch  in  th e  sequence of even ts  le ad in g  to  the  d e fe a t o f the 
“p r o te c t io n i s t s ” .
TABLE 9
Gross T axation  R ece ip ts  and B alances on C onso lidated  
____________Revenue Fund. 1891-94 ~ £*000_____________
(A) Gross T axation  R ec e ip ts^5 '
Year Customs E xcise Stamps L icences T o ta l
1891 2168 288 327 133 2916
2 2678 290 350 133 3450
3 2128 266 312 130 2835
4 2066 258 297 125 2746
(B) B alances, C onso lidated  Revenue Fund, December 31
Year B alances
1891 -  332
2 -  484
3 -  911
4 -1000
SOURCE: P u b lic  Accounts.
(a )  For re funds and n e t r e c e ip t s ,  see Appendix 1 , Table 12.
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On 2 December I89I a new tariff came into effect, with 
relatively heavy specific duties on a long list of articles and ad 
valorem duties of 10 and 15 per cent on many others. Figure 14 and 
Table 9 show how effective the tariff was in augmenting the revenue 
in 1892 and how ineffective thereafter as imports fell away. In 
December I89I the Government had outstanding public works contracts 
valued at £4*2 million, despite the fact that after the Baring 
crisis it was known that borrowing in London would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. The Dibbs Government made little 
effort to scale down expenditure to accord with conditions of severe 
depression. Export earnings fell, aggravating serious balance of 
payments problems. Unemployment grew worse and protests multiplied 
about the effect of the tariff on the prices of retail products.
The Government was unable to demonstrate that the tariff was 
effectively operating to nurture native industries. Dibbs came in 
for bitter criticism as the representative of the banks and 
pastoralists, with no sympathy for the working classes or commercial 
interests.
In an effort to counter some of the criticism, Dibbs abolished 
the duty on tea - a source of much grievance - and amended the Stamp 
Act to exempt estates under £200 from duty. This was in I892. In
7^
•'Loan Funds - Liabilities on Government Contracts”, N.S.W.V. & P., 
1891-2, Vol. 2, p.853.
144
the following year Parliament was advised that the Government was
considering an income tax, hut knew it would he opposed hy the free-
68traders. An Income Tax Bill was duly introduced and duly opposed
bitterly hy the freetraders, who claimed that the Government (with
a majority of three) did not have the confidence of the country and
69were not prepared to reduce customs taxation. "Our object,"
reported the Treasurer, "is to obtain revenue, and we obtain it from
that class which can best afford to contribute directly towards
70carrying on the business of the state". What the Government had
to do, according to the Opposition, was to economise and reduce
taxation, not place new burdens on the country. Debate dragged on
in both Houses month after month, until it became obvious that the
measure would not become law. In 1894 Dibbs decided to slash the
expenditure as a prelude to taxation reform. He then appealed to
the Governor to appoint nine new members to the Upper House so that
a future attempt to introduce direct taxation would be successful.
71The Governor refused and Dibbs resigned.
68
Debate on financial statement, N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, Vol. 62, p.3779* 
("Free-traders talk about direct taxation, but the moment there is an 
attempt made to introduce direct taxation, the free-traders say it 
is in the wrong place").
69
N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, Vol. 63, P.4279 ff.
70
Ibid., p.4218.
71Details are in Dibbs Papers (Mitchell Library, Sydney), Set 132, 
correspondence between Dibbs and the Governor (Duff).
145
Free Trade and Direct Taxation, 1895-1900
- 7-
George Reid, who had been wooing working-class voters for a
couple of years, moved in 1894 to establish free trade as working-
class policy. "The battle between protective policy and direct
taxation is going to be fought out next election, no matter what
clever schemes are laid for the intrusion of other issues. In the
settlement of that question labor is supremely interested, and the
72workers will have to speak out this time.” The workers responded
78enthusiastically to this type of arguments
The freetrade party has shabbily repaid the magnificent 
support it received from the electors of New South Wales.
It has tried to do impossible things - to enjoy the blessings 
of freetrade without the burdens of direct taxation. I fear 
that when the time comes to carry out the policy to its 
legitimate conclusion, freetrade will become much less 
fashionable than it is in certain quarters.... The fortresses 
of capital will have to be challenged, powerful vested 
interests will have to be accustomed to pay what they owe 
to the State. We freetraders have lived long enough on the 
glories of our theory, and must put it into practice at the 
earliest possible opportunity - and that means a pulling down 
and rebuilding of the fiscal policy of the country.... The 
day for talking about and politically living upon freetrade 
principles without honestly carrying them out is about over now. 
Freetrade is an impossibility without direct taxation, and we 
have shrunk from direct taxation.... When the monied classes 
have to pay their fair share there will be a chance for real 
downright economy in the public expenditure.
72
Policy statement of G.H. Reid, Daily Telegraph, 5 August 1894*
73
Loc. cit.
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The w orkers s h i f te d  t h e i r  a lle g ia n c e  from p r o te c t io n is t s  to  the 
"new look" Free Trade P a rty , Reid swept in to  o f f ic e  w ith  a la rg e  
m a jo rity  and a d e f in i te  mandate to  reduce customs ta x a tio n  and impose 
lan d  and income ta x e s .
TABLE 10
Gross Taxation  R ece ip ts  and Balances on C onsolidated  
___________Revenue Fund, 1895-1900 -  £*000____________
(A) Gross T axation  R ece ip ts (a )
Year Customs E xcise  Stamps L icences Land & In c . T otal
1895* 963 129 148 82 1322
9 5 / 6 1825 272 318 123 28 2566
96/  7 1281 277 332 122 446 2458
9 7 / 8 1256 291 349 123 552 2571
9 8 / 9 1304 317 362 122 454 2560
99 /00  1414 340 312 120 490 2677
(B) B alances, C onso lidated Revenue Fund, June 30
Year B alances
1895 -1834
6 -1717
7 -2079
8 - I 9I 6
9 -2002
1900 -2073
SOURCE: P u b lic  .Accounts and A udit R eports .
(a )  For refunds and n e t r e c e ip t s , see Appendix 1 , Table 12.
* H alf y e a r , Jan u ary -Ju n e . T h e re a f te r , f in a n c ia l  y e a r , July- 
June.
R e id 's  p o lic y  in c luded  annually  balanced  budgets and he 
proposed th a t ,  from Ju ly  1895 > the  p u b lic  accounts should be put on 
a cash b a s is .  So th a t  th e  new system might be g iven  a f a i r  
b eg inn ing , he decided  th a t  s te p s  should be taken  to  deal w ith  the
147
accumulated revenue deficiency of the Dibbs administration. Approval 
was secured for the issue of Treasury Bills of £1,175)000 to cancel 
the estimated deficiency. The next step was to reform the tariff.
All ad valorem duties were abolished; specific duties were imposed on 
intoxicants, narcotics and 25 other items. Prom 30 June 1896 duties 
on 16 of the 25 items were to be removed and duties on the remaining 
nine items were to be gradually reduced so as to disappear by 1900. 
Thus came into effect a free trade tariff estimated to involve a loss 
of revenue in the vicinity of £l-g- million. To make good the loss, 
land and income taxes had to be imposed. As was to be expected, 
these encountered sustained and bitter opposition from all likely to 
be affected.
Many former leaders of the Free Trade party were as staunchly 
opposed to the new taxes as were leaders of the protectionist oppo­
sition. These looked to the Upper House to reject Reid's direct
74taxes. A political observer has written of the Legislative Council:
The members of the Council who are nominated for life...have 
been active mainly where their own interests have been con­
cerned. In pursuance of their right to reject measures of 
taxation, they threw out Sir George Dibbs’ Income-Tax Bill 
in 1893 and, two years later, Mr. Reid's Land and Income-Tax 
Assessment Bill. As landholders they objected to a land 
tax, and to an income tax as representatives of the wealth 
of the community.
The Council's method of delaying the introduction of the new taxes 
was to object to the proposed exemptions which Reid had inserted 
74
Henry de R. Walker, Australasian Democracy (London, l897)> P*36.
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to satisfy Labour. When the Land and Income-Tax Assessment Bill 
was amended in the Council, Reid sought a dissolution and another 
general election. He returned to office confident that the majority 
of electors approved the introduction of land and income taxes.
A Land Tax Bill was promptly prepared, with provision for a 
levy of one penny in the pound on unimproved values in excess of 
£475» After lengthy debate in both Houses, the exemption was reduced 
to £240 and the Bill was passed. The Income Tax Bill took longer to 
pass, disagreements between the two Houses being settled eventually 
by a conference between managers appointed for each House. A tax 
of sixpence in the pound was adopted, with a general exemption of 
£200. The method of assessing the amount of tax payable was to take 
the income of the previous year as an estimate of the probable 
income of the year of tax. If the actual income of the year proved 
to be less, the taxpayer was entitled to an amendment of the assess­
ment and a refund. If, on the other hand, the actual income proved 
to be greater than that of the previous year, the Government had no 
power to increase the tax assessment.
It would be impracticable to recount the bitterness which these
75taxes engendered. However, it is worth noting the reaction of 
those most affected. George Reid had prophesied that "when the
75
For a fairly complete discussion, see Stephen Mills, Taxation in 
Australia (London, 1 9 2 5 ), p.66 ff.
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monied, classes have to pay their fair share there will be a chance
1 c
for real downright economy in the public expenditure'’. According
to William McMillan, freetrader of the old school and spokesman for
the income-tax payers, the Reid policy could have no other effect
that "the relaxation of individual effort, the decay of enterprise,
the plundering of those who pay the taxes by those who live on the 
77plunder":
No wonder the theory has arisen, has grown, and is strongly 
advocated, that the function of the State is to find employ­
ment for the people. And this is the principle underlying 
most of the agitation we see around us to increase still 
further the scope of the State's control, until the immense 
army of State employees and the immense interests they dominate 
gradually submerge all other interests, and draw them within 
their octopus net.
The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record commented in 
1896 that the free trade ministry had pinned its hopes on an immediate 
revival of business activity as a result of the new taxation policy, 
"just in the same way that the late protectionist Ministry laboured 
hard against all the evidence of the facts to prove that the tariff
n O
of I89I had stimulated production and manufacture". The effect 
of the remissions of customs taxation, the journal added, had been
76
See note 72.
77
Prom "The Services of the State", a paper read before the 
Australian Economic Association and reviewed in A.I.B.R., 19 June
I896, p.396 ff.
78
Leading article, "The Fulfilment of the ’Reid Programme* in New 
South Wales", 9 March 1896, p.l6l.
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neutralised by drought and the bitterness of leaders of private 
enterprise about the direct taxes. The colony recovered very slowly 
from depression and drought and the Reid policy increasingly became 
distasteful to many sections of the community. The Labour Party 
seethed with discontent as Reid failed to meet numerous demands for 
new expenditure to give employment and Reid was forced to engage in 
deficit financing in an effort to meet the most pressing demands.
It will be recalled that Reid had secured approval for the 
issue of Treasury Bills to cover the accumulated deficiency in 1895 
and that he committed himself to annually balanced budgets thereafter. 
His taxation policy seriously reduced the revenue, while he was 
unable to scale down current expenditure to accord with this 
reduction. Bibbs had resorted to borrowing in London on short-dated 
Treasury Bills which had to be redeemed in Reid's period of office 
at a time when interest payable in London was in the vicinity of £2 
million annually. Reid drew heavily on the flourishing "trust funds 
(largely Savings Bank deposits) to meet expenditure commitments 
and manipulated the accounts each year to bring out a revenue surplus. 
This brought him under fire from the Auditor-General, whose annual 
reports disclosed large deficits each year, and from McMillan and 
Dibbs, who set out to prove that the Reid taxation policy was incapable 
of producing the necessary revenue. McMillan charged him with 
•'financing by every possible subterfuge" with "an ingenuity and 
ability combining the financier and the lawyer which has never been
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79seen in the finance of this country”. Dibbs methodically
analysed Reid’s accounts to demonstrate precisely how his ’’fictional
80surplus” was achieved. It is not necessary here to delve into
8lthe accounting procedures involved: it will be enough to refer to
Figure 15 which shows an almost unchecked deterioration of the C.R.F. 
balances after I89O - a steadily increasing deficit from 1891 on­
wards. This deficit was covered by surpluses on other funds, 
especially trusts. By November 1898, even Reid had to admit that 
the tariff was not yielding the revenue which he had anticipated. He 
decided then to convert some of the "diminishing duties” to perma­
nent duties and to add one or two minor duties to the schedule.
The following year, the Free Trade party lost the elections and a 
well organised protectionist party came to power. Since, by general 
agreement, the tariff question was to be left unresolved until the
colony decided whether or not to join the Australian federation, the
82new ministry turned for additional revenue to the Stamp Act and
79
See The Public Finances of N.S.W. - Deficiencies in Accounts. 1894 
and previous years, provided for by Treasury Bills. Addresses and 
Letters Respecting (Sydney» Government Printer, 1897)> P«5Q»
80
See Sir George Dibbs, The Public Finances of N.S.W. (Reprint of 
Letters to the Press, October-November, 1897)> Sydney, 1897*
81
See Appendix 1, notes to the estimates.
82
Probate and succession duties imposed in 1899 ranged from two per 
cent on estates between £1 ,0 0 0 and £2,000 to ten per cent on estates 
of £100,000 and above. The Premier said, "I must have revenue” and 
made no other explanation. (See Mills, op. cit., p.60).
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secured approval for the issue of Treasury Bills to cover the deficit 
which Reid had persistently attempted to disguise.
Thus New South Wales continued to be, as it had been for almost 
the whole period here surveyed, the most lightly taxed colony in 
Australia. Free trade had occasionally forced the Government to 
retrench, but only at times when there were limited opportunities for 
the exploitation of other sources of funds. In the chapters which 
follow the full meaning of this assertion will, it is hoped, become 
clearer.
Chapter Three
NON-TAX SOURCES OF FUNDS - BORROWING
1. Origins of the Decision to Approach London 
for Funds
2• Reliance on London, I856-I868 
3. Limited Overseas Borrowing, 1869-78 
4* Massive Overseas Borrowing, 1879-86 
5* Borrowing, Cash Reserves and Crisis,
1887-91
6. “When John Bull Buttoned up his Pockets"
"We have been having a long course of stimulants, which has been 
suddenly withdrawn. The geniality and extravagance, the rapid 
development, the exuberant confidence we now find were not so much 
as we thought, the result of natural health and strength. The 
inspirations have proved as fleeting as alcoholic happiness."
--- G.H. Reid, Daily Telegraph, 5 August 1893
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Introductory
Having examined the growth of government expenditure and the 
limited use made of taxation, it is necessary now to concentrate on 
the most significant non-tax source of funds. This chapter aims to 
explain why, where, how and on what scale the N.S.W. Government 
borrowed, and with what implications for policy and the economy.
The net proceeds of loans raised between 1856 and 1900 amounted 
to approximately £68 million, not much less than was yielded by 
taxation.^ Over £50 million of this was raised in London, so that 
the N.S.W. Government was directly concerned with the channelling 
of perhaps one-seventh of the British capital attracted to the 
Australian economy in this period.
Borrowing to finance public works commenced in the colony in 
1853) but after 1855 ike Government relied heavily on London for 
funds. From one point of view, the basic objective was to transfer 
funds from an area of relatively low interest rates to one of 
relatively high interest rates. This meant that it was necessary 
to establish access to the London capital market - no easy task - and 
to make arrangements in the light of market restrictions on the
1
It should be observed that this estimate is derived from Treasury 
and Audit Office accounts. Conversions and new issue expenses 
have been deducted from total gross loan receipts (less transfers 
from consolidated revenue and trust funds). When the estimate is 
broken down on a yearly basis, there must inevitably be some conflict 
with other estimates based, for example, on market data relating to 
subscriptions to new issues.
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exercise of the borrower*s initiative. Throughout the period it 
was the responsibility of the Treasury (acting with or against the 
advice of financial agents) to find ways of raising loans to meet 
budgetary requirements. Treasury policy and parliamentary policy 
on borrowing were not identical.
Parliament at various times sanctioned loans to cover revenue 
deficiencies, but in the main loans were approved for long-term 
purposes, primarily new capital formation in communications. The 
£68 million raised between 1856 and 1900 was formally distributed 
as follows:
Classification jo of Total
Railways and Tramways........................ 60.0
Water and Sewerage.......................... 13.3
Harbours and Rivers........................... 7*7
Public Buildings ............................  4*7
Telegraphs ....................  . . . . . . .  1.8
Roads and Bridges............................. 1.9
Defence Works................................. 2.0
Immigration...............  0.8
Land Resumption etc..........  0.9
"Revenue Deficiencies" ......................  6.9
While this gives a useful guide to parliamentary policy over the 
whole period, it throws very little light on the actual borrowing 
programmes directed by the Treasury. At this point it will be 
sufficient to draw attention to some important differences between 
new capital outlays and net loan proceeds in five sub-periods 
(Table 11) and annually (Figure 18).
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TABLE 11
Government New Capital Formation and Net Loan Proceeds
Sub-period N.C.F. Loans Annual Averages
N.C.F. Loans
£'000 £'000 £'000 £'000
(1) I856- 68 6666 7469 513 575(2) I869- 78 8469 4954 847 495
(3) 1879- 86 29561 26716 3695 3340
(4) 1887- 91 13910 10708 2782 2142
(5) 1892-1900 18486 17715 2054 1968
SOURCES: (l) New Capital Formation: Butlin and de Meel, op. cit., 
163 (my estimates for 1856-9);
(2) Net Loan Proceeds: Appendix 1, Table 15»
It is important to realise that Parliament, having decided 
on a programme of railway extensions or other works and having 
sanctioned the raising of loans for this purpose, transferred to 
the Executive and the Treasury all further responsibility. The 
Treasury's decisions on borrowing were influenced by many conside­
rations, including:
(a) Known expenditure commitments in the colony and in Britain;
(b) Expectations about market conditions;
(c) Trends in other sources of funds and in cash balances.
There were times when the Treasury attempted to arrange
borrowing programmes with the interests of private enterprise 
primarily in mind but, by and large, Treasury officials were pre­
occupied with the day-to-day problem of keeping cash balances at a 
sufficiency level to meet expenditure commitments. Since borrowing
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was usually the major means available to the Treasury for correcting 
unfavourable trends in cash balances, short-term budgetary conside­
rations normally took priority over longer-term considerations 
relating to the growth of the private sector. Government borrowing 
policy and practice, viewed over half a century, appears prominently 
amongst the factors bringing to an end the long-run expansion of 
the private sector and hindering recovery from depression in the 
nineties.
- 1 -
Origins of the Decision to Approach London for Funds
Although public loans were raised before 1853 for immigration, 
developments between 1853 and 1855 deserve priority consideration.
In these years, it will be recalled, the N.S.W. Government replaced 
private enterprise in the construction of railways and gave prominence 
in expenditure programmes to public works of many kinds. Well aware 
that heavy capital expenditure could not be financed from revenue 
(especially with a free trade tariff) the Government decided to raise 
loans for public works in 1853* Under boom conditions loans were 
comparatively easy to raise in the colony and the Treasury handled 
the marketing arrangements without outside assistance. But the 
local market soon proved inadequate to the Government’s increasing 
capital requirements, as investors demanded higher yields than the 
Government deemed practicable to offer. In September 1855 the
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Government decided  th a t  i t  was necessa ry  to  tu rn  to  London fo r  the 
fu r th e r  funds re q u ire d  to  com plete e x is t in g  p u b lic  works c o n tra c ts .  
T o ta lly  inex p erien ced  in  d e a lin g  w ith  the  London c a p i ta l  m arket, the 
Government sought the  a s s is ta n c e  o f th e  Bank o f New South Wales in  
p la c in g  the  f i r s t  s e c u r i t i e s  in  London.
(a )  Loan A u th o risa tio n s  fo r  No lo an s  fo r  p u b lic  works were
P u b lic  Works, 1853-55 2
r a is e d  b e fo re  1853* By c o n tra s t ,
the L e g is la t iv e  Council san c tio n ed  th e  r a is in g  o f £1 .8  m ill io n  in  the 
th re e  y e a r s ,  1853-55 fo r reaso n s d iscu ssed  e a r l i e r  and which re q u ire  
only b r i e f  a m p lif ic a tio n  h e re .^  For p re se n t pu rposes, th e  circum­
s tan c e s  le ad in g  to  a major change in  borrow ing p o licy  r e l a t e  to  the  
problems o f the  Sydney Railway Company.
2
£500,000  was r a is e d  between 1842 and I 852 fo r  im m igration on th e  
s e c u r i ty  o f th e  lan d  fund. "Land and im m igration deben tu res"  were 
is su e d  by th e  Treasury  to  banks, sh ip p e rs  engaged in  th e  im m igration 
programme and a few w ealthy in d iv id u a ls .  The p r in c ip a l  was repayab le  
in  two, th re e  or f iv e  y e a r s , i n t e r e s t  be ing  c a lc u la te d  on a d a ily  
r a t e .  D ebentures is su e d  in  1842 a t  two per cen t d isco u n t c a r r ie d  
i n t e r e s t  a t  the  r a te  of 5'4'd-* per cen t per diem. Issu e s  in  l a t e r  y ears  
were made a t  a premium and c a r r ie d  i n t e r e s t  a t th e  r a te  o f 4d. o r 3i d .  
per cen t per diem. A ll is s u e s  were a d v e r tis e d  in  the  Government 
G a ze tte , ten d e rs  being  in v i te d  fo r  amounts rang ing  from te n  to  fo r ty  
thousand pounds. Tenderers o f fe r in g  th e  h ig h e s t premium (low est d is ­
count) re c e iv e d  p r io r i ty  in  a l lo c a t io n s .  For fu r th e r  d e t a i l s ,  see :
(1) Loans C ontracted  by th e  Colony (N.S.W. A ud ito r-G en era l, 26 
September I 856);
(2 ) Papers o f J .D . Lang (M itch e ll L ib ra ry , Sydney), Vol. 7» P»107 ff»>
(3) Appendix M, A u d ito r-G en era l’ s R eport, 1901* pp.295“ 6.
( 4 ) H is to r ic a l  Records of A u s t r a l ia , 1 , x i i i  ( passim );
( 5 ) S .J .  B u tl in , Foundations o f the A u s tra lia n  Monetary System, 
1788-1851 (M elbourne, 1953), pp.427-431.
See C hapter One, p p .4 3 -6 .
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In August I852 the President of this company informed Deas
Thomson (Colonial Secretary) that many causes, especially the slow
rate of construction, had tended 'Very much to damp the ardour of the
4public mind with reference to the undertaking". 1 Negotiations were 
immediately opened for considerable government assistance to the 
Company and late in I852 the Government decided to pay the passages 
of 500 railway labourers from England. The Company’s request for 
loans took longer to evaluate but was agreed to early in 1853* The 
Legislative Council sanctioned the raising of a loan of £150,000, 
the proceeds to be lent on mortgage to the Sydney Railway Company.
Two further Acts before the company was wound up lifted the total 
authorised to £217>500.^
The success of the early issues of securities under these Acts - 
discussed a little later - encouraged the Legislative Council to 
sanction several other loans for public works. As noted previously, 
these loans were for water and sewerage works, buildings, roads, the
4
The source of these comments is "Correspondence Relative to the 
Sydney Railway", Legislative Council V. & P., 1853* Vol. 2 (pages 
not numbered consecutively) • The quotation is from a letter of 
Charles Cowper dated 2 August I852.
5
The loans "were not repaid by the company nor was the amount accounted 
for in the purchase of their property by the Government". (31st 
Audit Report, p.295)«
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purchase of the assets of the two railway companies and for com­
pleting the Sydney-Parramatta Railway. Other loans for immigration 
were authorised as a matter of course. Here, then, in brief, were 
the policy decisions of the legislature.
(b) Loan-raising Efforts, The task of raising the loans
1853-55
authorised by the Council devolved 
on the Colonial Treasury. Hot a great deal of information is available 
on the small colonial market for government securities, but it is 
possible to piece together various scraps of evidence to show why 
it became essential to look elsewhere for investible funds.
The form of security offered by the Government was the 
••transferable and remittable debenture1* used since 1842. This had 
half-yearly interest coupons attached. Interest was payable at the 
Treasury on presentation of the coupons. So far as can be ascertained, 
the Treasury advertised issues at frequent intervals, stipulating the 
nominal rate of interest and requesting tenders by a specified date. 
Tenders were opened by the Auditor-General (the financial officer of 
the Government) and the Colonial Secretary, who proceeded to allocate 
securities, starting with tenders offering the highest premium, 
until the issue was filled.
The first issue of securities under the Act authorising the 
railway loan of 1853 was for £20,000. According to Deas Thomson, 
£21,053 was “raised by the sale, at a premium of £5 5s» 4d. per £100, 
of £20,000 of Transferable and Remittable Railway Debentures, secured
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upon the  T e r r i to r i a l  Revenue, b ea rin g  in t e r e s t  a t th e  r a te  of 3-Jti. 
per £100 p er diem, and redeem able a t  par a f t e r  the  e x p ira tio n  of 
twenty y e a r s , o r a t  such e a r l i e r  p e rio d  as may be f ix e d  by the 
Government” . 0 T reasury A rchives show th a t  te n d e re rs  fo r  th e se  r a i l ­
way deben tu res in  1853-4 p a id  an average premium of th re e  per cen t 
and th a t  th e  Government handed the  premiums to  the Sydney Railway 
Company. W ater, sewerage and im m igration d eben tu res is su e d  in  1853 
were a lso  d isposed  of a t par o r b e t t e r ,  b u t in  l854“ 5 only a t s te a d ily  
in c re a s in g  d isc o u n ts . By 1855 'the Government was o f fe r in g  g e n e ra lly  
f iv e  per cen t per annum, and is su in g  a t  d isco u n ts  rang ing  up to  s ix  
per c e n t. Y ields to  in v e s to rs  in  the  v ic in i ty  of s ix  p e r cen t 
ap p aren tly  could  not compare w ith  y ie ld s  on m ining and p a s to ra l  in v e s t­
m ents, fo r  th e  reco rd s  suggest th a t  few is su e s  a f t e r  1854 were f u l ly  
su b sc rib ed .
The names o f su b sc rib e rs  to  government is su e s  can r a r e ly  be 
id e n t i f i e d .  There are  o ccasio n a l l e t t e r s  in  T reasury  Archives
g
acknowledging te n d e rs  from banks and o th e r i s o la te d  s ta tem en ts  
suggest th a t  te n d e re rs  in c luded  in su ran ce  companies and le ad in g
6
Thomson to  C harles Cowper, 28 February  1853 (source  c i te d  in  
no te  4)*
7
F o lio  T92 ( 4/ 248) ,  r e tu rn s  o f "D ebentures Issu ed  and O utstand ing” . 
(See a lso  31st A udit R eport, p p .298- 9 )*
8
For example, one acknowledging a ten d e r of £45>5^9 from the  
Commercial Bank (T92, l e t t e r  no. 197)> 24 September 1853)«
163
import-export merchants.^ It is also apparent that, in 1854-5» the 
Government attempted with modest success to issue securities in 
Melbourne. All the evidence suggests that, from late 1854? the 
Government was experiencing increasing difficulty in floating loans 
and was becoming very concerned at the upward trend of interest 
rates.^
(c) The Decision to It will be recalled that the first
Approach London
boom based on gold came to an end 
in 1855 and that budgetary difficulties led to a reappraisal of 
tariff policy. Contracts for public works, apparently amounting to 
over £1 million, had been let and the Government found it necessary 
to seek short-term credits from several banks.^ Deas Thomson, in 
defending his free trade tariff, argued that retention of the free 
trade policy of the colony would contribute to a sympathetic response
from English capitalists should the Government decide to try to raise 
loans in London. Only minor alterations were made in the tariff in 
1855 and the problem of paying for public works in progress was left 
for decision by the Executive Council.
9
See, for example, Legislative Council V. & P., 1854> Vol. 1, 
"Statement showing the sums received for Railway Debentures under 
the Notices of 9 January and 7 and 23 February, 1854“ (in "Corres­
pondence Respecting the Sydney Railway").
10
See, for example, "Final Report from Select Committee on Roads 
and Railways", Legislative Council V. & P*, 1854» Vol. 1 (pages not 
numbered consecutively).
11
See Treasury Archives, T92 (4/248), letters to managers of banks 
with reference to "cash credits".
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On 27 September 1855» the Government wrote to the Bank of New
South Wales, explaining its difficulties and asking for assistance*
The "colonial demand for public securities is in great measure
12satisfied", the Bank was informed. The letter continued:
...as first-class investments can be obtained at rates of 
interest much higher than any which have hitherto been given 
by the Government, the time appears to have arrived when 
recourse must be had to the English money market for the 
further loans which are required to carry on the Public Works 
now in progress.
This, unquestionably, was a decision of profound significance 
for the colony and for the Government. The method adopted to 
interest British investors will be discussed in the next section, 
but here one or two comments are required on the choice of the Bank 
of New South Wales as financial adviser and agent. There is no 
evidence that thought was given to engaging the services of any of 
the large issuing houses in London. The Bank of New South Wales 
had opened a London branch in I854 (under the management of Donald 
Larnach) and seems to have been selected as financial agent because 
of its willingness to advance ninety per cent of the nominal value 
of the debentures which the Government hoped to have issued in 
London. Prom the Government’s point of view, the arrangement with 
the bank was very satisfactory. Public works did not have to be 
suspended and the bank was shouldering the risks involved in trying 
to break into the London market.
■^Colonial Secretary to Secretary, Bank of N.S.W., 27•9•55>
N.S.W.V. & P. ,  I856-7, Vol. 2, p.1137.
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Reliance on London, 1856-1868 
The Bank of Rev; South Wales made the first sales of N.S.W. 
government debentures in London in 1856, In the same year, the 
newly established Parliament confirmed the policy of the former 
government by sanctioning further loans for public works. But, 
because there was an accumulated revenue deficiency estimated at 
about £150,000 and unanimous opposition to further taxation increases, 
Parliament approved a new borrowing principle, namely, the raising 
of a "deficiency loan" by the issue of Treasury Bills repayable in 
five years. In following years, loans were sanctioned to meet 
other revenue deficiencies and to finance almost all public works.
The Treasury was, at least until 1865, unable to control expenditure 
and often unable even to predict likely requirements. It attempted 
to arrange for the issue of securities under various Loan Acts to 
keep bank balances in London and in the colony in credit - a task 
fraught with many serious difficulties. Sharp changes in the 
responsiveness of British investors to the frequent appeals from 
Hew South Wales were reflected in the colonial demand for securities, 
so that it was seldom possible over any lengthy period to borrow 
in the colony on satisfactory terms if the London market was currently 
unfavourable. The result was dependence, sometimes very considerable, 
on support from banks in Sydney and London. A succession of cash 
deficits in the mid-sixties was covered by large overdrafts, to
- 2-
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cancel which it was essential to borrow on very unfavourable terms 
during and after the Overend-Gurney crisis. Taxation increases, 
allied to heavy borrowing, met the Treasury’s short-term needs but, 
by I869, the Government was forced to call a halt to overseas
borrowing.
(a) Parliamentary 
Policy
Between 1856 and 1868 Parliament 
sanctioned the raising of loans
for public works and revenue deficiencies to the nominal value of 
£8.1 million. The planned distribution of the proceeds was as 
follows:
Classification jo of Total
Railways.............. .. 63.0
Deficiencies............................... I8.4
Harbours and Rivers ........................ 5*7
Telegraphs.................................. 3.9
Roads and Bridges....................... 3.3
Buildings.................................. 2.8
Immigration ................... . . . . .  1.8
Water and Sewerage..........................0.6
Defence (works and guns)................... 0.5
It is obvious that the two classifications of loan appropriations
worthy of special attention are railways and revenue deficiencies.
The principle of borrowing to make good a deficiency in con*
solidated revenue was formulated by Stuart Donaldson, the first
2 -ifinance minister. Proposing an issue of Treasury Bills in 1856, 
Donaldson argued that Parliament could not be blamed for a shortage
Financial Statement, Herald, 7 November 1856.13
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of revenue. The "old government", he observed, had paid too little 
attention to revenue estimates when passing appropriations and had 
not anticipated the collapse of the boom. He forecast a quick 
recovery, which would make it possible to pay off short-dated loans 
from improving customs revenue. His argument was acceptable to 
Parliament which, on all future occasions when evidence was produced 
of revenue deficiencies, sanctioned the issue of Treasury Bills or 
debentures repayable usually in five years or less. The major 
authorisations were in 1864-5» when proposals for increased taxation 
were first rejected and then accepted in modified form.^ A little 
later it will be necessary to examine the outcome of the expedient 
use of "deficiency loans" in the mid-sixties.
The major loan appropriations for railways were made in 1862,
15as noticed in Chapter One. An Act of that year provided for the 
raising of almost £2 million, mainly for the construction of the 
three trunk lines of railway. Other loans for railways were sanc­
tioned each year to 1868, largely because original estimates of 
costs were grossly misleading. Each of the rapidly changing 
Treasurers of the period found it necessary to report that loan votes
14
Note that "deficiency loans" cannot be allocated amongst various 
services. Note also that the volume of Treasury Bills authorised 
might at one time represent an actual recorded deficit on the con­
solidated revenue fund and at another time an estimated probable 
deficit a year hence.
15
See pp. 52-5
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for specified sections of the railway trunks had been drawn on to 
pay for other sections, thereby necessitating the voting of further 
sums to legalise the expenditure.
It would be impracticable to trace in any detail the progressive 
formulation of parliamentary borrowing policy as summarised earlier.
But certain points need emphasis:
(l) The authorisation of loans in 1856 was quite explicitly the 
outcome of wishes to retain the free trade tariff while providing for 
relatively heavy expenditure on capital and current services. Three 
loans were sanctioned in 1856, one for railways, one to meet the 
deficiency in consolidated revenue and the third to pay off maturing 
debentures. The latter loan followed no precedent in N.S.W. public 
finance, for maturing debentures had always been redeemed from revenue. 
Donaldson's plea - that it would be impossible to provide £130,000 
from revenue for redemption purposes - found support from many 
businessmen-politicians who believed that posterity should contribute 
to the cost of permanent public works. In the first few years of 
responsible government, Parliament evolved a firm policy on maturing 
loans: first, that loans for immigration, Mnon-reproductive public 
works" and for revenue deficiencies should be redeemed on maturity; 
and, second, that other loans should be redeemed from the proceeds 
of new loans. Straight out conversion operations were not envisaged, 
but the basic principle of conversions was understood and favoured.
169
(2) Loans authorised before 1862 rarely had a nominal value 
greater than £0.3 million, whereas the 1862 Loan Act sanctioned 
a loan of nearly £2 million. It is important to note that Victoria 
decided in 1857 to raise £7 million in London for railways and to 
explain why New South Wales delayed a similar decision and then 
sanctioned a much smaller loan.
Comparatively small loan appropriations before 1862 reflected
early uncertainties about the colony’s credit in London."^ But
this is only part of the explanation, because loans were comparatively
easy to raise after 1858, as will be shown later. Until the
question of land settlement was resolved, Parliament was unwilling
17to agree to long-range railway investment plans. When the 
decision to build the three trunk lines was taken, the major fear 
of most politicians was that an interest burden might be incurred 
which would require substantial increases in taxation - a fear 
which later events proved to be well founded. There seems no doubt 
that Parliament agreed to the construction of the railway trunks after 
considering thoroughly unrealistic estimates of costs. It is also 
clear that, having agreed to the construction programme, Parliament 
in following years had little choice but to agree to the voting of 
additional funds to complete construction.
16
See below, pp. 175-83*
See Chapter One, pp. 50-1*
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( 3) Budgetary d ise q u ilib r iu m  and ba lance  of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s
in  the  ra id -s ix tie s  fo rced  P arliam en t to  san c tio n  in c reased  ta x a tio n
and the  r a is in g  o f d e fic ien c y  lo a n s . By 1867, P arliam ent was v o ic in g
s tro n g  d isapp roval o f m in is te r ia l  p ro p o sa ls  fo r  fu r th e r  la rg e
borrow ing, s p e c i f ic a l ly  on the  score  o f adding f u r th e r  charges to
c o n so lid a ted  revenue and thereby  ren d e rin g  im possib le  the  removal
of the emergency ta x a tio n  im posts o f 1865- 6. A government p roposal
in  I 867 to  f l o a t  a loan  o f £3 m illio n  in  Europe was r e je c te d .
P arliam ent san c tio n ed , as an a l t e r n a t iv e ,  a lo an  o f £1 m il l io n . In
1868 , la rg e  loan  e s tim a te s  were reduced in  committee to  le s s  than
£180,000. Glowing re p o r ts  by the  T reasu re r on the ease w ith  which the
l81868 '‘m illio n  loan" was f lo a te d  in  London f a i le d  to  im press P a r-
19liam en t. As the  Sydney Corning H erald  s a id :
This loan  com pletes a l l  th e  a u th o rised  borrow ings fo r  the 
p re s e n t, and i s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  com plete the  o u ts tan d in g  
ra ilw ay  works, and the  o p p o rtu n ity  i s  th e re fo re  favourab le  
fo r  a calm review  of th e  f in a n c ia l  p o s i t io n  o f the  colony, 
and a comparison of the  debt w ith  i t s  r e s o u r c e s . . . .  I t  may 
be p o licy  to  borrow more, b u t as in  th e  absence of immi­
g ra tio n  th i s  must n e c e s s a r i ly  invo lve  f re s h  ta x a t io n ,  the 
questio n  i s  which i s ,  on the  whole, th e  b e s t fo r  th e  country  -  
more ra ilw ay s and more ta x e s , or -  as we a re . I t  i s  c h i ld is h  
fo r  the  people to  be c a l l in g  out fo r  ra ilw ay s  one y e a r , and 
c a l l in g  out a g a in s t th e  c o s t next y e a r , and th e re  has been 
r a th e r  too much o f t h i s .  I f  th e  people decide on going in to  
fu r th e r  d e b t, l e t  them do i t  w ith  t h e i r  eyes open.
18
See below, pp. 1 9 0 -1 .
E d i to r ia l ,  4 January  I 869 .
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In I869 there were plenty of demands for more railways (and more 
overseas borrowing), but Parliament had chosen to give priority to 
debates on taxation. For the time being, parliamentary policy was 
in the process of reformulation.
(b) Raising the Loans Given appropriations to be pro-
Authorised by
Parliament vided for by loans, the Treasury
had to formulate policy for the issue of securities. Before con­
sidering Treasury arrangements, it is necessary to make clear the 
fact that, for most of this sub-period, the Treasury was unable to 
control expenditure - often unable to forecast requirements. This
was stressed by Geoffrey Eagar in I864 in a minute outlining a
20scheme to improve the financial administrations
The Public Funds are placed at the disposal of irresponsible 
officers.... The Treasurer is unable to exercise a proper 
supervision over the expenditure...(and)...is dependent on 
departments for the accuracy of his accounts.... Sums, to 
the extent of two or three hundred thousand pounds, are often 
spent by Public Officers without the cognizance of the 
Treasury.... The Auditor-General assumes the place of Minister, 
in authorizing or disallowing Credits - in controlling expen­
diture - and in keeping the Public Account of the Colony.
The main reason for this state of affairs was that departments
incurred expenditure on the basis of parliamentarywtes and without
reference to the Treasury. By the time that Eagar managed to
effect sweeping reforms, the Government was heavily overdrawn at
20
Minute of the Treasurer, 16 June I864, L.C. Journal, 1864, Vol. 11, 
p.141.
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the banks and several years passed before the Treasury was able to 
effectively regulate expenditure to accord with receipts.
Almost from the beginning, the Treasury attempted to arrange 
for the issue of securities in the light of short-term movements 
in bank balances in London and in the colony. Whereas the Victorian 
Government, in 1857-8, worked out plans for the raising of £7 million 
in London over a period of five years in order to ensure continuity 
in the construction of railways, the N.3.W. Government relied on 
frequent small issues to balance, so far as possible, receipts and 
disbursements in London and in the colony. This policy worked 
reasonably well for several years, but proved disastrous in the mid­
sixties. In order to cancel relatively enormous overdrafts, the 
Treasury was forced to go into the London market for much larger 
sums than ever before and to issue at heavy discounts. By 1867 
the Treasury was convinced that new borrowing policies should be 
formulated, basically to raise large amounts at infrequent intervals. 
Parliament by this time was seriously concerned at the interest 
burden and acted to cramp the Treasury's plans. New marketing 
arrangements were introduced in 1868 and a "million loan" was 
floated with success, but the Treasury was then forced to suspend 
overseas borrowing for some time.
Treasury policy, problems and techniques need to be examined 
in some detail, and in the light of the statistics incorporated 
in Tables 12 and 13 and Figure 19« It is desirable to make a further
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TABLE 12
Loan Receipts, 1856-1868 - £*000
Receipts of Issues in
Year
(a) London (b) Colony
Total Conversions Net Receipts
I856 640 265 905 49 856
7 - 345 345 145 200
8 34 43 77 50 27
9 819 - 819 136 683
1860 561 - 561 398 163
1 206 188 394 19 375
2 485 159 644 - 644
3 618 — 618 — 618
4 291 171 462 — 462
1865 299 128 427 - 427
6 958 200 1158 300 858
7 267 268 535 - 535
8 1435 529 1964 343 1621
* SOURCE: Public Accounts and Vouchers to Receipts (Loans).
TABLE 13
Actual Rate of Interest
New Issues jin
Year /a) London (b) Colony
$ p. a. io p. a.
1856 5-17 5.1
7 - 5.3
8 5.3 5.2
9 5.06 -
i860 5.07 -
1 5.1 5.1
2 5.2 5.1
3 5.0 -
4 5.0 5.9
1865 5.5 5.6
6 5.63 7.0
7 5*97 5.6
8 (5.6 5.1
(5.16
SOURCE: Public Accounts and
Vouchers to Receipts (Loans)
New Issues, 1856-68*
*The nominal rate of interest, 
except for an issue of Treasury 
Bills in 1865, was five per 
cent per annum. The actual rate 
of interest has been calculated 
on a yearly basis according to 
the nominal value of new issues 
within the year less charges 
and discount. Two rates are 
shown for issues in London in 
1868: the first relates to all 
issues prior to the floating of 
£1 million loan in October; the 
second is the rate payable on 
the £1 million loan.
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subdivision of the period, as follows: (l) 1856-8; (2) 1859-64;
(3) 1865-7; and (4) 1868. In the first subdivision, interest centres 
on the bungling of the first approaches to the London capital market 
and the contractual arrangements made with the Oriental Bank. The 
second subdivision is concerned with the operation of a mechanism 
which regulated borrowing according to the short-term budgetary 
situation so long as the London market was favourable to colonial 
issues. The crisis years, l865-7> then attract very close attention. 
Finally, it is necessary to examine the issue of the "million loan" 
of October 1868, since this marked the end of one phase of borrowing, 
but at the same time established an issuing procedure which was not 
changed for many years.
i. The Problem of Gaining It will be recalled that the
Access to London
incentive to arrange for loans 
in London was the upward trend of interest rates in New South Wales. 
The Government at first was very hopeful of borrowing in London on 
much more favourable terms than in the colony. When it was dis­
covered that this was not to be the case, the Government did not 
agree to any marked increase in the yield to be offered to investors. 
In fact, there was a determination not to issue securities to yield 
more than 5*3 per cent, even though other colonial governments were 
willing to offer six per cent. This, together with Treasury pig­
headedness about the form of security to be offered, brought
17 6
borrowing in  London to  a h a l t  from the  beg inn ing  o f 1857 and then  
made i t  im possib le  to  borrow in  th e  colony between mid-1857 and 
l a t e  1858.
The arrangem ent en te red  in to  w ith  th e  Bank of N.S.W. in
September 1855 provided fo r  th e  is su e  in  London o f deben tu res w ith
a nominal value o f £650,000 a g a in s t which th e  bank was to  advance
n in e ty  per cen t pending s a le .  The deben tu res forwarded to  Donald
Larnach in  London were fo r  w a te r , sew erage, ra ilw ay s and o th e r p u b lic
works and had v a rio u s  c u rre n c ie s  ( f iv e  to  twenty y e a rs)  and a range
21of in t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The Bank o f N.S.W. d r ib b le d  deben tu res onto
th e  m arket, b y -p assin g  jo b b ers  bu t m a rsh a llin g  support from a few
sp e c u la to rs , w ealthy e x - p a tr ia te  c o lo n is ts  and banks w ith  b u s in ess
22in  New South Wales. This goes a long way towards ex p la in in g  why 
is su e s  e a r ly  in  1856 y ie ld e d  le s s  than f iv e  per c en t to  in v e s to r s ,  
whereas is su e s  l a t e r  in  th e  y ear y ie ld ed  in  excess of f iv e  per 
c e n t. Having avoided employing a la rg e  is s u in g  house l ik e  B arin g s, 
and having l e f t  to  the  bank the  d ec is io n  to  make freq u e n t sm all 
i s s u e s ,  the Government f a i l e d  to  b rin g  i t s e l f  f o r c e fu l ly  to  the 
n o tic e  o f the London Stock Exchange. Once the com paratively  sm all
21
D e ta ils  a re  in  A udit O ffice  A rchives -  Vouchers to  R ece ip ts :
Loans, f o l io  2/ 1964*
22
This i s  made c le a r  in  the  evidence o f s ev e ra l bankers b e fo re  th e  
S e le c t Committee on G reat Trunk L ines of Railw ay, L.C. Jo u rn a l 1 
1857, Vol. 2, p .407 ff*
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group of investors to support early issues in 1856 lost interest, 
the bank found it extremely difficult to dispose of the balance of 
the debentures in its hands. By 1857» the Government was unable 
to arrange any debenture sales in London at all and was forced to 
rely for investible funds on banks and merchants in the colony.
These investors, however, ceased tendering for government securities 
in the middle of 1857» when it became known that no sales had 
been made in London. The cessation of borrowing in London in the 
first half of 1857 and in the colony in the second half of the year 
must be explained. This involves attention to the course of Treasury 
negotiations with banks from the time of Stuart Donaldson’s appoint­
ment as Colonial Treasurer.
Donaldson considered that the Bank of N.S.W’s charge for
24placing debentures on the London market (£10,000) was exhorbitant.
Early in 1857 be informed eight banks of the Government’s intention
25to seek a new contract for its London business. The banks were 
invited to tender for this business for the next five years, the 
tender to make provision for loan issues, all government payments in 
London and short-term credits on the security of debentures forwarded
23
See evidence of George Ingelow, Thomas Breillat and James Falconer,
ibid., pp•406-7•
24
Herald report, 20 August 1857»
25
See "Papers Relative to the Establishment of an English Banking 
Agency”, N.S.W.V. & P., 1857, Vol. 1, p.413 ff.
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fo r  is s u e .  The b e s t  o f f iv e  te n d e rs  came from the  O rie n ta l 
Banking C o rpo ra tion , which had re c e n tly  extended o p e ra tio n s  to  New 
South Wales. B efore s ig n in g  a c o n tr a c t ,  Donaldson and Ingelow ( th e  
b an k 's  Sydney manager) wrangled over two main problem s: f i r s t ,  the 
e x te n t o f advances to  be made by th e  bank; and, second, the  lower 
l im i t  (d isc o u n t)  a t  which deben tu res could be d isp o sed . Donaldson 
c le a r ly  wanted an arrangem ent which would g ive  the  Treasury access 
to  about £250,000 re g a rd le s s  of is su e  d a te s ,  y e t was u n w illin g  to  
agree to  th e  bank’ s demand th a t  i t  should determ ine is su e  p r ic e s .
When a c o n tra c t  was e v en tu a lly  s ig n ed , th e  bank was re q u ire d  to  
advance fo r  a maximum of s ix  months n in e ty  per cen t of the nominal 
value o f d eben tu res in  i t s  hands ( to  a l im i t  of £250, 000) and was 
fo rb idden  to  is su e  deben tu res a t  a d isco u n t g re a te r  than  s ix  per 
c en t. Ingelow- signed  the c o n tra c t  on b e h a lf  of the  O rie n ta l w ith  
grave m isg iv ings about the  b e n e f i t  of the  c o n tra c t  e i th e r  to  h is
26bank or to  th e  Government.
I t  was not long  b e fo re  th e  bank fo rm ally  expressed  d i s s a t i s ­
fa c t io n  w ith  th e  c o n tra c t ,  fo r  i t  had advanced approxim ately £200,000
27a g a in s t deben tu res which i t  could not m arket. A gainst th e  advice
26See, in  a d d itio n  to  the correspondence c i te d  above, a l e t t e r  to  
th e  S e le c t Committee on R ailw ays, p u b lish ed  as an appendix to  the  
com m ittee 's  r e p o r t ,  L.C. J o u rn a l , 1857> Vol. 2, p .446. The arrange­
ment, s a id  Ingelow , would be d isadvan tageous to  the Government, p r i ­
m arily  because is su e s  (none o f which was to  exceed £100 , 000) would be 
too sm all to  i n t e r e s t  job b ers  and la rg e  b ro k e rs .
^ S e e  "Correspondence on the  London M arket", N.S.W.V. & P., 1858 ,
Vol. 3, p.115 f f .
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of the hank, Donaldson had insisted on forwarding to London
£100,000 of "interminable debentures” - repayable at the option
of the Government only - at a time when consols were out of favour
28with investors. Ingelow kept requesting Donaldson to withdraw the
"interminables” and replace them by debentures repayable in fifteen
or twenty years. His head office, he insisted, was unable to
interest investors in N.S.W. securities offering no guarantee of 
2Qrepayment. But Donaldson was determined to raise funds if at all 
possible on debentures which the Government might never be called 
upon to redeem. He instructed the Oriental to suspend its efforts 
to market the £100,000 of "interminables” for the time being, and 
forwarded bills of exchange to meet known commitments in London. 
Having placed £265,000 of terminable debentures on the local market 
in 1856, Donaldson sought to raise the funds urgently needed by 
the issue of "interminables” locally.
There is no need to explain in detail all the efforts made 
to attract local investors in 1857»"^ But it is worth mentioning
28
The Economist, 1857> successive issues. (Disturbances in India, 
together with the failure of several large speculators, seem to have 
been responsible for a general loss of confidence by British investors).
29
See "Correspondence on the London Market”, H.S.W.V. & P., 1858, Vol.
3, p . H 5ff. See also L.C. Journal, 1857, Vol. 2, p.408, for a comment 
by John Want on letters received from English companies asking for 
explanations of the "interminables”.
30
Details are available in Audit Office Archives, folios 2/1965-6»
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that Donaldson tried to create a new class of investors by offering 
£10 debentures ”to place frugal persons of the labouring class, upon 
a footing with those whose means may induce them to deal only in large 
amounts”. ^  This issue - unrestricted - was managed by the Joint 
Stock Bank and produced about £20,000. No less than eight other 
issues (of £100 debentures, all repayable at the option of the 
Government only) were made before Donaldson was ready to admit that 
he was lucky to receive tenders for a quarter of each issue. The 
Government was in serious difficulty, for banks and merchants, who 
normally tendered, ceased tendering in the middle of 1857 when it 
became known that no sales had been made in London.
It is important to realise that most local debenture sales
were made to individuals and institutions seeking debentures for
foreign exchange transactions. These debentures were useful only so
32long as they were readily marketable in London. On receiving 
advice that the "interminables" were not negotiable in London, the 
few large regular tenderers ignored further issues advertised by 
the Treasury. Richard Jones (chairman of directors of the Commercial 
Bank), on succeeding Donaldson as Treasurer, advertised issues to be 
repayable in twenty or thirty years, but found that local investors 
were waiting for news of acceptance of N.S.W. securities in London.
Government Gazette and Herald, 18 June 1857*
32J See Financial Statement of S.A. Donaldson, Herald, 21 August 1857» 
(Note that interest was payable in Sydney or London, at the option 
of the holder).
181
Although the unacceptable "interminables" were withdrawn, the
Oriental was unable to market debentures repayable in twenty-five
years - at least, not at the price fixed by the Treasury. The
33Oriental’s Sydney manager explained:
The Ministry from time to time ask for authority to borrow 
such sums of money as it may appear desirable or necessary 
to raise for the public service, and then to make use of 
that authority, from time to time, as the exigencies of the 
service require. The public are left entirely in the dark 
as regards the future - they have no means for forming an 
opinion as to the amount of loan the Ministry may propose to 
contract, nor when that amount has been announced, have they 
any means of ascertaining when and how the loan will be 
issued, nor even the terms.
This certainly constituted one reason for non-acceptance by the 
London capital market. But the main reason was the commercial 
crisis of the autumn of 1857 - "the first really world-wide crisis 
in history, the crisis that broke out at almost the same moment 
in the United States, England and Central Europe, and was felt in 
South America, South Africa, Australia and the Far East".^ Many 
months were to pass before borrowers might approach London with 
any confidence and the Oriental Bank made it clear to the N.S.W. 
Government that there was no prospect of debenture issues at the 
low rates of interest which the Government was prepared to offer.
33
George Ingelow to Treasurer, 13 November 1857> N.3.W.V. & P., 
I858, Vol. 3, pp.116-17
34
Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England (Cambridge, 1945)» Vol. 11,
p.226
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The Treasury meanwhile was planning to raise £400,000 in the
colony by the issue of Treasury Bills. Late in 1857> all banks in
the colony were circularised about the proposed issue and their
35help was sought. The first response came from the Bank of N.S.W., 
which enquired whether the Government would give it the local banking 
agency (currently held by the Joint Stock Bank) in return for its 
help. This the Government claimed to be impossible. Then Ingelow 
advised that it was known that all banks were opposed to the issue 
of the Bills and, within days, the Joint Stock Bank stated that it 
could not proceed alone. Immediately, the Government cancelled the 
Joint Stock Bank's contract and offered the local agency to the 
Bank of IT.S.W., which was no longer interested. This left the 
Government without a local agency and it was decided to issue the 
Bills from the Treasury. To popularise them, they were to be 
receivable in a year's time in payment of customs duties. In other 
words, the issue was directed primarily to import merchants. They, 
however, displayed little interest and a meeting of inspectors and 
managers of all banks in the colony resolved in March 1858 to have 
nothing to do with the Bills. The issue was consequently heavily 
under-subscribed and Government then found it necessary to plead
35
See IT.S.W.V. & P., I858, Vol. 3, p.22 ff.
36
Resolution of Inspectors and Managers, 11 March 1858, ibid., p.129*
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with bankers for advances. Although the Oriental’s Sydney manager
kept objecting to requests for advances beyond what were provided
37for in the contract,"^ there is no evidence that the bank's London 
directors opposed advances to the Government. Indeed, it was probably 
regarded as good business to afford overdraft facilities at nine to 
ten per cent interest. The Bank of N.S.W., which secured the 
contract for the local business, also provided overdraft facilities 
pending an improvement in the public finances. The Treasury was able 
to make all necessary payments under public works contracts and to 
meet commitments in London on account of interest, railway rolling 
stock, immigration, pensions and office supplies. Towards the end 
of 1858 there were indications that the Government's difficulties 
were coming to an end, mainly as a result of favourable publicity 
for Australian borrowers as a whole during the floating of the great 
Victorian loan.
ii. Acceptance in London, For five or six years, the
1859-64
N.S.W. Government was able to
borrow on very satisfactory terms in London and also in the colony. 
However, no effort was made to borrow in excess of current needs.
This was to prove, by the mid-sixties, a serious error of policy, 
because large contracts were let from 1862 onwards for railway works. 
Any sudden change in the conditions on which loans could be raised 
37
See, for example, Ingelow to the Treasurer, 8 March 1858, ibid.,
p.106.
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was bound, to lead to financial embarrassment. Such a change 
occurred in 1865 when London investors learned of budgetary problems 
in New South Wales and sav; advertised an issue of Treasury Bills 
carrying a nominal rate of interest of six per cent. Comment on 
borrowing between 1859 and 1864 may be directed mainly towards 
identifying reasons for the crisis of 1865-7*
Stress must be laid on the fact that overseas borrowing was 
only indirectly related to new capital formation by the Government.
The loans raised in London before I865 were nominally for public 
works, but the volume of loan raisings was determined in the short 
run by the Government’s total expenditure commitments in London.
It is important to realise that payments in London covered interest 
on the public debt, purchases of stores and equipment, assisted 
immigration, salaries and pensions and loan redemptions. The arrange­
ment with the Oriental Bank provided for the issue of debentures in 
the light of the Government's balances with the bank. The appearance 
of an overdraft was the signal for a further issue of debentures.
By and large, the decision to make an issue rested with the bank, 
which was always kept supplied with debentures in excess of estimated 
current requirements. In terms of the contract, no issue was to 
exceed £100,000 and the function of the bank was to issue debentures 
to yield no more than 5*3 per cent. It is evident from Table 13 
that the arrangement with the Oriental was satisfactory so far 
as yields on new issues were concerned.
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In  p ass in g , i t  has been noted th a t  is s u e s  were a lso  made in  
the  colony ( in  1861-2 and 1864) . To ex p la in  th e se  is s u e s ,  i t  i s  
necessary  to  p o in t out th a t  c o lo n ia l in v e s to rs  made i t  known, so soon 
as London became favourab le  to  N.S.W. s e c u r i t i e s  in  1859> th a t  is su e s
•3 o
in  the colony would be w ell sup p o rted . The Treasury was, however, 
w il l in g  to  borrow lo c a l ly  only i f  convinced th a t :
(1) A h igher y ie ld  would no t be demanded than  was payable on new 
is su e s  in  London according  to  l a t e s t  r e p o r ts ;
( 2 ) Bank ba lances in  the  colony were d e te r io r a t in g .  In  1861 and
1862 i t  was deemed ad v isab le  to is s u e  s e c u r i t i e s  d i r e c t  from the
39Treasury  and a few la rg e  te n d e re rs  rece iv ed  a llo tm e n ts . A lo c a l  
is su e  in  1864, by c o n tr a s t ,  was made under c o n d itio n s  o f acu te  
f in a n c ia l  embarrassment and, because i t  was h e av ily  u n d e r-su b sc rib e d , 
s e t  in  t r a in  a sequence o f even ts  which e v en tu a lly  le d  to  the  
temporary suspension  of overseas borrow ing.
From e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n ,^  i t  w il l  be remembered th a t  a 
T reasu rer f o r e c a s t ,  l a t e  in  1863 , a d e fic ie n c y  in  c o n so lid a te d  revenue
2$
In  Audit O ffice  A rchives, f o l io s  2/ 1965/ 6 , a re  to  be seen l e t t e r s  
from banks and m erchants ask ing  the  Treasury  w hether i t  was in tended  
to  o f fe r  deben tu res to  lo c a l  in v e s to r s .  Such l e t t e r s  u s u a lly  in d ic a te d  
the  amounts which would be ten d ered  fo r  and th e  d isco u n t necessa ry  
to  e f f e c t  a s a le .
39
John Solomon, G.A. Lloyd and Co. and Lennon and Cape ( th e  l a t t e r  
a firm  o f Sydney b ro k e rs) were th e  main te n d e re rs .
40
See p p .107-8
186
in the vicinity of £1 million* Proposals to augment the revenue 
by new taxation imposts were rejected by Parliament which, instead, 
authorised the issue of £400,000 of Treasury Bills. These Bills 
were to carry interest of six per cent and to be repayable in five 
years. The issue was advertised in Sydney for several months, but 
few tenders were received. The Bank of N.S.W. and two or three large
merchants paid a small premium of £170,000 of the Bills, but rapidly
worsening budgetary prospects prompted the Treasury to forward the
balance of the issue to the Oriental Bank in London.
The first effect of this action 
may be described in the words
iii. Years of Crisis, 
1865-67
of a subsequent Treasurers'
These bills were...very imprudently forced upon the English 
market at a time when our debentures were really looked upon 
as a first-class security; no sales being made under 99 or 
100. The result was that when these bills, bearing 6 per cent, 
interest, were offered for sale with our debentures that bore 
5 per cent, only, they were, to use a Stock Exchange phrase, 
immediately blown upon, and none of them would sell. But this 
was not the only result; for our credit was affected by the 
alarm of some persons on seeing a new security bearing 6 per 
cent, interest forced on the market. The consequence of this 
was that our debentures, previously at 104, fell to 92i, whilst 
those of Victoria, previously at 104, rose to 107-8.
This was serious enough, but there were other complications. The 
most important of these resulted from a Treasury decision in 1864 
to cancel the London contract with the Oriental Bank in favour of
Financial Statement of T.W. Smart, Herald, 30 March 1865.41
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42one w ith  the  Bank o f N.S.W. In  the  words of ano ther o f th e  ra p id ly  
changing T rea su re rs
On th e  'Jth October he (G eoffrey Eagar) com pleted h is  a rran g e ­
ment w ith  the  Bank of New South W ales, and w ithou t any f u r th e r  
n o t ic e ,  beyond a communication to  th a t  e f f e c t ,  withdrew the  
agency from th e  O rie n ta l Bank, W ell, when th i s  arrangem ent 
reached the  Bank of New South Wales in  England, they d e c lin ed  
to  c a rry  i t  o u t, because they were no t in  a p o s it io n  to  do 
so . The hon. Member had arranged w ith  th e  Bank o f New South 
Wales to  tak e  over a l l  c r e d i t s ,  pay a l l  advances, and r e l ie v e  
th e  O rie n ta l Bank from a l l  our l i a b i l i t i e s .  But they were 
found by the Bank to  be much la rg e r  than  my hon. f r ie n d  
re p re se n te d  them to  b e , and so they w rote to  the  O rie n ta l 
Bank d e c lin in g  to  take over the  agency w ith  a l l  the l i a b i l i t i e s  
a tta c h in g  th e re to .
The Government, as a r e s u l t  o f th e se  manoeuvres, was w ithou t a 
f in a n c ia l  agent in  London and would have d e fa u lte d  in  th e  payment 
o f en d -o f-y ea r i n t e r e s t  on th e  debt had n o t the O rie n ta l Bank come 
to  th e  re sc u e . The i n t e r e s t  was pa id  and th e  bank c a r r ie d  on, in  
e f f e c t ,  as government ag en t. But, as one c o n tra c t  had been c a n c e lle d  
and a new one n o t s igned , the  bank did no t f e e l  ob lig ed  to  l im i t  
deben ture  s a le s  to  te n d e re rs  o f fe r in g  to  purchase a t £94 per £100 
deben ture  or b e t t e r .  The bank, in  f a c t ,  e x tra c te d  from th e  T reasury  
a gu aran tee  th a t  i t  had "ab so lu te  power to  s e l l  our d eben tu res a t  
any p r ic e  to  cover i t s  cash a d v a n c e s " .^  These advances, e a r ly  in  
1866, amounted to  £940>000 , a g a in s t which i t  h e ld  alm ost £2 m il l io n
42
See pp. 3 3 1 -2 .
43.
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f Saul Samuel, H era ld , 29 November 1865»
44
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f G eoffrey Eagar, 2 March 1866, Thomson, 
F in a n c ia l S ta tem en ts , p .l6 8 .
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of government debentures. An arrangement v?as made with the Govern­
ment whereby debentures would be issued in £100,000 lots, interest 
on the overdraft being charged at one per cent above the Bank of 
England discount rate from time to time.
It is important to realise that Parliament, before agreeing 
to increase taxation in I865, sanctioned a ’’deficiency loan” of 
£850,000 which the Treasury urged the Oriental Bank to float in 
London. When news was received that only £32,000 of the amount was
raised, the Treasury replaced the debentures with others repayable
45by annual drawings commencing at the end of 1867* J In the colony, 
the Treasury arranged two special loans, each of £100,000, from 
the A.M.P. Society and the N.S.W. Savings Bank, carrying interest 
at the rate of 8 and 6 per cent respectively. These loans, together 
with increased taxation receipts, made it possible to reduce the 
overdraft with the Bank of New South Wales. The London overdraft, 
on which the Government was paying eleven per cent in the second 
half of 1866 - ”a rate obviously ruinous to the Government”^  - 
increased during the Overend-Gurney crisis. Geoffrey Eagar, Treasurer 
in 1866, announced that the Oriental was expressing great reluctance 
to issue government debentures for fear of ruining the colony's
45
Financial Statement of Geoffrey Eagar, 27 September 1866, Thomson, 
Financial Statements, pp.183-4»
46
Ibid., p.189.
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credit. This, he said, was ridiculous: to pay eleven per cent on 
an overdraft might be satisfactory in the eyes of the Oriental, but 
it was inconceivable that money could not be raised by the issue of 
securities on terms more satisfactory to the Government. The 
overdraft "acts as a dead weight: our debentures are tied up, and we 
can make no arrangements of any kind. Our instructions therefore are 
of a positive, definite, and peremptory character - in order to get 
rid of this monstrous overdraft - to sell our debentures even at 
what in ordinary times would be considered a sacrifice”. ^  From late 
1866 to early 1868 the Oriental acted to implement Eagar's instruc­
tions and issues were made with yields to investors between 5*5 and 
six per cent.
In I867 the Treasury was in the position of having given 
instructions for the issue of all loans so far sanctioned by Par­
liament.^ In the expectation of backing from Parliament, Eagar
made secret arrangements for the floating of a loan of £3 million 
49in Europe. This loan was to be issued jointly by Oppenheim,
Alberti and Co. of Paris and Fruelen, Goschen and Co. of London in
47
Ibid., p.189.
48
Apart from the debentures in the hands of the Oriental Bank, close 
on £-£ million of debentures had been handed over to the Sydney bro­
kers, Lennon and Cape, for sale in the colony. Lennon and Cape were 
able to meet requests at any time from people wanting gilt-edged 
securities or debentures for foreign exchange. (See Audit Office 
Archives, folios, 2/1965-6).
49
See Thomson, Financial Statements, pp.204-7*
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Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and London* Before a contract could be 
signed, Eagar had to submit his proposal to Parliament. Parliament, 
apart from being shocked by the novelty of the proposal, was at 
first unwilling to sanction any more loans on the grounds that 
additional interest payments would make taxation reductions impossible. 
Eagar had to argue for several weeks before Parliament agreed to the 
floating of a loan of £1 million, which was stated to be the minimum 
amount required to complete the railway works.
iv. The "Million Loan" To float the loan, special
of 1868
arrangements were made with the
Bank of N.S.W. and the Rothschilds. First, a contract was signed with
the bank for conducting the London agency of the Government, provision
being made for advances pending the floating of the loan, should they
be required. From then on, arrangements were in the hands of Donald
Larnach, managing director of the London branch of the bank, who
delayed the issue until the market appeared favourable.
The loan was floated on 20 October 1868, following payment
of the unprecedented sum of £500 for advertising, which directed
attention to the fact that the Rothschilds were connected with the 
50issue. Tenderers were invited to meet for the opening of their 
tenders by Donald Larnach and the Messrs. Rothschild who decided,
50
This account is based on a report from Donald Larnach dated 
30.10.68 and located in Audit Office Archives, folio 2/1966, 
Voucher 9> 1869.
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f iv e  m inutes b e fo re  the m eeting, th a t  th e  minimum p r ic e  to  be
accepted would be £97* 10s* per £100 d eb en tu re . The minimum was
not announced to  th e  ’’la rg e  g a th e r in g  o f bankers and b ro k e rs” and
th e re  was excitem ent when i t  was d isco v ered  th a t  one ten d e r o ffe re d
a premium of two per cen t and th a t  th e  whole loan  was taken  up a t
p r ic e s  rang ing  upwards from £98 3 s. 4d. A lto g e th e r th e re  were
236 ten d ers  fo r  a to t a l  of £3 , 592,000  and the su ccess , according
to  Larnach, was ’’q u ite  beyond th e  most sanguine e x p e c ta tio n ” .
Successfu l te n d e re rs  pa id  f iv e  per cen t on a llo tm en t and the
51rem ainder in  in s ta lm en ts  over s ix  months. The is su e  c o s t the  
Government £20,000, of which £2,000 was fo r  the  se rv ic e s  o f the  
R o th sch ild s .
To complete t h i s  survey o f borrow ing between 1856 and 1868, 
a t te n t io n  i s  drawn to some advice o ffe re d  by Ronald Larnach to
52Henry Parkes a f t e r  the su cc e ss fu l is su e  o f the ’’m ill io n  lo an ” :
I f  you a re  w ise in  your Colony, you w il l  a t  once reduce 
the  p r ic e  of la n d , and d ispose  of every acre  of the  R iv e rin a  
Country, devo ting  th e  proceeds to  the e x tin c t io n  o f your 
d eb t. Your deb t i s  becoming a l to g e th e r  too la rg e  fo r  the  
p o p u la tio n  and re so u rce s  o f your Colony, and u n le ss  you take 
some measures to  keep i t  down, your ta x a t io n  w il l  become so 
g re a t as to  d r iv e  c a p i ta l  away from your sh o res .
51
I t  should be observed th a t  the  payment by in s ta lm en ts  ex p la in s  
the  l i s t i n g  in  Table 14 o f lo an  r e c e ip ts  in  1869 under the heading 
o f is su e s  in  London.
52
Donald Larnach to  Henry P ark es , 26 .5*69> Parkes Correspondence 
(M itch e ll L ib ra ry , Sydney), A924, p .100 .
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The advice was important, hut it should he noted that many leading 
politicians were thinking the same way.
-3-
Limited Overseas Borrowing, 1869-78
In the ten years after i860, the N.S.W. Government approached 
the London capital market on three occasions only - in marked con­
trast to the I856-I868 suh-period. There is a sequence to he 
noted and explained briefly:
(1) For some years after 1868, borrowing in the colony was 
possible at steadily falling interest rates;
(2) From 1871 land revenue boomed and bank balances mounted rapidly, 
making it possible to pay off the "deficiency debt" and reduce 
taxation;
(3) From 1873 Parliament sanctioned important railway extensions 
and other public works, authorising the raising of loans for these 
purposes;
(4) The Treasury deferred many authorised loans, drawing on cash 
balances and recording "advances" from consolidated revenue to 
loan funds;
(5) After 1877> land revenue declined but Parliament had become 
increasingly less cautious in sanctioning expenditure on both 
capital and current account. Bank balances were run down and the 
Treasury commenced negotiations with the Bank of N.S.W. for the 
floating of a loan of over £3 million in London.
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Explanation needs to cover parliamentary policy, the statistics 
of borrowing and Treasury policy and practice. First, however, it 
is necessary to emphasise the fact that, although loan issues by 
the Government in London were infrequent, the notable expansion of 
government expenditure in the seventies depended heavily on the 
inflow of funds from Britain. Successful issues in the colony were 
possible mainly because local investors were able to dispose of 
their holdings of ft.S.W. government debentures in London. Booming 
land revenue resulted initially from a marked increase in wool 
export earnings and later from the inflow of British capital to 
the private sector in N.S.W. and Victoria, banks and land finance 
companies readily advancing to pastoralists for the purchase of 
Crown land. A decline in land sales in 1878 prompted the Treasury 
to commence arrangements for a very large loan issue in London, 
which had to be deferred until 1879» In the next section, the 
opportunity will arise for examination of connections between economic 
recession in the colony and large-scale borrowing by the Government 
in London. For the time being, it is necessary to look briefly at 
parliamentary policy between I869 and 1878.
(a) Parliamentary Parliament, between I869 and 1878,
Policy
sanctioned loans totalling £8.6
million, that is, about £0.5 million more than in the I856-I868 
sub-period. Two things need emphasis:
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(1) Loans a u th o rise d  fo r  ra ilw ay s re p re se n te d  72 per cen t o f 
t o t a l  loan  a u th o r is a t io n s  (by comparison w ith  63 per cen t p r io r  to  
1869) and loans a u th o rised  to  meet revenue d e f ic ie n c ie s  re p re se n te d  
only 0 .4  per cen t of the t o t a l  ("by comparison w ith  I 8.4  per cen t 
"before I 869) ;
(2) In  the  fo u r y e a r s , 1869-72, loan  a p p ro p ria tio n s  to ta l l e d  £1.9
54m ill io n , but in  the fo llow ing  four y e a rs  to ta l l e d  £7 m ill io n .
These f ig u re s  a re  in d ic a t iv e  o f the  p re -o ccu p a tio n  w ith  the 
p lann ing  of ra ilw ay  e x ten s io n s , e s p e c ia l ly  a f t e r  1872, and the  
marked improvement in  th e  co n d itio n  o f the  c o n so lid a te d  revenue fund 
a f t e r  1 8 7 1 .^  A ll th a t  needs to be remarked here  i s  th a t  P arliam en t 
approved the  is su e  o f T reasury  B i l l s  in  I 87O (£335>000) when urged 
to  in c re a se  ta x a t io n ;  approved in c re a se d  ta x a t io n  in  1871 when 
convinced of the con tinued  d e te r io r a t io n  o f th e  c o n so lid a te d  revenue 
fund; and, as the  budgetary  ou tlo o k  ra p id ly  improved, s tro n g ly  
supported  bo th  ta x a t io n  red u c tio n s  and p ro p o sa ls  fo r  la rg e - s c a le  
p u b lic  works. Although w ell aware of the o p p o r tu n itie s  fo r  f in a n ­
c ing  p u b lic  works from o rd in a ry  revenue, P arliam en t con tinued  to
54
These f ig u re s  exclude lo an s  of £650,000 a u th o rised  fo r  conversion  
purposes. The £1*9 m illio n  a u th o rise d  between I 869 and 1872 inc luded  
a loan  o f £450>000, known as the "T a ilin g s  Loan", which was autho­
r is e d  to  "make good the lo s s  su s ta in e d  in  th e  n e g o tia tio n  o f the 
D ebentures of p rev ious Loans" -  th a t  i s ,  to  recoup the d isco u n t on 
a l l  is su e s  between 1853 and I 87O.
55
See F igure  16 (page 114)«
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reg a rd  p u b lic  works (w ith  th e  excep tio n  of ro ad s) as loan  t r a n s ­
a c tio n s . It was n o t u n t i l  1878 -  as w il l  be shown in  the  nex t 
se c tio n  -  th a t  P arliam en t decided  to  a p p ro p ria te  accum ulated revenue 
su rp lu ses  fo r  p u b lic  works.
(b) Borrowing S ta t i s t i c s *  Loans were f lo a te d  in  London
1^9-75 ----------------
l a t e  in  I87O and in  1875 and
561876. In  the co lony, loans were r a is e d  each y ear from 1869 to
l 874> bu t not th e r e a f te r .  I t  i s  s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  the  marked f a l l
in  in te r e s t  r a te s  -  shown in  Table 15 d id  no t lead  to  a g re a te r
volume of loan  r a is in g s ,  d e sp ite  the ra p id  expansion o f new c a p i ta l
fo rm ation . This em phasises th e  im portance o f the land  revenue in  
57th e se  y e a rs .
(c )  Treasury Throughout th i s  su b -p e rio d ,
P o licy
th e  T reasury  was extrem ely
re lu c ta n t  to empower i t s  f in a n c ia l  agent ( th e  Bank o f N.S.W .) to  
is su e  government s e c u r i t i e s  in  London. The d e c is io n  to  r a i s e  funds 
in  London in  1870 fo llow ed from re p o r ts  th a t  the  London Stock 
Exchange would n o t l i s t  is su e s  made in  the  co lony , thereby  l im it in g  
th e  c o lo n ia l demand fo r d eb en tu res ; and a lso  re p re se n te d  an attem pt
56
Note th a t  the  ta b le  of lo an  r e c e ip ts  re p re se n ts  loan  p roceeds, 
as brought to  account in  th e  books of the  T reasury . T enderers pa id  
u su a lly  5 P©r  cen t on a l lo c a t io n  and th e  rem ainder in  in s ta lm e n ts  
over sev e ra l m onths).
57
R eference i s  in v ite d  to  F ig u res  2 and 3 in  o rd e r to  r e c a l l  the 
e x ten t of the  land  revenue in  the  s e v e n tie s .
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TABLE 14
Loan Receiptsf 1869-78* - £*000
Receipts of Issues in
Year
(a) London ("b) Colony
Total Conversions Net Receipts
1869 979 435 1414 350 1064
1870 50 349 399 343 56
1 1143 495 1638 343 1295
2 - 772 772 343 429
3 - 347 347 131 216
4 - 170 170 - 170
1875 753 - 753 - 753
6 971 - 971 - 971
7 — — — - -
8 — — — — —
* SOURCE* Public Accounts and Vouchers to Receipts (Loans)
TABLE 15
Actual Rate of Interest on New Issues, 1869-78*
New Issues in
Year
(a) London (b) Colony
/o p* a. $6 p.a.
1869 - 5.0
1870 5.05 5.0
1 - 5.0
2 — 4.8
3 - 4.13
4 - 4.16
1875 4.4 -
6 4.3 -
7 - -
8 - -
* SOURCE: Vouchers to Receipts (Loans)
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to oope with pressing "balance of payments problems. The loans 
of I875-6 were the result of bank opposition to the Treasury's 
calls on export earnings. These are the facts which it is now 
necessary to clarify.
No loan was floated in London in I869 because the proceeds of
the "million loan" were brought to account and were sufficient to
meet the Government's London obligations until about June I87O.
Borrowing in the colony continued along lines established by
Eagar in I867: debentures were handed over to the Sydney brokers,
Lennon and Cape, who were able to meet requests at any time from
people wanting gilt-edged securities or debentures for foreign 
58exchange. Saul Samuel, who replaced Eagar as Treasurer late in 
1868, observed that the yield on debentures issued in the colony was 
falling and, because he had led the opposition to Eagar's proposals 
for heavy overseas borrowing, favoured raising future loans in the 
colony. He was, however, warned that he could not expect any sub­
stantial local support until he could arrange for the London Stock
59Exchange to list issues made wholly or in part in the colony.
He instructed Donald Larnach to inform the secretary of the Stock 
Exchange that refusal to list debentures issued in the colony was
55
Details are in Audit Office Archives: Vouchers to Receipts-Loans,
folios 2/1965-6.
59
Financial Statement, 17*2.70, Thomson, Financial Statements, p.252.
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causing  h ardsh ip  to h o ld e rs  who expected them to  he re a d ily
n eg o tia b le  in  London b u t ,  a lthough  Larnach t r i e d  throughout 1870,
th e  Stock Exchange would no t co -o p e ra te  u n t i l  su p p lied  w ith  accu ra te
d e ta i l s  of a l l  is s u e s  which the Government wanted l i s t e d  -  d e ta i l s
which Larnach could  not s u p p ly .^  While th e  Bank o f N.S.W. was
w il l in g  to  take up an is su e  o f T reasury  B i l l s  in  1870, no o th e r
in v e s to rs  d isp lay ed  any i n t e r e s t  in  government s e c u r ity  is s u e s .
T h is , to g e th e r w ith  the  knowledge th a t  the  G overnm ents bank b a lances
6lin  London were f a l l i n g  ra p id ly , and the  f a c t  th a t  the  bank was 
u n w illin g  (p robab ly  unab le) to  supply b i l l s  of exchange on London, 
fo rced  Samuel to  san c tio n  th e  is su e  o f a lo an  o f £1.2  m ill io n  in  
London l a t e  in  I 87O. A ll arrangem ents were l e f t  in  th e  hands of 
Larnach, who chose the most s u i ta b le  tim e to  f lo a t  the  lo an . An 
o v e rd ra f t on the  London account was can c e lled  and ba lan ces  were 
s u f f ic ie n t  to  meet London o b lig a tio n s  u n t i l  th e  end of I 87I .
In  the  second h a l f  o f 1871 th e re  were unm istakable  s igns 
th a t  the colony was emerging from economic re c e s s io n  in  response to  
r i s in g  wool ex po rt p r ic e s .  The l a t e s t  T re a su re r , George Lord, 
is su ed  deben tu res lo c a l ly  a t  an average g ro ss  p r ic e  o f £ 1 0 0 .2 s .9 d ., 
having arranged fo r  the l i s t i n g  of the is su e  on the  London Stock
60
See '’P ub lic  Debt -  Q uotation  o f upon the O f f ic ia l  L i s t s  o f the  
London Stock Exchange” , N.S.W.V. & P . ,  I 87O -I, Vol. 2, p . l0 6 l  f f .
61
See F igure 20
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Exchange. The fo llow ing  y e a r , th e  T reasury  was embarrassed, by a 
v i r t u a l  flo o d  of a p p lic a tio n s  fo r deb en tu res  and was ab le  to  r a is e  
£ j  m ill io n  a t  premiums of up to  s ix  per c e n t .0  ^ This le d  to  a r e ­
d u c tio n  of th e  nominal r a te  o f i n t e r e s t  from f iv e  to  fo u r per c e n t. 
The very  ra p id  growth of government cash b a lan ces  in  the  co lony, 
however, made i t  im p rac tic ab le  to  borrow and a f t e r  1874 th e  T reasury
64re fu sed  to  make lo c a l  s e c u r ity  is s u e s .
O verseas borrow ing had been suspended in  1871; i t  was not 
resumed u n t i l  l875> under s tro n g  p re ssu re  from th e  Bank o f N.S.W ., 
th e  Governm ent's so le  f in a n c ia l  ag en t. B i t t e r  d isp u te s  between the 
T reasury  and the bank in  1S74~5 w ill  be considered  in  Chapter S ix . 
Here i t  i s  necessa ry  simply to  no te  th e  c ircum stances causing  th e se  
d isp u te s  and le ad in g  to  the  resum ption of overseas borrow ing.
In  December 1871 P arliam en t was inform ed th a t  the  T reasury  had 
had to  rem it £350,000 to  London fo r  i n t e r e s t  and redem ption pur­
poses. "There be ing  no balance  in  London to  meet th ese  c la im s" , s a id  
th e  T re a su re r , "nor any deben tu res a g a in s t which I could  draw, I
62
Financial Statement, 6.12.71? Thomson, F inancial Statem ents, p.277»
63
Amongst those rece iv in g  allotm ents were: the A.M.P. S o c ie ty , the 
Bank o f N.S.W ., the Union Bank, Lennon and Cape, f i f t e e n  or so 
Sydney merchants, several women and the newly e sta b lish ed  Govern­
ment Savings Bank. (D e ta ils  are in  Vouchers to R eceipts -  Loans, 
f o l io  2 /1966).
64
For comments on the la rg e  u n s a t i s f i e d  demand fo r  N.S.W. s e c u r i t i e s  
in  th e  co lony, see A .I.B .R . , 1877? pp.26 and 109*
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was compelled to purchase bills of exchange here for the amount". J When 
asked why the Treasury had not made use of authorities to borrow, the 
Treasurer explained that there was more money in the bank than was re­
ceiving interest, so that it would be unwise to borrow at 5 cent 
overseas and "allow it to lie in the bank unproductive". As cash balances
in the colony continued to mount, the Treasury drew an increasing volume
of bills of exchange on London: £648,000 in 1872$ £1,074*000 in 1873»^
Although the Bank of N.S.W. agreed to several alterations in its contract
with the Government - to provide for the payment of interest on a larger
daily balance - the Treasury continued to prefer to pay exchange on remit'
tances rather than float new loans in London. This may have been sound
practice from the Treasury's point of view, but was an increasing
embarrassment to its financial agent, which had to find the foreign
exchange needed. The colony's export earnings in Britain had doubled
67between I87O and 1873» but fell quite sharply in 1874* Under strong 
pressure from Shepherd Smith, general manager of the bank, the Treasurer
65
Financial Statement of G.W. Lord, 6.12.71» Thomson, Financial Statements, 
p.274.66
These figures have been assembled from data in Treasury Archives, Tl6, 
Box 700*
67
According to the Statistical Registers, exports to Great Britain in 
I87O were valued at £2*5 million, reached £6.6 million in 1873 and fell 
to £5*7 million in 1874« Government obligations in London (for interest, 
redemptions, immigration, salaries, pensions, supplies and equipment) 
appear from the records to have varied between £600,000 in I87O and 
£940,000 in 1875* In 1876 they may have amounted to more than £1,600,000.
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in 1874 agreed to forward to Larnach debentures with a nominal value of 
£1 million, but with instructions to issue only if the market were favour­
able. Larnach took measures to prepare the market for the proposed ET.S.W.
68(*)loan, and advised his friend Henry Parkess
You will have heard by telegram of the break down of the Victorian 
loan. I was anxious to get it out of the way of your loan and induced 
the other Banks in taking the balance at upset price. The market has 
now improved in consequence, and I look forward to the successful 
floating of your loan about Christmas.
The loan was floated in January 1875 "with fair success", considering that
69the market was "glutted with colonial debentures". William Forster, the
current Treasurer, told Parliament that he was pleased to have avoided
"the withdrawal of coin from the Colony. I am as well convinced as the
keenest merchant in Sydney of the undesirableness of sending money out of
70the Colony, if it is fairly avoidable".
During 1875 the Treasury was urged by businessmen-politicians and the 
Sydney press to float further loans in London, obviously because of the
71increasing competition amongst banks for funds to advance to pastoralists. 
The argument that it was unsound to borrow while cash balances in the
68
Larnach to Parkes, l6.11.74> Parkes Correspondence, A924, p.113*
69
Larnach to Parkes, 12.1.75) loc. cit., p.117«
70
Financial Statement of W. Forster, Thomson, Financial Statements, p.345*
71
See below, pp. 269-75*
(*)
Note that Larnach was a representative of the Associated Banks which 
contracted for the Victorian Government's business, including the floating 
of loans.
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colony continued  to mount went unheeded and F o rs te r  made arrangem ents fo r 
th e  f lo a t in g  of an o th er £1 m illio n  in  London e a r ly  in  1876. No f u r th e r  
in s t ru c t io n s  fo r  is su e s  in  London were given and the  Treasury l a t e  in  
1876 again  re s o r te d  to  b i l l s  o f exchange to  meet commitments in  B r i ta in .  
B i l l s  fo r  £650,000 were drawn in  1877 and fo r  £800,000 in  1878 , d e sp ite  the  
f a c t  th a t  export ea rn in g s  in  B r i ta in  were f a l l i n g .  In  1878 government 
b a la n c e s , bo th  in  London and in  the  co lony, were d e c lin in g , bu t the  
T reasury  opposed demands fo r  the  resum ption of overseas borrow ing, no lo n ­
ger because i t  was reg ard ed  as "uneconomical*’, bu t because re p o r ts  from 
London suggested  th a t  the  c a p i ta l  m arket was un favourab le .
- 4 -
M assive Overseas Borrowing» 1879-36
From 1872 onwards, th e  T reasury  had been reco rd in g  advances from c o n so li­
d a ted  revenue to  loan  funds fo r  p u b lic  works ex p en d itu re , in  th e  meantime 
drawing on cash b a lan ces  to  fin an ce  c o n s tru c tio n . P a rliam en t, in  th e  same 
p e rio d , had become a c u te ly  conscious of th e  ra p id ly  growing nominal su r­
p lu s on c o n so lid a ted  revenue, which encouraged demands fo r  la v is h  
expend itu re  on a l l  government s e rv ic e s . In  I 878 , a t  th e  in s t ig a t io n  of 
Henry P arkes, P arliam en t re so lv ed  th a t  the  "accum ulated revenue su rp lu s"  
should be ap p ro p ria ted  fo r  p u b lic  works. To meet P a r lia m e n t 's  d ir e c t io n s  
and in  view o f f a l l i n g  lan d  revenue, the  T reasury  was o b liged  to  arrange  
fo r  the  is su e  o f a la rg e  lo an  in  London -  the  f i r s t  o f sev e ra l which 
tu rned  the in te rn a t io n a l  s p o t l ig h t  on th e  N.S.W. Government as the  l a r g e s t  
re g u la r  borrower in  London. The a p p ro p ria tio n  o f the  su rp lu s  was ju s t  the
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start of a burst of enormous appropriations for public works, mostly 
for railways, the extent of which can be gathered from the figure of loan 
authorisations between 1879 and 1886 - almost £37 million. The amount 
actually raised in this sub-period was £26.7 million, most of it between 
1883 and 1886, following the rapid falling off of land sales.
While the London capital market was highly receptive to the appeals 
of the N.S.W. Government and other colonial borrowers, new marketing 
arrangements had to be developed to ensure successful issues. The Trea­
sury's replacement of the Bank of N.3.W. by the Bank of England as its
London financial agent was a significant change in policy, the implications
72of which need close consideration in the appropriate place. Massive 
overseas borrowing substantially countered drought and falling export 
earnings, but added enormously to the Government's foreign exchange require­
ments - as may be gathered from Figure 21. Growing balance of payments 
problems and political conflict over taxation policy led to the suspension 
of overseas borrowing in I887 and brought to an end the most important 
phase of the N.S.W. Government's relations with the London capital market.
(a) Parliamentary In 1875 Henry Parkes introduced a reso-
Policy
lution in the Legislative Assembly that 
"A large cash surplus at the credit of the Government is unsound in prin­
ciple and policy" and ought to be expended without delay on immigration
72
See Chapter Six, pp. 335—8
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and "works of public improvement". The resolution was not acted upon 
until 1878, when the Assembly decided that £2.4 million ought to be trans­
ferred to a "Surplus Revenue Account" and applied to "public works of 
admitted general utility, for the erection of important public buildings, 
and for other services which cannot fairly be considered a charge upon 
the revenue of any one year in particular".*^ The decision to appropriate 
the surplus was made at a time when land sales were falling off - a pre­
lude to the liquidity crisis of 1879* A highly successful loan of £3 
million in London that year undoubtedly influenced parliamentary policy 
on loan votes. Loan appropriations of £7*4 million in 1879 were justified 
in Parliament as necessary for the promotion of economic recovery. In 
fact, proposals for enormous railway extensions were based almost entirely 
on political considerations, as politicians tried to attain or retain 
office by satisfying the demands of all would-be supporters. In two Loan 
Acts (l88l and 1884), approval was given for the construction of no less 
than 1,840 miles of railway track. This was the period par excellence of 
"political railways", when scant attention was paid to the prospects of 
new railway investment contributing to production, especially of exports. 
The loan authorisations of these years tell their own story.
It is hardly necessary to dwell on the fact that loan appropriations 
on this scale were made in the knowledge that the London capital market
73
See Henry Parkes, Fifty Years in the Making; of Australian History 
(London, 1892), Vol. 1, pp.347-8.
74
Explanatory Statement of the Ways and Means, 1879> P*6*
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Loans A u th o r ise d  -  £ '0 0 0
Year (a) Railways (b) O ther P u b lic  V/orks (c ) Total
1379 5866 1437 7353
1880 1012 250 1262
1
O
8127 681 8808
c.
3 1645 355 2000
4
c
13013 1375 14388
J
6 1988 1127 3115
TOTALS 31651 5275 36926
******
had become h ig h ly  re c e p tiv e  to  is su e s  by A u s tra lia n  governments -  th a t
in v e s t ib le  funds were a v a ila b le  in  seemingly in e x h a u s tib le  q u a n tity  a t
very low ra te s  of i n t e r e s t .  Here i t  i s  necessa ry  to  emphasise the  f a c t
th a t  London was s t i l l  fav o u rab le  to  c o lo n ia l is su e s  in  1887 , the  y ear in
which the  N.S.W. P arliam en t re fu sed  to  san c tio n  any fu r th e r  lo a n s . By
th a t  time the  m a jo rity  of p o l i t i c ia n s  were read y , r e lu c ta n t ly ,  to  admit
th a t  the  borrowing sp ree  could no t con tinue  unchecked. A q u o ta tio n
from a speech of Henry Parkes w il l  i l l u s t r a t e  the  type o f argument le ad in g
75to  a re v is io n  o f p a rliam en ta ry  p o lic y :
Now, a t th i s  p re sen t tim e , the  p u b lic  deb t o f th i s  country  was 
£41>064,259> or i t  had in c re ase d  upon th e  debt of 1882 by the 
tremendous sum of £22,343*040. The in t e r e s t  on the  d e b t . . . i n  
1882 was £640, 518 . In  1886 i t  was £1 , 646,681 I s .  8 d . , o r ,  in  
o th e r words, a f te r  fo u r y ea rs  th e re  was added to  th e  annual ex­
p en d itu re  o f th i s  country  the  sum of one m ill io n  s t e r l in g  fo r
75
Speech a t  a p u b lic  m eeting , 16 August 1886, P a rk es , F i f ty  Years o f . . .  
A u stra lian  H is to ry , Vol. 2, p .l6 6 .
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interest on borrowed money. How they understood why taxes were 
wanted.... No wonder - with this large increase in the public 
debt - no wonder that the revenue had failed to meet our engage­
ments. No wonder that the legislature was called upon to impose 
new taxation, no wonder that many things which should be done for 
the real benefit of the country could not be done; but still 
extravagant expenditure went on for unproductive works, and those 
not necessary for the general happiness of the people.
(b) Treasury Policy 
and Practice
In directing the Government’s borrowing 
programme, the Treasury had to take
into account Parliament’s emphatic instructions for a much greater rate 
of new capital formation than ever before. It was also necessary to make 
decisions in the light of fluctuations in the land revenue and in bank 
balances in the colony and in London. Further, it was essential to improve 
the arrangements for the issue of securities in order to ensure success in 
London. Discussion of Treasury policy and practice may be presented most 
conveniently in three subdivisions of the period: (l) 1879; (2) 1880-2; 
and (3) 1883-6. First it is necessary to look at the loan of 1879 in 
the light of diminished land revenue and Parliament’s appropriation of the 
nominal revenue surplus. Next, attention is directed to the impact on 
borrowing made by the revival of land sales in the early eighties. Finally, 
interest centres on the steps taken to raise £21 million between 1883 and
1886.
i. The £3 million 
Loan of 1879
The falling off of land sales in 1878,
Parliament’s appropriation of the
revenue surplus and a threatened overdraft on the London account prompted 
The Treasury to issue preliminary instructions for the floating of a loan
209
TABLE 16
Ret Loan Receipts. 1879-86* - £'000
Year Receipts Year Receipts
1879 2177 1883 4505
1880 828 1884 2984
1881 2113 I885 6317
1882 500 1886 7292
* SOURCE; Public Accounts and Vouchers to Receipts (Loans)
NOTE; All new issues were in London; there were no conversions.
******
7 6of £2.8 million in London. Almost a year passed before the loan was
floated, the delay giving rise to an overdraft in London, intensifying the
colony’s liquidity problems and leading to a near-rupture of relations
77between the Treasury and the Bank of N.S.W. Eagar, permanent head of
the Treasury, advised the bank in July 1878 that it had been decided to
take advantage "of the present highly favourable state of the London money
market” to pay for public works and to reimburse local cash balances for
78advances to loan funds in recent years. Donald Larnach immediately tried 
to influence the Treasury to borrow only £1 million, rather than the 
proposed £2.8 million. Before the Treasury had time to consider this 
suggestion, the colony's Agent-General reported a "sudden unusual change
76
See "Correspondence, Telegrams, etc., respecting Public Loan",
N.S.W.V. & P.t 1878-9, Vol. 2, P.1172 ff.
77
See Parkes Correspondence, Vol. 46, A916, pp.419-426 and Vol. 45» 
pp.684-5»
78
This account is based on correspondence cited in note 76 and letters from 
Larnach to Parkes, Parkes Correspondence, Vol. 45» p.684 ff.
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in the money market”. On learning of this, the Treasury arranged for
advances from the Bank of N.S.W. in London and deferred the issue of the
loan. Requests for an extension of the term of the advances, refusal to
sanction a smaller loan and unwillingness to draw on special deposits in
other banks led to extreme bitterness in negotiations between the Treasury
and the bank. By March 1879 the Treasury was convinced that the market
was favourable, and instructions were issued for the floating of a larger
loan than was originally intended - one of £3«2 million. The loan was
duly floated - a ’’grand success, the whole taken at and above ninety
eight pounds eight shillings”, according to Larnach - and the bank was
instructed to remit £1*5 million to the colony and to hold the remainder in 
79London.
ii. The Revival of Land The Treasury did not arrange for the
Sales, 1880-82
floating of another loan until June
1881, preferring to draw on local cash balances to finance the rapidly 
mounting capital outlays; land sales were again booming and the Treasury 
was anxious to give the London Stock Exchange time to forget its dis­
approval of the large borrowing programme authorised by Parliament in
O q
1879• When a loan of £2 million was floated in 1881, the ’’accepted
79
One interesting sidelight on this loan was that the Agent-General was 
recalled for not keeping the Treasury fully informed on trends in the 
London market. (See ’’Recall of the Agent-Generals Correspondence”, 1T.S.W. 
V. & P., 1879-80, Vol. 2, p.654 ff)# The next Agent-General had precise 
instructions for corresponding with the Treasury by coded cable.
80
See cable from Agent-General, and reply, September 4 and 10, 1879» 
ibid., p.662.
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tenders gave an average price of £103 8s lid., being the highest rate
8i
ever obtained by any of the Australasian Colonies”• In a financial
statement following the floating of this loan, the Treasurer referred to
the Government1s reluctance to make use of its loan authorisations on a
large scale, owing to the flourishing condition of the general revenue;
the loans account, he added, was overdrawn by £3*5 million, covered by
advances from Consolidated Revenue and Trust Funds, ’’and this indebtedness
82is increasing at the rate of about £200,000 per month”. He then observed 
that it would be ’’unwise, as well as inconsistent, to borrow money at 4 
per cent, when we are receiving only 3 per cent, from the banks here for 
our deposits, and that only for a limited amount.... As I intend to leave 
the whole of the proceeds of the last loan in London, no remittance from 
the colony will be required during the present year”. Finally, he reported 
that the Treasury was closely investigating the question of offering 
inscribed stock in London to see whether there would be any marked advan­
tage in altering current practice.
It was not until late in 1882 that another £2 million loan was 
floated in London. (This was issued to yield £3 18s. 2d. per cent). The 
Treasury had preferred to wait for the best short-term position in the
81
Thomas Richards, Hew South Wales in l88l (Government Printer, Sydney, 
1882), p.30. The actual rate of interest payable on this loan was 
£3-16.10. per cent, compared with £4* 2. 8. on the loan of 1879* The 
terms on which the N.S.W. Government was able to borrow were the envy of 
financial experts in Victoria. (See A.I.B.R., 1879» pp.120-1; 1881, p.237)- 
82
James Watson, 15-11-81, H.S.W.P.D., Vol. 6, p.1986 ff.
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market, meanwhile running down cash balances in London and eventually
incurring an overdraft. But caution in approaching London was coming to
an end, as political conflict over the “wholesale alienation of the public
estate” became the dominant issue in colonial politics.
iii. The 2nd of the Land As will be explained in the next chapter,
Boom and Massive
Borrowing, 1883-6 the “land question” was one of the major
dividing lines in colonial politics between 1879 and. 1883* The well-
entrenched Parkes-Robertson Government was subjected to mounting criticism
for its policy of land sales and a political group led by Alexander Stuart
went to the polls in 1882 with proposals for land reform. The electorate
returned Stuart and the "land reformers ”, who promptly announced a
decision to suspend auction sales of country lands while Parliament debated
a new Land Bill. George Dibbs, Treasurer in the new Government, claimed in
later life that his approval of the new land policy, before alternative
sources of revenue were ensured, was "the gravest political blunder” of 
8 ihis life.  ^ Dibbs knew that there was no prospect of reducing expenditure, 
although the new land policy involved a loss of revenue of between one 
and two millions annually. His plan for meeting expenditure without heavy 
taxation increases was simples to embark on extensive loan raising in 
London. Referring to bankers’ comments in 1883 that "the coin of the
84colony is not sufficient for the business of the colony”, Dibbs remarked:
^ Dibbs Papers (Mitchell Library, Sydney), uncat. set 132s miscellaneous.
^Financial Statement of G.R. Dibbs, 7 February 1883, U.S.W.P.D., Vol. 8, 
1883, p.304. (For one example of financial commentaries, see A.I.B.R.,
1883, p.148s "The demand for bills on London continues, and cover is very 
scarce. Some of the banks will have to ship sovereigns soon to a conside­
rable extent, unless the Hew South Wales loan be floated at an early date”).
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It is the intention of the Government to replace the money advanced 
out of the consolidated revenue to meet loan votes •which have already 
been passed by the House in previous sessions, and it is our inten­
tion shortly to float a loan of some magnitude with that object. At 
the present time we have nearly three millions of money under advance 
to the loan account. A large portion of that will have to be called 
back to the colony by floating portions of the loans which have 
already been authorised, and that course I hope will restore commer­
cial confidence in a large measure.... (lYirther), as considerable 
sums will be required to meet the cost of the great public works 
which have already been sanctioned, and which it is the intention 
of the Government to push on with the utmost vigour, the Government 
intend at any early date to place a further loan on the market.
Having decided on his policy, Dibbs forced an Inscribed Stock Bill 
through the Legislative Assembly in the last week of January 1883» Ex­
plaining that English investors were pressing to have the Government’s
85bonds inscribed, Dibbs said:
Our debentures which are payable to bearer at the present time exist 
in a bulky and risky form, liable to be stolen, to be destroyed by 
fire, or to be acquired by fraud. Owing to these great disadvantages 
it is probable that many thousands of persons who otherwise would 
have secured our stock as permanent investments, and for trust 
investments, have been debarred from buying it.
He added that the Treasury had been considering such a course for some
years and that the Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, had constantly urged
the Government to offer inscribed stocks. The Treasury had, in fact,
promised investors in the £2 million loan of 1882 that arrangements would
be made to have the stock inscribed if they wished, so that the Government
was committed to this course. To attract the widest range of investors
it was essential to make use of a very well known bank; the Treasury for
85
Second reading debate, Inscribed Stock Bill, H.S.OT.P.D., Vol. 8, 1883, 
p.140 ff.
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years had envisaged employing the Bank of England and that policy ’was now
being tentatively implemented. Dibbs did not waste any time in preparing
the London Stock Exchange for the huge borrowing programme being planned.
A financial statement which he delivered in February 1883 was transmitted
86almost in full by cable to London newspapers. This statement was pre­
pared especially for British investors and was designed to present New
87South Wales as a more worthy borrower than the other Australian colonies. 
Soon after this ’’advertisement” was published in the London press, arrange­
ments were completed for the inscription of the £2 million loan of 1882.
notices were published in the Times that the Bank of England would exchange
88debentures issued in 1882 for inscribed stock of 50 years’ currency. The 
bank had agreed to inscribe the stock and manage it for the currency of the 
loan at an annual charge of £600 per million.
Once these preparations were completed, arrangements were made for 
the floating of the first of five loans to be raised in less than four 
years, with a nominal value of £22§- million.^ Two of these loans, each 
of £3 million, were floated in a period of five months: the yield on the 
first being 3*92 per cent and on the second 4*04 per cent. These loans,
86
See censure motion by A.G. Taylor, N.S.W.P.D., 1883, Vol. 9, p»13l6.
87
The statement appears in N.S.W.P.D., 1883» Vol. 8, pp.301 ff.
88
G. Eagar, ’’First Report under Inscribed Stock Act of 1883*', N.S.W.V. £ P., 
1883-4, Vol. 2, pp.1031-4.
89
Compare the loans of other Australian governments in these four years: 
Victoria, 4 loans, £9jm.; South Australia, 4, £6m.; Queensland, 4, £6m.
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according to the Agent-General, were raised "under circumstances of the
90greatest difficulty - difficulty which it was impossible to magnify".
At the insistence of brokers, the Bank of IT.S.W. underwrote the first loan
to the extent of £500,000, after the Agent-General accepted responsibility
for guaranteeing the bank against loss. The second loan appears to have
been taken up solely by the Bank of IT.S.W. "and the stock was quietly
91worked off afterwards as opportunity offered". It was not surprising,
therefore, that the Bank of IT.S.W. should express bitter disappointment
when advised by the Treasury that it would no longer be employed to float
92loans, this business now being handed over to the Bank of England.
George Bibbs’ explanation of the use of the Bank of England was
that "the very fact of the bank allying itself with the colony - taking
the colony under its wing - is a sufficient guarantee to persons in
93England who lend money that the colony is sound". Dibbs placed great 
importance on this move because his borrowing programme had only just 
started; he was not only determined to raise even larger loans, but to 
offer a lower rate of interest. The £5*5 million loan of 1884 was 
ostensibly to assist private enterprise to recover from the effects of a
90
Sir Saul Samuel to the Treasurer, "Loan for £5,5^0,000: Correspondence", 
ibid., I885-6, Vol. 3, p.1006.
91
"An Important Banking Movement", A.I.B.R., 14.1.85, p.l.
92
The rupture of relations between the Treasury and the Bank of IT.S.W. 
is fully treated in Chapter Six, pp. 335—0 «
93
Daily Telegraph, 19.11.84.
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serious drought and general recession, while the decision to offer only
3g per cent interest was to take advantage of the attempted conversion of
94Consols by the British Government.'' That the time chosen to float the 
loan was particularly opportune is shown by the yield - 3»7 per cent - 
and the promptness with which arrangements were commenced for floating 
another £5*5 million loan. The Bank of England indicated in the middle of 
I885 that it was reluctantly willing to advertise a new issue, but would
prefer to advance £1*5 million (if the Government needed funds) and give
95the market a rest for a while. This brought a curt command from the
96Treasury to the Agent-General:
Issue at once. The criticism of the Standard should be met by a 
counter statement that the loan is for the rapid construction of 
railways and other reproductive works.
97Then the Agent-General was informed:
Government indignant at reported dictation of stock-broking Syndi­
cate, and their attempt to question our discretion in issue of loan.
The Bank of England became uneasy at the obvious indications that the
98market was opposed to a further N.S.W. loan, but the Treasury argued:
Confidential. We are unable to perceive the difference in value 
between guaranteed Egyptian and our own loan, and we take exception
94
See N.S.W.P.D., 1883-4, Vol. 15, pp.5276-7.
95
Agent-General to Treasurer, 1.7*85, IT.S.W.V. & P., 1885-6, Vol. 3, P*995*
96
14.7.85, ibid., P.997.
97
15.7.85, ibid., P.997.
98
27.7.85, ibid., p.999
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to statement that Bank of England objects to bring out our loan 
before October. It is at our own discretion, and on our own respon­
sibility exclusively, that loans are to be issued, and although as 
to terms of issue we should of course be guided by advice of Bank 
of England, we should never permit their objection to prevail 
against our ovm conclusion.
Despite this the loan was not floated until October - the yield was 3*8 
per cent - and the Agent-General was advised that the Government was 
proposing to recall him for being bluffed by Stock Exchange speculators. 
Stuart, the Premier, argued that it was a grievous mistake Mto permit 
those speculators to be the dictators to us of our policy in regard to 
loans. We quite admit the necessity of carrying their good feelings with 
us as far as we can, and we recognise the value of the services which it 
is in their power to confer by cordial co-operation; but we fear that 
the giving way to them by postponing the issue of our loan after it had 
been publicly announced will have the dangerous effect of causing them to 
assume a position to which they are not entitled, and to which no Colonial. 
Ministry could submit".^
It was reported in I885 that "the Government transferred considerable 
sums of money from London to the Associated Banks in Sydney, which makes 
the money market tolerably easy.... Merchants complain of the extreme 
dulness of trade, which is scarcely to be wondered at considering the low 
prices ruling for all produce. Engagements, notwithstanding, seem to be 
satisfactorily met, and this is no doubt largely attributable to the 
support afforded by the enormous Government expenditure throughout the
99
Alexander Stuart to Saul Samuel, 6.8.85, ibid., p.1005»
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colony. Contractors and builders are busily engaged, and probably the
working classes in Sydney have never been so well off".^C^ The Government,
in fact, was consciously trying to counter the effects of falling export
income by its borrowing and public works programmes and, although there
were complaints from the London capital m a r k e t , p l a n s  were prepared
early in 1886 for the floating of a further loan of £5»5 million. In
May 1886, Eagar cabled the Agent-General to make confidential enquiries
102about the views of the Bank of England. The Bank of England said it 
was willing to float the loan if the Government would guarantee to keep 
out of the market for at least eighteen months and this the Treasury agreed 
to. By July, however, this assurance was reconsidered and the Agent- 
General was told to inform the Bank that "Government policy regulates 
expenditure on reproductive public works, within five millions per annum 
...Can be regulated to make proceeds last until towards close of next year. 
On this explanation assurance for a definite time considered inexpedient 
and u n n e c e s s a r y " . O n  17 July 1886 the Agent-General reported that the 
loan was a great success; there were no less than 1,440 tenders for a 
total of £17,586,000, the yield averaging 3*6 per cent. Despite the
100
"Our Sydney Letter", A.I.B.R., 14»11»85, p.676.
101
James Watson, in a letter from London to Henry Parkes (Parkes Corres­
pondence, A930, pp.662-5) said that he was at a party of leading financial 
men, including an ex-governor of the Bank of England, and "was ashamed" at 
the comments made about ii.S.W. government borrowing.
102
N.S.W.V. & P., 1885-6, Yol. 3, P.1009.
Treasury to Agent-General, 8.7.86, ibid., p.1011.
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rumblings of protest about N.S.W. government borrowing, it was irrefutable 
that it was still possible to raise very large amounts on extremely 
favourable terms. But this was no longer the major consideration for the 
N.S.W. Government: it had borrowed in excess of current requirements and the 
current taxation controversy rendered further borrowing politically unwise 
in the extreme.
-5-
Borrowing, Cash Reserves and Crisis, 1887-91 
Parliament passed no loan votes in 1887, the year in which retrench­
ment became government policy. In the following three years, opposition to 
the raising of further loans diminished and loan appropriations totalled 
£15«7 million (£3*6 million in 1888, £5.1 million in 1889 and £7 million 
in I89O ) . I n  I89I, largely in response to the Baring crisis, Parliament 
once more refused to sanction further loans. The loan appropriations of 
I888-9O differed from those of earlier years in that only one-third of the 
total were for railways.
Retrenchment proved to be extremely unpopular and was abandoned not 
long before the Baring crisis. While it lasted, the Treasury raised two 
loans (each of £3.5 million, partly for conversion purposes), taking ad­
vantage of favourable market conditions to build up cash reserves. A far 
greater volume of loan raisings would have been aimed for - as will be 
explained a little later - had the colonial banks been inclined to accept
104
This excludes authorised conversion operations and loans for the 
cancelling of revenue deficiencies (£2.1 million in 1889-91)•
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the  proceeds on f ix e d  d e p o s it a t  s u i ta b le  r a te s  o f i n t e r e s t .  Late in  
1889 the  Treasury and the  a sso c ia te d  banks, which c u rre n tly  he ld  the  
lo c a l  f in a n c ia l  agency, f a i le d  to  agree on the  trea tm en t of government 
d e p o s its . The T reasury , which knew th a t  i t  was e s s e n t ia l  to  p rovide fo r  
a m assive b u rs t  o f new c a p i ta l  fo rm ation , decided  to  run down bank 
b a lances -  a d e c is io n  which appeared as a grave e r ro r  of p o lic y  when news 
was rece iv ed  o f the  Baring c r i s i s .  (See F igure  20). No attem pt was made 
to  r a is e  a loan  in  London in  I 89O, b u t by th e  m iddle of 1891 funds were 
u rg e n tly  needed and the  T reasury  was fo rced  to  complete sp e c ia l arrangem ents 
to  cope w ith  problems fo llow ing  the  breakdown of the  London m arketing 
mechanism. In th i s  se c tio n  i t  i s  proposed to  sketch  in  the  main f a c ts  
about borrowing p o licy  and cash re se rv e s  and to  u n d e rlin e  th e  c r i s i s  of 
I 89I .  In  Chapter S ix , o p p o rtu n ity  a r is e s  fo r  a f u l l e r  trea tm en t o f the 
im portance o f Treasury p o licy  a t  a c ru c ia l  s tag e  of the  co lo n y 's  h is to ry .
TABLS 17
Loan R ece ip ts , 1887-91^^  -  £ '000jju
R ece ip ts  of
i d  9 i U ’
Is su e s  in
—  X ,
Year (a ) London (b) Colony T otal Conversions Net R ece ip ts
1887 1585 — 1585 — 1585
8 3625
1907 ^
3625 487 3138
9 1500 3407 901 2506
1890 2026
207^ )
2026 718 1308
1 2210 2417 246 2171
(a ) SOURCE: P ub lic  Accounts and Audit R eports
(b) Treasury B i l l s  to  cover revenue d e f ic ie n c ie s
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(a) The Loans of 1888-89 Close secrecy surrounded the Treasury’s
and Cash Reserve Policy
decision to float a loan in London in
1888. The issue was timed to take advantage of a highly favourable market
following Goschen’s successful conversion operation« Issued to yield
3«4 per cent, the loan was regarded as a remarkable achievement by the
N.S.W. Government which, despite its massive borrowing of earlier years,
was still able to issue on much more favourable terms than any other
Australian government. A year later, once more at a favourable opportunity,
another successful issue was made. So impressed was the Treasury by the
ease with which loans could be raised that thought was given to entering
the market for very large amounts, to be deposited in the colonial banks
at interest. The banks, however, angered the Treasury by refusing to
agree to the payment of interest on more than a part of government deposits.
The Treasury then became extremely high-handed in its dealings with the
banks, decided to run down balances and to cancel the contract. It will
be necessary in Chapter Six to delve more deeply into Treasury policy,
but some indication must here be given of Treasury thinking in I889.
In his financial statement of December 4> William IIcMillan complained
that the associated banks expected to absorb the proceeds of all loans
(even if these amounted to three or four millions) but were willing to
105pay interest on only one million. Determined to get interest on all 
government deposits, McMillan commenced the practice of investing large
IÖ5
The statement is reproduced in part in A.I.B.R., 1889, P*909
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amounts in exchequer hills in London. Although the hanks objected to
this, they still claimed to he unable to pay interest on more than £1
million. This, said McMillan, was a hangover from earlier years, "when
the hanks came first and the Government came second. Now the Government
are in a better position than all the hanks combined. I hold that in
a country like this, with our enormous credit and immense territory, the
banks and everything else must go before Government. What bank, or what
combination of banks, can approach the London money market and borrow like
this Government can borrow? I say that in all money negotiations the
Government, and not the banks, is master of the situation. The banks
thought that as they were combined the whole business of the country was
to be put into their hands, and that there was nobody else to go to. They
thought, in fact, that they were masters of the situation. Well, I gave
them every interview they wanted, and listened to their proposals. At
last they handed me their ultimatum, and when I found their proposals
105unreasonable, I determined to have nothing more to do with them". The 
banks were to be punished by losing their contract and through the steady
105
withdrawal of government deposits.
It is significant that negotiations with the banks commenced in 
July 1889, just after the successful floating of a £3«5 million loan in 
London. By November it had become obvious that the banks would not
log
See "Government Banking Agreement - Correspondence...", N.5.V/.V. & P., 
I889 (second session), Vol. 1 , p.585 ff*
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substantially increase the amount on which they would pay interest, so
that the Treasury would he unwise to raise further loans. "I am determined1',
McMillan announced, "to gradually reduce the bank balances to the lowest
107margin which we can work on with safety." This policy went into opera­
tion contemporaneously with a policy of rapidly increasing contra- 
depression expenditure - about a year before the Baring crisis.
(b) The Crisis Reference to two earlier figures will make
of 1891
clear the nature of expenditure expansion 
after 1889 and the rapid reduction of cash balances. (See Figures 6 and 
20). The Treasury made no effort to float a loan in I89O, before the 
Baring panic, and could not risk an issue while the market was so unfavour­
able after the panic. But the rapid depletion of bank balances could not 
continue for long: public works contracts valued at between £3 and £4 
million had been let, earlier loans were maturing, the annual interest 
commitment exceeded £1^- million and expenditure under most other headings 
was rising. The near-failure of Victorian and Queensland loans in I89O
was recognised by the N.3.W. Treasury as a clear warning. As McMillan
. . 108 observed:
But, whether for good or ill, the network of monetary interests 
is so interwoven between all the Colonies, that each feels very 
quickly the pulse of the others, and the unhealthy beating of one 
affects the London market as regards the others. The middleman 
fails to unload his stock, and a Colony, anxious to commence new
107
Minute of the Colonial Treasurer, 4*11*89) ibid., p.586.
Treasury Minute, 12.2.91) Parkes Correspondence, Vol. 27, pp.203-4*
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works, determines to issue another loan without any regard to 
the condition of those upon whom we have hitherto depended for 
successful floating. Hence, a depressed market, and a renewal 
of the periodical warnings from the London journals. The time, 
therefore, seems opportune for a review of our position, and an 
enquiry into the methods used in bringing about a successful 
issue. To avoid further failure and depreciation, Sir Saul Samuel 
(Agent-General) has suggested...that we might place our loans 
privately, in a series of moderate amounts, such as the market 
might, from time to time, absorb, independently, I presume, of the 
middleman. I have not considered this suggestion very carefully, 
but on the surface, there would seem to me to be one very salient 
objection. We should be obliged, from time to time, to make a 
price, and we might come very seriously into conflict with holders 
of our Stock”.
McMillan, in fact, anticipated what A.R. Hall says was the striking feature
of 1891, 
ties:109
the break-down of the marketing mechanism for Australian securi-
The period I888-I89O had been one of exceptional activity in the 
new issue market and the sudden set-back given by the Baring crisis 
had left underwriters and marketing syndicates with large batches 
of unmarketable securities on their hands. When, as a result of 
this over-loading, the syndicates failed to tender for Australian 
securities there was no one to take them up. This failure of the 
marketing mechanism influenced investors who thought that the 
failure was due to a loss of confidence in them and the net result 
may well have been such a loss.
Despite the failure of South Australian, Victorian and Queensland 
issues, a N.S.W. loan of £4«5 million was floated in September I89I at
what appeared to be a remarkable price - the yield was 3*7 per cent - but 
no less than £1.5 million represented a straight-out conversion operation
and of the remaining £3 million, one-third was taken up by the Bank of
109
A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and the Flow of Capital to 
Australia 1870-1914 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1951)» PP*250-1•
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England and over one-third by four colonial hanks. When advances 
were repaid only £930,000 of the loan proceeds remained and it was 
necessary, for the first time in over a decade, to draw hills of exchange 
on London. The Government, with good reason, was under fire in the 
colony for seriously affecting the ability of hanks to lend to their 
regular customers. McMillan's 1889 assertion - that "the hanks and every­
thing else must go before Government” - was now a reality.
-7-
"When John Bull Buttoned up his Pockets”
"Money must he found, whatever may he the consequences”, the Treasurer
112told Parliament early in 1892. Large contracts for public works had 
been let, despite the clear warning given by the Baring crisis that 
borrowing in London could not continue on the old scale. The Government's 
commitments in London were extremely heavy: the London interest hill 
exceeded £1.5 million a year; large payments for equipment and stores 
had to he provided for; and securities totalling several million pounds
110
"Loan of £4,500,000 - Return Showing Particulars Respecting”, N.S.W.V. 
& P., 1891-2, Vol. 2, p.847* (A year after the floating of this loan, 
the Treasurer admitted that "None of these debentures...have been sold by 
those institutions, and, therefore, a large sum of money is necessarily 
tied up in those debentures, which the banks were in hopes they would be 
able to sell at a favourable price”. See N.S.W.P.D., 1891-2, Vol. 55» 
PP*3835“6*)111
Prom a colourful commentary on the effects of reduced capital inflow, 
by George Reid, Daily Telegraph report, 5 August 1893« ("When John Bull 
buttoned up his pockets the crash came”.)
112
N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, Vol. 64, P.5633.
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were nearing maturity# The need to increase taxation had touched off a 
new storm of disapproval of overseas borrowing on the score of adding to 
the drain on ordinary revenue. But depression was creating widespread and 
growing unemployment and the Government was expected to counter this.
There was strong opposition to raising loans in the colony on the ground 
of crippling an already shaky banking system. British investors were 
emphatically opposed to investing in long-dated securities issued by 
Australian governments. Pears were being expressed in British newspapers 
about the likelihood of Australians defaulting in the payment of interest 
and the return of principal lent in the days of optimism. Private enter­
prise in the colony, cramped by the continued worsening of the terms of 
trade, was fearful of the possible consequences of the Treasury acting 
without sufficient attention to the plight of the private sector. Banks 
crashed, bankruptcies increased and unemployment grew. Drought - serious 
and prolonged - retarded the recovery from depression. In brief, these 
are the main features of the background to N.S.W. government borrowing 
from 1892 to the end of the century. It is proposed now to look a little 
more closely at the onset of depression and the responses of Parliament 
and the Treasury to the reorientation of British investment away from 
Australia.
(a) The End of For the Australian economy as a whole,
Expansion
expansion came to an end before the 
Baring crisis, probably in 1889» New South Wales had begun to
i n JFor comprehensive discussion of all available evidence, see N.G. Butlin, 
Investment in Australian Economic Growth. 1861-1900«
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experience major economic problems as early as 1882, although the onset
of depression was delayed until 1887 mainly through the massive overseas
114borrowing of its government. A steady worsening of the terms of trade 
and a rapid increase in dividend and interest payments overseas posed 
constant threats of a serious balance of payments crisis. Total capital 
formation (public and private) declined from 1886 to I89O, recovered 
briefly in I89I, then plunged to a major trough in 1897» (See Figure 22 
with comparative estimates for Victoria) Export earnings in Britain
(at 1901 prices) rose to a peak in 1895, then declined, the movements 
being in inverse relationship to imports from Britain. (See Figure 23). 
From mid I89I to 1893 successive finance company and bank crashes told 
the story of the collapse of private enterprise. Years of painful effort 
were needed to rehabilitate the economy and to recover from the effects 
of excessive overseas borrowing on both public and private account. The 
slowness of recovery was frequently attributed at the time - often with a 
good basis in fact - to the indifference of the Government to the impact 
of its financial operations on the activities of private enterprise. 
Government spending was not curtailed markedly, except in 1894? and the 
Government’s requirements pressed heavily on the resources of a seriously 
depressed economy.
^^In 1887 and following years, the net barter terms of trade were: 101.8, 
99.3, 96.7, 94.5, 89.8 , 88.8 , 83.4, 79.2, 81.9, 82.9, 79*8, 83.3, 104.5, 
90.0. (From E.A. Boehm, ’’Australia in the Depression and Recovery of the 
1890’s”, A.N.Z.A.A.S. paper (Section G), 1962, p.2l).
115
The figure is based on the estimates of IT*G. Butlin.
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FIGURE 22
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION PUBLIC & PRIVATE 
HEW SOUTH WALES & VICTORIA..... 1861-1900
BB-EiqE•|—M—;—r it—r— j — r— —^  ,— '— r~
1861 1865 1870 1375 1880 1885 1890 18^5 1900
(SOURCE: II. G. Butliri)
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FIGURE 23
IMPORTS moil API) BZPORgS TO GREAT P1I1AI1,, 3,670-1' 
(1901 Pricess Semi-logarithmic Scale)
7 y . -
i" ~ V  ' T  ' '« ‘ t "i ..'
1 3 7 0 1375 1 8 8 0 1885 1 8 9 0 1895 1 3 0 0
•----- InT.S.W. Exports to Great Britain
--- -—  F1S.Y/1 Imports from Great Britain
(Price indexes from R. Wilson, Capital 
Imports and the Perms of Trade., p* 89)
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(b) Parliamentary Loan The realisation that British investors
Appropriations
were no longer willing to lend on the
old scale, and the need for heavier taxation (largely to service the debt), 
had the effect of causing noisy opposition in Parliament to further pro­
posals for raising loans. Parliamentary loan appropriations - summarised 
in the table below - were more modest than they had been for a lengthy 
period and made comparatively small provision for new railway works. Many 
of the items figuring in Loan Acts represented the re-voting of sums sanc­
tioned in earlier Loan Acts in terms of the Inscribed Stock Act of 1883, 
this being made necessary by the impossibility of issuing inscribed stock 
in London in 1892 and the related need to float loans in the colony. Par­
liament sanctioned the issue of short-dated Treasury Bills in 1892, 
ostensibly to meet payments under public works contracts, and authorised 
the issue in Sydney of funded stock at the discretion of the Treasury.
Loan Appropriations - £*000
Year Rails. & Trams. Other Pub. Works Defic.a Total^
1892 908 507 1415
3 418 422 - 840
4 403 1262 - 1665
5 527 1028 1200 2755
6 725 1480 - 2205
7 67 6 1172 - 1848
8 802 1234 - 2036
9 607 5410(0) - 6017
1900 1175 1154 - 2349
(a) Revenue Deficiencies (Treasury Bills)
(b) Total excludes authorised conversion operations
(c) Includes £4 million for resumption of land at Darling Harbour
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In  1895 a f u r th e r  is su e  o f T reasury B i l l s  (£1 .2  m ill io n )  was san c tio n ed  
to  meet an accum ulated revenue d e fic ien c y  as a p re lim in a ry  to  th e  in t r o ­
du c tio n  of annual budgets and cash accoun ts . P arliam en t c o n tin u a lly  demanded 
d e ta i l s  of T reasury  lo an  tra n s a c tio n s  and ex p lan a tio n s  of those  tr a n s ­
a c t io n s , bu t had to  be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  evasive  answers from the two Prem iers
(Dibbs and Reid) who d ire c te d  Treasury  o p e ra tio n s  w ith  firm ness and
c o n sid e rab le  sec recy .
(c) Loan Receipts, 
1892-1900
Loan r e c e ip ts  a re  shown in  th e  ta b le  
below. S pec ia l in t e r e s t  a tta c h e s  to  the
la rg e  volume of conversions e f fe c te d  -  m ostly  in  London -  and th e  la rg e
TABLE 18
Loan R e c e ip ts , 1892-1900 -  £ '000
R ece ip ts  of Is su e s  in
Year
(a ) London (b) Sydney
T otal Convs. Net R eceip ts
1892 4534 977 5511 1799 3712
3 2857 1828 4685 40 4645
4 1338 307 1645 1250 395
5 (a)1 822 — 822 822 0
1895/ 6(UI) 3805 1582 5387 1224 4163
9 6 / 7(bJ1 63 6 1560 2196 2196 0
9 7 / 8 ( t ;  
1899/O0(b]
I 1480
> 995
846
727
2326
1722
2
6
2324
1716
TOTALS 16467 8779 25246 7531 17715
NOTES: (a ) H alf Year, January-June
(b) F in a n c ia l Year, Ju ly -Ju n e  
SOURCE: P u b lic  Accounts and A udit R eports
volume of loan  ra is in g s  in  th e  colony. R eference should a lso  be made to  
F igure  21, which em phasises the  enormous p ro v is io n  which had to  be made in
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these years for interest and redemptions. Further comment on these 
aspects may he deferred for the time being, hut it needs to he emphasised 
that the conversions and redemptions checked the growth of the annual 
interest commitment in a period when new issues continued to he made. The 
conversions, in fact, were justly regarded hy the Treasury as important 
achievements, involving in several instances a lowering of the actual 
interest rate payable from over five per cent to four per cent or less - 
as will he illustrated later.
(d) Government Foreign Exchange Since the hulk of conversions were in 
Requirements
London, the net receipts of loans issued
ll6there probably totalled less than £10 million between I892 and 1900.
A conservative estimate, based on official sources, of hills of exchange
drawn hy the Treasury in the same nine years is £10 million, which would
represent between 13 and 15 per cent of the colony’s export earnings in
117Britain in the same period. In three years - 1893> 1895> 1896 - the 
proportion may have been as high as thirty to forty per cent. The Govern­
ment's recorded quarterly remittances to London are shown in the following
. 11 118table.
^^Information is not available to establish in every year where conversions 
were effected. Conversion operations appear in the public accounts as "re­
payment of loans by new loans", transactions being separated from the 
recorded receipts of new issues.
117Export earnings in Britain are shown in Statistical Registers, but can 
only be regarded as approximations.
118Treasury ledgers record bills of exchange drawn on the Government’s 
bankers, but the annual totals occasionally conflict with statements to Par­
liament and some entries in the public accounts. Entries commence only in 
June 1892, earlier records possibly having been destroyed.
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TABLE 19
Quarterly Remittances to London, 1892-1900 - £*000
________________ Quarter_______________
Year Annual Total
1st
1892 IT.A.
2nd
9*
3rd
35
4th
416 460
1893 19 359 15 1630 2023
1894 33 292 36 361 722
1895 31 321 68 1590 2010
1896 61 285 1087 319 1752
1897 89 235 49 283 656
1898 36 328 63 457 884
1899 120 248 81 268 717
1900 63 272 106 343 784
* From June 20 only. SOURCE: Treasury Archives, T44» Box 695» 
’’Remittances to London hy Mail Steamer”.
Government spokesmen frequently had to explain to back-benchers in 
Parliament why it v;as necessary to ’’remit funds from the colony”, thereby 
interfering with the ability of banks to lend to their ordinary customers. 
As John See, Treasurer in 1893» observed, ”If my honourable friend were 
in my position he would find that when he had to make a remittance to the 
old country to meet certain obligations, the bank with which he transacted 
the business would tell him that they would have to provide on the other 
side of the world, where the drafts or bills of exchange were presented, 
gold to meet it, and the absence of gold would make this operation
absolutely useless” 119 For that reason, the Government was at times
forced to float loans, no matter what the state of the market was. Said 
See:11?
119
N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, Vol. 64, P.5653.
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We raise loans from time to time to suit our own finances, and it 
is all a question of the value of money at the time the loan is 
issued as to what we get for it.... It has not been a question of 
what it would cost to borrow the money; it has simply been a question 
of accomplishing a certain object.
The fear of not being able to meet obligations in London in 1893 was
largely responsible for the Government’s emergency legislation to deal 
with the bank crisis.
(e) Poaching of Local The Government's calls on export earnings
Investible Funds
undoubtedly interfered with private 
economic activity. Further interference arose from the Government's 
absorption of Savings Bank deposits and its competition in the local 
market for other investible funds. The same reason which prompted requests 
for drafts on London - the difficulty of raising loans in London - lay be­
hind the Government's local borrowing. This borrowing needs to be reviewed 
before turning to consider new issues in London.
120
See p. 341
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TABLE 20
The Growth of Savings Bank Deposits, 1890-1900
Deposits at end of year Sav. Bank Deps.
Year (a) All Banking (b) Savings
as % of Total
Deposits in all
Institutions* Banks Banking Institns
£’000 £ ’000 t
1890 43.3 4.7 10.9
1 4 3 .6 5.3 12.2
2 43.4 5*7 13.1
3 4 0 .2 6 .5 1 6 .2
4 39.3 7.2 18.3
5 4 0 .0 8 .1 20.3
6 39.7 8*5 21.4
7 3 9 .8 9.1 22.9
8 40.4 9*5 23*5
9 4 2 .6 1 0 .1 23*7
1900 44.3 1 0 .9 2 4 .6
SOURCE: Statistical Registers
ROTE: (*) Includes deposits in registered companies and Benefit Building 
Societies
The table demonstrates the remarkable growth of savings bank deposits 
in the nineties, a growth largely the product of the transfer of funds 
from shaky institutions to the two savings banks, which were guaranteed 
by the Government. Coghlan’s commentary on Australian Savings Banks is 
worth quoting:'*'^
The Savings Banks are on a very different footing (to the other 
banks), being to a greater or less extent under State control and 
otherwise safeguarded, so that they enjoy public confidence. The 
institutions classed as Savings Banks may be divided into two kinds -
121
T.A. Coghlan, The Seven Colonies of Australasia, 1899-1900 (Sydney, 
1 9 0 0), p.7 4 8.
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those worked in conjunction with the Post Office, and, consequently, 
directly administered by the State; and those under trustees or 
commissioners, who are generally nominated by the Government. The 
declared objects of these banks are to encourage thrift in the 
working classes, and to provide a safe investment for the funds of 
charitable institutions, friendly societies, and such like. The 
institutions, however, have become so popular that all classes of 
the community are represented amongst their depositors, and the 
banking crisis of 1893 had the effect of largely increasing their 
business.
Deposits of the banks were paid into trust funds under Treasury control.
Interest payable on deposits was 3i per cent until 1894» when it was
reduced to 3 per cent, this being payable only on the first £200 deposited.
Here, then, was a large and growing source of cheap funds during the
depressed nineties. By 1900, £5.9 million had been invested in government
securities and a further £2.5 million had been absorbed to cover deficits
122on consolidated revenue and loan funds.
In addition to this absorption of savings bank deposits, the Govern­
ment competed in the open market for local investible funds. A storm 
of protest greeted the Government’s announcement in I892 that it was 
proposed to resume local issues after a lapse of nearly two decades. The 
Government, however, persisted in its request for the sanctioning of 
the raising of £3 million by the issue of funded stock, securities to 
bear a face value of £10, to be issued only at par or better, to bear 
interest of four per cent per annum and to be repayable at the option 
of the Government only after twenty years. The Treasurer announced that
122
See explanatory notes, Appendix 1, p.355
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an Act a u th o r is in g  th e  is su e  o f £3 m ill io n  of funded s to ck  would a s s i s t
the  T reasury  to  meet government o b lig a tio n s  and would a lso  make i t
p o ss ib le  fo r  anyone w ith  £10 or more to  in v e s t  to  c a l l  a t  any tim e a t
123the  Treasury  in  o rd er to  p lace  money s a fe ly . Said th e  T reasu rers
I t  may p o ss ib ly  absorb some money th a t  would o therw ise  go in to  
th e  banks; b u t ,  as I  have s a id , when we co n sid er th e  number o f 
bogus f in a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which we have had in  the  colony during  
the  p a s t few y e a r s ,  I  th in k  th e  p u b lic  w il l  tak e  a s e n s ib le  view 
o f the  m atte r and see th a t  they had b e t te r  make 4 per c e n t, c e r ta in  
than  look fo r  a d oub tfu l 8 or 9*
Events proved the  T reasu rer c o r r e c t ,  and th e  demand fo r  funded s to ck  
soon o u ts tr ip p e d  th e  supply . F u rth e r Funded Stock Acts were passed in  
fo llow ing  y e a r s . By 1895 s to ck  is su e d  in  1892 was changing hands in  
Sydney a t 110. In  1896 Reid (Prem ier and T reasu re r) could say th a t  
"There was an enormous mass o f money locked  up to -day  in  th e  b ig  i n s t i ­
tu t io n s ,  which were running a f t e r  him to  borrow i t ,  b u t w hile he was 
in  favour o f r a is in g  lo an s  in  the  co lony, he was no t in  favour of easing
people who were h o ld ing  c a p i ta l  which should be used fo r  the  b e n e f i t  of 
128th e  co u n try " . A read in g  of th e  "Sydney L e tte rs "  in  th e  A u s tra la s ia n  
Insu rance  and Banking Record d is c lo se s  a s tro n g  and growing i n t e r e s t  in  
T reasury announcements from tim e to  time th a t  more funded s to ck  would be 
is su e d , fo r  th i s  meant o f te n  the  re le a s in g  of funds being  hoarded , as 
w ell as s tim u la tin g  the development of a v igorous lo c a l bond m arket.
123
N.S.W.P.D. ,  1891- 2 , V oi. 55 , p .1138.
124
A .I.B .R . , 19 October 1895 , p .670.
125
A .I.B .R . , r e p o r t ,  20 A pril 1896 , p .242 .
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There were, as might he expected, many complaints about the raising of 
loans in the colony, but financial exports by and large in the last years 
of the century were complaining that the Treasury made too little funded 
stock available in the open market, being content more often to formalise 
the use of trust funds by crediting these funds with investments in funded 
stock.
(f) Borrowing in Matters so far considered have been
London
concerned with actions made necessary, 
first, by the break-down of the London marketing mechanism for Australian 
securities and, second, by the continued reorientation of British over­
seas investment away from Australia. Attention turns now to the efforts 
made to recapture the support of British investors and the considerable 
success achieved after 1892.
The large loan floated in September 1891 eased the strain on the 
public finances temporarily, but that the bulk of the issue was taken 
up by banks which were left with large batches of unmarketable securities 
on their hands. The Government was forced to recognise the fact that 
these institutions could not again quickly come to its assistance and 
that the syndicates which had formerly tendered were currently unable 
and/or unwilling to assist. Advice from the Agent-General in 1892 led to 
the decision to try to raise £4 million by the issue of Treasury Bills 
with a currency of two or four years and bearing interest at the rate 
of 4l2 per cent. The Bank of England would not handle the issue, and 
arrangements were made with the London and Westminster Bank for the
239
stop-gap issue. £2.5 million was raised in London in 1892 at prices
which astonished the Government: yields to investors ranged from £3 19s»
to £4 6s. per cent, the lower yields being on Bills issued late in 1892
following the announcement that borrowing in the colony was to be resumed -
an announcement said to have strongly influenced British investors in
126favour of the colony.
The issue of Treasury Bills in London and the resumption of 
borrowing in the colony met the Government's short-term needs for funds, 
but there were serious qualms about the future. In 1892, George Dibbs, 
the Premier, made a special visit to England to give favourable publicity 
to all Australian colonies and to intervene with the British Government 
in the matter of legalising trustee investments in colonial securities.
On this last point, the trip was a. failure, but it seems clear that Dibbs 
learned a great deal about the thinking of British investors and the 
measures which must be taken prior to a successful issue by his govern­
ment. When he returned to the colony in 1893 be had completed arrangements 
with the London and V/estminster for a further issue of Treasury Bills 
(£§ million) - he had been told bluntly that it would be impossible to 
renew earlier issues - and had arranged with the Bank of England for 
the floating of an inscribed stock loan of £2.5 million. Although this 
126
A.I.B.R., 17 November 1892, p.851> reported that prices of N.S.W. 
stocks rose sharply following the announcement, and that there were strong 
indications of an immediate revival of confidence in the colony by London 
brokers, who showed that confidence by applying for funded stock, even 
though interest on this was payable only in Sydney.
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was essentially a conversion loan, Dibbs made sure that there would be a 
surplus to augment London cash balances. The maturing debentures amounted 
to £1,782,000 on which the actual interest payable was at the rate of 5*2 
per cent. Dibbs arranged for the issue of securities amounting to 
£2,028,000 under the Act sanctioning the conversion and raised £167,000 
more than was needed for this purpose. The rest of the loan was accounted 
for by £472,000 of stock described as being for '‘reproductive public 
works" and altogether the net proceeds amounted to £628,000. Yield on 
the loan was 4*2 per cent, so that the Government had reason to be 
pleased with the operation. On later occasions similar arrangements were 
made - also with marked success.
It is worth noting that Dibbs - apart from his negotiations in 
London - took special pains to create a favourable reception for the 
1893 loan. At the moment the loan was advertised in London, Dibbs intro­
duced into the Legislative Assembly a Bill to set up a sinking fund. His 
prospect of getting this measure passed was negligible and it is doubt­
ful whether he was sincere in his protestations, but his timing was 
perfect. He was able to read to the Assembly telegrams quoting all 
London papers praising the move, and to say that "because we as a govern­
ment have publicly announced this Bill...our loan has taken a more 
favoured place in the English market; and before midnight to-night the 
result will be known that its position will be 5 per cent better than that 
of the Victorian 4 per cent, loan of last week. The reason of this is, 
that there is more confidence in London in the colony of Hew South Wales
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than in any other of the Australian colonies, and that confidence exists 
because we are leading the way in a reform in financial administration,
127showing the people of England that we have at last recovered our senses". 
Dibbs knew very well that there was no prospect of making another success­
ful issue in London for some time unless the brokers were convinced that 
the government would provide a sinking fund. He warned Parliament of 
this and referred to the severe jolt he had received when discussing 
problems with the Bank of England, the London and Westminster Bank and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Goschen). Goschen, he said, was com­
pletely unimpressed and said that he would make no effort to legalise 
trustee investments in colonial securities. In Dibbs1 words, every banker 
and financial expert he met said, "You come here knocking at the door
every year for a loan of £4,000,000 or £5,000,000, and you never make any
128proposal as to how the money is to be repaid". But Dibbs was ridi­
culed by Reid, leader of the Opposition, as having become "infected 
by his visit to London. Ever since he went home he has been talking of
nothing else but what the London people think and what the London money-
129lenders will say about us". Reid, in fact, played on Dibbs' 
pre-occupation with the colony's credit in London to convince the working 
classes that only the banks and large capitalists interested the Premier.
127
Statement, 28.9.93, H.S.W.P.D., 1893, Vol. 67, p.213*
128 ........
Ibid., p.208.
129
Debate on financial Statement, N.S.W.P.D., 1893, Vol. 67, P*502
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This line of argument - allied to his proposals for major taxation 
reforms - brought Reid to office in 1894*
Before he lost control of Parliament, Dibbs made a frantic effort 
to retrench, cancelled plans for the raising of further loans for public 
works in London and rushed through arrangements for a conversion loan 
of £822,000. Reid, for long the major opponent of overseas borrowing, 
gave directions for the floating of only two loans in London in the second 
half of the nineties. The first, in 1895» was for £4 million. This was 
to provide funds for the retiring of £3«3 million of debentures maturing 
in the next eighteen months, and £0.7 million for public works. The 
loan - inscribed stock with a currency of 40 years and a nominal interest 
rate of only 3 per cent - was regarded in Australia as probably the 
greatest achievement by any Government since borrowing began in London.
The yield to investors was only slightly in excess of three per cent and 
the proceeds were invested in the short-term money market for periods 
ranging up to eighteen months. Reid’s next London loan - in January 1898 - 
produced £1.5 million which was invested in the short-term money market.
A new issue entirely, this was issued to yield slightly less than three 
per cent to investors - another marked success for the Government.
The success of these two loans created a growing belief in New 
South Wales that London was once more willing to supply whatever funds 
the Government might require. This belief, however, was soon shattered;
IP
See A.I.B.R., 19 October 1895, p.670.
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a t  the  end of the  c en tu ry , when the  N.S.W. Government sought to  r a is e
sev e ra l m illio n s  in  London, i t  was necessary  to  r e s o r t  to  th e  I 892
exped ien t -  sh o r t-d a te d  T reasury  B i l l s  h ea rin g  in t e r e s t  of four per c e n t.
For the  f i r s t  tim e s in ce  I 89I ,  i t  became n ecessary  to  in c u r o v e rd ra f ts
in  London. Between May 1900 and A p ril 1901, rem ittan ces  to  London
to ta l l e d  no le s s  than  £2 .4  m illio n  -  testim ony to  th e  Governm ent's new
131la rg e  c a l l s  on N.S*W. export earn in g s  in  B r i ta in .  Many d i f f i c u l t i e s
had been surmounted d u ring  the  tro u b led  n in e t ie s ,  bu t o th e r -  p o ss ib ly
g re a te r  -  d i f f i c u l t i e s  s t i l l  la y  ahead. By 1906 the  se r io u sn e ss  o f th e se
d i f f i c u l t i e s  was be ing  em phasised by T.A. Coghlan, 1T.S.W. A gent-G eneral
in  London, who condemned th e  f a i lu r e  of e a r l i e r  T reasu re rs  to  co n sid e r
132p o s t e r i t y 's  problems as huge d eb ts  reached redem ption d a te s . The 
1I.S.W. borrowing sp ree  o f 1883- 6 , s a id  Coghlan, could never be re p e a te d , 
not even by a l l  the  A u s tra lia n  S ta te s  a c tin g  to g e th e r . S inking funds had 
no t been provided because i t  would have been im possib le  to  make s u f f ic ie n t  
p ro v is io n  fo r the annual t r a n s f e r s .  I t  shou ld , of co u rse , have been 
recogn ised  when th e  deb t was being  in c u rre d  th a t  borrowing proceeded f a r  
beyond the e x te n t to  which i t  might have been regarded  as j u s t i f i a b l e .
131
See Appendix 3 of 31st Annual Report o f the  A u d ito r-G en era l, 1901 -  
which g ives the f i r s t  com plete s ta tem en t of tra n s a c tio n s  in  London w ith  
th e  Bank of England and London and W estm inster Bank.
132
See T.A. Coghlan, Memorandum by th e  Agent-General o f New South Wales 
on th e  T ransference  o f the  S ta te  Debts to  the  Commonwealth ( c o l le c te d  
w ith  pamphlets on P ub lic  Finance in  the  P u b lic  L ib rary  of IT.S.W.) .
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In the early twentieth century, it was difficult to make out a case for 
the contribution of overseas borrowing, especially in the eighties, to 
the economic growth of 1T.S.W. Expediency had always overridden long- 
run considerations. The Government had by and large placed its own 
financial problems before the interests of the economy.
Chapter Four
NON-TAX SOURCES OF FUNDS - THE CROWN LANDS
1# The First Phase, I856-I87I
2. The Second Phases "The Wholesale Alienation of the
Public Estate", 1872-1882
3. The Third Phase: 1883-1900
"I think I have shown in a manner entirely unanswerable that so far 
as the people generally are concerned - I mean those who neither buy 
nor lease land from the Crown - the country has done well in regard 
to the income from the land."
--- SIR JOHN ROBERTSON, N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 7, p.ll66
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Introductory
Whatever may have been the motives underlying land legislation at 
the beginning of the sixties, it is beyond dispute that the implementation 
of that legislation - and the introduction of later amending legislation - 
was governed very largely by budgetary considerations expressed at the 
time in terms of the interests of those who comprised the majority of the 
population, the urban landless. •’We have to consider the interests of the 
whole country," said John Robertson in 1882, "and of the large body of the 
people who never can be owners of the Crown lands either as leaseholders 
or purchasers. The great mass of the people will always be those who hold 
no land".^
In each of the three previous chapters, reference has been made to 
the budgetary significance of booming land sales between 1872 and 1882. 
Between these years land revenue dwarfed the other sources of funds, stimu­
lated a rapid expansion of government expenditure, enabled the Government 
to reduce taxation and restrict overseas borrowing. When the land revenue 
declined abruptly in 1883» the Government turned to the London capital 
market for funds on a huge scale. There are, therefore, good reasons for 
drawing attention to the operation of the land laws in the middle of the 
period. Yet it would be a serious mistake to ignore the fact that the land 
revenue before 1872 and after 1882 accounted for between ten and twenty per 
cent of total net receipts, thereby playing an important part in the
N.S.W.P.D., 1882, Vol. 7, p.ll60.
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retention of comparatively low levels of taxation throughout the period.
The land revenue, in fact, amounted to £64 million "between 1856 and 1900,
only slightly less than the total net proceeds of loans and only about
£10 million less than was yielded by taxation. This was a total at least
three times as large as the land revenue of any other Australian government.
There can be little doubt that the N.S.W. Government was determined to
wrest from the Crown lands the largest possible revenue and that this
objective normally took priority over considerations bearing on the
interests of those who purchased or leased land from the Government.
Government land policy, except perhaps in the nineties, did not foster
agriculture, nor did it benefit many pastoralists. Squatters were forced
to become owners instead of leaseholders. As Professor S.J. Butlin has
observed, a major outcome of the 1861 legislation was the "replacement of
2squatting leaseholds by nominal freeholds heavily burdened with debt".
The outlay of millions of pounds to purchase land merely protected the 
squatters against predatory selectors} the productivity of the pastoral 
industry was not thereby increased. Much of the finance for land purchase 
came from Britain, so that government land sale policy contributed to the 
colony's mounting balance of payments problems in the second half of the 
period, when the long-run trend of wool prices was downward. It is not 
too much to say that the land laws were amongst the causes of declining 
economic prosperity in New South Wales in the eighties. Politicians
S.J. Butlin, Australia and New Zealand Bank (Longmans, 1961), p.212.
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might l i s t  an im pressive a rray  of sh o rt- te rm  b e n e f i ts  to  the  community 
as a whole accru ing  from the  o p e ra tio n  o f th e  lan d  law s, bu t in  the  long 
run the  community as a whole had reason  to  condemn th e  o p e ra tio n  of 
those  law s. In  the  n in e t ie s  e f f o r t s  were made to  c o rre c t some o f th e  more 
b la ta n t  e r ro rs  of th e  p a s t and genuine concern was expressed  fo r  the  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  fac in g  the  men on the  la n d . Sven so , th e re  s t i l l  flowed 
in to  the  N.S.W. Treasury in  th e  v ic in i ty  o f £2 m ill io n  a y ear from men who 
had c o n d itio n a lly  purchased land  in  p rosperous tim es. R ece ip ts  c l a s s i f i e d  
as from land  s a le s  amounted to  about £1 .3  m illio n  -  £1 m illio n  more than in  
V ic to r ia ,  which headed the  l i s t  o f o th e r A u s tra lia n  governm ents. In  
a d d itio n  to  th i s  th e re  was £800,000 a year from le a s e s  of v a rio u s  k in d s  -  
double the  comparable r e c e ip ts  o f Queensland and e ig h t tim es those  of 
V ic to r ia . Hence the  envious comment o f the  V ic to rian -p roduced  A u s tra la s ia n  
In su rance  and Banking Record th a t  "When a colony re c e iv e s  in to  i t s  tre a su ry  
c lo se  on two m illio n s  a year from i t s  p u b lic  e s t a t e s ,  i t  i s  l i t t l e  wonder 
th a t  i t  can a ffo rd  a f r e e - t r a d e  p o lic y " .^
F igure 25 shows the  revenue from s a le s ,  the  a rea  so ld  a t  au c tio n  
and th e  acreage ap p lied  fo r  under c o n d itio n a l purchase p ro v is io n s  o f the  
law. This might f r u i t f u l l y  be examined in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  e s tim a te s  of 
new a g r ic u l tu ra l  and p a s to ra l  investm ent (F igu re  26) and F igure  27, which 
shows the  com position o f the lan d  revenue. Table 21 summarises annual 
average re tu rn s  from the Crown lan d s  in  v a rio u s  su b -periods r e q u ir in g  
sep a ra te  a t te n t io n .
3 19 October 1898 , p .667
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TABLE 21
Net Revenue From Crown Lands* - £*000
Sub-Period No. of Years Total Net Rev. Annual Av. Rev.
(1) 1856-71 16 6 8 £ 421
(2) 1872-82 n 21823 1 9 8 4
a. 1872-77 6 10895 1816
b. I8 7 8 -8 O 3 5407 1802
c. 1881-82 2 5521 2760
(3) 1883-1900 1 8 35358 1 9 6 4
a. 1 8 8 3 - 6 4 6386 1597
b. 1887-1900 14 28972 2069
* Gross revenue less refunds
- 1-
The First Phase, 1856-1871
When the Orders-in-Council of 1847 were published, it was supposed 
that a final settlement of the land question had at last been 
reached. But the settlement had been arranged in England and was 
greatly disapproved by the majority of persons in Australia not 
directly interested in pastoral pursuits, who felt that the vital 
interests of the colony had been sacrificed to placate a small, 
albeit rich, minority.
4--- T.A. Coghlan
The attitude of those who hoped to benefit from land reform 
scarcely needs any explanation. It was an expression of simple 
self-interest, but it also had the sanction of prevailing liberal 
and radical assumptions. Equality of opportunity and personal 
independence were articles of faith which, in a new country, 
appeared to have more chance of realization than in the old world.
Labour and Industry in Australia, Vol. 11, p.644*
4
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However, the interests of men who actually carried the reform in 
parliament were in general not directly involved in the opening 
of the land. In the main they were landowners and members of the 
urban middle class - business men, manufacturers, and members of 
the professions.
5--  Robin Gollan
When the first N.S.W. Parliament assembled, the dominant political group 
represented the colony’s squatters, some three thousand of whom occupied 
the major part of the Crown lands. To dislodge the squatters from at 
least some of the Crown lands was an objective of many, probably the 
majority of, colonists. Demands for land reform were "as much a challenge 
to the political oligarchy of the squatters as a demand for access to 
land for small farming by new settlers".^ Land reform was not possible 
while the squatters dominated politics and the politicians who challenged 
the squatters concentrated first on political reform. In 1858 the N.S.W. 
Parliament, following Victoria's lead, approved the introduction of man­
hood suffrage and the secret ballot. The Parliament elected in the 
following year was not dominated by squatters' representatives. In fact, 
the majority of politicians had been elected to amend the land laws.
Once elected, they discovered that there was a variety of opinion about 
the best way of instituting land reform. Debate dragged on for nearly 
three years before John Robertson's compromise was accepted and made law.
5 Radical and Working Cla,ss Politics: A Study of Eastern Australia, 
1850-1910 (Melbourne^ I960), p.38.6
S.J. Butlin, op. cit., p.120.
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Robertson made it clear that he did not wish to ruin the squatters, 
that he hoped to foster the agricultural industry, but that above all he 
wanted a solution which would benefit the community as a whole. His 
plan involved a reduction in the land revenue for a short time, but he 
envisaged a remarkable long-term growth of the land revenue which would 
enable the Government to increase its expenditure without taxation increases. 
Until 1872, the Robertson plan seemed to many to be an almost total failure. 
Agriculture remained backward; squatters were forced into debt to buy land; 
and the land revenue was not sufficient to avoid the necessity of 
increasing taxation.
(a) The Nature of Prior to the Robertson reforms, Crown
Land Reform
Land was sold at auction - from I842
at a minimum price of £1 per acre - and there was provision for leasehold 
tenure. By the famous Orders-in-Council of 1847> the squatters had a 
virtual monopolistic holding of the Crown lands. Lands were classified as 
unsettled, intermediate and settled. In unsettled districts leases for 
fourteen years could be secured for the use of land for pastoral purposes.
A minimum rental of £10 a year could be charged and for each 1,000 sheep 
above 4,000 the lessee was to pay £2. 10s. Leases for eight years were 
obtainable in ’’intermediate districts”, subject to sixty days' notice 
that the land would be offered for sale. In settled districts one-year 
leases could be obtained, together with the right of free depasturing 
on adjacent Crown land but subject to dispossession at any time when the 
land might be offered for sale. A warning about the implications of
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this system was given in 1847 "by Robert Lowe, whose words are worthy of 
reproductions^
Once grant these leases, and beyond the settled districts there 
will be no land to be sold - the lessees will have a right to hold 
their lands until someone will give £1 an acre for them.... Be 
the capabilities of these lands what they may, they are to be a 
sheepwalk for ever!.... The squatter may make sure of his run at 
the end of his lease by buying up, in the exercise of his pre­
emptive right, all the water-frontage, thus rendering it valueless 
to anyone except himself.
Although not nearly so serious a problem as in Victoria, declining
employment opportunities on the gold-fields created an unsatisfied demand
for land to be put under crop. The Government’s continued subsidisation
of immigrants also meant that newcomers to the colony might expect to
take up land. Coghlan tells of the difficulties of men wishing to
o
become farmers in the fifties. There were long and tedious formalities
to be gone through before the Government withdrew land from lease and
organised an auction. Men of small means often found themselves outbid
at the auctions, usually by squatters who tended to become owners of the
best portions of their runs. The Surveyor-General in 1855 asserted that
the squatters occupied nineteen-twentieths of the land in the unsettled
districts and their objections to the government surveyors making reserves
Qfor sale in the future were normally supported by the Land Commissioners.
7
Quoted by Stephen H. Roberts, The Squatting Age in Australia, 1835-1847 
(Melbourne, 1935)» p*331*8
Labour and Industry in Australia, Vol. 11, p.648.
9
Discussed by Coghlan, op. oit., p.648
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Political organisation for election to the first Parliament provided 
opportunities for the formulation of demands for land reform. The 
colonial press recorded the bitterness of those who claimed to be unable 
to take up land for farming; even where sympathies were clearly with the 
squatters, newspapers admitted that the squatter-monopoly of the Crown 
lands was at variance with the ’’spirit of the age” - the democratic move­
ment. Wealthy landowners like John Robertson claimed that it was unfair 
to those who paid for their land that the squatters could retain possession 
of millions of acres simply by occupation and occasional purchases of 
small portions of their runs. The value of property as a whole was seen 
as being reduced by the current system, and the Government was missing 
out on an important source of income.
It is not necessary to trace the political manoeuvring of the early 
years of responsible government and the gradual clarification of ideas 
about the way land reform should proceed. By i860 there was no longer 
any doubt that the Crown lands should be thrown open for selection, but 
opinion was fairly evenly divided on the question as to whether selection 
should be allowed to proceed before or only after the land was properly 
surveyed. Candidates went to the polls on this issue and Robertson and 
others favouring free selection before survey had clear-cut electoral 
victories. Henry Parkes and the other politicians who opposed Robertson 
made a great fuss about the emphasis placed by Robertson on the ease 
with which the Government in future would be able to pay for railways 
and other public works instead of being concerned with ’’the greater
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though more remote advantage o f s e t t l i n g  th e  people on th e  s o i l “ ." ^
R o b e r tso n s  l i f e lo n g  defence was th a t  h is  ta sk  was to  f in d  a compromise
s a t i s f a c to r y  to  th e  s q u a t te r s ,  the  in te n d in g  farm ers and “ the  la rg e  body
of th e  people who never can be owners o f th e  Crown la n d s“ . ^  He h e ld
out fo r  the  r e te n t io n  o f au c tio n  s a le s  and th e  minimum p r ic e  o f £1 an acre
12and h is  ex p lan a tio n  i s  w orth re p e a tin g :
Before th e  Act was passed  th e re  was no com petition  whatever fo r  
what was regarded  as i n f e r io r  la n d . The le s s e e s  d e sc rib e d  the  
land  as w o rth le ss ; they  s a id  th a t  no one would ever dream of l iv in g  
on i t ;  b u t when th e  r ig h t  was g iven  to  th e  people to  e n te r  upon i t ,  
and they d id  so f r e e ly ,  th e  le s s e e s  soon found th a t  th e  lan d  was 
worth £1 per acre  and m ore .. . .  In  1861 I  d id  not th in k  th a t  to  
a b o lish  au c tio n  s a le s  was d e s ir a b le .  I t  i s  one th in g  to  p rov ide  
th a t  a man may have lan d  fo r  h im se lf , and i t  i s  ano ther th in g  to  
say th a t  ano ther man who cannot re s id e  on th e  land  s h a l l  no t buy 
th e  land  in  th e  open m arket on a p roper u p se t p r ic e .
The le g i s l a t i o n  o f 1861 made ample p ro v is io n  fo r  new men to  take
up lan d  fo r  fa m in g  an d /o r g raz in g  on a sm all s c a le ,  fo r  s q u a tte rs  to
p ro te c t  them selves a g a in s t  p red a to ry  s e le c to r s  and fo r  o th e rs  to  purchase
land  w ithou t the  need to  r e s id e  on i t  o r make improvements. The Crown
Lands A lien a tio n  Act p rov ided  fo r  th e  s e le c t io n  of any b lo ck  owned by
th e  Crown, w ith  an a re a  o f 40 to  320 a c re s , a t  £1 per a c re . One-
q u a r te r  o f the  purchase money was re q u ire d  as a d e p o s it  and th e  balance
TO
Speech in  Committee on Crown Lands A lie n a tio n  B i l l ,  1861, Henry P ark es , 
Speeches on V arious O ccasions Connected w ith  the  P u b lic  A ffa irs  o f N.S.W. 
(M elbourne, 187^), p .137 .
11
N.S.W.P.D. , 1882, V ol. 7 , p p .1160-4«
I b id . , p . l l6 2 .
12
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was to  be paid  in  th re e  y ears  or could be d e fe rre d  in d e f in i te ly  on payment 
o f f iv e  per cen t i n t e r e s t  on the  amount o u ts ta n d in g . Bona f id e  re s id en ce  
and improvements va lued  a t  £1 an acre  were to  be proved b e fo re  the  g ra n t 
o f permanent t i t l e  to  th e  la n d . C erta in  a reas  were excepted  from se le c tio n s  
th e se  were "tow n", "suburban" and "improved" lan d s  as d e fin ed  in  the  Act.
At th e  d is c r e t io n  o f th e  M in is te r  fo r  Lands, lan d  could be au c tio n ed , 
w ith  minimum u p se t p r ic e s  o f £8, £2 and £1 fo r  town, suburban and country  
lan d s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The Crown Lands Occupation Act d e fin ed  the  method 
o f g ra n tin g  le a s e s :  th e se  could be is su e d  fo r  one y ear in  s e t t l e d  d i s t r i c t s  
or f iv e  y ea rs  in  th e  rem ainder o f the co lony. In  th e  s e t t l e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  
th e  annual r e n ta l  was f ix e d  a t  £2 per acre  and in  o th e r  d i s t r i c t s  accord ing  
to  th e  c a rry in g  c ap ac ity  o f th e  run . F u r th e r , any person  s e le c t in g  land  
was e n t i t l e d  to  le a s e  Crown lan d  ad jo in in g  h is  s e le c t io n ,  th e  a rea  le a se d  
no t to  exceed th re e  tim es th a t  o f th e  s e le c t io n .  P re - le a se s  took precedence 
over o th e r types o f le a s e .  A lthough, as R oberts say s , th e  Robertson p lan  
was b a s ic a l ly  s im p le ,^  the  two Acts were long  and co n fe rred  on the  
m in is te r  in  charge enormous d is c re t io n a ry  powers in  fram ing re g u la t io n s , 
d e a lin g  w ith  d is p u te s , en fo rc in g  adherence to  th e  v a rio u s  requ irem ents fo r  
s e le c t io n  and le a s e  and in  managing au c tio n  s a le s .
(b ) The Robertson Acts For some y e a rs  m in is te rs  were co n ten t
in  O peration
to  l e t  th e  s q u a tte rs  and f r e e  s e le c to r s  
in te r p r e t  th e  Acts so f a r  as they  could  to  t h e i r  own advantage and w ithou t
13
S.H. R oberts , H isto ry  o f A u s tra lia n  Land S e ttle m e n t, 1788-1920 
(M elbourne, 1924), p .223.
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rauch government intervention. Coghlan estimates that between l86l and 
1871 land alienated amounted to 3,607,000 acres, but that only four per 
cent of this was put under cultivation.^ In 1862, over seven thousand
selectors moved into the squatters' territory and in the first five years
14seventeen thousand families were settled on the land. But almost from
15the beginning climatic conditions were against intending farmers:
The vicissitudes of climate in ITew South Wales during the period 
1862-70 were very extraordinary, and did much to hinder the progress 
of agriculture. The farmers were everywhere disheartened, and 
their methods became careless, as they came to consider it a mere 
chance whether they would be able to gather in a crop or would lose 
the fruit of their labours by flood or drought.
Figure 28 shows the enormous fluctuations in wheat harvests in the sixties 
and suggests why two thousand selections were forfeited between 1864 and 
1871.^ An increasing number of selectors found it impossible to meet 
instalments on conditional purchases and, in order to retain possession
of the land, paid five per cent interest on the amount outstanding. A 
large proportion of the selectors turned from farming to grazing and there
was a marked tendency for the more successful selectors to increase the
17size of their holdings.
14
Op. cit., Vol. Ill, P.1191.
14
Roberts, op. cit., p.224*
15
Coghlan, op. cit., p.1193*
16
8th Annual Report of the Department of Lands, I887, N.S.W.V. & P., 
1888-9, Vol. 3, p.25.
17
See speeches by John Robertson, N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 1, p.13 and Vol. 7,
pp.II65-6.
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The problems b e s e t t in g  sm all farm ers and the com plain ts o f s q u a tte rs
about t h e i r  v ic t im is a t io n  by s o -c a l le d  f re e  s e le c to r s  could no t be ignored
by P a rliam en t. Suggestions fo r  amendments o f th e  law were made in  every
s e s s io n , bu t m a jo rity  op in ion  h e ld  th a t  th e  new system should be g iven
a f a i r  t r i a l .  The Government, i t  was s a id , was n o t re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e
flo o d s  and droughts and th e se  were th e  main reason  fo r  th e  modest success
o f th e  Robertson A cts in  fo s te r in g  th e  a g r ic u l tu r a l  in d u s try . The s to ck in g
o f th e  sheep-runs was p roceed ing  ra p id ly :  the  sheep p o p u la tio n  rose  from
5 .6  m illio n  in  l8 6 l  to  17*6 m il l io n  in  1872.^  " I t  was t h i s  very  marked
p ro g ress  in  sh eep -b reed in g ,"  Coghlan o b serv es , "which persuaded the  people
of th e  colony th a t  n a tu re  had in ten d ed  New South Wales to  be a sheepwalk,
and re c o n c ile d  them to  th e  com parative n e g le c t to  which a g r ic u l tu re  was 
19re le g a te d " .
(c )  The Land Revenue The t o t a l  n e t revenue from land  between
and the  Budget
I 856 and 1871 amounted to  £6*8 m il l io n , 
o r approxim ately e ig h teen  p er cen t o f t o t a l  n e t r e c e ip ts .  The lan d , 
acco rd in g ly , was even in  t h i s  p e rio d  an im portan t source o f funds. Prom 
the  view point o f th e  T reasu ry , however, the  land  revenue was very u n s a t i s ­
f a c to ry ,  p rim arily  because i t  f e l l  away when funds were most u rg e n tly  
needed ( in  1863-4 and I 87O -I) and d id  no t in  o th e r  y ears  reach  the  le v e ls  
p re d ic te d  by Robertson and o th e rs  during  th e  p ass in g  of th e  l8 6 l  A cts.
IS
See F igure 29*
Op. c i t . ,  p.973«
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The revenue to  he secured  from th e  Crown lan d s rece iv ed  a g re a t 
deal o f a t te n t io n  du rin g  a l l  d isc u ss io n s  of government f in a n c e , hu t espec­
i a l l y  when a t te n t io n  tu rned  to  q u estio n s  of borrowing and the  e s tab lish m en t 
of a network o f  ra ilw a y s . "We have a sm all d e b t, and m illio n s  of acres
as a re so u rce  whence to  o b ta in  the  means of paying i t , "  th e  f i r s t  T reasu rer 
20po in ted  o u t. The va lue  o f t h i s  la n d , i t  was argued, would be g re a t ly  
in c re a se d  by the  c o n s tru c tio n  o f p u b lic  works, e s p e c ia lly  ro ad s , ra ilw ay s 
and o th e r  communications f a c i l i t i e s .  The Crown Lands A lie n a tio n  A ct, 
R obertson was wont to  em phasise, would mean th a t  m ill io n s  of pounds from 
lan d  s a le s  would flow in to  th e  T reasury  in s te a d  of the  modest sums rece iv ed  
w hile th e  s q u a t te r s  h e ld  the  b u lk  o f th e  land  on low -cost le a s e s .  Arguments 
l ik e  th i s  were s tro n g ly  v o iced , and w idely approved, du rin g  th e  p lann ing  
of the th re e  ra ilw ay  tru n k s . I t  was no t a c c id e n ta l th a t  the  P arliam en t 
san c tio n ed  la rg e  c o n s tru c tio n  programmes soon a f t e r  th e  pass in g  o f the  
Robertson A cts. The land  had been thrown open to  a l l  who might wish to  
s e t t l e ,  so th a t  th e  ra ilw ay s and o th e r p u b lic  works were no lo n g er regarded  
as being  in ten d ed  to  se rv e  p r im a rily  one sm all s e c tio n  o f the  community; 
and, more im p o rtan tly  to  many, th e re  seemed no reason  to  doubt th a t  la rg e  
sums would be ra is e d  from th e  Crown lan d s  to  se rv ic e  th e  debt and pay fo r  
p a r t  of the  work to  be undertaken .
A p p lica tio n s  fo r  lan d  proved som ething o f a d isappoin tm ent to  the  
Government. Prom 1862 to  1871 th e re  were 37,000 a p p lic a tio n s  fo r  a t o t a l  
20
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f S tu a r t  Donaldson, H era ld , 7 November 1856.
265
area of 2.8 million acres under the conditional purchase clauses of the 
21Act. Since selectors were required only to put up one-quarter as a
deposit, had three years in which to pay the balance and could, if they
so desired, defer payment indefinitely by paying five per cent interest on
the amount outstanding, the Government did not immediately benefit from
the new legislation. In 1865» the first year in which selectors were
required to make deferred payments on land conditionally purchased in
1862, the land revenue jumped from £300,000 to £500,000. Thereafter, the
great majority of selectors, presumably unable to secure bank loans
following the Overend-Gurney crisis, retained possession of their land by
paying the five per cent demanded by the Government. It was not until
1872 that there was a rush to complete purchases commenced years earlier.
Predictions of marked increases in the price to be obtained at land
auctions were also falsified. The average price received for country
lands at auction in 1862 was £1 2s. 4d. per acre. Thereafter, prices
22tended downwards: £1. Os. 9^* in 1866; £1 Os. 5<i* in 1871. This was one 
reason why the Government offered comparatively little land for auction 
in this period. Another, and more important, reason was that there was 
little finance available in the colony for land purchase, especially in 
the second half of the sixties and in I87O-I.
21
Department of Lands: Report for I89O, R.S.W.V. & P ., 1891-2, Vol. 4»
P*43*
22
See Official Year Book of N.S.W., 1904-5) P*80.
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B earing th e se  p o in ts  in  mind, th e  r e la t io n s h ip  of f lu c tu a t in g  
lan d  revenue to  sh o rt- te rm  “budgetary problems may be review ed. I t  w il l  
be r e c a l le d  th a t  th e  adm ission o f a mounting revenue d e fic ie n c y  l a t e  in  
1863 s ig n a l le d  th e  beginn ing  of a p e rio d  of s e r io u s  budgetary d is o rd e r , 
le ad in g  to  q u ite  sharp  ta x a tio n  in c re a s e s . In  1863-4» th e  lan d  revenue 
f e l l  from £400,000  to  £300, 000 , a f a l l  which, added to  d im inished  customs 
revenue, was s u f f ic ie n t  to  r e s u l t  in  a cash d e f i c i t .  Amongst the  reasons 
put forward fo r  d e fe r r in g  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f ta x a t io n  in c re a se s  was the  
a s s e r t io n  th a t  th e  lan d  revenue would be tre b le d  in  1865 , when th e  f i r s t  
d e fe rre d  payments under c o n d itio n a l purchases f e l l  due. The e x tra  
£200,000  re ce iv ed  in  I 865 was co n sid e rab ly  l e s s  than  th e  in c re a se  a n t i c i ­
pa ted  and, a lthough  i t  helped  towards the  r e s to r a t io n  o f the  f in a n c e s , 
was n o t s u f f ic ie n t  to  avoid th e  n e c e s s ity  o f in c re a s in g  ta x a t io n . The 
Government’ s problems in  t ry in g  to  meet i t s  o b lig a tio n s  by heavy 
borrow ing in  the  m id -s ix tie s  re q u ire  no e la b o ra tio n  h e re . But i t  needs 
to  be s t r e s s e d  th a t  the  ta x a tio n  in c re a se s  of 1865-6 le d  to  mounting 
o p p o s itio n  to  overseas borrow ing and fo rced  th e  Government to  c u r t a i l  work 
on th e  ra ilw ay s and o th e r  p u b lic  works in  th e  l a t e  s i x t i e s .  When the  land  
revenue again  f e l l  in  1870, th e  Government decided  on fu r th e r  ta x a tio n  
in c re a se s  and the  fu r th e r  c u rta ilm e n t o f c o n s tru c tio n  programmes.
The budgetary  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f th e  m id - s ix t ie s  prompted T reasu re rs  
to  seek  a way out of t h e i r  tro u b le s  by tu rn in g  th e  lan d  to  b e t t e r  account. 
The M artin  Government (G eoffrey E agar, T rea su re r) was w ell aware th a t  
e x is t in g  lan d  le g i s l a t i o n  d id  no t ho ld  out hope o f b a lan c in g  the  budget
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by land sales. In 1866 feelers were put out to see whether Parliament
would support proposals for a reduction in the price of land. Political
opinion seemed to he evenly divided and in I867 Martin introduced a Bill
23to amend the Robertson Acts. The Martin plan was to reserve half a 
million acres in the most desirable parts of the colony for , sale at 
10s. an acre to immigrants; to make further reserves in other areas for 
sale in the future; and to give the squatters better tenure in return 
for a much higher return. The revenue from the land was to be set aside 
as a sinking fund for the public debt. This plan was rejected by 
Parliament for several reasons. Opposition to assisted immigration 
had become intense following evidence of unemployment in the colony. Men 
who had given £1 or more per acre objected to a lower price for new 
purchasers. Many thought that the squatters had gained the ear of the 
Government and were about to recapture the ground lost since the intro­
duction of the Robertson Acts. Still more objected to any plan for ear­
marking the land revenue to form a sinking fund.
When Robertson again became Premier late in 1868, prospects for 
increased auction sales were better than they had been for some time.
In I869 nearly twice as much revenue was received from auction sales as 
in the previous year (£110,000), but the recession of I87O-I thwarted 
plans to rely heavily for revenue on land sales. Martin returned to 
office as Premier and rumours were widespread that he still intended to
See Herald» November 18-21, 1867#
23
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reduce the price of land. It was widely believed that he was "determined
to prop up his falling fortunes by handing over that immense and magnifi-
cent territory (the Riverina) in huge blocks". ' He did, in fact,
unsuccessfully introduce a new Land Bill in 1871 before news was received
of the best wool prices for years and after he had secured taxation
increases to help balance the budget. Martin still proposed to link land
sales and assisted immigration and to provide a sinking fund - proposals
still unacceptable to the majority. Henry Parkes was rapidly emerging as
a popular idol, because his blueprint for the future attracted support
from all sections of the community: free trade, economic freedom generally,
a spirited policy of public works, vigorous competition with Victoria
for the status of leading Australian colony and the renewed encouragement
25of settlement by those who would "turn the soil to best account".
While Parkes was successfully campaigning against the Martin govern­
ment, the colony received news that wool prices at the London sales had
26risen substantially and seemed likely to rise even further. Expectations 
throughout the colony were much more optimistic and Martin's "depression
24
From a letter to J.D. Lang by Francis Longmore, Papers of the Rev. J.D. 
Lang (Mitchell Library, Sydney), Vol. 7> pp.1043-4*
25
See Henry Parkes, Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History,
Vol. 1, pp.270-1.
26
The importance of better wool prices was shown immediately in revised 
bank lending policies. See a good example in London instructions to the 
Bank of Australasia in 1871, S.J. Butlin, op. cit., p.217»
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budget" of 1871 seemed completely unrealistic. Parkes became Premier 
in 1872, v;ith unprecedented opportunities for expiating the Crown lands 
to solve the Government’s budgetary problems. For over a decade Parkes 
and Robertson alternated as Premier. Both, for years, had seen in the 
land a potentially inexhaustible supply of funds. Economic conditions 
hitherto had been unfavourable, but were rapidly changing.
- 2-
The Second Phases "The Wholesale Alienation of the 
____________ Public Estate", 1872-1882_____________
Some statistics of land alienations will serve to underline the
extent to which the N.S.W. Government was prepared to dispose of its
major asset between 1872 and 1882. From 1788 to 1861, ten million acres
of Crown land were alienated by grant and sale; from 1862 to 1871 another
three and half million acres were alienated by auction and conditional
purchase sales; but from 1872 to 1882, the area alienated exceeded 25 
27million acres. Comparable figures of alienations between 1872 and 1882
20
in Victoria are 4»9 million and in Queensland, 852,000 acres. Con­
temporaries, therefore, had good reason for referring to the N.S.W. 
Government’s land policy in this period as "the wholesale alienation 
of the public estate".
The "enormous alienation of land," in Coghlan's words, "was not 
due to the requirements of agriculture or even of pastoral settlement.... 
27Estimated from figures in Roberts, op. oit.» p.224 and Lands Department 
returns, N.S.W.V. & P., I885-6, Vol. 5> PP.257-9*20
Statistical Registers of Queensland and Victoria.
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On behalf of the squatters it is claimed that they were forced to buy
land in order to protect their fortunes, which were sunk in their runs;
and on behalf of the banks from whom the squatters obtained money, that
they were compelled to protect their own interests, which were deeply
involved in the pastoral industry of the colony...* The land purchased
by the squatters cost at least £1 per acre, and this, at the time,
represented interest at the rate of l6d. a year, whereas for the same
land on leasehold the squatters would probably have paid not more than 2d.
To purchase his land, therefore, cost the squatter eight times as much as
29he would have paid had it remained in his possession under lease”.
The increasing indebtedness of the pastoral industry had important long- 
run implications for the development of the economy. From the mid­
seventies onwards, as N.G. Butlin demonstrates,^ the rate of increase 
of pastoral productivity slowed down. The long-term trend of wool prices 
was downwards. ^  Yet a large proportion of the finance for land purchase 
came from Britain, so that an increasing proportion of wool export 
earnings was hypothecated for the payment of interest and dividends.
Massive land sales, as has already been stressed several times, 
provided a large part of the funds employed by the N.S.W. Treasury in the
29
T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, Vol. Ill, p.1348.
30
Investment in Australian Economic Growth. 1861-1900. Chapter 1.
31
Alan Barnard, The Australian Wool Market. 1840-1900 (Melbourne, 195^),
pp.200-1.
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s e v e n tie s  and e a r ly  e ig h tie s  to  fin an ce  ra ilw ay s and o th e r p u b lic  works. 
In s o fa r  as th ese  funds were borrowed overseas on p r iv a te  account -  govern­
ment overseas borrow ing meanwhile being  suspended -  i t  can be sa id  th a t  th e
colony in c u rre d  thereby  a la r g e r  overseas i n t e r e s t  b i l l  than  would have
32r e s u l te d  from government s e c u r i ty  is su e s  in  London. I t  would be mis­
le a d in g  to  imply th a t  contem poraries d id  no t understand  th e  p rocess by 
which government new c a p i ta l  fo rm ation  was p a r t ly  financed  by c a p i ta l  
in flow  on p r iv a te  account. N.G. B u tlin  c i t e s  a T reasury adm ission to  
th i s  e f f e c t ^  and sev e ra l o th e r i l l u s t r a t i o n s  could be given from budget 
s p e e c h e s .^  But i t  would a lso  be m islead ing  to  g ive the  im pression  th a t  
only  c a p i ta l  exp en d itu re  mounted ra p id ly  in  response to  la rg e  land  
s a le s .  A ll c la s s e s  o f government ex pend itu re  in c re ase d  in  th e  s e v e n tie s .
As a newspaper observed in  1879> ’’The knowledge th a t  th e  Government had 
la rg e  u n ap p ro p ria ted  ba lances in  th e  banks, as w ell as immense sums of 
money ly in g  id le  in  th e  T reasury , tended to  s tim u la te  such demands fo r  
the  ex p en d itu re  o f p u b lic  money from a l l  p a r ts  of th e  colony th a t  no 
M in is try  could rem ain in  power th a t  r e s i s t e d  them. I t  was not m erely 
fo r  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f p u b lic  w orks, fo r  which the  country  could  w ell 
a f fo rd  to  w a it a few y ears  lo n g e r , th a t  th e se  demands were made, bu t an
32
For d e ta i le d  d isc u ss io n  and s t a t i s t i c s ,  see N.G. B u tlin , op. o i t . ,  and 
by th e  same a u th o r, A u s tra lian  Domestic P r o d u c t . . . , Chapter XX, "Balance 
o f Payments, 1861-1900".
33
"C olon ial S ocialism  in  A u s tra l ia ,  I 86O -I9OO", pp. 54—5«
34
See, fo r  an e a r ly  s ta tem en t, budget speech of G.A. L loyd, Thomson, 
F in a n c ia l S ta tem en ts , p.314*
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in c re a se  in  the  number of C iv il s e rv an ts  in  alm ost every departm ent
of the  P ub lic  S erv ice ; and in  t h i s  way a c a re e r  o f ex travagance was opened
35up to  whatever Government might happen to  be in  power". D e ta ile d  study 
o f 1T.S.W. p o l i t i c s  in  th i s  p e rio d  has prompted one p o l i t i c a l  h i s to r ia n  
to  th i s  conclusion :
. . .n o th in g  emerges more c le a r ly  than  t h a t ,  w hatever th e i r  i d e a l i s t i c  
p r o te s ta t io n s ,  those  no t d i r e c t ly  engaged in  prim ary p u r s u i ts  -  th e  
g re a t  ' t h i r d  e s t a t e ’ , as t h e i r  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  f re q u e n tly  c a l le d  
them -  were p r in c ip a l ly  d ed ica ted  to  th e  m a te r ia l o b je c t o f see in g  
th a t  th e  S ta te  rece iv ed  th e  f u l l e s t  p o s s ib le  income from the  la n d .
Who possessed  i t  thus tended to  be to  them a le s s  im portan t q u estio n  
than  th a t  the  lan d  should con tinue  to  p rov ide  the  T reasury  w ith  
funds which might o therw ise  have come from g en era l ta x a t io n .
The p o l i t i c a l  campaign which brought to  an end la v is h  lan d  s a le s ,  w hile
d e a lin g  in  d e ta i l  w ith  th e  u n d e s irab le  r e s u l t s  o f government p o lic y  f o r
p a s to r a l i s t s  and fa rm ers , gave p r io r i ty  o f ex p ress io n  to  f e a r s  th a t  th e
Government would, i f  unchecked, d isp o se  o f a l l  the  b e s t  lan d  in  th e
colony to  meet c u rre n t f in a n c ia l  req u irem en ts . A continuance o f t h i s
p o lic y  was seen as th re a te n in g  th e  c o lo n y 's  c r e d i t  in  B r i ta in ,  w hile
making alm ost in e v i ta b le  heavy ta x a tio n  in c re a s e s  should th e re  be any
sudden d ry ing  up o f the  land  revenue. To an in c re a s in g  number i t  seemed
p o ss ib le  to  secure  a la rg e  and re g u la r  income from th e  lan d  w ithou t
s e l l in g  any more.
F ig u re  25 makes i t  c le a r  th a t  th e  b u lk  of a l ie n a t io n s  in  th i s  
p e rio d  were not o u tr ig h t  bu t c o n d itio n a l. For s ev e ra l y ea rs
•^ D a ily  Telegraph e d i t o r i a l ,  14 October 1879*
■^A.W. M artin , P o l i t i c a l  Groupings in  N .S.W ., 1872-1889 (U npublished 
Ph.D. th e s i s ,  A .N.U., 1955), p .2 1 .
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representatives of areas in which selectors were fairly numerous tried, 
to get Parliament to grant selectors their land without payment of 
balances outstanding. Parliament, however,was unsympathetic. In 1875 
the Government acted to bring to an end indefinite credit, following many 
complaints in Parliament that selectors, after putting down the required 
deposit, were holding the land selected by paying the five per cent 
interest on the balance outstanding. Prom 1875 a conditional purchaser 
had to pay one shilling an acre annually, a sum which in twenty years 
extinguished the debt and provided for the interest, which was reduced to 
four per cent. This change was justified by the Government on two main 
grounds: first, that it would benefit the revenue and facilitate the 
preparation of annual estimates; and, second, that it would operate to 
restrict the practice of dummying. By an amendment to the Act the minimum 
age of any person ’’selecting" was raised from two years to sixteen years. 
This prevented heads of families from selecting land in the names of their 
young children, but this check was easily overcome by applying for land 
in the names of servants, relatives and fictitious individuals. ”By 
means such as these, many squatters were ahle to accomplish what they 
desired, that is, they acquired such a dominating position on their runs
37as to make the remaining area of little value to any one else”.
Apart from the squatters' opportunities to purchase land condition­
ally to keep out predatory selectors, they were able to purchase land at
Coghlan, op. cit., p.1349*
37
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auction  -  and were no t slow to  purchase i f  th re a te n e d . But w ell e s ta b ­
l is h e d  s q u a tte rs  were no t the  only b id d e rs  fo r  Crown lan d : in  the  south  
of the co lony, hundreds of V ic to r ia n s  became owners w ith  th e  he lp  o f 
banks o p e ra tin g  in  V ic to r ia .  The d isp o sa l o f the  R iv e rin a  in  huge b locks 
to  V ic to r ia n s  was th e  Government’s way of r a is in g  huge sums u n t i l  1878. 
’’There were no l im i t s  on a re a ” , says R oberts , "and most o f the  land  was 
so ld  a t  th e  u p se t p r ic e ,  two m ill io n  ac res  o f the  c h o ic e s t R iv e rin a  land
going in  one y e a r” . 0 I t  i s  w orth rep roducing  the  comments o f F a rn e l l ,
39who amended th e  Robertson Act in  1884s 7
There has been th i s  k ind  o f co m p etitio n : many persons in  the  R iver­
ina  c o u n try .. .carne over from V ic to r ia ,  and n a tu ra l ly  d e s ire d  to  
o b ta in  a p o rtio n  o f the  Crown la n d s . We have a lie n a te d  whole 
co u n tie s  o f land  in  th i s  p a r t  o f the  c o lo n y . . . .  In  th e  f i r s t  
in s ta n c e  some people in  V ic to r ia  who had ap p lied  to  purchase the 
land  formed a sy n d ica te  -  a k ind  of company o f th e i r  own -  and 
they re so lv ed  th a t  when the  lan d  was o ffe re d  a t  au c tio n  they would 
b id  a g a in s t th e  p a s to ra l  te n a n t i f  he d id  not buy them o f f  a t  an 
advance o f I s .  o r l s .6 d .  per a c re . In  some in s ta n c e s  they made 
the  p a s to ra l  te n a n ts  pay p r e t ty  d e a rly  fo r  the  la n d . P re se n tly  
the p a s to ra l  te n a n ts  formed an a s s o c ia t io n ;  a la rg e  fund was 
accum ulated, and i f  a te n a n t d e s ire d  to  purchase land  on h is  own 
ru n , and, being  run up, had to  pay more than th e  u p se t p r ic e ,  he 
was recouped by the  a s s o c ia t io n . These two c la s s e s  fought one 
a g a in s t the o th e r ;  b u t in  a sh o rt tim e they found i t  to  th e i r  
m utual advantage to  compromise the  m a tte r . This compromise meant 
th a t  th e  p u b lic  e s ta te  was to  be so ld  a t the  u p se t p r ic e  w ithou t 
any com petition .
The h ig h e s t average p r ic e  re ce iv ed  fo r  country  lands from 1871 to  1878 
was £1 Os. 6d. an acre  and t h i s ,  as w il l  be shown a l i t t l e  l a t e r ,  
to  a b r i e f  in c re a se  in  th e  u p se t p r ic e .
38
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According to  the  A u s tra la s ia n  In su rance  and Banking R ecord,
V ic to r ia n  hanks had in v e s ted  in  excess o f £4 m ill io n  in  the  R iv erin a  by 
e a r ly  1878. The jo u rn a l sev e re ly  c r i t i c i s e d  th e  N.S.W. Government and 
" th e  s h o r t-s ig h te d n e s s  o f some o f our A u s tra lia n  hankers in  p e rm ittin g  
such la rg e  amounts o f c a p i ta l  to  d r i f t  in to  s e c u r i t i e s  p r a c t ic a l ly  incon­
v e r tib le *  The m isfo rtu n e  o f th e se  lan d  investm en ts  in  R iv erin a  i s  th a t  
n o th ing  i s  added to  th e  p ro d u c tiv en ess  of what i s  a l ie n a te d . I t  would 
feed  as many sheep and grow as much wool form erly  under a Government le a s e ,  
as now when the  freeh o ld  t i t l e  deeds a re  is su e d  and in  th e  sa fe  o f the  
nominal owner’s b a n k e r ." ^  I n t e r e s t  r a te s  were r i s in g ,  money was sca rce  
and a ba lance  of payments c r i s i s  was th re a te n e d , the  jo u rn a l im p lied , 
u n le ss  th e  N.S.W. and V ic to r ia n  Governments r a is e d  la rg e  lo an s  in  London.
The N.S.W. T reasu ry , as no ted  in  th e  p rev ious c h a p te r , was re lu c ­
ta n t  to  borrow in  London w hile  the  lan d  revenue was booming. T o tal 
e x p en d itu re , a lthough  r i s in g  ra p id ly , d id  no t keep pace w ith  th e  growth 
of r e c e ip ts  b e fo re  1878 and la rg e  b a lances were accum ulated in  th e  
banks. In  1878, i t  w i l l  be r e c a l le d ,  P arliam en t decided  to  a p p ro p ria te  
the  nominal revenue s u rp lu s , which was g re a te r  than  the  a c tu a l cash 
su rp lu s  owing to  th e  T reasury  having "advanced" from cash b a lan ces  to  
lo an  acco u n ts . The tim ing  of P a r lia m e n t 's  d e c is io n , from th e  T re a su ry 's  
v iew p o in t, was u n fo r tu n a te , fo r  from the  m iddle o f 1878 th e re  was a sharp 
d e c lin e  in  th e  lan d  revenue. While n e g o tia tin g  fo r  th e  is su e  o f a la rg e
A .I.B .R . ,  8 Ju ly  1878, p .163.
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loan  in  London, cash b a lances in  th e  banks were d e p le te d , a p rocess which 
in te n s i f ie d  r e s t r i c t i v e  bank le n d in g  p o l ic ie s  and hastened  the  onset o f 
re c e ss io n  a t  the  end of the  decade. The T reasury  e v e n tu a lly , in  1879» 
ra is e d  i t s  £3 m illio n  lo an  and t h i s ,  to g e th e r  w ith  heavy overseas 
borrowing by the  V ic to r ia n  Government, overcame th e  l iq u id i t y  c r i s i s .  In  
the meantime, however, th e  N.S.W. Government had moved to  in c re a se  the  
u p se t p r ic e  o f country  lan d  from £1 to  £1 5s» an a c re . This in c re a se  d id  
n o t, as a n tic ip a te d , coun ter the  f a l l i n g  o f f  o f b id s  a t  a u c tio n s . In  1880, 
the  p r ic e  was reduced to  £1 an acre  once more and th e  Government s e t t l e d  
down to  a fu r th e r  co n cen tra ted  e f f o r t  to  w rest a m assive revenue from the 
la n d .
The in c re a se  in  th e  u p se t p r ic e  o f country  lan d  in  1879 was th e  
Parkes-R obertson  govern m en ts  answer to  th o se  who com plained, as soon as 
the lan d  revenue f e l l  in  1878, th a t  th e  Government was no t g e t t in g  enough 
from i t s  p a s to ra l  te n a n ts .  P a rn e l l ,  head of a shaky m in is try  in  1878, 
had decided  on a fa r- re a c h in g  reform  of th e  Robertson Land A cts, h is  main 
in te n t io n  being  to  r e s t r i c t  a l l  c la s s e s  o f s a le s  and to  g re a t ly  in c re a se  
r e n t a l s .  "The B i l l , "  says Coghlan, "p leased  no p a rty  and was thrown out 
on i t s  second read in g  by a la rg e  m a jo r ity , and th e  Government r e s ig n e d " .^  
An a l te r n a t iv e  ex p lan a tio n  was given by a member o f the  d e fe a te d  
g o v e rn m en t:^
41
Op. c i t . ,  p.1355*
42
F i tz p a t r ic k ,  R.S.W .P.D. , Vol. 3» p.2922.
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Let the public bear in mind that the late Government fell chiefly 
for an honest attempt to get a proper rent for the Crown lands, 
and that hon. members who now fill their places put them out of 
office for that reason. The bank influence was enormous on that 
occasion. The banks insisted that their security over the unfor­
tunate pastoral tenants would be seriously injured.... The 
pastoral tenants of the Crown are not paying enough for their 
lands.... The Colony must be humbled in the view of strangers when 
it is known that we allow our Crown lands to be occupied for less 
than id. per acre.
This argument, combined with violent criticism of "the wholesale alien­
ation of the public estate", attracted support from an increasing number 
of politicians, though a minority until 1883* John Robertson brushed 
aside all criticism and took what steps he thought necessary to increase 
the land revenue.
Two changes in government policy require notice: first, an altera­
tion to the law affecting conditional purchases; and, second, a change 
in the location of land offered at auction. In 1880 the Government 
reduced from £1 to 10s. an acre the value of improvements which conditional 
purchasers were required to make before gaining title to their property.
The chief effect of this, according to Coghlan, "was to increase 
enormously the number of conditional purchases, the applications in 1879
numbering 7>540, embracing 924>130 acres, compared with 14»220 in l88l,
43covering 2,329,202 acres, and about the same number and area in 1882".
The second change in government policy deserving attention was 
in the location of land offered for sale at auction. In the seventies
43
Op. cit., p.1355*
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almost all the land auctioned was in country districts; from 1880 to
1882 at least half of the revenue from auction sales came from sales of
'‘town” and ’’suburban" lands, for which the upset prices were £8 and £2 an
acre respectively. In other words, the Government was acting to benefit
from the developing residential boom. It is useful to know something of
44the average prices received in these years.
Average Prices at Auction, 1880-82
Year "Town Land" "Suburban Land" "Country Land"
1880 £17» 8. —. p. a. £4* 5. — • p.a. £1. 4* 2. p.a.
1881 £30« 7* 5* p.a. £5.13« 6. p.a. £1. 3* b• p.a.
1882 £29- 3» 2. p.a. £6. 1. 9* p.a. £1. 5. —jj p.a.
It was common knowledge that the Government regulated land sales
45according to the Treasury’s need for funds. The annual average revenue 
from land in the two years, 1881-2, was £2.76 million. John Robertson 
was strongly justifying his policy on grounds that the Government had 
no responsibility for the actions of those who took up land, but was bound 
to consider first and foremost the interests of the Sydney working-class
46and others not directly involved in the land. But the parliamentary
44
The table is based in figures in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Annual Reports 
of the Department of Lands, N.S.W.V. & P.
45
A typical A.I.B.R. comment (10 August 1881, p*336): "It is pretty 
generally understood that in the face of the contemplated large expendi­
ture for railway extension, the Government will accelerate land sales 
generally throughout the colony..."
46
Robertson’s most famous defence of his policy was given in the Legis­
lative Assembly on 8 November 1882. See N.S.W.P.D., 1882, Vol. 7> 
p.1159 ff.
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opposition, now led by Alexander Stuart, was preparing to go to the 
electors solely on the question of land reform. Arguments were advanced 
against every aspect of the Robertson Actsi the failure of the Acts to 
promote settlement and agriculture; the enforced indebtedness and in­
security of the squatters; the blatant disposal of the best of the Crown 
lands to meet short-term budgetary needs and to retain, thereby, the 
political support of the urban landless. In bitterly fought elections 
in 1882, Stuart and his followers convinced the majority that all interests 
would be protected by sweeping reform of the land laws. Stuart's firm 
promise was, if returned to office, to immediately suspend auction sales 
of country lands and to satisfy only the "genuine" demands of purchasers 
for town and suburban lands. Stuart won the elections and at the 
beginning of January 1883 announced that the policy on auctions was in 
force. A Royal Commission was appointed to consider the evils of the 
Robertson Acts and to recommend changes.
The Morris-Ranken Report, which was presented in April 1883, has been 
so fully treated in the literature as to require only brief comment 
here. Its central argument, which could hardly be disputed, was that 
"the rights and interests of all mainly concerned have been the sport 
of accident, political interest, and departmental disorder". ^  Although 
170,000 conditional purchases had been made up to the end of 1882, the
47
Report of Inquiry into the State of the Public Lands and the Operation 
of the Land Laws, 12th April, 1883, by Augustus Morris and George Ranken, 
N.S.W.V. & P., 1883, Vol. 2, p.91.
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actual number of resident selectors was less than 20,000: records and 
maps "show to how great an extent conditional purchases have been absorbed
48to make up large estates or to increase small ones". In the central
division, "Monied institutions have emptied their safes in buying up the
Crown Lands on stations, and the largest and best of these properties
49have become little more than the assets of financing firms". The Report
further gave rise to a legend when it asserted that fully 100,000,000 acres
were occupied by 1,302 registered lessees "who represent individuals, firms,
50or banking and other financial institutions". Robertson*s estimate of
51the number of lease-holders was 23,597 and Professor Butlin has pointed
out that the fact that the bulk of leases were registered in the names
52of banks did not mean that the banks had foreclosed. Even so, there was 
no question that there were relatively few men settled on the land at the 
end of 1882, that those who were were heavily in debt and that the fric­
tion between selectors (genuine and otherwise) and squatters had operated 
to the serious detriment of both the agricultural and pastoral industries. 
Coghlan*s assessment of the Robertson Acts was in keeping with the tone of
the Morris-Ranken Report and will serve to bring this brief review to a 
53close:
48
Ibid., p.?8.
49
Ibid., p.83.
50
Ibid., p.78.
51
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The great merit of the Act was that the genuine land-seeker was 
able to satisfy his desire to obtain a holding equal to his require­
ments, but this was obtained at a cost to the whole community entirely 
disproportionate to the benefit received. The monetary loss in the 
decline in the price obtained for the land sold may be passed over 
as not of great importancej not so the arrest of productive energy 
arising out of the ceaseless struggle between the squatters and the 
selectors, and the moral loss resulting from a law which made perjury 
a commonplace incident in the lives of thousands of people.... The 
rapid alienation of the public estate to enable pastoralists to 
consolidate their holdings, and thus keep free selectors at a distance, 
at last became something of a scandal, and public opinion demanded 
that it should cease. The Government so far conformed to public 
opinion as greatly to reduce auction sales, but they were not discon­
tinued altogether, as the Treasurer needed revenue, and he was not 
prepared to impose direct taxation.
- 3-
The Third Phase, 1883-1900
The Stuart government's policy of restricted land auctions posed 
immediate budgetary problems of considerable magnitude. Unable to offset 
the loss of revenue by steep taxation increases, and determined to expand 
both capital and current expenditure, the Government turned to the London 
capital market for funds on a huge scale. The massive borrowing which 
followed imposed an increasing strain on the ordinary revenue for debt 
service and eventually made essential the imposition of heavier taxes. 
When Henry Parkes again became Premier in 1887, he reduced customs 
taxation, suspended overseas borrowing and greatly increased rentals 
on Crown lands. This latter action was taken under powers conferred 
by a Land Act passed in 1884, the first of several which were designed 
to help the pastoral and agricultural industries, but which provided 
ample scope for the Government to ensure a large inflow of revenue from 
the land each year.
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(a) The Nature and Signifi- The Stuart government’s decision to
cance of Land Reform
1883-87 suspend auction sales of country land
was almost certainly the result of genuine concern about the consequences
of the Robertson Acts. The land, said the Treasurer in February 1883,
”is not being alienated - the country is not receiving money torn from
the squatters, wrung from the banks, diverted from the ordinary channels 
54of commerce”. Parliament was bound to formulate a more satisfactory 
policy for the occupation of the land, the Treasurer added, and must 
realise that the loss of revenue would have to be made good by extra 
taxation falling on the whole community. For a year or two, Parliament 
need not be unduly concerned about falling revenue, because the Government 
intended to raise loans in London to ’’repay” advances to loan accounts 
from consolidated revenue. But the time of reckoning could not be delayed 
indefinitely and important decisions would have to be reached on taxation 
and expenditure policies.
These were important considerations in the formulation and discussion 
of new land legislation in 1883-4* The Government introduced a Bill based 
on the recommendations of the Morris-Ranken Commission and settled down 
to await the outcome of lengthy debate. It was not long before 
suspicions strengthened that the Government’s burning enthusiasm for land 
reform was waning. ’’’Take the bill', they say, 'make it what you like,
54
Financial Statement of G.R. Dibbs, 7 February 1883, N.S.W.P.D., 1883, 
Vol. 8, p.303.
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only let us stick to office and get all the money we can.11* This 
might have been a crude type of criticism, but it seems well supported 
by the facts. As debate on the Land Bill dragged on, extraneous issues 
came to the fore and few opportunities were lost for discussion of 
possible taxation increases. It soon became apparent that the majority 
in Parliament would not agree to important new taxes or to the retrench­
ment of expenditure. The Government, with no fixed group of supporters and 
constantly facing defeat in the Assembly, withdrew Bills providing for 
direct taxation at the first indication of opposition, but readily agreed 
to demands for increased expenditure, particularly on railways. Early 
hesitation about heavier expenditure had given way, by early I884, to 
firm proposals for massive outlays on railways and other public works.
"I believe", said the Treasurer, "that the continuation of a vigorous 
policy rather than the adoption of a baneful system of retrenchment will 
advance the best interests of the country.... I believe that we shall 
best administer the trust imposed in us by a vigorous expenditure upon 
public works coupled of course with that reasonable economy which must 
on all occasions be exercised; by keeping the enormous machinery of state 
in full progress, as we propose to do, without retrenchment and without
holding back from those public works necessary for the advancement of
56the colony". As token of the Government's intentions, a Loan Bill was
55
Comment by McElhone, ibid., lS83-4> Vol. 10, p#429*
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introduced in I884 providing for an expenditure of £14*38 million, £13 
million of it on railway extensions: this passed after less than two 
hours’ debate.
It is important to realise the nature of the budgetary considerations 
uppermost in politicians’ minds during the discussion of new land legis­
lation in 1883-4. It is also important to realise that an increasing 
number recognised that the land boom would have soon come to an end 
without government intervention: falling wool prices and serious drought, 
rising interest rates - all pointed to conditions making impossible large
purchases of land by squatters. The fact that the land reform movement -
57much stronger outside than within Parliament - sought a change in the 
law to facilitate settlement by farmers was accepted as one more reason 
for framing a law which would ensure that the bulk of the revenue from 
land would come from leaseholders and conditional purchasers. Majority 
opinion by mid-1884 held that the squatters should be made to make room 
for conditional purchasers and should be willing to pay higher rentals 
in return for more secure tenure of the land left in their possession.
An Act, unrecognisable as the outcome of the Bill introduced in 1883, was 
passed and came into effect at the beginning of 1885.
The Lands Act of 1884 divided the colony into three parts, each 
of which was subdivided into administrative districts under the super­
vision of Land Boards. The squatters' leases were to be surrendered and
T.A. Coghlan, op. cit., p.1364*
57
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each run divided into two equal portions. One portion reverted to the 
squatter, who was guaranteed against selection during the currency of 
his lease: five years in the Eastern Division, ten years in the Central 
Division and fifteen years in the Western Division. The rent payable 
was to be assessed by the Boards, subject to amendment by the Minister 
for Lands, but was not to be less than one penny an acre in the Central 
and Eastern Divisions or three-farthings an acre in the Western Division. 
The ’’resumed area" of the squatter’s run could be occupied for one year 
only on payment of a licence fee, but subject to dispossession at any 
time. Only the Western Division was exempt from free selection. The 
area which free selectors might conditionally purchase was increased.
The uniform price of £1 an acre could be paid by a deposit of 2s. on 
application and the balance in instalments of Is. a year with four per 
cent interest added. The selector had to live on his selection for five 
years, fence it within the first two years and maintain it in good 
condition. At the end of five years, he could extend his property by 
further purchase, specifically of an area adjoining his run which, on 
first taking up occupation, he was entitled to lease conditionally. Any 
person desiring to purchase land, but unwilling to satisfy conditions 
of residence, could select a maximum of 320 acres which had to be 
fenced within twelve months. The price fixed was £2 an acre, improve­
ments valued at £1 an acre had to be made within five years, and the 
deposits and instalments were twice what was required of selectors 
taking up residence. The Minister was empowered to reserve special
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areas from the operations of conditional purchase in order to take 
advantage of increased prices for land in areas specially attractive 
to purchasers. The Minister might auction any land not held under lease, 
to a limit of 200,000 acres a year, purchasers to deposit one-quarter 
of the purchase money and pay the balance in three months. In the 
Western area, admittedly unsuitable for agricultural development, condit­
ional purchases were forbidden, but homestead leases could be granted in 
the ’’resumed area” or on any vacant land. The maximum area of a homestead 
lease was to be 10,240 acres: lessees had to be in residence for six 
months a year, had to make improvements to a specified value and, after 
fifteen years, had to submit to having the lease auctioned, no compen­
sation for improvements being payable.
To get this Act into proper perspective, it is necessary to follow 
the course of the land revenue from 1883 to 1887, since this affords 
opportunities to see what was happening on the land and the nature of 
Treasury influence on land law administration. By way of introduction, 
reference is drawn to the gross receipts from Crown lands. In 1882, 
these totalled £2,914>OOOj in 1883, they fell to £1,656,000, at about 
which level they remained until 1887, when they jumped to £2,379>000*
The fall of £1.3 million in the land revenue in I883 was mainly 
the result of restrictions imposed by the Executive on auction sales. It 
was not solely due to this, for there was a fall of about £200,000 in 
deposits on conditional purchases. This represented a significant 
falling away in applications for conditional purchases, the start of a
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trend which continued unchecked until the late eighties. At first, 
the Government came to the conclusion that conditional purchasers were 
holding' off until it became clear whether Parliament would make more 
attractive the conditions for selecting land. By 1885, when these 
attractive conditions had been provided by legislation, there were less 
applicants for conditional purchases than for many years. This was 
indicative of the severity of drought and the waning appeal of life on 
the land. The massive construction programmes of the Government offered 
easier and better-paid conditions than struggling for a living on the 
land and the city beckoned an increasing number from rural areas. The 
Government sold very little country land at auction, despite the fact 
that it was empowered by the 1884 Act to sell 200,000 acres a year.
'There was little demand for this land but the Government, still raising 
huge loans in London, could finance its relatively enormous expenditure 
without difficulty. A political upheaval, however, resulted from minis­
terial admissions that the Government had been accumulating a huge con­
solidated revenue fund deficiency. As explained in previous chapters, an 
attempt was made to correct this deficiency by sharp increases in 
customs taxation, which signalled the beginning of a bitter conflict 
throughout the colony as freetraders and protectionists organised for 
control of Parliament.
In 1887 Henry Parkes and the free trade party gained control of 
Parliament and set about balancing the budget. For present purposes, 
the significant fact is that the Government turned once more to the
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land for a great increase in revenue. The actions taken will be con­
sidered a little later, but first it is necessary to note some of the 
effects of the I884 Act. Roberts asserts that Mthe new classes under
58the I884 Act were ’created to be crushed’, especially in the west”.
The Government, having divided the squatters’ runs to make land avail­
able for conditional purchasers who came forward in rapidly diminishing 
number, had virtually left half the land unoccupied except by rabbits. 
Moreover, having forbidden conditional purchases in the west country, the
Government had stimulated the western movement of pastoralists. Dr
59Cain's comment should be considered:
Knowing little of the capabilities or history of the western 
country, but aware that it offered certain advantages over occu­
pation elsewhere - among them, freedom from selection and a 
facility for handling sheep in large numbers - men paid prices 
for stations, and spent sums improving them, far in excess of 
their real worth. The country had been greatly overestimated.
Banks, but increasingly pastoral finance companies, financed this west­
ward movement of flocks, drawing funds readily from Britain. After I884 
rapid falls in wool prices were calamitous ’’because they were imposed 
on a pastoral industry facing rising wages and a huge burden of debt, 
for investment in fencing and other improvements and for land purchase”.
58
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By 1887, financial institutions were checking investment in the 
pastoral industry. As shown in Figure 26, new agricultural and pastoral 
investment fell away from over £9 million in 1886 to £2*5 million in 
I89O. The fading fortunes of the pastoral industry received a great 
deal of ”sympathetic” comment from the Government, hut when it became 
essential for the Government to put its finances in order there was no 
hesitation in seeking a larger return from the squatters.
Balances on the consolidated revenue fund had been falling rapidly 
since 1882, despite the recrediting of amounts ’’advanced” to loan funds in 
earlier years. At the end of 1886 the fund was overdrawn by over £1 
million, but the new Parkes government was committed to the reduction of 
customs duties early in 1887, the suspension of overseas borrowing and 
the adjustment of the finances to bring out a revenue surplus. While 
excise and stamp duties were expected to offset some of the revenue lost 
through lower customs taxation, substantial additional revenue was 
urgently required. The Crown lands offered the obvious solution to a 
pressing problem.
The Lands Department was instructed to review and increase all 
rentals on Crown land held under lease, a task greatly complained about 
in its annual report.^ The extent of the increases may be gathered 
from the public accounts: in 1886, leases brought into the Treasury
6l
8th Annual Report of the Department of Lands, 1887, N.S.W.V. & P., 
1888-9, Vol. 3, p.8.
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£438,000; in  1887, the  re tu rn  was £1 ,158 ,000 . MThe a c tio n  o f our
M in is te r of Lands in  in c re a s in g , in  many in s ta n c e s , s q u a t te r s ' r e n ts
which have been assessed  by Land B oards, has been much commented on, as
tend ing  to  aggravate  the  dep ress io n  under which the  colony s t i l l  s u f f e r s .
Seeing how much p a s to ra l  i n t e r e s t s  a re  weighed down by ex cep tio n a l lo s se s
and h a rd sh ip s , they  are  deserv ing  of every p o s s ib le  concession , r a th e r
62than of a d d itio n a l b u rth en s" .
Although the  a r b i t r a r y  in c re a s in g  of p a s to ra l  r e n ta ls  was the  most
b la ta n t  fe a tu re  o f Treasury in flu en c e  over the  Lands Department in  1887 ,
i t  was not th e  only measure adopted to  in c re a se  the  revenue from the
Crown la n d s . A c o n f id e n tia l  memorandum by Copeland, M in is te r  fo r  Lands,
and dated  3 January 1887 , in s tru c te d  th e  Under S ec re ta ry  as fo llow s
In  the  p re sen t s t a t e  of the  C oun try 's  f in an ces  i t  w il l  be d e s ira b le  
to  e f f e c t  s a le s  to th e  f u l l  l im i t  of 200,000 a c re s , and w ith  th i s  
o b je c t in  view, i t  w il l  be n ecessary  to  b r in g  forw ard fo r  au c tio n  
in c lu d in g  town, suburban and country  lan d s  no t le s s  than 500,000 
a c re s . Of course a t  once the  s a le s  reached 200,000 a c re s , the 
maximum allow ed by law , any a rea  a d v e r tise d  in  excess of th a t  a rea  
would req u ired  to  be withdrawn.
The annual re p o r t  of the  Department shows th a t  land  was o ffe re d  a t  au c tio n  
in  h ig h ly  s e le c t  a re a s . "Town lo ts "  so ld  a t  S tock ton , fo r  example, 
numbered 341 and brought in  an average of £369 an a c re ; l6 0  l o t s  a t 
B eecro ft so ld  a t  an average o f £55 an a c re . The revenue from s a le s  of
62
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P arkes, 30 October 1888, Parkes Correspondence, A9l6, Vol. 46 , p p .304-6.
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town land (£51>000) was nearly three times that of 1886. Suburban land 
yielded £25,000, the average price per acre being £8 13s. Country land, 
all of it very close to towns, was sold for £158,746 at an average 
price of £1 10s. 7d. an acre. This careful selection of land to be 
offered at auction was clearly designed to offset the continued decline 
in deposits on conditional purchases and to take advantage of a modest 
residential boom. Although the total revenue from sales was far below 
the levels of the seventies and early eighties, the steps taken by 
the Lands Department to meet Treasury requirements in 1887 were of con­
siderable political importance, for Henry Parkes was enabled to fulfil 
his promise of a '‘return to free trade".
(b) Land Policy and Revenue After 1887 revenue considerations
After 1887
became less important in the framing 
and administering of land legislation. Yet sight should not be lost of 
the fact that the annual land revenue to the end of the century averaged 
slightly over £2 million, after deducting refunds. This was an enormous 
amount, compared with the land revenue of other colonies, in a period 
of prolonged depression, and helps to explain why New South Wales 
remained the most lightly taxed colony in Australia while the Government 
made only modest efforts to reduce expenditure. Comparatively little 
land was auctioned, but there were always some new conditional purchasers 
to join the thousands who remained in debt to the State. At the end 
of 1887, unpaid balances on conditional purchases amounted to over £12 
million. In addition to revenue coming in from conditional purchasers,
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sizable amounts were received from leases held, not only by pastoralists 
but by businessmen engaged in the reviving mining industry. The revenue 
from land would never again support massive capital outlays by the 
Government, but normally was adequate at least to cover the interest on 
the public debt. And, meanwhile, belated though often half-hearted 
efforts were made to foster agriculture and give greater security to the 
pastoral tenants.
One of the immediate effects of reduced capital outlays on railways 
in 1887 was an increase in unemployment. The Government, it will be 
recalled,^ briefly accepted responsibility for this unemployment and 
instituted relief works. When this proved too expensive, the Government 
agreed to bring assisted immigration to an end. In the following year 
there was an increase (the first since 1882) in the number of applicants 
for conditional purchases: 5*364 as against 4*769 in 1887. This was 
offset by the forfeiture of selections by 2,022 men, three times the 
number who forfeited selections in I887. Clearly, conditions for men on 
the land were deteriorating. This was brought increasingly to public 
notice by law suits against the Government brought by pastoralists who 
objected to the arbitrary increasing of their rentals. Parliament could 
not remain unmoved by the evidence of distress and there were many poli­
ticians willing to support new land reforms. By 1889 these were in the 
majority and Parliament amended the existing legislation.
64
See Chapter One, p. 74
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Three Acts were passed  in  18892 the  Crown Rents A ct, th e  Rahhit 
Act and the  Crown Lands Act o f 1889. The second o f th e se  follow ed recog­
n i t io n  o f th e  damage caused by teem ing ra b b i ts  in  the  ’’resumed a re a s” of 
the  s q u a t t e r s ’ runs s in ce  1884, and was designed  to  ’’f a c i l i t a t e  and
encourage the  e re c t io n  o f r a b b it-p ro o f  fe n c in g , and to  impose c e r ta in
65l i a b i l i t i e s  on the  owners o f lan d s  in  connection  w ith  such fen ces” .
The Crown Rents Act fo llow ed an appeal by a p a s to r a l i s t  to  th e  Privy  
C ouncil: i t  p rovided  th a t  th e  M in is te r  and th e  Land Boards must agree on 
r e n ta ls  to  be charged; i f  th e re  was any d isagreem ent, the  d isp u te  had to 
be re fe r re d  to the  Land C ourt, which was e s ta b lis h e d  by the  Lands Act of 
I 889. This Act removed th e  a u to c ra t ic  powers o f th e  M in is te r  over p a s to ra l  
te n a n ts  and gave to  th e  Land Court bo th  ju d ic ia l  and ex ecu tiv e  a u th o r i ty .
I t  a lso  gave longer le a s e s  (21 y e a rs )  to  te n a n ts  in  th e  C en tral and 
W estern D iv is io n s  and provided  fo r  th e  p e r io d ic a l reappraisem ent o f r e n ta ls  
in  the  l i g h t  o f changing economic c o n d itio n s . Leases were no lo nger m erely 
to  be recorded  in  Lands Department le d g e rs . The le a se h o ld e r  was to  be 
given a “document o f ta n g ib le  s e c u r i ty  -  an instrum ent of t i t l e  th a t  
may be n e g o tia te d  su b je c t to  c o n d itio n s  on i t s  fa c e ” . ^  C ond itional pur­
ch ase rs  became e n t i t l e d  to  s e le c t  la r g e r  a reas  than  fo rm erly  and were 
g ran ted  more l ib e r a l  term s fo r  payment. S q u a tte rs  and s e le c to r s  a l ik e  
were expected to b e n e f i t  g re a t ly  from th e  new m easures.
65
11th Annual Report o f th e  Department of Lands, I 89O, N.S.W.V. & P. « 
1891-2, V ol. 4 , p .3 .
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A .I.B .R . , 16 December 1889, p.295*
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These Acts coincided with one of the best seasons for years and 
in I89O there was an increase over 1889 of 2,000 applicants for con­
ditional purchases. These applicants were attracted by “the increased
67liberality of the provisions affecting this class of purchase” and by 
the access provided to good land in the Eastern Division following the 
determination of pastoral leases, which began in the middle of the year. 
Squatters, despite sharp falls in wool prices, found it necessary to 
protect their interests by further land purchases. The Government auc­
tioned 113>000 acres of country land (three times as much as in I889)
68at an average price of £1 14s. 5^* an acre. Twice as much town and 
suburban land as was auctioned in 1889 was sold in I89O and the total
69revenue from auctions amounted to £236,000, as against £93>000 in 1889.
In 1891> when the financial crisis commenced, the Government received
boom prices for all classes of land auctioned: town land sales averaged
£71 an acre, suburban sales, £7* 8s. an acre and country sales £2 Is. an 
70acre. But these prices were mostly secured in the first half of 1891$ 
in the second half of the year demand for land fell to almost nothing.
Some had thought that the colony was rapidly recovering from depression, 
when in fact the worst phase of depression lay ahead.
67
Department of Lands: Report for I89O, U.S.W.V. & P., 1891-2, Vol.4> p»8.
68
Ibid., p.7»
69
Ibid., p.7»
70
Department of Lands: Report for 1891« p.109*
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After 1891 applications for conditional purchases fell continuously.
The Government had power, under the Crown Lands Amendment Act of I89I, 
to waive forfeiture of selections if satisfied that selectors were expe­
riencing extreme hardship. It also had power to extend the time for payment 
of instalments on conditional purchases in cases where hardship was proved 
to the satisfaction of the Minister for Lands. A reading of Lands Depart­
ment reports and the parliamentary dehates during 1892-3-4-5 discloses 
two things: first, that the Minister proved extremely difficult to convince 
that genuine hardship existed and that extra time should he granted for 
the payment of instalments; and, second, that Parliament displayed an 
increasing determination to aleviate the distress of selectors. An Act 
of 1895) to he referred to again a little later with reference to 
pastoralists, was the Government’s answer to demands that the State 
should waive all balances on conditional purchases. Selectors were 
now to he given three years free tenure before the instalments of Is. an 
acre became payable. An amendment of this Act in 1896 reduced from Is. 
to 9<i* ike instalment to he paid for each acre selected. The Minister, 
further, was empowered to reduce instalments to 6d. an acre if satisfied 
that hardship existed. By this amendment, conditional purchases had to 
he finalised within 66 years. In 1899 "the Advances to Settlers Act 
was passed ’’with the object of making temporary advances to relieve sett-
71lers financially embarrassed owing to droughts and other causes". It
71
Department of Lands: Report for 1899) N.S.W.V. & P., 1900, Vol.3)
P.1029.
296
w ill  be seen th a t  the Government p ro g re s s iv e ly  eased, th e  f in a n c ia l  burden
on s e le c to r s  w ith o u t, however, su rre n d e rin g  i t s  r ig h t  to  the  unpaid
b a lances on c o n d itio n a l p u rchasers  which, a t  the  end of th e  p e r io d ,
amounted to  n e a r ly  £13 m il l io n . By 1900 th e re  were 150,000 incom plete
c o n d itio n a l purchases covering  an a re a  of some 20 m ill io n  a c re s .
The 1895 Act was designed to  ensure  th a t  s e le c to r s  would rem ain
on the  la n d -  by in c re a s in g  from f iv e  to  te n  y ears  th e  p e rio d  o f re s id en ce
demanded. The s e l e c to r 's  r ig h t  to a c o n d itio n a l le a s e  o f land  a d jo in in g
h is  p ro p e rty  was confirm ed and made more a t t r a c t i v e  by an ex ten s io n  of
the  le a se  from f i f t e e n  to  tw en ty -e ig h t y e a r s .  In  an e f f o r t  to  a t t r a c t
more s e le c to r s ,  a new form of purchase was in troduced« th e  homestead
s e le c t io n .  The ten u re  o f the  lan d  was nom inally  f re e h o ld , b u t in  e f f e c t ,
men s e le c t in g  acqu ired  p e rp e tu a l le a se h o ld s  over a maximum of 1 ,280
a c re s , on which i t  was n ecessary  to  e re c t  a dw elling  worth £20. A sm all
d ep o sit and modest annual r e n ta ls  were payable on homestead s e le c t io n s ,
which made them a t t r a c t iv e  to  th e  man w ithou t c a p i t a l .
O ther l e g i s l a t i v e  e f f o r t s  to  promote a g r ic u l tu re  were made in
the  n in e t ie s ,  b u t need no comment h e re . C oghlan 's conclusion  i s  very  
72much to  the  p o in ts
. . . f o r  a country  where a g r ic u l tu r a l  developm ent was c h a r a c te r is ­
t i c a l l y  slow an in c re a se  from 1,310,000 acres  under crop in  1894 
to  2 ,342,000 ac res  in  1900 should be co n sidered  somewhat n o te ­
w o r th y . . . .  In  o rder no t to  impede p ro d u c tio n , the  Act of 1895 
demanded from persons ta k in g  up land  a much sm alle r i n i t i a l
Op. c i t . ,  p .1979.
72
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outlay than was required, under the systems which it sought to 
supersede, and for this reason such persons were in a better 
position to develop their holdings than if the Act had not 
been passed. But increased attention to production of all kinds 
was a common feature of all the colonies, and the effect of 
agrarian legislation in promoting this increase...may be easily 
over-estimated.
For the squatters, the nineties was a period of almost unrelieved 
gloom. Investment outlays fell from about £9 million in I89I to about 
£100,000 in 1893* In 1895 and 1897 disinvestment was the rule. The 
sheep population, 60 million in I89I, fell to less than 40 million in 
1899» Wool prices remained very low until the last years of the century. 
Many of the financial institutions which had so extravagantly backed the 
squatters in the seventies and eighties crashed and those that survived 
the crisis of 1891-3» were in the main, still counting their losses 
later in the century.
The squatters and their financial backers were not the only victims 
of a lengthy process which had led to the formation of huge landed 
estates heavily burdened with debt. The labour movement in New South 
Wales recognised in the early nineties that the depression in the 
pastoral industry added thousands to the colony's unemployed. As men 
flocked to the city in search of work - men formerly occupied in dam­
sinking, fencing, ring-barking, subdividing and so on - arguments were 
advanced that a major cause of this unemployment was the imminence of the
expiration of pastoral leases in the Central Division, covering 18.6 
73million acres. The lessees, uncertain whether their leases would be
A good illustration of the argument is to be found in the A.I.B.R. 
review (May 1894» p.307) of a paper read to the Economic Association of 
N.S.W. by R.J. Black.
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renewed, and faced with the prospect of losing their improvements to 
the State, were dismissing labour and awaiting the outcome of pleas to 
the Government and the Land Court for special consideration. The Land 
Court, in August 1894» upheld an application for an extension of a Central 
Division pastoral lease. The Government challenged the decision in the 
Supreme Court, which upheld the decision. Immediately thousands of appli­
cations came in from squatters for extensions and these were granted,
the value of improvements forming the basis for the extensions. This was
74of "immense importance to the lessees and holders of securities” who
benefited by further concessions under the Act of 1895*
Roberts points out that eight million acres previously occupied by
75squatters were abandoned by 1893* J By 1894 there were "only 41>000
T6country holdings and even these were diminishing". Carruthers, who 
had charge of the 1895 Bill, "proposed to give ’long leases - a secure 
tenure on an improvement basis’, really perpetual leaseholds with ’the 
old name of freehold.’ For the pastoralists, the division of 1884, since 
it was ’a rule of thumb that has no logic or sense to commend it,' was to 
be rescinded and Carruthers proposed to leave the squatter in possession 
of the whole of the land until it was actually needed and then to resume 
the smallest area necessary, giving in return an extension of lease
74
A.I.B.R., leader, 19 September 1894» p»603»
75
Qp. cit., p.293*
Ibid., p.293»
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proportionate to the area withdrawn.... Thus, after ten years of waste,
the resumed areas of I884, "both in the centre and the west, were again
placed under pastoral lease.... But the redress came too late. Most
of the western graziers were hopelessly involved.... There was less
77settlement in the west in 1900 than there had been in i860'’.
7 0
When introducing amending legislation in 1894» Carruthers remarked:
In l86l...we had 159*834 residents in our towns and 189,116 resi­
dents in the country districts5 but after thirty years, under the 
operation of our present land system, we have 730,000 residents 
in the towns as against only 388,321 in the country districts.
The tide of population has flowed from the country where the land 
is plentiful to the towns where land is scarce;...nearly 50,000,000 
acres have been sold to settle barely 200,000 people in the country 
districts, whilst prior to 1861, before we had our present system, 
189,000 residents were settled on 7,350,000 acres of alienated 
land..•• The holdings in the country in 1861 were represented 
by 15,650 occupants.... Today, with our enormous alienation, the 
holdings are represented by 41,000 occupants; or, in other words, 
over 50,000,000 acres have been alienated since 1861, or are now 
in course of alienation, for an increase of 25,750 rural occu­
pants.... Take the figures how you will, there is barely a ray of 
sunlight in them.
There can be no doubt that government policy was in large degree respon­
sible for the rapid urbanisation of the population. Legislation 
facilitated the aggregation of large properties, together with clusters 
of small properties close to towns, a large number of which were supplied 
with good communications. The revenue from the Crown lands over a long 
period enabled the Government to impose only very light taxes and to
77
Ibid., pp.293-4«
78
Quoted by Coghlan, op. cit., pp.1968-9
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service a debt incurred to construct the massive communications net­
work. Government construction programmes employed a large proportion 
of the workforce and tended to force wages upwards in a period of falling 
export prices. The desire to wrest from the Crown lands the largest 
possible income was largely responsible for the facilities offered 
for access to the land by purchase in one form or another. After the mid­
seventies, when the rate of pastoral productivity was slowing down,
British capital was depended on increasingly for the purchase of land 
and to this extent government policy contributed to the mounting calls 
on export earnings to service the colony’s overseas debt. In addition 
to encouraging the private sector to borrow overseas, the Government 
was directly responsible for the import of millions of pounds of British 
capital which increasingly strained the colony's balance of payments. The 
population of the cities and towns, enjoying high wages and low taxes, had 
little cause for complaint about the Government's administration of the 
Crown lands until the effects of declining pastoral productivity and 
serious balance of payments problems became manifest. Even during the pro­
longed depression the urban population benefited considerably from the 
contribution to government revenue made by pastoralists and farmers. The 
efforts made to ease the distress of men on the land were based on recog­
nition of the fact that the majority of the population could not be isolated 
from the effects of depression in the primary industries. The essential 
task of politicians in the nineties was to find ways to bring about a
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recovery of the pastoral industry - still the major source of export 
income - while meeting the demands of urban dwellers for the remission 
of taxes and increased government spending. The compromise solutions 
of the period satisfied very few.
Chapter Five
OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDS
1. The Growth and Composition of Receipts from Services 
and Miscellaneous Sources
2. Railway Rating Policies and Operating Losses
"I consider this rapid increase in the remunerative returns of the 
railway a most encouraging feature; it leads us to expect that as 
these lines progress through the country they will pay every farthing 
of the interest on the money that has been expended on them."
--- Budget Speech, 7 August 1862
"...we might fairly place to the credit of the account the indirect 
benefits which the Colony has derived from the introduction of rail­
ways. .."
— - Report of Railway Commissioner, 1876 
"Our railways ought to be worked on commercial principles." 
--- Henry Parkes, 1886
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Introductory
The remaining sources of funds - services and miscellaneous - do 
not warrant lengthy examination, despite the fact that together they 
accounted for a steadily increasing* proportion of total net receipts. 
Railways and other services were not self-supporting and cannot he 
considered significant sources of funds. Because services were not self- 
supporting, the Government was forced to exploit other sources of funds 
to cover operating losses; or, alternatively, because it was possible 
to exploit other sources of funds, the Government was able to provide 
services freely or at uneconomical rates. The provision of unprofitable 
services was held to accord with broad social and economic objectives 
being pursued by the Governments the establishment of a stable society, 
the extension of rural settlement and the promotion of private enterprise. 
While it is possible to make out a case for the contribution of unprofit­
able services towards these ends, it is undeniable that the financial 
expediencies adopted to cope with losses on railways and other services 
often had effects which conflicted with the avowed objectives of govern­
ment activity.
Earlier chapters have aimed to illustrate this argument and the 
final chapter is intended to clarify the issues raised. The present 
chapter has two functions:
(l) To record the growth and composition of receipts from services and 
miscellaneous sources; and
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(2) To examine the accounts of the railways department with special 
reference to rating policies and operating losses.
- 1 -
The Growth and Composition of Receipts from Services 
_____________ and Miscellaneous Sources
The sources to he noted here are shown in Figure 30 and Table 22.
The average annual return from all these sources was about £200,000 in
the second half of the fifties, but by the second half of the nineties
was about £4*9 million.^ At the beginning of the period these sources
together accounted for less than ten per cent of total net receipts;
at the end of the century the proportion had increased to roughly one- 
2third. Over the period as a whole nearly four-fifths of the total 
derived from these sources was accounted for by railway and postal 
services, the bulk of it by the former. This can be seen from a brief 
examination of Table 22, which also serves to emphasise the comparatively 
negligible amounts derived from each of the other sources identified.
Figure 31 shows the growth of postal and telegraphic receipts in 
relation to expenditure on these services.^ Only two or three comments
are required. Coghlan’s explanation is worth quoting:^
1
See Figure 30 and Tables 14 and 17» Appendix 1.
2
See Figure 3*
3
See Tables 6 and 14» Appendix 1. (Note that payments do not include 
interest chargeable to the postal department).
4
T.A. Coghlan, The Wealth and Progress of New South Wales, 1887-8 (Syd­
ney, 1888), p.525*
FIGURE 30 305
FIVE-YEARLY AVERAGE RETURNS FROM RAILWAY, POSTAL & OTHER SERVICES
£m.
5
4
2
1
0
AND FROM MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES , 1856-1900
Railways & 
Tramways
mPostS & 
Telegraphs
ggj Other 
Services
[— I Miscel# 
Revenue
FIGURE 31 306
POSTS A1TD TELEGRAPHS -  RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS, I85 6 -I9 O Q
£*000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
90
80
70
60
1856 1860  1865 1870  1875 1880  1885 1890  1895 ^900
20
307
The receipts from the Post and Telegraph services of the Colony 
have increased substantially year by year, but so also has the 
expenditure.... Though both the Postal and Telegraphic services are 
carrried on as far as practicable on commercial principles, a 
deficiency is experienced every year. The reason of the deficit 
is found in the desire of the Government to extend the facilities 
of both the post and telegraph to every part of the Colony. And 
so important has this policy appeared, that it has been carried 
out -with considerable loss.... It is quite possible that the 
principle of affording the benefit of postal and telegraphic com­
munication to every district of New South Wales would be adhered 
to even if the system ultimately failed to become self-supporting; 
but the time cannot be far distant when the revenue derived will 
more than meet the expenses.
TABLE 22
Total Receipts« 1856-1900* Services and Miscellaneous 
Source £ million
(A) Services
Railways and Tramways ....  64« 3
Posts and Telegraphs   14*5
Harbour Charges   1.6
Water and Sewerage Rates   3*3
School Pees ..... 2.8
Fees of Office   2.8
Other Services   0.9
Total 1 Services ..... 86.2
(B) Miscellaneous
Rents (other than land) ....  1.8
Fines and Forfeitures ....  0*5
Bank Interest ••*.. 1.2
Other ..... 3*9
Total, Miscellaneous ....  7*4
Grand Total ....  93*6
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I t  should be observed th a t  newspapers were c a r r ie d  f re e  and were
commonly used as means fo r  conveying m essages, thereby  reduc ing  th e
5
re tu rn s  from m ail s e rv ic e s ."  In  th e  f i f t i e s  and s ix t i e s  r a te s  fo r  t r a n s ­
m ittin g  te legram s were in tended  to  ensure th a t  th e  te le g ra p h ic  b ranch  o f 
p o s ta l departm ent should u lt im a te ly  cover working expenses and i n t e r e s t  
on th e  c a p i ta l  co s t of c o n s tru c tio n . Rates were reduced in  1874 and. 
again  in  1878, fo llow ing  recommendations by a committee headed by John 
R obertson. T elegraph ic  r a t e s ,  according  to  R obertson , were so h igh
th a t  only w ealthy people could a ffo rd  to  use  the  s e rv ic e ; poorer tax p ay e rs
7
re ce iv ed  no b e n e f i t  from a se rv ic e  which they helped  to  f in a n c e . Budget 
su rp lu se s  in  the  sev e n tie s  encouraged p o l i t i c ia n s  to  s t r e s s  th e  in d i r e c t  
b e n e f i ts  o f o p e ra tin g  the  p o s ta l departm ent a t  a lo s s ,  a lthough  r a t i o n a l -
g
i s a t io n s  were u su a lly  vaguely worded, l ik e  t h i s :
In  a country  l ik e  t h i s ,  o f such v a s t i n t e r i o r ,  the  twopenny 
p o stag e , say fo r  sending a l e t t e r  from h ere  to  Bourke, does not 
pay in  a money p o in t of view , bu t we co n sid e r th a t  i t  pays in  
ano ther way.
F igure  32 o f f e r s  an in tro d u c tio n  to  th e  r e c e ip ts  of th e  ra ilw ay s
9
departm ent. Exam ination o f th ese  r e c e ip ts  in  r e la t io n  to  c u rre n t
5
See, fo r  example, 30th Annual Report of th e  P o stm aster-G enera l, I 884, 
N.S.W.V. & P . , 1888 (second sess io n  ) ,  Vol. 2 , p p .435-6.
6
See pp. 54-5*
7
See Report of S e le c t Committee on T elegraph ic  Communication, l873> 
N.S.W.V. 8c P . , 1872-3, Vol. 2, p .71 .
8
F in a n c ia l S tatem ent o f Alexander S tu a r t ,  24 January  1877> Thomson, 
F in a n c ia l S ta tem en ts , p.373*
9
Revenue s t a t i s t i c s  a re  from annual re p o r ts  o f th e  ra ilw ay  com m issioners, 
N.S.W.V. 8c P.
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outlays may be deferred, to the next section. For the time being it 
will be sufficient to summarise the main features:
(1) The coaching traffic was the main source of railway revenue until 
the mid-sixties, but thereafter the goods traffic was far more important.
(2) The very rapid expansion of receipts from goods traffic ended in 
I884, but there was a recovery from I889 to 1892. Receipts then declined 
slightly but tended to fluctuate around a more or less straight-line 
trend to the end of the period.
(3) Coaching traffic receipts increased more slowly than goods receipts 
in the first half of the period. After 1892 receipts declined fairly 
sharply, but recovered steadily in the second half of the nineties.
(4) After the introduction of tramways in 1879> receipts mounted at a 
very rapid rate for a few years. Expansion was arrested in the mid­
eighties and resumed in the late eighties and early nineties. Receipts 
slumped from 1893 to 1896 then again began to rise, reaching the 1892 
level at the end of the century.
- 2-
Railway Rating Policies and Operating Losses 
In Figure 33 the gross receipts of the railways department are 
related to official calculations of net earnings after paying working 
expenses; in Figure 34 net earnings are shown as percentages of interest 
on railway and tramway loans. The function of this section is to 
indicate pitfalls in using official statistics, to demonstrate that 
these services were not self-supporting and to indicate the objectives 
underlying rating policies.
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(a) “Net Earnings1*
Figure 33 strikingly indicates that net earnings did not always increase 
as rapidly as gross receipts and suggests that special attention should 
be given to the statistics after l88l (or perhaps earlier, after 1877)* 
First, however, it is necessary to scrutinise official calculations of 
net earnings.
“Net earnings“ were found by deducting “working expenses“ from 
gross receipts. Working expenses included maintenance outlays charged 
to revenue account and occasionally outlays for the replacement of rolling 
stock. Little knowledge of the period is necessary to realise that 
railway officials might be tempted to charge maintenance and replacement 
outlays to capital account if Treasury approval could be secured and if 
it were deemed necessary to record a larger volume of “net earnings" 
than actual operations justified. This certainly was the case in the 
sixties, but was especially so in the first half of the eighties, as may 
be seen in the comments of the three railway commissioners appointed in
1888. Reviewing the undertaking which they were expected to operate 
profitably, the commissioners reported that the lines were in poor con­
dition and much relaying was necessary; rolling stock was generally 
antiquated and inefficient; very little painting of stations and stock 
had been done for many years.^ “Revenue in future years should, in
10
Quarterly Report of Railway Commissioners, December 1888, N.S.W.V. & P.,
1889, Vol. 5, P-96.
314
our opinion, be called upon to bear much larger sums for replacing 
engines, waggons, and carriages than has been the case in past years, 
instead of adding to the stock at the expense of the capital account”. ^  
On closer study, the commissioners decided that "a sum of more than 
£1,000,000 has been underspent out of revenue on the rolling-stock’* and 
’’the Treasury has unduly benefited in the past by receiving money which 
should have been spent to keep the stock in better condition, and the 
capital account has been shown as earning a profit which was not really 
earned”•
Such criticisms can be levelled against official calculations for 
the greater part of the period, including the nineties when the Treasury 
insisted that maintenance work be deferred as long as possible or dis­
guised railway outlays in trust accounts. There is a need to keep in 
mind the fact that net earnings were probably over-stated in most years. 
This being so, calculations of ’’yield on capital” must be in some degree 
suspect. In fact, such calculations prove to be very arbitrary indeed, 
(b) ’’Capital Cost”
Yields were calculated by relating net earnings to what purported to 
be the capital cost of lines open. The cost of construction, however, 
was not based on railway department records but on Treasury statements 
of loans standing in the name of the railways department. The
n
Ibid., P.97.
Quarterly Report, March 1889, ibid., p.105*12
315
weakness in  th i s  procedure was u n d e rlin ed  by the A uditor-G eneral in  
1901j 13
. . . t h e  Accounts o f moneys borrowed and expended have been, and 
a re  con tinued  to  be , so k ep t th a t  i t  i s  im possib le  to  show a 
d i s t i n c t  r e la t io n s h ip ,  such as ought to  be shown, between them 
in  re sp e c t to  Railways o r any o th e r Loan S e rv ice . Thus, w hile 
the  proceeds o f Loans a re  computed on the  b a s is  of the  Loan Serv ice 
A ppropria tion  A cts as d i s t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  c la s s e s  o f se rv ic e s  
named th e re in ,  th e  a c tu a l E xpenditure  charged to  those c la s s e s  i s  
by no means confined  to  the  sums computed to  have been ra is e d  fo r  
the  purpose, th e  d isbursem ents b e in g , in  f a c t ,  s o le ly  guided by 
th e  a p p ro p r ia tio n , and no t a t  a l l  by any c o n s id e ra tio n  as to  
whether o r no t th e  money ap p ro p ria ted  by a Loan Act has a c tu a lly  
been p laced  to  th e  c r e d i t  o f the  a p p ro p ria tio n .
In  a p rev ious r e p o r t ,  th e  A uditor-G eneral claim ed th a t  the  ra ilw ay  and
tramway accounts Mp rec lu d e  th e  p re s e n ta tio n  of anyth ing  more than app rox i- 
14mate r e s u l t s ” . So th a t ,  w hile ra ilw ay  o f f i c i a l s  and Coghlan recorded  
“in t e r e s t  on c a p i t a l ” to  two o r more decim al p la c e s , the  c a lc u la tio n s  
graphed in  F igure  34 a re  a t  b e s t  a very  rough guide to  ra ilw ay  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
(c )  Actual Rate of I n te r e s t  Payable
The a c tu a l r a te  of i n t e r e s t  payable  on the  p u b lic  deb t a t  te n -y e a r  
in te r v a ls  was as fo llo w s:
1856 -  5$; 1866 -  5*7$; 1876 -  1886 -  4$; 1896 -  3.856.
By re fe re n c e  to  F igure  34 (and in  th e  l i g h t  o f th e  fo rego ing  c r i t i c i s m s ) ,  
i t  w il l  be a p p re c ia te d  th a t  th e  only p e rio d s  when th e  ra ilw ays might
13
”The Railway and Tramway Accounts” , A u d ito r-G en era l’s R eport, 1900-1«
p .208.
14 /A u d ito r-G en era l’s R eport, 1900« p .212 . ( In  t h i s  re p o r t  i t  was estim ated
th a t  th e  ra ilw ay s  had been unab le  to  meet £8 m ill io n  in  i n t e r e s t  charges 
from th e  beg inn ing  of c o n s tru c tio n ) .
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conceivably  have come c lo se  to  m eeting in t e r e s t  on c a p i ta l  would have
been 1881-2 and some y ea rs  in  th e  n in e tie s*  The ra ilw ay  com m issioners,
in  f a c t ,  in s i s t e d  th a t  th i s  was the  case bu t p roof i s  la c k in g . In  th e
n in e t ie s  i t  was a m a tte r of p r id e  in  New South Wales th a t  the colony had
the  only s e lf - s u p p o r t in g  ra ilw ay  u n d ertak in g  in  A u s tra lia  and New Z ealand,
15b u t even Coghlan f e l t  bound to  d isp u te  the  claim*
D espite  the  u n r e l i a b i l i t y  o f the  s t a t i s t i c s ,  they  suggest c le a r ly
enough why th e  Government found i t  n ecessary  to  in c re a se  ta x a t io n  in  th e
m id - s ix t ie s ,  1871, th e  m id -e ig h tie s  and in  1891 (e s p e c ia l ly  when i t  i s
remembered th a t  p o s ta l  and o th e r s e rv ic e s  were even mors u n p ro f ita b le
than  th e  ra ilw ay s and tramways).
For the p re s e n t, p a r t ic u la r  in t e r e s t  c e n tre s  on th e  d e c lin e  in
nominal n e t earn in g s  in  the  e ig h t ie s .  Remembering the  comments o f th e
new ly-appointed o f f i c i a l s  in  1888, i t  w il l  be ap p rec ia ted  th a t  th e re  must
16have been s u b s ta n t ia l  r a te  re d u c tio n s  in  the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f th e  e ig h t ie s .  
This a lso  was the  tim e when ra ilw ay  c o n s tru c tio n  proceeded a t a ra p id  
r a te  to s a t i s f y  lo g - r o l l in g  country  p o l i t i c i a n s  and when overseas 
borrow ing was on a huge s c a le , le ad in g  to  a very ra p id  in c re a se  in  the 
annual i n t e r e s t  b i l l .  Under th e  c ircu m stan ces , the  d e c lin e  in  revenue 
from lan d  s a le s  in  1883 and fo llo w in g  y ears  made se r io u s  budgetary  problems 
in e v i ta b le .  Table 23 b r in g s  to g e th e r some o f the  re le v a n t s t a t i s t i c s .
15
T.A. Coghlan, The Seven C olonies o f A u s t r a la s ia , 1899-1900, p . 650 .
16
See below, in  the  su b -se c tio n  on r a t in g  p o l ic ie s .
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TABLE 23
Government F inances, 1882-6 -  £ '000
Year Railway a In te r e s t^ Land0 C.R. Fund
Earnings on Debt Revenue Balances
1882 764 795 2797 3889
3 754 871 1494 2511
4 785 1042 1579 1229
5 716 1299 1769 3
6 667 1579 1544 -1287
(a ) Railway Net E arn ings (ex c lu d in g  tram ways), from ra ilw ay  re p o r ts .  
( I d )  T otal I n te r e s t  payable on th e  p u b lic  d eb t.
(c ) T o tal n e t r e c e ip ts .
(a ) R ating  P o l ic ie s
The mounting budgetary problems which Table 23 in d ic a te s  le d  to  a major 
re a p p ra is a l  o f the  p o l ic ie s  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  those  problem s. Henry P arkes, 
a f t e r  re tu rn in g  to  o f f ic e  as Prem ier in  1887, reduced customs ta x a t io n , 
in c reased  p a s to ra l  r e n t s ,  t r i e d  to  le a s e  the  tramways, and in tro d u ced  a 
B i l l  to remove the  ra ilw ay s and tramways from p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro l ,  in  
o rd er to  f a c i l i ta te  management o f the s e rv ic e s  on commercial p r in c ip le s .  
Parkes claim ed th a t  P arliam en t had always pa id  l ip - s e r v ic e  to the  
o b je c t iv e  of making th e  ra ilw ay s s e lf -s u p p o r tin g  b u t ,  by in s i s t in g  on 
r a te  re d u c tio n s  "to  promote se ttle m e n t and p ro d u c tio n " , had made i t  
im possib le  fo r  o f f i c i a l s  to  o p e ra te  the  u n d e rtak in g  p ro f i ta b ly .
I t  w il l  be r e c a l le d  th a t  the  f i r s t  "su p e rin ten d en t o f in te rn a l  
communications" gave currency  to  th e  view th a t  the  ra ilw ay s should be
managed so as u l t im a te ly  to  cover working expenses and in t e r e s t  on c a p i t a l .  
^ S e e  pp. 54
17
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In the fifties it was assumed that high rates would achieve this end
probably within a decade. By i860, however, politicians had come
to the conclusion that passenger rates were far too high and all rates
were reduced by one-third. Officials soon pointed out that demand for
the service was inelastic and rates were restored to their former level
in 1862. As the lines were extended across the mountains, John Rae
(commissioner from I865) decided to boost revenue by active competition
with road hauliers for freight. This necessitated numerous changes in
rate schedules as experience was gained in determining elasticities in
demand for the railway service. Rae strongly influenced the Government
in a policy of neglecting the three main roads running parallel to the
railways and of constructing minor roads as feeders to the railways; he
also was influential in having work proceed on the railways in 1866-7
l8when the Government had to cope with serious budgetary problems. Rae’s
object was "to make the rates sufficiently low to induce traffic to
leave the road for the Railway, where the lines run parallel; and yet
sufficiently high to pay working expenses, and give a fair return on 
19capital". y By 1876 Rae had become convinced that the stage was rapidly
20approaching "when our railways will be self-supporting".
18
See pp. 62-4*
19
John Rae, Report on the Construction and Progress of the Railways of 
N.S.W. from 1866 to 1871, N.S.W.V. & P., 1872-3, Vol. 2, p.511.
20
John Rae, Railways, 1872-5? Report, ibid., 1875-6, Vol. 4, P*34*
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In 1877 Charles Goodchap replaced Rae as commissioner. Hounded
by politicians and anxious to satisfy Parliament, Goodchap staked his
reputation on rate reductions. When relieved of office in 1888, he
21defended his rating policy- thus:
In the matter of rates and charges the policy of the superseded 
administration was defective in the extreme. For some years prior 
to my appointment, efforts had been made to induce the Minister for 
Works to consent to a considerable augmentation of the rates for 
the conveyance of merchandise and produce. To this policy I was 
always opposed, being convinced that the truest wisdom was to 
reduce the rates to the lowest possible point....
Goodchap then listed rates for various commodities in 1876 and 1888 to 
illustrate reductions in his period:
Rate per ton for 130 miles
1876 1888
Hay • • • 20s. • • • 8s.lid.
Straw • • • 20s. • • • 8s. 6d.
Grain • • • 19s. 5d. ... 11s. 3d.
Flour • • t 24s. 8d. ... 11s. 3d.
Coal • • • 17s. 5d. •.• 10s. Id.
Bricks • • • 22s. 8d. ... 10s. Id.
Cement • • • 43s. 4d. ... 21s. 8d.
Fruit • • • 24s. 8d. ... 11s. 3d.
Timber • • • 28s. • • • 11s. 3d.
Goodchap attempted the impossible: to offer progressive
reductions and to demonstrate that the railways had become self- 
supporting. In l88l he presented such a glowing report on the 
profitability of the railways that the Government, in his words, "deter­
mined to reduce the rates of carriage and to increase the wages of the 
workmen, so that the public who use the Railways and the men who work
21
Railways - Statement by Commissioner on Relinquishing Office, ibid., 
1888-9, vol. 2, p.598.
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22them should b e n e f i t  d i r e c t ly  by th i s  prosperous co n d itio n  o f a f f a i r s ” .
In  ad d itio n  to  such g en era l r a te  re d u c tio n s , re b a te s  were g iven  to
a t t r a c t  th e  wool t r a f f i c  from the R iv e rin a , s e c re t  arrangem ents being
23made w ith  agen ts to  d iv e r t  t r a f f i c  from Melbourne to  Sydney. As the
e ig h t ie s  advanced, r a te  red u c tio n s  to  b e n e f i t  h ig h ly  s e c tio n a l i n t e r e s t s
became in c re a s in g ly  common. P o l i t i c i a n s  w aited  on the  commissioner and
th e  M in is te r fo r  Works to  p lead  th e  causes of c o n s t i tu e n ts  and i t  became
in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  re fu se  re q u e s ts .
The p o l i t i c a l  upheaval o f th e  m id -e ig h tie s  brought in to  th e  open
th e  e x ten t to  which the  ra ilw ay s  and tramways had become a d ra in  on
g en era l revenue and the se r io u sn e ss  o f p o l i t i c a l  in te r fe re n c e  in  working
the  u n d e rtak in g s . In  1886 th e  Jenn ings Government in tro d u ced  a B i l l  to
reform  the  ra ilw ay  a d m in is tra tio n . Lyne (M in is te r fo r  Works) p o in ted
out th a t  "a g re a t d eal o f p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  i s  brought to  b e a r on the
M in is te r  and on the  o f f i c i a l s  -  a g re a t deal too much p o l i t i c a l  
24in f lu e n c e ” . Parkes v io le n t ly  opposed the B i l l  because i t  p rov ided  fo r  
the  appointm ent o f a M in is te r fo r  Railw ays. When he re tu rn e d  to  o f f ic e  
in  1887 , he s e t  about fram ing a new measure to  g ive the  ra ilw ay s  a 
la rg e  measure o f independence from th e  E xecu tive . I t  should be n o ted ,
22
Railways and Tramways: Report by Commissioner fo r  1883, N.S.W.V. & P . , 
1883-4, Vol. 5, p .221.
23
See Debate on Adjournment, N.S.W .P.D. , 1880-1, Vol. 4 , p p .114-16.
24
2nd Reading Debate on Government Railways B i l l ,  i b i d . , 1885- 6 , Vol. 23,
p.5331.
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however, that the Act as passed in 1888 placed the railways under the 
control of the Treasurer, while providing for the appointment of a 
chief commissioner and two others.
E.M.G. Eddy, imported to reform the railway and tramway administra­
tion, won an Australia-wide reputation for efficient management. Eddy 
aimed to make each line, each class of traffic and the tramways self- 
supporting by careful adjustment of rates. But the new management 
entered on its duties with a run-down system to operate and when the 
long-run expansion of the economy had come to an end. During the long 
years of depression and drought which followed, tremendous pressure was 
brought to bear on the Government and the commissioners to assist the 
coal industry, agriculturalists and the western graziers by large rate 
rebates. At the same time, there was a constant demand from the Press 
and many politicians that the railways be operated profitably. It 
was impossible to satisfy all demands. The Treasury assisted the com­
missioners by charging various railway expenses to trust accounts in
which detailed transactions traditionally did not have to be disclosed
25in the annual abstracts presented to Parliament. Other actions which 
helped to narrow the gap between net earnings and interest chargeable 
to the railways department were:
(l) the retrenchment of staff;
25
Treasury Archives (T135> folios 4/6821-4) include a mass of evidence 
of Treasury interference with the railway commissioners and of negotia­
tions about the preparation of accounts for public disseminations.
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(2) wage reductions throughout the public service;
(3) successful conversion operations arranged by the Treasury to lower 
the actual rate of interest payable on the public debt.
Sven so, these undertakings, like all other government services, made 
it essential for the Government (in practice, the Treasury) to draw on 
other sources of funds to cover operating losses.
It is not possible - and certainly not essential for present 
purposes - to demonstrate all the implications of railway and tramway 
rating policies. But one or two need comment at this stage.
Unquestionably, some sections of the community benefited as a result 
of rate reductions at different stages in the development of railways 
and tramways. Yet it must be stressed that those same rate reductions 
were often intended by the officials who managed the undertakings to 
attract passenger and goods traffic from the roads. For many road 
hauliers, government policy spelled ruin and private operators of coaches 
and omnibuses suffered severely as a result of competition from the 
railways and tramways for passengers. Some railway extensions (and 
relatively huge rate concessions) were planned expressly with the pur­
pose of diverting traffic from established routes to ports in neighbouring 
colonies to Sydney and Newcastle. Pastoralists in the districts 
concerned were the chief beneficiaries as a result of reduced costs of 
transport of their wool to port but overland transport accounted for 
only a part of the costs of getting wool to market in Britain. The same 
pastoralists were almost certainly heavily in debt, partly in consequence
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of borrowing to purchase land - transactions often forced on the squatters
by government policy on the disposal of Crown lends. Other pastoralists,
most of whom were settled long distances from the railways, would have
echoed the sentiment that "the railways might just as well never have 
26been built". All pastoralists and all farmers who had purchased or 
leased Crown lands helped to make possible the operation of railways and 
other government services at uneconomical rates. For the community as 
a whole, there were important offsets to the benefits from cheap transport, 
cheap postal services and so on, but these might best be considered in 
a wider context in Chapter Six.
26
See N.G. Butlin, "Colonial Socialism in Australia" in Aitken, op. cit.,
P.73.
Chapter Six
EXPEDIENCY IN THE FINANCING OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
1. Major Changes in Cash Balances
2. The Government and the Banks
3. Some Conclusions
“One may he dogmatic about an objective, but the suitability of a 
means is judged by expediency.”
-—  Gerhard Colm, Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal 
Policy (New York, 1955)> P*17*
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Introductory
While it is important for some purposes to try to determine the 
extent to which some classes of expenditure were covered by receipts 
from specified sources, it is at least as important to examine 
inequalities between total net receipts and total net disbursements. In 
fact, significant developments in N.S.W. government finance cannot be 
explained satisfactorily unless it is clearly understood that, for all 
practical purposes, all resources were pooled to meet government commit­
ments.
Figure 35^ shows at a glance that the pool of funds could and did 
at times grow more rapidly than expenditure and at other times did not 
grow as rapidly as expenditure (or shrank more rapidly than expenditure). 
There were, in brief, important changes in government bank balances 
which cannot be ignored.
Section 1 of this chapter is designed to call to mind the main 
reasons for these changes in cash balances. Section 2 considers some 
of the implications of these changes for the banks doing business with 
the Government. The conclusion is inescapable that the Government, 
through its banking transactions, more than once acted to intensify 
the problems of the private sector. Whether such interference with the
T
This figure shows government cash balances in the banks and also 
balances on the consolidated revenue fund. The latter were of special 
interest to Parliament (mainly in relation to questions of taxation), 
but cash balances were the main guide for Executive and Treasury 
decision-making•
FIGURE 35 326
BALANCES PIT THE CONSOLIDATED REVENUE FUND ATT!) GASH 
BALANCES IN BANKS AT END QF FINANCIAL YEAR *
--- Cash Balances
--- C.R.F. Ledger Balances
( * Financial Year Ending December 31? 1856-1894; 
Thereafter, Ending Jane 30*)
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market mechanism was unintentional, unavoidable or simply the outcome 
of Treasury views on sound financial management, the consequences for 
the private sector were not in accord with the avowed objectives of 
government activity as a whole. Section 3 relates this observation to 
the main points developed in earlier chapters.
- 1 -
Ma.jor Changes in Cash Balances
In Table 5 (Appendix l), overall cash surpluses and deficits are
shown for the whole period. In Figure 35 these surpluses and deficits
are translated into changes in cash balances in the banks at the end of
2each financial year. It would be impracticable at this stage to con­
sider all the fluctuations indicated and the reasons for those 
fluctuations. It is proposed to confine the discussion to the main 
features in seven phases which are identified by vertical lines in 
Figure 35*
(a) 1856-63» In this phase expenditure was increasing fairly rapidly
as the Government became pre-occupied with the provision of communications 
and other services calculated to promote settlement and production. Free 
trade (modified by a very light revenue tariff) was in effect; overseas 
borrowing was, if not large, persistent; and, after l86l, the Crown 
lands were thrown open to settlement by all-comers. The Treasury was 
unable to regulate expenditure and attempted to keep cash balances at a
For the relevant statistics, see Table 2, Appendix 1.
2
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sufficiency level by raising loans as required by the short-term 
budgetary situation. By 1863 the consolidated revenue fund was over­
drawn and bank balances were falling. Disbursements had been increasing 
more rapidly than receipts.
(b) 1864-67. In the second phase, the Government was overdrawn at the 
banks, for two main reasons:
1. Expenditure, according to the Treasurer, could not be reduced; and
2. Loans were difficult to raise in both Sydney and London, even at 
considerably higher rates of interest than the Government had hitherto 
been prepared to offer. Taxation was increased, partly to augment the 
consolidated revenue fund, partly to allow railway construction to con­
tinue; while relatively large overdraft facilities in London were needed 
to meet commitments for interest and supplies.
(c) 1868-77« Bank overdrafts were cancelled in 1868 by relatively huge loan 
raisings, but a persistent decline in balances on the consolidated revenue 
fund prompted Parliament to insist on the curtailment of overseas borrowing 
in order to restrict the growth of the interest bill and to make possible 
the remission of taxes imposed in 1865-6. A further large loan was
raised in London late in I87O to cancel an overdraft and to avoid 
drawing bills of exchange on London to meet further commitments.
Taxation was again increased in 1871 and until 1874 the Government delibe­
rately curtailed work on railways pending the redemption of various 
•‘deficiency loans“. Meanwhile, land sales were booming and revenue was 
pouring into the Treasury, making possible, amongst other things, “a
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re tu rn  to  f re e  t r a d e ” . E xpenditure was re v ised  upwards but was not 
allow ed to  in c re a se  as ra p id ly  as r e c e ip ts  b e fo re  1878. Overseas 
borrow ing was in fre q u e n t and mounting c a p i ta l  o u tla y s  were financed  
la rg e ly  from even more ra p id ly  mounting cash b a lan ces .
(d) 1878- 84 . In  th e  fo u r th  phase, cash b a lances in  th e  banks f e l l  
alm ost co n tin u o u sly . The d e c lin e  commenced in  1878 when p a s to r a l i s t s  
began to  experience  d i f f i c u l ty  in  secu rin g  bank advances fo r  lan d  pur­
chases and when evidence o f unemployment provided  p o l i t i c ia n s  w ith  
excuses fo r  s a n c tio n in g  m assive o u tla y s  on ra ilw ay s and o th e r p u b lic  
works. P arliam ent decided  to  ap p ro p ria te  the  nominal revenue su rp lu s  and 
th e  T reasury  was ob lig ed  to  r a i s e  a la rg e  lo an  to  augment cash b a lan ces . 
But the  London market was unfavourab le  u n t i l  1879» The fo llow ing  y ear a 
fu r th e r  land  boom go t under way and fo r  two y ea rs  overseas borrow ing was 
no t adequate to  fin an ce  p u b lic  works, mounting c a p i ta l  o u tlay s  being  
financed  in  la rg e  p a r t  once more from cash ba lan ces  in  the  colony. In  
1883, however, the  Government decided to  r e s t r i c t  land  s a le s  and cash 
b a lan ces  in  the colony were ra p id ly  absorbed , even though overseas 
borrowing was stepped up i n i t i a l l y  to  augment lo c a l cash b a lan c e s . Cash 
d e f i c i t s  were in c u rre d  in  1878 , 1879 , 1880 , 1882 and I 884 , amounting
in  th e  aggregate  to  £5.4  m ill io n  ( as a g a in s t su rp lu se s  in  1881 and 
I 883 amounting to  £1 .3  m il l io n ) .
(e ) 1885-88. In  th e  f i f t h  phase, cash su rp lu ses  amounted to  £5«7 
m il l io n , as a g a in s t d e f i c i t s  o f £1 .2  m illio n  and cash ba lances rose  
from Dr. £548*000 (1885) to  £4,002,000 (1888). These r e s u l t s  were
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achieved partly by the retrenchment of expenditure (particularly on 
railways) and partly by borrowing in London in excess of current needs.
(f) 1889-91« In these three years cash balances tumbled to £484,000,
%
reflecting a renewed burst of railway construction, abandonment of 
the Government’s retrenchment policy and serious problems in arranging 
for the issue of loans in London in I89O-9I.
(e) 1892-1900« Figure 35 establishes a striking contrast between
balances on the consolidated revenue fund and cash balances in the banks 
in this phase, the former steadily deteriorating, the latter normally 
at relatively high levels. The fundamental explanation of this contrast, 
of course, was the existence of a rapidly expanding volume of trust 
funds (largely savings bank deposits) more than adequate to cover large 
deficiencies in revenue.
- 2-
The Government and the Banks
It is not proposed to delve into the origins of government contracts 
with banks or to re-examine the main features of Treasury relations with 
banks in the sixties.^ For present purposes it will be sufficient to 
consider the beginnings of serious disputes between the Treasury and 
the Bank of N.S.W. in the mid-seventies and the strengthening tendency
3
For early correspondence between the Treasury and the banks, see 
Treasury Archives, series T13 and T92. See also Chapter Three, pp. 175-83.
4
See pp. 186-8.
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GOVERNMENT BANKING ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE COLONY
Year Contracting Financial Agents Other Accounts Notes
I8 5 6 A. J • 0 • C.B.C.; Union; 
London; A ’asia;
N.S.W.
1 8 5 7 A.J.S. H
I8 5 8 N.S.W. A.J.S.; C.B.C.
1859)
1874) N.S.W.
-
N.S.W. 
Sole agents
1875 N.S.W. O.B.C.; City* ( * 2  fixed 
deposits)
1876)
1884)
N.S.W. N. S.W.; A.J.S.;*
O. B.C.; City; 
A'asia; Union; 
E.S.&A.; Merc.
( * 8  fixed 
deposits)
1 8 8 5 )
1889)
Associated Banks 
(A’asia; Union,
A. J.S., London, 
E.S.&A., City, 
Merc., C.B.C.,
B. N.Z.)
Treasury dis­
missed London 
1889.
1 8 9 0 )
1891)
(No contract) General a/c with 
N.S.W., C.B.C., 
A.J.S., Merc. & 
City. (C.B.A. 
from July 1 8 9 1 )
Treasury 
closed a/c 
with City in 
February I8 9 I 
Merc, failed 
in March I8 9 I
1 8 9 2 (No contract) C.B.C., N.S.W., 
A.J.S., C.B.A.
1893)
1894)
N.S.W. City (fixed 
dep).
2 banks did 
not re­
construct.
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GOVERNMENT BANKING ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE COLONY - CONTINUED
Year Contracting Other Accounts Notes
Financial Agents
1895 N.S.W. City (current a/c)
I896) N.S.W. City, C.B.C. In 1897 fixed
I9OO) (current a/cs). dep. with City.
ABBREVIATIONS: (l) C.B.C. = Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney} (2) A* asia 
= Bank of Australasia; (3) N.S.W. = Bank of N.S.W.; (4) A.J.5. = Aust.
Joint Stock Bank; (5) London = London Chartered Bank; (6) Q.B.C. *=
Oriental Banking Corporation; (7) City * City Bank of Sydney; (8 ) E.S. £ A. 
= English, Scottish £ Australian Chartered Bank; (9) Merc. = Mercantile 
Bank; (lO) B.N.Z. = Bank of New Zealand; (ll) C.B.A. * Commercial Bank of 
Australia; (12; Union = Union Bank of Australia.
GOVERNMENT BANKING ARRANGEMENTS IN LONDON
Year Contracting 
Financial Agents
Other London 
Business
Notes
1855 Bank of N.S.W. -
1857)
1864)
Oriental B.C. Contract with 
Oriental Termi­
nated Dec. 1864»
1865)
1868)
Bank of N.S.W. Oriental No London agent until 
Sept. 1865. Oriental 
had right to place 
debentures to cancel 
overdraft.
1869)
1882)
Bank of N.S.W. - Sole agent.
1883)
1884)
Bank of N.S.W. Bank of England Bank of Eng. inscri­
bed loans issued by
N.S.W.
1885)
1889)
Associated Banks Bank of England Assoc. Banks repres­
ented by London £ 
Westminster for Lon­
don payments; loans 
floated £ inscribed 
by Bank of England.
1890)
1900)
Bank of England London £ West­
minster
L. £ W. issued Treas. 
Bills and handled
minor business not 
covered by arrange­
ment with B. of Eng.
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of th e  Treasury to  igno re  the e f f e c t s  of i t s  p o l ic ie s  on th e  hanking
5
system and the p r iv a te  s e c to r  more g e n e ra lly .
A parliam en tary  S e le c t Committee was appoin ted  in  1875 to  in v e s t i ­
g a te  com plain ts hy th e  Bank o f N.S.W. th a t  th e  Treasury was u n fa ir ly  
and unreasonably  in te r p r e t in g  th e  c u rre n t c o n tra c t .  To g e t th e se  com­
p la in ts  in  p e rsp ec tiv e  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  r e c a l l  th a t  government cash 
b a lances in c reased  ra p id ly  a f t e r  1870 and to  s t r e s s  th a t  the  Treasury 
was determ ined to  a rrange fo r  the  payment o f i n t e r e s t  on a l l  c r e d i t  
b a lances in  o rd er to  j u s t i f y  a p o licy  o f accum ulating cash re s e rv e s .^
The bank agreed to  sev e ra l re v is io n s  o f the  c o n tra c t  as cash ba lan ces  
mounted, each re v is io n  p rov id ing  fo r  th e  payment o f i n t e r e s t  on a la rg e r  
p ro p o rtio n  of d a ily  c r e d i t  b a lan c e s . E arly  in  1875» however, the 
T reasury  in s is t e d  th a t  th e  bank allow i n t e r e s t  on h a lf - a -m il l io n  f ix e d  
fo r two months and when the  bank in d ic a te d  th a t  th i s  would be im possib le  
the  T reasury  opened accounts w ith  two o th e r  banks, making f ix e d  d e p o s its
fo r  e ig h teen  months. Shepherd Sm ith, g en era l manager of the Bank of
7
N.S.W ., inform ed the  S e le c t Committee th a t :
. . . t h e  s p i r i t  in  which the  Government and the  Bank had h i th e r ­
to  conducted th e i r  b u s in ess  o p e ra tio n s  had been one of a la rg e ,  
comprehensive g ive and take  p r in c ip le ,  and i t  was h a rd ly  p o ss ib le
5
A su m m ay lis t o f changes in  c o n tra c ts  and o th e r  banking arrangem ents 
i s  p rovided  on pages 331-32.
6
M inutes o f Evidence, Report of S e le c t Committee on Removal o f P ub lic  
Moneys from Bank of IT.S.W. to  o th e r Banking I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  N.S.W.V. & P . , 
1875» Vol. 2: evidence o f G eoffrey Eagar and James Thomson.
I b i d . ,  p .742: evidence of Shepherd Smith.
7
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to conduct so large and so fluctuating a "business satisfactorily 
or equitably to either side unless this spirit pervaded the whole 
of the transactions.
Smith argued that his bank had over a lengthy period acted to extricate 
the Government from financial predicaments resulting from lack of fore­
sight and administrative inefficiency; that the Treasury had strained the 
bank’s resources to provide foreign exchange when loans could be raised 
on good terms in London; and that all the other banks doing business in 
New South Wales were seeking a share of the Government business following
g
the publication of misleading statements of balances available.
Self-interest undoubtedly prompted the Bank of N.S.W. to fight to 
preserve a monopoly of the government business at a time when the govern­
ment account had started to prove very profitable. The Treasury, on the 
other hand, was not interested in Shepherd Smith’s arguments about the 
past performances of the bank in exceeding the terms of its contracts 
to solve government financial problems. It suited the Treasury to 
transfer large amounts from the Bank of N.S.W. to other banks, which were 
eager to offer interest on fixed deposits which would aid them in meeting
the mounting demands of pastoralists for advances to purchase Crown land
9and develop their properties.
8
Ibid., p.78 5.
9
See Auditor-General’s Report for 1875» N.S.W.V. & P., 1875~6» Vol. 2, p.815 for demands by rivals of the Bank of N.S.W. for a share of the 
government business. (See also A.I.B.R., 1878, p.141 and p.7^3 for 
comments on the implications of Treasury policy).
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The Bank of N.S.W. became increasingly critical of Treasury policy 
as government cash balances fluctuated downwards. Reluctance by the 
Treasury to sanction the floating of loans in London and related requests 
for foreign exchange and advances prompted both Shepherd Smith and 
Donald Larnach (London branch) to intervene with ministers to secure 
more satisfactory arrangements.^^ By 1884 it had become evident that the 
long association of the bank and the Government was drawing to a close (as 
events were to prove, only temporarily). It will be sufficient here to 
note some of the points raised in public following the Treasury’s decision 
to employ the Bank of England for the issue of inscribed stock.
The tone of correspondence between the two institutions needs first 
to be established. Consider this extract of a letter from Eagar (perma­
nent head of the Treasury)
...you entirely misconceive the relations of your Bank to the 
Government if you suppose that you can be permitted without further 
protest to adopt precisely that course of action which you erron­
eously charge the Bank of England with pursuing, viz., coercing 
the Government into a certain line of conduct. Acquiescence in 
such pretensions would be to concede to the Bank political control 
of financial arrangements.
12And this sample of Shepherd Smith's correspondence:
10
See Parkes Correspondence. Vols 45 and 46 for letters between Parkes 
and Larnach in 1879 and. Financial Statement of G.R. Dibbs, N.S.W.P.D.. 
1885-6, Vol. 18, pp.457-8 for comments on serious disputes from l88l 
onwards.
11
Correspondence: the Government of N.S.W. with the Bank of N.S.W., on 
terminating their contract for conduct of the Government Banking Business 
(Sydney, 1886): Eagar to Smith, 9 September 1884.
12
Ibid., Shepherd Smith to the Treasurer, 12 September 1884*
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You have postponed and postponed a settlement until your loan has 
been floated. You have meanwhile gone on overdrawing your account 
with us, contrary to all agreement terms, to the extent of 
£1,300,000 in Sydney, without previous arrangement with us of any 
kind; and we cannot now consent (it is strangely unreasonable that 
you should ask us to consent) to further disorganise and tear 
about in this huge and spasmodic fashion all our financial strength 
and weakness.... You seem to be unaware that, whilst you are using 
provocative language to us of dictation and threat, you are and 
have been for sometime past absolutely dependent upon our self- 
sacrificing willingness to pay your daily cheques.
Thomas Walker, the bank's chairman, told shareholders that "the
management of the finances of the country had been so erratic, there had
been such a want of foresight and precaution in providing funds for the
Government expenditure (resulting at one time in enormous overdrafts beyond
the provision of the agreement, and consequent drain upon the resources
of the Bank of New South Wales; at another in vast, and to the bank,
embarrassing surpluses), as to make it impossible to conduct the account
in accordance with sound banking principles - in fact, rendering the
account a trouble and menace to the interests of the bank, as well as a
danger and loss to the country".^ The bank demanded settlement of a
debt of £1,858,348 and, when the Treasury failed to acknowledge the demand,
14Shepherd Smith wrotei
To the Government of the country it is a question of book-keeping 
importance and nothing more. To us and our constituents, and to 
the borrowing public, you can temporarily make it a bitter and 
serious injury. And it seems to my directors that you are wantonly 
trying to make it so.
13
Prom a pamphlet extracted in A.I.B.R.t 14 February 1885, p»73 ff»
14
Loc. cit.
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A series of lav; suits, ending in appeals to the Privy Council by both 
the bank and the Government, ensued before the dispute was finally 
settled in 1888.
In the meantime, from the beginning of 1885, the Government’s local 
financial agency was shared by the "Associated Banks”. When the new 
arrangement was made public, The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record 
observed
Anamolous as the statement may seem, we are confident that the 
change that has taken place in the Government account, will be 
advantageous to the banks which have obtained it, to the bank 
which has lost it, and that the tendency to cheapen money as sur­
mised, will benefit the general public....
Governments are fickle, and they are not always farseeing. At 
times a Treasurer has leant heavily upon his banker, and with an 
inevitable result. However intrinsically powerful an institution 
may be, for the making of profit its resources must of necessity 
be out in the shape of advances to its customers. Thus it has 
occurred in fact that to satisfy its Government client, the Bank 
of Hew South Wales has, upon occasion, called in advances from 
commercial customers, to their great discomfort, at inopportune 
times, and a reputation for fickle policy has been fastened upon 
the bank, when the real offender was perhaps a rapacious Government 
in the background. Again, when, glutted with the proceeds of a 
large loan, for which interest had to be paid, it was necessary 
to push out the funds, the bank naturally adopted that policy, 
until the inevitable swing of the pendulum made the Government 
again a hungry borrower, and history repeated itself in the alien­
ation of good general customers.
It is evident that the Treasury was not concerned about the problems it 
might create for its bankers and that the decision to terminate the 
contract with the Bank of N.S.W. followed from pre-occupation with its 
own problems. At the end of I884 those problems were*
Editorial, 14 January 1885, p.l: "An Important Banking Movement”.15
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(1) The Government’s determination to continue raising relatively huge 
loans in quick succession in London, despite increasing criticism from 
marketing syndicates;
(2) The Government’s failure to provide funds by additional taxation
to offset the diminished revenue from the Crovm lands since the beginning 
of 1883.
To deal with the first problem, the Treasury pinned its hopes on employ­
ment of the Bank of England to issue inscribed stock successfully; while 
the second problem seemed to make essential some arrangement for overdraft 
facilities on a scale beyond the resources of the Bank of N.S.W. acting
16alone. It was expedient to sign a contract with the "Associated Banks".
From the Treasury viewpoint, it was extremely satisfying that 
Parliament became intensely interested in deficits on the consolidated 
revenue fund after 1884 and displayed little interest in the growth of 
cash balances. Ministerial directives led to a retrenchment of expen­
diture and an increase in revenue from the Crown lands and, except in 
I887, the Treasury was permitted to arrange for the floating of further 
loans. Cash balances increased very rapidly indeed, and the "Associated 
Banks" benefited handsomely.
A determined effort to make the banks pay interest on all the
government surplus cash in I889 resulted in a Treasury decision to run
The banks agreed to advance £2,250,000, of which only £1,000,000 was 
secured on the proceeds of future loans - a vastly more favourable 
arrangement for the N.S.W. Government than that made by the same banks 
with the Victorian Government. (See Herald, 8.1.85).
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down the balances. In March of that year, William McMillan became 
17Treasurer and he immediately expressed great dissatisfaction with the
18
current policy of accumulating large cash reserves. He commenced 
negotiations with the banks for the payment of interest on the total 
daily cash balances and when the banks rejected his demands, he decided
19to "teach them a lesson". At the end of the year he informed Parliament:
...on the occasion of the last loan...I gave the banks their full 
quantum of a million of money, and by a favourable state of cir­
cumstances. . .we got 5 per cent, on the rest. We paid a million 
of money to the banks, for which we have been getting for several 
months 4 per cent. I have also invested another million in 
exchequer bills at 2§- and 2-J per cent. I then invested £600,000 
and £175)000) of which £300,000 is at 3 per cent., £300,000 at 
3i per cent, and £175)000 is lodged in the London and Westminster 
Bank.
When the contract had been signed with the "Associated Banks", McMillan 
pointed out, the Government seemed likely to be dependent on the banks 
for some time, but:
Now the Government are in a better position than all the banks 
combined...I say that in all money negotiations the Government, 
and not the banks, is master of the situation. The banks thought 
that as they were combined the whole business of the country was 
to be put into their hands, and that there was nobody else to 
go to.... Well, I gave them every interview they wanted, and 
listened to their proposals. At last they handed me their ulti­
matum, and when I found their proposals unreasonable, I determined 
to have nothing more to do with them, and the Government of this 
country has now intimated...that no further agreement will be 
entered into.
17
For notes on McMillan, see Appendix 2.
18
Minute of the Treasurer, 4 November 1889, N.S.W.V. & P . , I889 (2nd 
session), Vol. 1, p.586.
Financial Statement extracted in A.I.B.R., 16 December l889> p.9^9*
19
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To his cabinet colleagues, McMillan explained that he had decided 
to keep out of the London market indefinitely and "to gradually reduce
20the Bank balances to the lowest level on which we can work with safety". 
This decision accorded with the Cabinet's intention of gradually aban­
doning the retrenchment policy introduced in 1887* McMillan, however,
did not bargain for increased capital outlays on a scale insisted on by 
21Cabinet, nor did he anticipate the break-down of the marketing mechanism
for colonial government securities. In fact, he confidently predicted
in I889 that "we can go into the London market and get £10,000,000 at 
22any moment".
At the beginning of I89O the Treasury opened separate accounts with 
the five banks whose head offices were in Sydney. £1 million was trans­
ferred from the Government’s London account with the Bank of England and 
shared amongst the banks on fixed deposit for twelve months. As the 
year advanced, news of the failure of loans floated in London by other 
colonial governments prompted McMillan to delay plans for a N.S#W. loan.
By this time, large contracts had been let for public works and expendi­
ture as a whole was rising rapidly. The Treasury, with good reason, was 
becoming increasingly concerned about the financial outlook. The account 
with the City Bank was closed in February 1891 when it dishonoured a
20
Treasury Minute cited in n.l8.
21
See notes on McMillan, Appendix 2.
Financial Statement cited in n.19*
22
341
23few departmental cheques. The following month, the Mercantile Bank
failed and financial crisis was imminent. Fixed deposits in the hanks
had already been withdrawn and by mid-1891 the Treasury was forced to
arrange an overdraft with the Melbourne-based Commercial Bank of
Australia? by October 1891 total overdrafts in Sydney amounted to
£395*000. The banks, in addition to providing overdraft facilities, had
agreed to combine with the Bank of England in taking up most of the loan
issued in September I89I in London, hoping thereby to supplement their
holdings of foreign exchange. In this they were disappointed, because
for many months it was impossible to dispose of the securities. The
Treasury, meanwhile, needed drafts on London and expected the banks to
assist, irrespective of the requirements of the banks' private clients.
Recognition of the fact that the banks were unable to satisfy more
than a fraction of the Treasury's foreign exchange needs forced the
Government in I892 to raise funds in London by the issue of short-dated
24 nTreasury Bills carrying a relatively high rate of interest. By 1893 
the Government feared that, without positive steps to bolster the banks, 
it would be forced to lose faith with British creditors. When justifying 
the Bank Issue Bill rushed through Parliament in April 1893* Sir George 
Dibbs argued that serious bank failures in the colony would mean that 
"our power of controlling our financial operations in London might be
23
See Herald, 7 February 1891»
24
See pp. 238-9*
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lessened to such an extent that a calamity might take place through
the loss of public credit. I ask the House to remember that the banks
must be protected as much to save the credit of the Government as to
25save the credit of private individuals’*.
So soon as the financial crisis was brought to an apparent end, the 
Government signed a contract with the Bank of N.S.W. for the conduct of 
its local business. The other local bank which did not reconstruct (the 
City Bank of Sydney) was "rewarded" with a small fixed deposit and later 
with a current account. These two banks (but primarily the Bank of N.S.W.) 
were the beneficiaries of the transfer of funds from commercial to savings 
banks stimulated by the financial crisis, a transfer which largely 
explains the rapid growth of government trust fund balances and the exis­
tence of substantial cash reserves when the consolidated revenue fund 
showed a mounting overdraft. The Bank of N.S.W. and the City Bank, in 
return for the use of these funds, had to meet heavy demands from the 
Government for bills of exchange on London. After 1895 they could not 
fully meet those demands and the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney was 
called on to help, in return for a share of the government business.
It was a privilege "dear-bought to be styled 'Bankers to the
26Government’," a financial expert observed in l890.~ There were, no doubt,
25
Second reading debate on the Bank Issue Bill, N.S.W.P.D.» 1892-3,
Vol. 65, p.6601. (My italics).
26
"London Letter", A.I.B.R., 1 February I89O, p.176.
/
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many occasions when it was profitable to do business with the Government,
but The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record frequently expressed the
view that the Government’s demands on its bankers very often had serious
implications for other banks "and their general customers". The Bank
of N.S.W's contracts with the Government - and large fluctuations in
balances held with the bank - were seen as an important reason for the
continual break-down of agreements by the various banks and the problems
27confronting smaller banks in trying to expand their business. The
Government’s frequent need of large overdraft facilities could not be
28dismissed lightly, the journal observed:
The safety of the advances is not...the point to which we take 
exception, for there is no doubt that in the event of the Govern­
ment contracting an obligation in accordance with law, the State 
will, sooner or later, meet its engagements. But we do not see 
any good reason why a Government should have it in its power to 
dislocate the financial conditions of an entire community, because, 
for political or other reasons, it chooses to anticipate its 
revenue.... A Government should not put itself in the position 
of being a competitor with the public for banking accommodation.
Its attitude should be the loftier one of doing all it can to 
foster the assistance given to enterprise, and not to cramp the 
public energy by spasmodically absorbing the motive power - capital.
The "links of the banks with the private sector made them a key
channel of influence between governments and private institutions",
writes N.G. Butlin in a study of the implications for the private sector
29of significant changes in government banking transactions. This is
27
A.I.B.R., 14 January I885, p.2.
28
Ibid., 14 February 1885> p.6l: "Government Bargains with Banks".
"Colonial Socialism in Australia", in Aitken, op. cit., p.56 ff*29
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not the place to pursue a detailed investigation of what is a very 
complicated aspect of Australian economic growth. For the present it 
is enough to realise that the N.S.W. Treasury - whether pursuing an 
unavoidable course or merely striving to make the most businesslike 
decision - could and did interfere seriously with the market mechanism 
through its banking transactions. The Treasury had its own day-to-day 
problems to solve and the banks often held the key to expedient solu­
tions. If those solutions conflicted with political assertions that the
Government's function was to promote private enterprise, the Treasury
30was not likely to worry. In the words of George Reid:
...we have in the Treasury a number of gentlemen who are most 
able and experienced officers, and whose duty it is to deal not 
with theories, but with facts.
-3-
Some Conclusions
The Government's banking transactions, clearly, fall within the scope 
of the proposition that, in the long run, the methods of financing 
government expenditure in New South Wales between 1856 and 1900 contri­
buted to the expansion of the government sector at the expense of the 
private sector. This outcome, it has been argued, was basically the 
consequence of attempts to reconcile demands for extremely low taxation 
with difficult-to-resist pressures for increased spending. The spending 
and the low taxation were generally justified dogmatically in terms of
Rebate on Financial Statement, IT.S.W.P.D., Vol. 6, p.2097*
30
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government aids to private enterprise, but the alternatives to taxation 
exploited to meet expenditure commitments tended to conflict with the 
avowed objectives underlying government activity.
Government expenditure rose from less than £0.7 million in 1853 to 
over £15 million in the nineties. Per capita expenditure was trebled 
and the proportion of national income represented by government expendi­
ture was at least twice as large in the nineties as in the fifties. Per 
capita taxation, on the other hand, displayed no long run tendency to 
increase; in fact, it was lower in the second half of the nineties than 
in the second half of the fifties. This reflects: (a) the persistence of 
free trade thinking; (b) the sustained opposition to taxation in any 
form; and (c) the fact that there were important alternative sources of 
funds.
£68 million was borrowed between 1856 and 1900, over £50 million 
of it on the London capital market. Nominally, the greater part of loan 
raisings was employed to finance railway construction, which was considered 
to be a very important way of promoting production and rural settlement. 
While borrowing undoubtedly at times contributed to these ends, it also 
carried with it a considerable overseas interest commitment which became 
increasingly significant as export prices declined. Overseas borrowing 
by the Government, in short, contributed to balance of payments crises 
and, in the long run, was partly responsible for the reversal of economic 
growth and depression.
Luring balance of payments crises, political attention was directed 
to the relationship between government borrowing and proposals for
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taxation increases, some of which could not be avoided. At such times, 
attention turned to alternative means of financing government expenditure. 
One highly important means was found in the exploitation of the Crown 
lands. There can be little doubt that, whatever the motives underlying 
land legislation at the beginning of the sixties, the implementation of 
that legislation and the introduction of later amending legislation was 
governed largely by budgetary considerations expressed at the time in 
terms of the interests of those who comprised I the majority of the popu­
lation, the urban landless. Government land policy was of little 
assistance to agriculturalists or pastoralists. The productivity of the 
pastoral industry was not increased as a result of the purchase of Crown 
land. But the pastoralists became heavily indebted and, because a large 
part of the capital for land purchase came from Britain, the whole community 
was subjected to the adverse effects of land legislation over a lengthy 
period. This legislation - or, perhaps more accurately, the way the 
legislation was administered - was an important factor in mounting 
balance of payments problems in the eighties and nineties.
Land legislation cannot be regarded as leading to any notable 
expansion of rural settlement. Nor did the provision of unprofitable 
government services contribute impressively to the same end. Rural 
settlement did increase, but at a much slower pace than the urbanisation 
of the community. Government rating policies tended to benefit highly 
sectional interests over short periods, but railway rating policies 
had the effect of crippling private transport undertakings with which
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the government railways competed. And, because railways and other 
government services were not self-supporting, it was essential to cover 
the deficiency in receipts by the exploitation of other sources of 
funds - borrowing and the Crown lands, in particular.
Depending on opportunities for the exploitation of these sources, 
the Government was at times enabled to accumulate cash reserves in banks 
or was forced at times to deplete those reserves rapidly, creating thereby 
difficulties for the banks and their private customers. At times, banks 
were called on for considerable overdraft facilities, normally at times 
when the private sector was in difficulty. At such times, the Govern­
ment paid little attention to the effects of its financial transactions 
on the private sector. Its own financial commitments had to be met and 
any of a variety of expedient solutions might be applied. The long run 
effect of such expedient solutions of pressing financial problems was the 
expansion of the government sector of the economy at the expense of 
the private. At the end of the period under review, the N.S.W. Govern­
ment, though still strongly free-trade, was by far the largest employer 
of labour, had a monopoly of land transport, provided a wide range of 
services - and was far more concerned with making ends meet than in 
finding ways of promoting recovery from the depression which its own 
financial policies over a lengthy period had helped to cause.
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APPENDIX 1
N.S.W. Government R e c e ip t s ,  Payments and B a lances ,
_________ 1856-1900, w ith  E x p la n a to ry  Notes»________
I c o n fe s s ,  however, t h a t  under th e  p r e s e n t  system of 
keeping  th e  p u b l ic  a c c o u n ts ,  w i th in  two or t h r e e  months 
a f t e r  th e  C o lo n ia l  T re a s u re r  has  made h i s  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta tem en t  i t  would be im p o ss ib le  f o r  me, u n le s s  I were 
c lo s e te d  w ith  th e  Under S e c r e t a r y  f o r  F inance and Trade , 
t o  g e t  an i n t e l l i g e n t  view of th e  s t a t e  of th e  p u b l ic  
f in a n c e s .
-----  W illiam  McMillan ( e x - T r e a s u r e r ) , 1893
Government a c c o u n tin g  in  A u s t r a l i a  in  th e  n in e t e e n t h  c en tu ry  was
f r e q u e n t ly  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  p r e s e n t  in fo rm a tio n  in  a form 
s u i t a b l e  f o r  p o l ic y  making o r  r e a d i l y  fo llow ed  by th e  g e n e ra l  p u b l i c .  
Economic h i s t o r i a n s  have been aware o f  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o  be over­
come b e fo re  th e  p u b l ic  acco u n ts  can be used  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  The 
a c c o u n ts  of th e  N.S.W. Government, g e n e r a l ly  more d e t a i l e d  th a n  th o s e  
o f  o th e r  governm ents , co n ta in  more u s a b le  in fo rm a t io n  th a n  has 
g e n e r a l ly  been supposed , e s p e c i a l l y  by th o s e  who have become accus­
tomed to  r e ly in g  on th e  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g i s t e r s  and T.A. Coghlan.
They canno t,  of c o u r s e ,  be made to  y i e l d  some of th e  s e c r e t s  which 
th e y  were in ten d ed  to  p r e s e rv e .  The t a b l e s  and n o te s  which fo llo w  
a r e  des igned  to  r e c o rd  th e  main r e s u l t s  o f  le n g th y  s tudy  of  th e  
a n n u a l a b s t r a c t s ,  t h e  A u d i to r - G e n e r a l 's  R ep o r ts  (from 1871),
T rea su ry  and A udit O ff ice  A rc h iv e s ,  budget speeches  and accompanying 
f in a n c e  p a p e rs .  A ss is ta n c e  in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  th e  troub lesom e 
" a c c r u a l s  system" o f  acco u n tin g  has  been g iven  by th e  p re s e n t  N.S.W. 
A u d i to r -G e n e ra l ,  Mr W .J. Campbell, t o  whom my th a n k s  a re  due.
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N. B.
(1) The Financial Year
From 1856 to 1894 inclusive, the accounting period was the 
calendar year. In 1895 the accounts were balanced on June 
30 for the previous six months, in order to alter the 
accounting period to the July-June financial year.
(2) Rounding
All entries are in £*000, as greater detail would suggest 
a misleading degree of precision. Some slight discrepancies 
in the tables are the result of rounding.
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TABLE 1
General A bstract o f th e  P u b lic  Accounts
GENfERAL NOTE: T his ta b le  shows th e  T reasury’s annual summary o f a l l
r e c e ip ts  and payments ( a l l  funds) and the o v era ll ba lances in th e  
led g ers  a t th e  c lo se  o f each y ea r . E n tr ie s  here have no va lu e fo r  
a n a ly s is ,  but have to  be r e c o n c ile d  w ith  cash b a lan ces (Table 2) and 
estim ated  net r e c e ip ts  and payments (Table 4 ) .  (Further n otes  
fo llo w  th e  t a b le ) .
Year T otal R ece ip ts T otal Payments Ledger Balances
£ ’000 £ ’ 000 £ '000
1856 2275 2093 312
7 1680 1723 269
8 1691 1873 87
9 2730 2176 641
1860 2195 2227 609
1 2020 2217 412
2 2440 2321 531
3 2576 2861 245
4 2157 2593 Dr . 191
1865 2465 2524 Dr . 249
6 3442 3207 Dr 14
7 2798 3158 Dr . 374
8 4294 3492 428
9 3890 3495 823
1870 2743 3473 93
1 4603 4168 529
2 4230 3707 1053
3 4696 3805 1944
4 5646 5554 2036
1875 8197 7678 2555
6 8182 7229 3509
7 8567 8005 4071
8 7258 7971 3359
9 9433 9773 3019
1880 8701 10067 1653
1 12456 11238 2871
2 10932 12090 1713
3 14605 14428 1890
4 14516 16305 102
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TABLE 1 (C ontinued)
Year Total R ece ip ts T otal Payments Ledger Bal<
£ '000 £ ’000 £'000
1885 17975 16650 1426
6 20170 17747 3850
7 14113 15371 2593
8 17902 15803 4691
9 19468 18610 5547
1890 17732 17981 5298
1 20841 22779 3360
2 24011 23936 3434
3 23842 20215 7061
4 16828 17168 6721
1895(a) 9101 9978 5844
95 / 6 21777 18813 8809
6 6 / 7 16728 18261 7276
9 7 / 8 16828 16024 8080
9 8 / 9 17302 17830 7553
99/00 18275 18178 7650
(a) H alf year
Note th a t r e c e ip ts  and payments in clud e in ter -a c co u n t tr a n sfe r  
item s, loan co n v ersio n s, revenue refunded. Ledger Balances should  
not be confused w ith cash b a la n ces . (See Table 2 ) .  Ledger 
B alances fo r  the th ree  main funds are shown in  Table 3 .
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TABLE 2
Ledger and Cash Balances
GENERAL NOTE: Ledger balances shown in Table 1 were represented by 
cash (in London and in the colony) and “securities in the Treasury 
Chest" held on behalf of trust funds. Cash balances were not shown 
in the annual abstracts until 1868 but occasionally were published in 
special statements. Owing to the small amount of "securities" before 
1868, no serious misrepresentation would follow the treatment of 
ledger balances as cash balances. (Further notes follow the table).
Year London Colony Total SECUR­ITIES
£'000
LEDGER
BALANCES
£ ’000
Curr. Fixed
£ ’000 £'000 £ ’000
(-C. & S. 
£ ’000
1856 27 282 amm 309 3 312
7 69 193 — 262 7 269
8 NA NA — 80 7 87
9 -93 704 — 611 24 641
1860 NA NA — NA NA 609
1 NA NA — NA NA 412
2 NA NA _ NA NA 531
3 NA NA — NA NA 245
4 NA NA — NA NA -191
1865 NA NA — NA NA -249
6 NA NA — NA NA -14
7 NA NA — NA NA -374
8 218 149 — 367 61 428
9 326 434 — 760 63 823
1870 -178 214 — 36 58 94
1 46 432 — 478 51 529
2 74 928 — 1002 51 1053
3 609 1098 — 1707 237 1944
4 321 1292 — 1613 423 2036
1875 538 1024 550 2112 443 2555
6 772 716 1450 2938 571 3509
7 766 804 1925 3495 576 4071
8 381 571 1825 2777 582 3359
9 -68 757 1725 2414 605 3019
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TABLE 2 (C o n tin u e d )
CASH
Y ear London C olony
C urr. F ix e d
£ ’ 000 £ ’000 £ ’ 000
1880 - 6 2 524 580
1 862 573 822
2 -3 7 4 203 922
3 1197 -7 7 2 837
4 492 -1 8 7 7 837
1885 53 739 —
6 1612 1593 —
7 1081 867 —
8 2090 1912 —
9 1131 1842 —
1890 379 880 1000
1 452 32 —
2 167 550 —
3 2042 560 859
4 1554 696 1025
1 8 9 5 (a ) 966 595 837
9 5 /  6 2875 558 550
9 6 /  7 1212 753 450
9 7 /  8 1578 1138 135
9 8 /  9 1132 647 75
9 9 /0 0 1165 780 -
T o ta l SECUR­
ITIES
LEDGER 
BALANCES 
( =C• & S .
£ ’ 000 £ ’ 000 £ ’000
1042 611 1653
2257 614 2871
1093 620 1713
1262 628 1890
-5 4 8 650 102
792 634 1426
3205 645 3850
1948 645 2593
4002 689 4691
2973 2574 5547
2259 3039 5298
48 4 2875 3360
717 2717 3434
3461 3600 7061
3275 3447 6721
2398 3447 5 8 4 4
3983 4826 8809
2415 4681 7 2 7 6
2851 5229 8080
1854 5699 7553
1945 5705 7650
(a )  B a la n c e s  f o r  1895 and f o l lo w in g  y e a r s  a r e  a s  a t  June 3 0 .
NOTES: ( l )  Cash b a la n c e s  in  London -  a s  a t  d a te  o f  r e c e i p t  o f  s t a t e ­
m ents from  London f i n a n c i a l  a g e n t s .
(2 )  S e c u r i t i e s  -  " s im p ly  v o u c h e r s  f o r  paym ents p r e v io u s ly
ch arged  t o  T ru st Funds a s  I n v e s tm e n ts ,  and r e ta in e d  a s  
A s s e t s  on t h e i r  b e h a l f  in  th e  T rea su ry  C h e st" . (5 th  
A u d it R e p o r t , p .1 0 3 ) .  E n t r ie s  und er t h i s  h ea d in g  reco n  
e i l e  ca sh  b a la n c e s  w ith  t o t a l  le d g e r  b a la n c e s .
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TABLE 3
Ledger Balances According to Funds 
GENERAL NOTE: Laymen regarded funds as specific accumulations of
money to be used only for particular fund purposes. Fund balances 
(as explained in the text) were a guide to Parliament in formulating 
policy but were the source of serious confusion. This confusion was 
essentially the result of the Treasury's practice of marshalling all 
resources to meet expenditure commitments and recording the transfers 
in the annual abstracts. Balances shown against each fund need to be 
treated cautiously. Loan fund credit balances in the seventies, for 
example, arose largely from the crediting of ‘'advances" from consoli­
dated revenue. Debit balances on loan funds in the first half of the 
eighties, when overseas borrowing was on a massive scale, resulted 
in part from the "repayment" of the earlier "advances" from revenue.
A brief example will illustrate the care needed in employing Treasury 
statements about fund balances:
Year 1899/1900: combined deficit on C.R.F. and Loan Funds = £2,495,000; 
credit on Trust Funds = £10,145,000. This credit included only 
£1,945,000 in cash (the Government's total cash reserve); £8,200,000 
to the credit of Trusts had been spent on behalf of the other funds.
Of this, "advances" formally recognised - shown by "Securities" in 
total balances - amounted to £5,705,000. Another £2,495,000 covered 
Dr. balances on the other funds, which otherwise would have required 
bank overdrafts. A further £1,000,000, "advanced" to loan funds in 
1895, appeared in continually changing guise in the annual abstracts.
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TABLE 3 (General Note Continued)
Some adjustm ents have been made to  the b a lan ces published  in  the annual
a b str a c ts ;  th ese  are in d ica ted  in  the n o tes  a t  the end o f the t a b le .
Year C onsol. Revenue Loan Funds Trust T otal
Fund Funds Balances
£ '000 £ '000 £ '000 £ '000
1856 76 117 119 312
7 56 32 181 269
8 234 -318 171 87
9 309 133 199 641
1860 415 -17 211 609
1 253 -5 6 215 412
2 214 119 198 531
3 -67 156 156 245
4 -247 -88 144 -191
1865 -81 -342 174 -249
6 633 -810 163 -1 4
7 420 -961 167 -374
8 257 16 155 428
9 192 473 158 823
1870 32 -102 164 94
1 -367 683 213 529
2 132 598 323 1053
3 925 546 473 1944
4 826 580 630 2036
1875 1111 687 757 2555
6 1946 709 854 3509
7 2351 714 1006 4071
8 1923 445 991 3359
9 1342 691 986 3019
1880 1440 -978 1191 1653
1 2927 -1728 1672 2871
2 3889 -4061 1885 1713
3 2511 -2822 2201 1890
4 1229 -3508 2391 102
1885 3 -1092 2515 1426
6 -1287 2435 2702 3850
7 -2180 2041 2732 2593
8 -1669 3188 3172 4691
9 57 2314 3176 5547
1890 434 1481 3383 5298
1 -332 -1305 4997 3360
2 -484 -619 4537 3434
3 -911 2112 5860 7061
4 -1000 1177 6544 6721
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Year C onsol. Revenue Loan Funds Trust T otal
Fund Funds Balances
1895(a)
£ ’000 £ '000 £'000 £ '000
-1834 653 7025 5844
9 5 / 6 -1717 2868 7658 8809
9 6 / 7 -2079 683 8672 7276
9 7 / 8 -1916 1531 8465 8080
9 8 / 9 -2002 78 9477 7553
99/00 -2073 -422 10145 7650
(a) For 1895 and fo llo w in g  y e a r s , balances as a t June 30.
NOTES: (1 ) C onsolidated  Revenue Fund. The Loan Account, which was 
presented  as a su b d iv is io n  o f C.R.F. u n t i l  1870, has been excluded , as  
has th e  ’’Old Loans A/c" which rep laced  i t  in  C.R.F* statem ents u n t i l  
1891. Several new accounts created  in  and a f te r  1895 were designed  to  
bring out surplus balances on co n so lid a ted  revenue. Follow ing th e  lead  
o f  the A uditor-G eneral, th ese  accounts have been amalgamated w ith  
C.R.F. to  e s ta b lis h  a ctu a l b a la n ces .
(2) Loan Funds. Nine separate loan funds were created  between 
1871 and 1879, in which year they  were amalgamated. To th ese  loan  
funds have been added the loan  accounts presented  as part o f th e  
C.R.F. from 1856 to  1891.
(3 ) Trust Funds. This column covers a l l  t r u s t  and sp e c ia l  
funds, o f which th ere  were more than one hundred by th e  n in e t i e s .  
Excluded are the sp e c ia l accounts created  a f t e r  1894 -  and l i s t e d  
w ith  t r u s t s  -  to  e s ta b lis h  c r e d it  balances on th e C.R.F.
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TABLE 4
E stim ated T otal Net R ece ip ts  and Payments
GENERAL NOTE: The Treasury’ s annual summary o f r e c e ip ts  and payments -  
Table 1 -  in c r e a s in g ly  o v e r s ta te s  cash r e c e ip ts  and payments. A lte r ­
n a tiv e  c a lc u la t io n s  appear in  th e  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g is te r s , but th e se  
are presented  as ’’expenditure from revenue” and ’’expenditure from 
lo a n s” . Many o b je c tio n s  may be r a ise d  to  th e se  c a lc u la t io n s , th e  most 
important being th a t  expenditure channelled  through tr u s t  and sp e c ia l  
funds i s  not in c lu d ed . The fo llo w in g  ta b le  aims to  f i l l  a ser io u s  gap 
in  the s t a t i s t i c s  needed by economic h is to r ia n s .  Procedures fo llow ed  
in  a r r iv in g  a t  th e  estim a tes  are in d ica te d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  pages.
Year T otal Net R ece ip ts  T otal Net Payments
1856
1860
1865
1870
1875
7
8 
9
1
2
3
4
6
7
8 
9
1
2
3
4
6
7
8 
9
£'000
1998
1468
1448
2344
1581
1903
2322
2238
2006
2387
3040
2725
3890
3402
2256
3630
3521
3872
4349
5384
6536
6174
5546
7290
£'000
1816
1515
1630
1814
1613
2100
2203
2523
2542
2445
2805
3085
3099
3009
2980
3188
2997
3167
4443
4885
5710
5617
6264
7653
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TABLE 4 (C ontinued)
Year T otal Net R eceip ts T otal Net Payments
£•000 £'000
1880 6440 7812
1 9945 8730
2 9117 10281
3 11819 11650
4 11462 13272
1885 15573 14233
6 16536 14123
7 11754 13011
8 14574 12520
9 13771 14800
1890 12750 13464
1 16242 18016
2 17219 16987
3 19756 17012
4 13125 13312
1895(a) 6280 7157
9 5 / 6 18277 16691
9 6 / 7 13222 14790
9 7 / 8 14780 14344
9 8 / 9 14474 15471
99/00 16181 16090
(a) H alf year, January-June
NOTES: ( l )  ESTIMATED TOTAL NET RECEIPTS
The e s tim a tes  are r ec o n c ile d  w ith Total R eceip ts  in  
th e annual a b s tr a c ts  (Table l )  by th ree c la s s e s  o f 
e n tr ie s :
(a) Revenue Refunded
(b) Loan C onversions
(c )  C ross-E n tr ies
The f i r s t  two are se lf -e x p la n a to r y ;  th e th ir d  needs 
some ex p la n a tio n .
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Cross-Entries
The Auditor-General’s Reports (from 1871) repeatedly criticised 
Treasury abstracts as giving a misleading impression of "the dimen­
sions of the public receipts and payments". The Report for 1875 
(p.103 ff.) contains the best general introduction to the nature and
extent of cross-entries in the accounts:
Fund Positive Temporary , Totaln®“ . T® Receipts and „ . .necdpts Re-credits Receipts
£ £
Consolidated Revenue . . . 4,104,455 485,264
Loan .....................  902,358 905,000
Trust.....................  594,501 1,186,498
£
4,589,719
1,807,358
1,780,999
5,601,314 2,576,762 8,178,076
"What are here classified as Temporary Receipts and Re-credits 
include all that class of entries which arises from what may 
be termed the Banking operations of the Treasury, such as the 
creation of Loan Funds by Transfers from the Revenue Fund in 
anticipation of the sale of Public Securities; the adjustment 
of the separate Loan Fund Accounts with the general Public 
Account, on the negotiation of Loans; the employment of the 
'Trust Fund' under several heads as a temporary medium for 
transactions which rest finally in the Accounts of Revenue 
Proper, or Loan Funds; all of which entries are distinct from 
those of positive or pure Receipts available for appropriation 
as Income."
The detailed information contained in this and following Reports 
indicates where to look for entries of this kind. In notes to Tables
15 and 16 cross-entries receive further attention, but it should be 
observed that it is frequently possible to trace a single item 
through abstracts of the three funds in the one year. The labour 
involved in keeping track of cross-entries is immense.
Year
1856
7
8
9
1860
1
2
3
4
1865
6
7
8
9
1870
1
2
3
4
1875
6
7
8
9
1880
1
2
3
4
1885
6
7
8
9
1890
1
2
3
4
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Reconciliation Items, Total Receipts (Table l)  and 
__________ Estimated Total Net Receipts___________
Revenue Refunded Loan Conversions Cross-Entries
£ ‘000 £ ’000 £ ’000
38 49 190
21 145 46
21 50 172
20 136 230
27 398 189
29 19 69
36 - 82
46 — 292
50 — 101
36 — 42
60 300 42
52 — 21
58 343 3
55 350 83
48 343 96
59 343 571
62 343 304
70 131 623
96 100 1101
94 149 2570  "
204 — 1442
271 — 2122
268 — 1444
40 — 2103
97 — 2164
157 — 2354
192 — 1623
243 — 2543
280 — 2774
207 — 2195
218 — 3416
206 — 2153
172 487 2669
191 901 4605
188 718 4076
262 246 4091
435 1799 4558
207 40 3839
157 1250 2296
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Year Revenue Refunded Loan Conversions Cross-Entries
£ ’000 £*000 £'000
1895(a) 80 822 1919
95/ 6 178 1224 2098
96/ 7 174 2196 1136
97/ 8 181 2 1865
98/ 9 208 192 2428
99/00 - 6 2088
(a) Half Year, January-June
(2) ESTIMATED TOTAL NET PAYMENTS
The procedure employed here has been to derive estimates of 
total net payments initially from total net receipts and changes 
in cash balances. To illustrates
Year 1887 - Total Net Receipts
Reduction in Cash Balances
Total Net Payments
£11,754,000 
£ 1,257,000
£13,011,000
The estimate of total net payments so derived is £2,359,000 less 
than total gross payments shown in Table 1 and this has to be 
tested by alternative procedures. The reconciliation items comprise 
revenue refunded (£206,000) and cross-entries in the accounts 
(£2,153,000). In other years, loan conversions must be taken into 
account, remembering that the operation of paying off debentures 
from the proceeds of a new loan may be delayed until the financial 
year following that in which the conversion loan is raised. In other 
words, the figure which reconciles total gross receipts and total 
net receipts in any one year may not be the same as the figure which
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reconciles total gross and net payments. The table below consists 
of painstaking estimates of the amounts nominally disbursed each 
year, and representing differences between Total Payments (Table l) 
and estimated Total Net Payments.
Year Nominal Payments Year Nominal Payments
£'000 £ ‘000
1856 277 1880 2267
7 216 1 2514
8 243 2 1821
9 410 3 2794
1860 614 4 3033
1 117 1885 2417
2 118 6 3645
3 338 7 2359
4 51 8 3372
1865 78 9 6882
6 402 1890 5447
7 73 1 4763
8 415 2 6949
9 490 3 3203
1870 493 4 3856
1 980 1895 3846
2 709 95/ 6 2122
3 1010 96/ 7 3471
4 1483 97/ 8 1680
1875 2833 98/ 9 2369
6 1774 99/00 2088
7 2398
8 1718
9 2166
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TABLE 5
Cash Surpluses ana Deficits
GENERAL NOTE: Cash surpluses and deficits in the table represent 
the final net result of transactions on all funds. Surpluses in the 
years 1860-7 may be slightly over-stated and deficits slightly under­
stated, for changes in ledger balances have had to be treated as
equivalent to changes in cash balances.
Year Surplus Deficit
£'000 £ ‘000
1856 182 —
7 — 43
8 — 182
9 530 —
1860 — 32
1 — 197
2 119 —
3 — 285
4 — 536
1865 — 58
6 235 —
7 — 360
8 791 -
9 393 —
1870 — 724
1 435 -
2 524 -o 705 —
4 - 94
1875 499 -
6 826 -
7 557 -
8 — 718
9 — 363
Year Surplus Deficit
£'000 £•000
1880 — 1372
1 1215 —
2 — 1164
3 169 —
4 — 1810
1885 1340 —
6 2413 —
7 — 1257
8 2054 —
9 — 1029
1890 — 714
1 — 1775
2 233 —
3 2744 —
4 _ 186
1895(a) - 877
95/ 6 1585 -
96/ 7 — 1568
97/ 8 436 -
98/ 9 — 997
99/00 91 -
(a) Half Year, January-June
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GENERAL NOTES ON EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES, TABT.Tre 6-11
No attempt has been made to construct estimates of expenditure 
for the whole range of government services, nor has it been deemed 
necessary to duplicate the work of Butlin and de Meel (op. cit.) 
on capital formation. The following tables have been prepared to 
meet the needs of the present study. All estimates of expenditure 
on particular services are complicated by:
(a) the recording of outlays in terms of original approp­
riations;
(b) the extreme inadequacy of entries in the Trust Fund 
division of the accounts;
(c) the arbitrary allocation of outlays to the various funds; 
and
(d) the grouping of outlays from consolidated revenue according 
to ministerial departments whose functions kept changing.
(a) Outlays by appropriations
In the Introduction it was pointed out that it was not until 
the amendment of the Audit Act in 1895 that votes were made to lapse 
at the end of the financial year. Every abstract of the public 
accounts between 1856 and 1900 included outlays charged to the votes 
of previous years. The significance of this was purely political: 
ministers refused to accept responsibility for deficiencies arising 
from misleading estimates provided by their predecessors. The 
present Auditor-General has advised against placing any significance
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on th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  accoun ts  f o r  1879, f o r  example, reco rd ed  
e x p e n d i tu re  " f o r  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  1874" and each fo l lo w in g  y ea r  to  
1879. No m a t te r  what y e a r ' s  a p p r o p r ia t io n s  were b rough t in to  th e  
a cc o u n ts  of any one y e a r ,  e x p e n d i tu re  reco rd ed  in  th e  acco u n ts  f o r  
t h a t  y ea r  i s  to  be rega rded  as  hav ing  been in c u r re d  in  t h a t  y e a r .
The p rocedure  has  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  however, in  com piling  e s t im a te s  o f  
ex p e n d i tu re  on p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v i c e s .  E x p en d i tu re  on ro a d s ,  f o r  
example, can only  be c a l c u la te d  by summing th e  o u t l a y s  " f o r  th e  s e r v ic e  
of"  each y ea r  p r i o r  to  t h a t  be ing  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  Numerous a d d i t i o n s  
must be made owing to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  o u t l a y s  on a p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ic e  
were a l s o  c l a s s i f i e d  acco rd in g  t o  m i n i s t e r i a l  d e p a r tm e n ts .  (See 
b e lo w )•
(b) O utlays  in  T ru s t  Accounts
Very r a r e l y  i s  i t  p o s s ib le  t o  i d e n t i f y  e x p e n d i tu re  i tem s in  
T ru s t  a c c o u n ts .  There i s  no doubt w hatever t h a t  l a r g e  o u t l a y s  on 
ro a d s ,  s ch o o ls  and a h o s t  o f  o th e r  government s e r v i c e s  were b u r ie d  in  
t r u s t  a cco u n ts  shoy/ing sim ply a b b re v ia te d  b a la n c e s .  The T r e a s u r e r ' s  
Advance V ote, which was pa id  in t o  a t r u s t  a c c o u n t ,  covered  u n iden ­
t i f i e d  e x p e n d i tu re  item s in  th e  v i c i n i t y  o f  £1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  a n n u a l ly  in  
th e  e i g h t i e s  and n i n e t i e s .  T ru s t  Fund acco u n ts  were conven ien t 
h id in g  p la c e s  f o r  a l l  s o r t s  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  which th e  Government d id  
n o t  wish to  make p u b l i c .  There i s  no way o f  c l a s s i f y i n g  such 
e x p e n d i tu re  f o r  in c lu s io n  w ith  th e  g roups t a b u l a t e d  in  T ab les  6 t o  11•
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Therefore, it must be clearly understood that entries in these 
tables represent the lower limits of expenditure under each heading.
A simple example of trust accounting will serve to show one 
way in which formal restrictions on the Executive could be side­
stepped. This comes from the 23rd Audit Report (p.155) and discusses 
a vote for the conveyance of the unemployed:
The amount voted for the service was £1,500 only, but this 
being far too limited a provision, sums recovered from the 
passengers were credited to the Special Deposits Trust Fund 
as for ’Government Labour Bureau,1 and were drawn upon to 
pay for new fares. The amount of such recoveries credited 
in 1893 was £2,621 2s. 5d., and with a balance from 1892 of 
£920 12s. Id. = £3,541 14s. 6d. Out of this sum there were 
expended improperly for new fares £1,517 14s. lid., leaving 
a balance in the Trust Fund of £2,023 19s. 7d. The effect 
of that procedure is that the cost of conveyance of the un­
employed in 1893 appears as limited by the Vote of £1,500, 
while the recoveries, £3,541 14s. 6d., are omitted from the 
Revenue, and misplaced to the Trust Fund.
(c) Arbitrary Allocation of Outlays
Expenditure under various headings is to be found scattered 
throughout the accounts without any consistent basis for allocating 
charges to the various funds. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
ignore divisions in the accounts in compiling estimates of expen­
diture under particular headings.
(d) Outlays by Departments
Further complications arise in connection with the recording 
of outlays from consolidated revenue according to ministerial 
departments. Expenditure on postal services is not always to be 
found exclusively in the accounts of the P*M.G’s Department: stores
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and stationery, repairs and additions, printing, stamps, rates, 
advertising etc., may be included with two or more other departments. 
The possibility of properly allocating such items as "Stores” depends 
largely on the detail provided in the annual reports of the various 
departments.
Many of the expenditure estimates in the tables which follow 
under-state expenditure actually incurred, but by how much it is not 
possible to say. These estimates should be regarded as no more than 
reasonable approximations.
TABLE 6
Payments for Communications - £*000
Railways Posts & Roads & Rivers & Total& Trams. Telegs. Bridges Harbours
1856 349 60 69 35 513
7 143 64 57 37 301
8 194 95 81 56 426
9 314 101 92 17 524
1860 251 95 260 39 585
1 356 119 233 37 745
2 351 179 140 57 727
3 428 147 268 48 891
4 477 147 246 64 934
1865 580 140 157 58 935
6 649 121 159 55 1014
7 726 221 202 66 1215
8 773 217 211 60 1261
9 625 187 199 69 1080
1870 729 145 170 67 1111
1 550 195 210 88 1043
2 502 167 181 63 913
3 347 185 279 99 910
4 602 254 305 123 1284
1875 1281 293 344 158 2076
6 902 327 406 130 1765
7 1273 358 484 129 2244
8 1410 409 552 195 2566
9 2632 395 651 257 3935
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TABLa 6 (C on tin u ed )
Year R ailw ays  & Trams.
P o s ts  & 
T e le g s .
Roads & 
B rid ges
R iv e r s  & 
Harbours T o ta l
1880 2437 421 660 231 3749
1 2947 493 478 215 4133
2 3222 476 578 359 4635
3 3969 540 644 291 5444
4 4471 641 689 295 6096
1885 4710 624 721 263 6318
6 4464 668 631 290 6053
7 3143 691 745 284 4863
8 2826 635 674 398 4533
9 2407 654 659 763 4483
1890 3223 656 762 532 5173
1 5512 748 318 549 7127
2 4079 797 780 440 6096
3 3156 794 305 371 4626
4 2433 755 453 494 4135
1895(a ) 1141 403 234 220 1998
9 5 /  6 2269 785 531 381 3966
9 6 /  T 2303 776 603 378 4060
9 7 /  8 2230 740 600 379 3949
9 8 /  9 2527 729 691 516 4463
9 9 /0 0 2958 815 644 546 4963
(a )  H a lf Y ear, January-June
TABLE 7
Payments on Account o f  th e  P u b lic  Debt -  £*000
Year I n t e r e s t Redem ptions T ota l
1856 109 10 119
7 127 6 133
8 96 — 96
9 139 35 174
1860 166 — 166
1 163 28 191
2 187 1 188
3 224 — 224
4 253 — 253
1865 268 — 268
6 367 63 430
7 287 208 495
8 410 100 510
9 456 100 556
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Year In te re s t Redemptions Total
1870 486 103 589
1 492 199 691
2 381 70 451
3 303 109 412
4 564 335 899
1875 564 53 617
6 588 734 1322
7 591 13 604
8 587 325 912
9 584 3 587
1880 719 — 719
1 717 _ 717
2 795 216 1011
3 871 76 947
4 1042 - 1042
1885 1299 - 1299
6 1579 — 1579
7 1693 — 1693
8 1745 — 1745
9 1805 — 1805
1890 1865 188 2053
1 1904 225 2129
2 1754 225 1979
3 2462 225 2687
4 2277 1475 3752
1895(a) 1154 64 1218
9 5 / 6 2285 1483 3768
9 6 / 7 2284 1351 3635
97 / 8 2270 263 2533
9 8 / 9 2293 246 2539
99/00 2410 265 2675
(a ) H a lf Year, January-June
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TABLE 8
Payments: Law, Order and Defence -  £*000
Year J u s tic e P o lic e  and G aols Defence Total
1856 46 207 25 278
7 36 160 34 230
8 35 210 25 270
9 50 207 21 278
1860 48 181 15 244
1 53 196 27 276
2 55 229 27 311
3 59 287 40 386
4 68 274 12 354
1865 57 254 22 333
6 96 216 19 331
7 102 213 21 336
8 99 205 36 340
9 63 200 33 296
1870 59 184 31 274
1 83 179 58 320
2 52 179 63 294
3 52 186 66 304
4 55 187 29 271
1875 80 202 25 307
6 124 229 37 390
7 101 239 51 391
8 104 258 87 449
9 113 279 202 594
1880 124 294 86 504
1 132 315 94 541
2 137 306 129 572
3 143 358 133 634
4 145 384 142 671
1885 157 396 227 780
6 150 398 295 843
7 164 389 306 859
8 157 387 316 860
9 162 402 248 812
1890 174 389 243 806
1 165 424 363 952
2 176 460 378 1014
3 169 453 214 836
4 176 424 237 837
1895(a) 88 233 112 433
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TABLE 8 (C o n tin u ed )
Year J u s t i c e P o lic e  and G aols D efence T o ta l
1895/ 6 159 463 217 839
9 8 / 7 150 438 218 806
9 7 / 8 160 433 215 808
9 8 / 9 161 472 255 888
99/00 168 490 325 983
(a ) H alf Y ear, Jan u a ry -Ju n e
Paym ents: E d u ca tio n ,
TABLE 9
H e a lth  and W elfare  -  £ ’000
Year E d u ca tio n H e a lth  and W elfare T o ta l
1856 104 36 140
7 53 35 88
8 56 44 100
9 71 39 110
1860 60 41 101
1 65 43 108
2 85 43 128
3 103 47 150
4 98 53 151
1865 86 41 127
6 95 52 147
7 105 54 159
8 118 57 175
9 125 69 194
1870 133 61 194
1 126 88 214
2 125 80 205
3 135 92 227
4 144 91 235
1875 186 92 278
6 274 119 393
7 272 129 401
8 381 136 517
9 396 176 572
1880 418 138 556
1 615 161 776
2 673 227 900
3 886 245 1131
4 864 235 1099
TABLE 9 (Continued)
Year Education Health and Welfare Total
1885 777 194 971
6 758 199 957
7 749 209 958
8 708 190 898
9 732 246 978
1890 801 181 982
1 971 278 1249
2 926 271 1197
3 831 317 1148
4 739 265 1004
1895(a) 394 195 589
95/ 6 767 294 1061
96/ 7 748 326 1074
97/ 8 723 308 1031
98/ 9 752 325 1077
99/00 813 357 1170
(a) Half Year, January-June.
TABLE 10
Payments; Religion and Inmigration - £*000
Year Religion Immig. Year Religion Immig.
1856 54 121 1880 15 43
7 44 137 1 14 46
8 45 90 2 12 46
9 31 81 3 12 82
1860 28 28 4 11 119
1 27 18 1885 11 52
2 28 56 6 11 35
3 32 83 7 10 32
4 28 26 8 10 2
1865 26 34 9 9 8
6 26 23 1890 9 -
7 25 14 1 9 5
8 25 11 2 9 2
9 23 2 3 7 3
1870 23 1 4 7 —
1 20 5 1895(a) 3 —
2 20 7 95/ 6 6 -
3 20 4 96/ 7 6 —
4 18 14 97/ 8 6 —
1875 18 15 98/ 9 5 —
6 19 16 99/00 5 —
7 18 74
8 16 81 (a) Half Year, January-June
9 15 81
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TABLE 11
Payments: Water and Sewerage - £ ’000
Year Total Year Total
1856 128 1880 42
7 55 1 118
8 74 2 370
9 15 3 610
1860 20 4 422
1 31 1885 691
2 43 6 660
3 44 7 318
4 .. 8 283
1865 52 9 169
6 38 1890 234
7 52 1 805
8 96 2 658
9 75 3 444
1870 66 4 413
1 — 1895(a) 213
2 — 95/ 6 430
3 — 96/ 7 521
4 — 97/ 8 520
1875 32 98/ 9 536
6 27 99/00 393
7 14
8 31
9 1
(a) Half Year, January-June
NOTES ON TABLES 12-18
The arrangement of receipts follows, in the main, the groupings
adopted by the Treasury. Tables 12 and 14 each occupy two pages.
TABLE 12 - TAXATION
(a) Customs Duties - Including sums paid by other governments under 
border tariff agreements.
(b) Stamp Duties - Suspended from 1874 to 1880; entries for these 
years are arrears.
(c) Other - Until 1879 gold licences, duties and fees. The entry 
for 1895/6 is for income taxation; entries thereafter are for 
land and income taxation, with land producing between 60 and 70 
per cent of the total.
(d) Refunds - It is impossible to allocate refunds amongst the 
various components.
TABLE 13 - CROWN LANDS
(a) Sales - Including interest on conditional purchases.
(b) Leases - Including mining and timber licences, quit rents, fees 
on transfer of runs, fees for title deeds and other miscellaneous 
collections.
TABLE 14 - SERVICES
(a) Harbour Dues, etc. - Including pilotage, light rates and 
tonnage duties.
(b) Other - Includes Gold Escort, receipts of the Sydney Mint,
fees for registration of brands, etc.
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TABLES 15-17 -  E xplanatory n o tes  fo llo w  each t a b le .
TABLE 18 -  B rings tog eth er  the n et r e c e ip ts  under a l l  main heads.
* # * *
TABLE 12 (Part l )  
R eceip ts; Taxation -  £ ’000
Year Customs E xcise Stamps L icen ces Other
1858 471 51 50 60
7 533 63 — 66 29
8 557 51 — 69 61
9 612 54 — 69 66
1860 555 44 — 68 54
1 585 39 — 72 65
2 609 35 — 74 88
3 616 51 — 75 57
4 538 26 - 75 36
I860 636 38 34 78 31
6 829 35 66 79 27
7 783 41 63 78 25
8 848 45 62 78 25
9 839 36 67 78 25
1870 854 30 65 78 22
1 860 29 78 76 27
2 975 24 94 80 35
3 1128 37 95 83 29
4 951 45 101 86 17
1875 974 40 5 89 14
6 1012 46 — 94 9
7 1075 48 2 101 7
8 1149 44 - 110 7
9 1112 44 2 112 3
1880 1189 44 72 112 -
1 1394 69 193 116 -
2 1480 79 228 117 -
3 1547 12 215 118 -
4 1727 80 226 120 -
1885 1760 116 254 123 -
6 2069 110 308 125 —
7 2012 204 322 126 -
8 1883 260 410 130 -
9 1906 261 380 130 -
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TABLE 12 (Part 1 -  Continued)
Year Customs Excise Stamps Licences Other
1890 1888 266 461 133 . . .
1 2168 288 327 133 —
2 2678 290 350 133 —
3 2128 266 312 130 —
4 2066 258 297 125 —
1895(a) 963 129 148 82 —
95/ 6 1825 272 318 123 28
96/ 7 1281 277 332 122 446
97/ 8 1256 291 349 123 552
98/ 9 1304 317 362 122 454
99/00 1414 340 312 120 490
(a) Half Year, January-June
TABLE 12 (Part 2)
Year Total Refunds
Total Ne 
R eceipts
1856 632 36 596
7 691 19 672
8 738 19 719
9 802 15 787
1860 721 22 699
1 761 25 736
2 806 24 782
3 799 33 766
4 675 30 645
1865 817 27 790
6 1036 48 988
7 990 29 961
8 1058 41 1017
9 1045 34 1011
1870 1049 28 1021
1 1070 36 1034
2 1208 38 1170
3 1367 39 1328
4 1200 30 1170
1875 1122 24 1098
6 1161 22 1139
7 1233 30 1203
8 1310 31 1279
9 1273 16 1257
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TABLE 12 (Part 2 -  Continued)
Year T otal Refunds T otal J Receipl
1880 1417 38 1379
1 1771 31 1740
2 1904 42 1862
3 1892 40 1852
4 2153 52 2101
1885 2253 46 2207
6 2612 59 2553
7 2665 81 2584
8 2682 56 2626
9 2677 42 2635
1890 2748 44 2704
1 2916 41 2875
2 3450 105 3345
3 2835 57 2778
4 2746 57 2689
1895(a) 1322 29 1293
9 5 / 6 2566 67 2499
9 6 / 7 2458 61 2397
97 / 8 2571 52 2519
9 8 / 9 2560 51 2509
99/00 2677 59 2618
(a) H alf Year, January-June
TABLE 13
R eceip ts: Croim Lands -  £*000
Year S a le s Leases T otal Refunds Net R ece ip ts
1856 246 52 298 1 297
7 210 64 274 1 273
8 241 161 402 — 402
9 253 225 478 2 476
1860 155 158 313 3 310
1 223 161 384 2 382
2 217 200 417 4 413
3 192 179 371 9 362
4 113 185 298 10 288
1865 213 319 532 6 526
6 262 285 547 8 539
7 236 309 545 15 530
8 237 304 541 13 528
9 319 265 584 16 568
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TABLE 13 (C ontinued)
Year S a les L eases T otal Refunds Net Receij:
1870 251 227 478 15 463
1 262 236 498 16 482
2 436 404 840 17 823
3 844 294 1138 23 1115
4 1163 263 1426 55 1371
1875 1685 336 2021 60 1861
6 2414 359 2773 167 2606
7 2841 395 3236 217 3019
8 1915 401 2326 137 2189
9 1216 416 1632 19 1613
18b0 1382 264 1646 41 1605
1 2483 338 2821 97 2724
2 2455 459 2914 117 2797
3 1269 387 1656 162 1494
4 1363 390 1753 174 1579
1885 1314 562 1876 107 1769
6 1206 438 1644 100 1544
7 1222 1158 2379 66 2313
8 1212 1056 2268 58 2210
9 1149 988 2138 87 2051
1890 1276 968 2243 84 2159
1 1271 996 2267 150 2117
2 1195 1019 2214 266 1948
3 1266 941 2206 91 2115
4 1264 861 2125 46 2079
1895(a) 878 175 1053 15 1038
95/ 6 1134 884 2018 47 1971
9 6 / 7 1121 832 1953 55 1898
97 / 8 1206 817 2023 56 1967
9 8 / 9 1198 804 2002 60 1942
99/00 1227 946 2173 65 2108
(a ) H alf Year, January-June
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TABLE 14
R eceip ts: S erv ices  -  £''000
Year Railways P osts  & School Harbour Water <
& Trams T e le g s . Fees Dues e t c . Sewera
1856 11 29 4
7 9 36 — 4 —
8 65 41 — 10 —
9 62 52 — 16 -
1860 60 57 — 16 —
1 76 65 — 14 -
2 97 80 — 18 —
3 129 90 — 15 -
4 146 98 — 17 -
1865 163 101 — 18 -
6 176 111 — 23 -
7 189 112 — 20 -
8 216 111 — 21 -
9 273 118 — 25 -
1870 304 113 — 23 -
1 361 116 - 25 -
2 422 145 — 28 -
3 484 155 — 29 -
4 533 146 — 30 -
1875 599 160 — 32 -
6 678 186 — 27 -
7 800 224 — 29 -
8 860 221 — 32 -
9 977 259 - 33 -
1860 1190 286 28 26 -
1 1460 330 46 35 -
2 1828 359 51 47 -
3 2081 404 51 52 -
4 2302 443 56 55 -
1885 2493 473 59 55 -
6 2389 486 63 55 -
7 2510 524 64 49 -
8 2759 563 70 63 101
9 2875 598 72 67 147
1890 3014 630 72 55 238
1 3439 649 76 68 251
2 3416 651 78 65 261
3 3253 644 73 51 276
4 3149 627 71 59 276
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TABLE 14 (part 1 - Continued)
Year Railways Posts & School Harbour Water &
& Trams Telegs. Fees Dues etc. Sewerage
1895(a) 1455 317 35 26 141
95/ 6 3157 677 74 66 285
96/ 7 3368 706 74 57 282
97/ 8 3369 735 74 48 274
98/ 9 3569 775 75 52 322
99/00 3640 819 80 56 351
(a) Half Year, January-June
TABLE 14 (Part 2)
Receipts: Services - £ ’'000
Year Fees of Other Total Refunds Net Receipts
Office
1856 26 2 72 72
7 29 15 93 — 93
8 27 — 143 — 143
9 28 _ 158 1 157
I860 27 19 179 1 178
1 26 23 204 1 203
2 25 33 253 1 252
3 26 24 284 2 282
4 25 27 315 6 309
1865 26 24 332 2 330
6 27 25 362 3 359
7 28 20 369 5 364
8 26 20 394 3 391
9 29 15 460 4 456
1870 26 14 480 4 476
1 25 19 546 4 542
2 25 18 638 3 635
3 28 12 708 4 704
4 27 14 750 4 746
1875 32 14 837 6 831
6 43 31 965 11 954
7 42 24 1119 15 1104
8 46 25 1184 90 1094
9 48 11 1328 3 1325
1880 52 12 1594 8 1586
1 60 14 1945 15 1930
2 67 11 2363 15 2348
3 69 8 2667 17 2650
4 76 10 2942 32 2910
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TABLE 14 (Part 2 -  Continued)
Year Fees o f  
O ffice
Other T otal Refunds Net R ece ip ts
1885 80 9 3168 40 3128
6 87 9 3089 43 3046
7 85 14 3246 44 3202
8 97 11 3666 53 3613
9 100 64 3925 56 3869
1890 102 64 4175 48 4127
1 104 19 4606 57 4549
2 105 15 4591 58 4533
3 101 28 4416 51 4365
4 95 17 4295 48 4247
1895(a) 40 7 2017 18 1999
95 / 6 97 15 4355 55 4300
9 6 / 7 96 14 4600 49 4551
9 7 / 8 96 37 4633 60 4573
9 8 / 9 96 69 4908 86 4822
99/00 98 85 5129 97 5032
(a) H alf Year, January-June
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TABLE 15 
Receipts: Loans
GENERAL NOTE: This table brings together all loan receipts, whether 
credited to Loan Funds or the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Conversions
and transfers (the latter explained overleaf) reconcile total receipts
and total net receipts.
Year Total Net Conversions Transfers Total Loan
Receipts Receipts
£'000 £'000 £ ‘000 £'000
1856 856 49 53 958
7 200 145 8 353
8 27 50 7 84
9 683 136 92 911
1860 163 398 31 592
1 375 19 4 398
2 644 — 57 701
3 618 — 31 649
4 462 — 100 562
1865 427 — — 427
6 858 300 — 1158
7 535 — — 535
8 1621 343 — 1964
9 1064 350 9 1423
1870 56 343 26 425
1 1295 343 244 1882
2 429 343 161 933
3 216 131 150 497
4 170 100 395 665
1875 753 149 905 1807
6 971 250 1221
7 _ 1026 1026
8 _ _ 750 750
9 2177 — 250 2427
1880 828 — - 828
1 2113 — - 2113
2 500 — - 500
3 4505 — — 4505
4 2984 — - 2984
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TABLE 15 (Continued)
Year Total Net 
Receipts
Conversions Transfers Total Loan 
Receipts
£ ’000 £ ’000 £ ’000 £ ’000
1885 6317 — _ 6317
6 7292 — — 72927 1585 — — 15858 3138 487 _ 36259 2506 901 _ 34071890 1308 718 617 2643
1 2171 246 217 2634
2 3712 1799 _ 5511
3 4645 40 2 46874 395 1250 16451895(a) — 822 1000 1822
95/ 5 4163 1224 500 5889
96/ 7 - 2196 _ 2196
97/ 8 2324 2 233 2559
98/ 9 760 192 67 1019
99/00 1716 6 84 1806
(a) Half Year, January-June
NOTE: "Transfers" cover credits (advances) from C.R.F. and Trust
Funds pending the floating of loans and nominal receipts, the nature 
of which may be indicated by a few examples:
(i) 1890 - Entry of £617,000, In 1889 a deficiency in the C.R.F. 
was calculated as £2,608,237 and Treasury Bills to a maximum 
of £2.6 million were authorised. The Auditor-General (20th 
Report, p.122) reported that £1,907,100 of the Bills were issued 
in 1889, leaving an "apparent balance to be raised - £616,784". 
This balance was not negotiated but the Treasury took credit for 
this as part of receipts.
(ii) Entries for last three years - Repayments to the credit of votes 
(railway services) where the work had been completed years pre­
viously. The items should have been written off but the Treasury 
refused to do so. (20th Audit Report, p.l7l).
(iii) Entries for first eight years - Repayments to the credit of votes 
not representing sales of materials or similar cash receipts, 
and balances of adjustments over advances to public departments.
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TABLE 16
Receipts: Trust and Special Funds
GENERAL NOTE: Receipts of all funds, other than Consolidated Revenue 
and Loan Funds, are brought together in this table. Further notes are 
to be found overleaf.
Year Total Net Internal Temp. Rec. Other Total
Receipts Transfers & Recredits Trans. Receipts
£ ’000 £ ’000 £ ’000 £'000 £ ’000
1856 64 — 30 14 108
7 124 _ 29 10 163
8 98 — 30 4 132
9 189 _ — - 189
1860 141 _ 25 8 174
1 122 — 30 37 189
2 106 — 20 1 127
3 132 — 29 3 164
4 200 — — — 200
1865 238 — 12 - 250
6 206 8 - — 214
7 223 — 21 - 244
8 214 _ 2 1 217
9 211 — 45 9 265
1870 153 _ 50 12 215
1 176 1 152 8 161
2 355 1 92 3 451
3 312 _ 294 197 803
4 603 13 602 193 1411
1875 600 1180 25 1805
6 653 _ 639 86 1378
7 675 4 960 19 1658
8 630 _ 810 24 1464
9 735 — 1134 29 1898
1880 852 — 1215 20 2087
1 1299 8 1629 28 2964
2 1441 — 1566 14 3021
3 1148 355 1683 12 3198
4 1672 4 2286 30 3992
1885 1941 __ 1989 34 3964
6 1904 13 3015 42 4974
7 1781 16 1989 56 3842
8 2731 9 1863 89 4692
9 2510 7 2212 1980 6709
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TABLE 16 (Continued)
Year Total Net Internal Temp. Rec. Other Total
Receipts Transfers & Recredits Trans. Receipts
£ ’000 £'000 £'000 £•000 £'000
1890 2119 — 2700 312 5131
1 4342 — 3581 305 8228
2 3456 16 3825 300 7597
3 5691 6 2016 802 8515
4 3504 11 1489 273 5277
1895(a) 1832 7 648 33 2520
95/ 6 5122 13 1071 287 6493
96/ 7 4171 10 1238 279 5698
97/ 8 3188 216 1060 351 4815
98/ 9 4227 16 1412 517 6172
99/00 4532 4 1486 292 6314
(a) Half Year, January-June
NOTES: (l) Internal Transfers, Cross-entries, e.g. where items are 
first credited to one account (such as the Police Reward Fund) and then 
recredited to another (such as the Police Superannuation Fund); and 
nominal receipts following the renaming of an account, the operation 
being treated as equivalent to a transfer of funds.
(2) Temporary Receipts and Re-credits. See the notes to 
Table 4.
(3) Other Transfers. Two groups of nominal receipts are 
included here:
a. Sums credited first to the C.R.F. and then recredited to Trust 
Funds;
b. Drawings on trust fund balances for outlays through the C.R.F. 
and Loan Funds, these being entered as receipts of the trusts.
(The rationale was that trust funds received "securities" in 
return for their "advances" to the other funds).
Year
1856
7
8
9
1860
1
2
3
4
1865
6
7
8
9
1870
1
2
3
4
1875
6
7
8
9
1880
1
2
3
4
1885
6
7
8
9
1890
1
2
3
4
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t .  It
113
106
59
52
90
85
125
78
102
76
90
112
120
92
87
101
109
197
289
141
213
173
154
183
190
139
169
170
216
211
197
289
256
200
333
188
225
162
211
TABLE 17
R ece ip ts: M isce llan eou s -  £ '000  
Rents F ines I n te r e s t  Other T otal Refunds
11 10 2
11 8 2
12 8 9
19 6 15
18 4 33
20 4 22
23 4 13
23 5 18
27 5
29 7
32 5 -
28 6 -
27 6
27 6 12
26 7 6
29 6 3
35 6 5
31 7 11
34 7 26
34 8 38
31 9 53
24 9 89
6 10 92
11 10 90
37 12 78
54 14 32
55 17 39
46 20 35
53 21 29
51 22 26
51 20 17
51 18 57
64 18 34
55 15 42
56 16 96
71 20 13
98 19 6
67 17 8
63 13 39
61 114 1
86 107 1
32 61 2
14 54 2
36 91 1
40 86 1
92 132 7
34 80 2
74 106 4
41 77 1
54 91 1
81 115 3
88 121 1
48 93 1
39 88 1
66 104 3
67 113 4
152 201 4
229 296 7
54 145 4
124 217 4
30 182 9
56 164 10
74 185 2
73 200 10
53 153 14
76 187 18
93 194 24
135 238 22
126 225 14
125 213 16
202 302 15
145 261 5
94 206 6
177 345 12
98 202 14
108 231 6
78 170 8
102 217 6
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TABLE 17 (Continued)
Year Rents Fines Interest Other Total Refunds Net. Rec.
1895(a) 33 6 16 81 136 18 118
95/ 6 70 13 32 116 231 9 222
96/ 7 72 12 18 112 214 9 205
97/ 8 71 13 14 124 222 13 209
98/ 9 73 13 16 123 225 11 214
99/00 79 13 6 86 184 9 175
(a) Half Year, January-June
NOTES: (1) Rents. Ferries, government wharves and toll-bars on
roads were rented by tender. Under this heading are rents 
from these sources and from public buildings.
(2) Fines. Includes forfeitures.
(3) Interest. Interest on bank deposits and, in London 
exchequer bills.
(4) Other. All receipts not classified elsewhere. Includes 
collections by Government Printer, sales of government 
property, sales of work of prisoners, immigration remittances 
and all non-recurring receipts.
TABLE 18
Classified Total Net Receipts - £'000
Year Taxn. Land Serv. Loans Trusts Misc. Total
1856 596 297 72 856 64 113 1998
7 672 273 93 200 124 106 1468
8 719 402 143 27 98 59 1448
9 787 476 157 683 189 52 2344
1860 699 310 178 163 141 90 1581
1 736 382 203 375 122 85 1903
2 782 413 252 644 106 125 2322
3 766 362 282 618 132 78 2238
4 645 288 309 462 200 102 2006
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TABLE 18 (Continued)
Year faxn . Land Serv . Loans T rusts Mise« T otal
1865 790 526 330 427 238 76 2387
6 988 529 359 858 206 90 3040
7 961 530 364 535 223 112 2725
8 1017 528 391 1621 214 120 3890
9 1011 568 456 1064 211 92 3402
1870 1021 463 476 56 153 87 2256
1 1034 482 542 1295 176 101 3630
2 1170 823 635 429 355 109 3521
3 1328 1115 704 216 312 197 3872
4 1170 1371 746 170 603 289 4349
1875 1098 1961 831 753 600 141 5384
6 1139 2606 954 971 653 213 6536
7 1203 3019 1104 0 675 173 6174
8 1279 2189 1094 0 630 154 5546
9 1257 1613 1325 2177 735 183 7290
1880 1379 1605 1586 828 852 190 6440
1 1740 2724 1930 2113 1299 139 9945
2 1862 2797 2348 500 1441 169 9117
3 1852 1494 2650 4505 1148 170 11819
4 2101 1579 2910 2984 1672 216 11462
1885 2207 1769 3128 6317 1941 211 15573
6 2553 1544 3046 7292 1904 197 16536
7 2584 2313 3202 1585 1781 289 11754
8 2626 2210 3613 3138 2731 256 14574
9 2635 2051 3869 2506 2510 200 13771
1890 2704 2159 4127 1308 2119 333 12750
1 2875 2117 4549 2171 4342 188 16242
2 3345 1948 4533 3712 3456 225 17219
3 2778 2115 4365 4645 5691 162 19756
4 2589 2079 4247 395 3504 211 13125
1895(a) 1293 1038 1999 0 1832 118 6280
9 5 / 6 2499 1971 4300 4163 5122 222 18277
9 6 / 7 2397 1898 4551 0 4171 205 13222
97/ 8 2519 1967 4573 2324 3188 209 14780
98 / 9 2509 1942 4822 760 4227 214 14474
99/00 2618 2108 5032 1716 4532 175 16181
(a) H alf Year, January-June
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Appendix II
NOTES ON TREASURERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS
Contents:
(a) Treasurers
i. Occupational Backgrounds of Treasurers, I856-I9OO
ii. No. of Terms, Length of Service and Other Positions
iii. Geoffrey Eagar
iv. George Dihbs
v. William McMillan
vi. George Reid
(b) Senior Officials
i. General Note
ii. John Whitton
iii. Geoffrey Eagar
A. TREASURERS
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i. Occupational Backgrounds of Treasurers, I856-I9OO
Treasurer First
Appt.(l)
Occupational Background (2)
Holt I856 Leeds wool merchant; co-founder many colonial 
enterprises; large private means
Campbell I856 Wealthy merchant and wharf-owner
Donaldson I856 Merchant, manufacturer, bank director
Jones 1857 Journalist, newspaper-proprietor, director 
insurance and banking companies
Weekes 1859 Merchant
Samuel 1859 Station manager; mining and manufacturing busi­
nesses; merchant
Smart 1863 Auctioneer and agent; bank manager; flour-mill 
owner; draper
Eagar 1863 Merchant's clerk; bank official; consulting 
accountant
Lord 1870 Pastoralist; director banking and insurance 
companies
Piddington 1872 Book publisher; importer
Lloyd 1872 Auctioneer and general merchant
Forster 1875 Pastoralist and lawyer
Stuart 1876 Bank inspector and director; merchant
Long 1877 Wine and spirit merchant
Cohen 1877 Barrister with extensive practice
Watson 1878 Merchant; bank chairman
Dibbs 1883 Merchant; ship-owner
Burns I885 Mill-owner; shipping company director
Jennings 1886 Wealthy pastoralist
Garvan I889 Director insurance and shipping companies
McMillan I889 Importer; President Chamber of Commerce
Smith 1891 Barrister; director shipping company
See 1891 Produce merchant; part-owner shipping company; 
Mayor of Randwick
Reid 1894 Clerk in Treasury; secretary to Attorney-General; 
barrister; professional politician
Carruthers 1899 Solicitor; company director
Lyne 18 99 Pastoralist
NOTES: (l) Year in which first accepted portfolio of Finance and Trade*
(2) Sources: Sydney Letters in A.I.B«R.; A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, 
Members of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, I856- 
1901• Biographical Notes (Canberra, A.N.U. Monograph N0.I6, 1959)•
i i .  No. o f Terms, Length o f S erv ice  and Other P o s itio n s
T reasu rer
Reid
Service 
59:0 P
No. of 
Terms
1
Other
P o r tfo l io s
1
Other Govt. 
P o s itio n s
Treasury  C lerk
Weekes 49:13 3 - -
Eagar 48:21 2 1 Under S ec re ta ry  
Treasury
Watson 48:14 1 - -
Dibbs 35:12 P 2 3 P -
See 33:10 1 2 -
Samuel 32:10 4 3 A gent-G eneral; 
London
McMillan 28:19 1 - -
Lloyd 26:3 1 - -
Burns 25:28 2 2 -
Lord 16:27 1 1 -
Campbell 16:1 2 1 -
Smart 15:10 2 - -
S tu a rt 13:13 1 1 P A gent-G eneral, 
London
Cohen 12:2 1 1 -
F o rs te r 11:28 1 2 P A gent-G eneral, 
London
P iddington 11:15 2 - -
Donaldson 11:4 1 1 P -
J  ennings 10:24 P 1 1 P -
Lyne 6:5 P 1 4 P -
Long 4:0 1 - -
Jones 3:27 1 - -
H olt 2:19 1 - -
C arru th ers 2:10 1 1 -
Smith 2:8 1 - -
Garvan 1:18 1 1 -
Burdekin 0:17 1 - -
NOTES: ( l )  S erv ice  i s  g iven  in  months and days.
(2) "P" in d ic a te s  Prem ier (b u t no t n e c e s s a r i ly  fo r  whole of term as 
T reasu rer or in  every M in is try  in c lu d ed  under the  head ing , 
"O ther P o r t f o l io s " ) .
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iii. The Hon» Geoffrey Eagar. The most prominent of the early Treasurers, 
Eagar was unique in that he returned to the Treasury as permanent head, a 
position he held for nearly twenty years. As minister and official covering 
the period 1863-91» Eagar was primarily responsible for the development
of the Treasury as the pre-eminent government department.^
Eagar was horn in Sydney in I8l8; educated by the fiery Dr John 
Dunmore Lang and the classical scholar, V/.T. Cape; worked for several years 
as a clerk; became a leading administrator of the Bank of N.S.W. in 1854» 
resigned in 1859 to enter Parliament; became Secretary of Public Works 
a month later; set up as a consulting accountant and acquired considerable 
wealth. Between 1863 and 1868 he had two terms as Treasurer, during which 
he reformed the financial administration and was the centre of several 
public controversies over government finance.
(See Section (b) for notes on Eagar as an official).
iv. Sir George Richard Dibbs. Entered politics in 1874 as a republican,
for which views he probably would have acknowledged his schoolteacher,
2the Rev. J.D. Lang. As a youth he worked for a Sydney wine and spirit 
merchant, then joined one of his brothers as a commission agent and 
wharfinger, operating under the name of J.C. Dibbs and Co. He went to 
South America and was a corn factor in Valparaiso in 1865* Back in
T
For a fuller account, see P.N. Lamb, "Geoffrey Eagar and the Colonial 
Treasury of Hew South Wales", Australian Economic Papers, September,
1962.
2
For basic biographical details, see Martin and Wardle, op. cit., p.60.
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Sydney in I867, he went bankrupt but established a reputation for 
integrity by paying his creditors in full over a period of eight years. 
Although ship-owning and importing were added to the family business,
George Dibbs seems to have become progressively pre-occupied with public 
life and from I883 was a full-time professional politician. He became 
Treasurer in that year and for a few years was continually in the lime­
light. Without doubt he was the colony’s greatest exponent of increased 
Government spending and his extravagance with public funds was legendary 
in his own lifetime. Disputed public accounts in his time as Treasurer 
brought him into disrespect and he hot-headedly commenced fantastic legal 
actions against newspapers for libel, trying to transfer blame for mis­
leading accounts to Eagar’s deputy in the Treasury, James Thomson. His 
public outbursts, contradictory statements and frequent changes of opinion 
distracted public attention from the fundamentally methodical way he 
went about his duties. He was a master of political tactics, a shrewd 
opportunist. When public opinion was all against him following ’’the case 
of the cooked accounts” (newspaper short-hand for his libel suit against 
the Telegraph) he correctly forecast that the electors were tiring of free- 
trade Governments and secretly arranged to join the Protectionist Party.
His unexpected announcement that he had become converted to the protec­
tionist doctrine preceded by a short period the return of a protectionist 
majority to the Legislative Assembly, with Dibbs as leader and, hence, 
as Premier. His first Ministry was soon defeated but he returned in I89I 
as leader of a stronger team with backing by the Labour Party. Through
395
the most serious years of depression he led the Government and paid 
special attention to the Treasury. Several things brought him into dis­
repute with the working classes; the fact that a brother was general 
manager of the Commercial Bank; his actions to deal with the financial 
crisis of 1893; his trip to England to allay the qualms of British investors 
in N.S.W. government loans. He resigned when thwarted by the Upper House 
on proposals for the introduction of land and income taxation and spent 
much of his time thereafter in exposing to public gaze the dubious ways 
that George Reid went about balancing his budget.
v. Sir William McMillan. Two contemporary comments sum up popular 
thinking about McMillans
...It is only when Mr.MacMillion’s capacious pocket is touched by 
ad valorem duties that he concerns himself about the political 
salvation of Hew South Wales.3
Never has New South Wales had a Treasurer whose abilities commanded 
more confidence both at home and abroad, and never has the Colony 
had more urgent need of clear-sighted and capable finance than 
during the time he occupied office.4
McMillan was a wealthy merchant and President of the Sydney Chamber of
Commerce before becoming Treasurer in 1889. As a founder of the Freetrade
Association formed to counter the growing appeal of the protectionist
party in N.8.W. politics, he saw his function as the reduction of State
interference in economic activities through fiscal reforms. As Treasurer
3
Sydney Bulletin, 5 February 1887*
4
Daily Telegraph, 27 July 1891.
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during the Baring panic he was responsible for adjusting Government 
finance in the light of a serious change in the opportunities for borrow­
ing on the London capital market. But McMillan promised far more than 
he had any hope of achieving, especially in the reduction of public 
expenditure and the reform of the public accounts. His miscalculations 
turned him into a disillusioned politician and also gravely weakened the
Treasury as a potential means of offsetting the first effects of depress-
5
ion. In later years he contrasted his position with that of Reids^
I am quite willing to put a case against myself.... My only 
excuse is that I had only been two years in Parliament when I 
became the Colonial Treasurer, and the difference between myself 
and the hon. and learned member is this: that he is the supreme 
master of the situation, being Colonial Treasurer and Premier, 
when I could do nothing to control the hon. members who now sit 
behind him.
After resigning from the Government in 1891 because he could not get 
the co-operation of cabinet, McMillan spent his time telling the public 
how the financial system functioned - "no one outside the Treasury 
knows what is done with the public funds” - and attacking Dibbs in 
particular. But when George Reid became Premier of a free-trade Govern­
ment in 1894> McMillan became his sternest critic, especially following 
the introduction of land and income taxation. He used his position as 
President of the Australian Economic Association to conduct an intelli­
gent and systematic exposure of Reid's methods and his position as
5
The Public Finances of N.S«W.« pp.25-6.
6
N.S.W.P.D., 1892-3, Vol. 66, P.7760.
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President of the Chamber of Commerce to explain how Reid’s fiscal 
policy interfered with the recovery of private enterprise from years of 
depression. Throughout the nineties he was widely regarded as the only 
"honest” authority on the public finances and his statements were taken 
very seriously by a large section of colonial society, 
vi. Sir George Reid. The first Treasurer to lead a united and stable 
Government, Reid held office continuously for five years. He brought free 
trade to New South Wales when the rest of Australia had moved to control 
imports and he shifted the incidence of taxation by the introduction of 
land and income taxes. For years he was a popular figure with the working 
classes until Dibbs and McMillan managed to brand him as a master of 
duplicity.
Reid had special qualifications for the Treasury position. Geoffrey 
Eagar had appointed him to a junior clerkship in 1864 and he remained in 
the Treasury for fourteen years, studying law as a recreation. In 1880 
he resigned from the public service, commenced a law practice and sought 
election to the Legislative Assembly. Though offered the Treasurership 
by Alexander Stuart in 1883, he declined to take charge of a department 
in which he had been a junior for so long and so recently and accepted 
instead the education portfolio. But for ten years (1884-1893) he was a 
minor figure amongst the freetraders and it was only when he set out to
7
Sir George Houstoun Reid, My Reminiscences (London, 1917)» pp.23-4*
8
Ibid., p*44*
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win labour support for free trade and direct taxation that he swept into 
prominence. A gifted speaker, with a flair for administration, he not 
only ruled his cabinet firmly but tightened his control over every branch 
of government, including the Railway Department. His fiscal policy was 
that which the colony, except between I89I and 1894» had chosen to regard 
as the ’'traditional" policy or objective of the N.S.W. Government. His 
rise to fame followed his claim that politicians had never been serious 
about the freetrade doctrine; his rejection by the N.S.W. electors in 1899 
implied the end of the doctrine as a political catch-cry. Reid achieved 
much of what he had promised in 1894» but he had some notable failures, 
especially in regard to annual budgeting. His claim to fame may well be 
that he completed in large degree the work which Geoffrey Eagar had started 
in 18642 the establishment of the Treasury as the great co-ordinating 
department of government.
B. SENIOR OFFICIALS
i. General Note. Lack of documentary material on the lives of senior
public servants can never be taken as justification for ignoring their part
in the making of policy. Considering the political instability of N.S.W.
for so much of the period here covered, it is astonishing that greater
9
efforts have not been made to investigate the role of officials.'' In the
9
N.G. Butlin, in a forthcoming book, Investment in Australian Economic 
Growth, stresses his belief that several officials were important in all 
colonies, especially in connection with railway development. For another 
preliminary confirmation of the hypothesis developed here, see Ken Knight, 
"Patronage & the N.S.W. Public Service...", The Aust. Journal of Politics 
& History, November 1961, p.l66 ff.
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fifties and sixties especially there were few colonists who doubted that
leading officials could be more safely trusted than cabinet ministers to
work for the progress of N.S.W. Although there seems to have been a long-
run decline in the influence of major public servants as the British
form of cabinet government became better acclimatised, several men whose
service extended over twenty or thirty years remained important into the
nineties. As was noted in 1892:^
The under-secretaries...have an immense amount of patronage, and a 
large number of members are continually asking favours from them... 
so that in time there grows up a kind of tie between members of this 
House and the under-secretaries and principal civil servants.
One only has to read the debates on the estimates for the public service
to realise the prestige of men like Charles Oliver (Lands Department)
and Critchett Walker (Principal Under Secretary). However, some of the
outstanding officials retired in the eighties and early nineties and their
successors generally were far less influential.
The first important challenge to the independent authority of
leading officials occurred in 1868, when Geoffrey Eagar dismissed W.A.
Duncan, Collector of Customs, for insubordination. On that occasion
Henry Parkes wrote to Duncan (one of his closest friends) in these words:1
...you should know quite as well as myself, that Government must 
govern, and that it is not for the servants of the Government, what­
ever their rank, to dictate the course of action which should be 
pursued by those who for the time beingrepresent and hold the powers
10
Debate in Committee of Supply, N.S.W.P.D., Vol. 57» p.5368.
Reprinted in Herald, 14 October 1868.
11
400
of the Constitution. It has often appeared to me that the public 
servants in this colony have failed to comprehend the full force of 
the change that has taken place in the management of our affairs - 
that all power of local government has been transferred to the 
Responsible Ministers of our Legislature.
Despite these views, Parkes supported Duncan in cabinet and in public
and Eagar received the full force of public condemnation. Officials of
Duncan’s standing were not only protected from public criticism always
directed at ministers; they had powerful political allies and the backing
of Parliament in running their departments.
ii. John Whitton. Engineer-in-Chief for Railways, 1856-91» Y/hen he
retired at the age of seventy, he was granted a special pension higher
than any salary paid in the public service. Henry Parkes claimed that
’’the whole of our railway system is attributable to the skill of this
eminent engineer...(who)...for considerably more than a generation was the
12sole director of these railways". The Treasurer reminded Parliament
that Whitton for many years had enjoyed the privileges, and borne the
responsibilities, of determining "not only the cost, but also the direc-
13tion and all the details of building up our railway system". Another
minister remarked that Whitton, for thirty-four years, had "power in his
hands greater than was possessed by any civil servant or minister".^
Many politicians had grudges against Whitton for making decisions contrary
to their wishes and were quick to point out that he had put "into the 
12
N.3.W.P.D., Vol. 50, p.6583.
13
Ibid., p.6581.
14
Ibid., p.6586
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pocket of his brother-in-law...(a British contractor).the sum of 
£65,000 in twenty-five years”. Prom this distance it is almost impossible 
to distinguish accurately between Whitton’s technical recommendations and 
those which virtually amounted to over-all policy decisions. But it seems 
that in the fifties and sixties he enjoyed remarkable authority, which 
diminished slightly in the second half of the seventies and almost 
disappeared in the eighties. In the earlier decades he and John Rae 
(Railways Commissioner) were almost unchallenged; in the seventies and 
early eighties he and Charles Goodchap (Commissioner) disagreed violently 
in making recommendations to cabinet and Parliament and this division of 
opinion weakened the authority of them both.
iii. Geoffrey Eager. After one term as Secretary for Public Works and 
two as Colonial Treasurer, Eagar became Under Secretary for Finance and 
Trade in 1872 and was probably the most influential public official until 
his retirement in 1891 at the age of 73» Sixteen changes in his depart­
ment’s political head during his term tended to strengthen his authority.
He became Chairman of the Civil Service Board and headed numerous
l6enquiries into government departments.
15
Ibid., p.6592.
16
For further comment, see P.N. Lamb, loc. cit
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